abcd 2nd Younger Members’ Conference With-Profits: How Much Worse Can It Get? 1-2 December 2003 The Glasgow Moat House Peter Ford Agenda Bonuses - how much worse can it get? Disclosure - transparency please! Equity Backing Ratio - an anachronistic term? Market Consistency - is this the answer? Waivers and Realistic Reporting - where is consistency? Principles & Practices of Financial Management (PPFM) - ties it all together £0 Jan-91 Apr-91 Jul-91 Oct-91 Jan-92 Apr-92 Jul-92 Oct-92 Jan-93 Apr-93 Jul-93 Oct-93 Jan-94 Apr-94 Jul-94 Oct-94 Jan-95 Apr-95 Jul-95 Oct-95 Jan-96 Apr-96 Jul-96 Oct-96 Jan-97 Apr-97 Jul-97 Oct-97 Jan-98 Apr-98 Jul-98 Oct-98 Jan-99 Apr-99 Jul-99 Oct-99 Jan-00 Apr-00 Jul-00 Oct-00 Jan-01 Apr-01 Jul-01 Oct-01 Jan-02 Apr-02 Jul-02 Oct-02 Jan-03 Apr-03 Where have we come from... £30,000 With-profits £25,000 Managed Fund £20,000 £15,000 90 day deposit Original Investment £10,000 £5,000 Source: Lipper Hindsight 90-day money£acts account, Norwich Union. Past performance based on the product & funds available in January 1991 & is not a guide to the future Smoothing in action... 35 35 25 25 15 15 5 5 -5 -5 -15 -15 -25 -25 Au g19 Fe 90 b19 Au 91 g19 Fe 91 b19 Au 92 g19 Fe 92 b19 Au 93 g19 Fe 93 b19 Au 94 g19 Fe 94 b19 Au 95 g19 Fe 95 b19 Au 96 g19 Fe 96 b19 Au 97 g19 Fe 97 b19 Au 98 g19 Fe 98 b19 Au 99 g19 Fe 99 b20 Au 00 g20 Fe 00 b20 Au 01 g20 Fe 01 b20 Au 02 g20 Fe 02 b20 03 Annualised rate of return (% p.a.) Comparison of with profits policies and UK equity unit trusts: £50 p.m. regular investment 10 year investment period Date of taking proceeds UK Equity Unit Trusts With Profits With Profit median UK Equity Median Source: Money Management Jan 2003 & Standard & Poors Bonuses - How much worse can it get? What has happened to payouts in 2003? 2002 25 year Endowments Payouts Year last 2003 at 2003 level % change Highest £113,445 £94,954 1988 - 16% Lowest £65,917 £57,993 1990 - 12% Average £87,356 £71,821 1988 - 18% Source: Money Management - as at 1/2/03 Best UK Balance Managed Fund in 2003 - £53,757 Regular reviews of payouts throughout the year now commonplace Underlying sum assured and annual bonus guarantee biting for many durations Bonuses - Regular bonuses slashed Examples: Industry Unitised Pensions Unitised Life High Low NU No of offices 2003 5.35% 1.0% 3.75% 17 2002 5.50% 3.50% 5.25% 18 2003 4.0% 0% 3.25% 17 2002 4.5% 2.0% 4.25% 19 Rates falling below minimum guaranteed levels Conventional: Many regular bonuses now passed, NIL or getting pretty close to NIL! Cost of guarantees increasingly onerous Source: NU What happens next? - Projection assumptions Historic investment returns: Market median performance Future Equity Backing Ratio: 50% (including 10% property) Economic Scenarios: Base Scenario No initial change in level of FTSE from 31 Dec 2002 Alternative Scenarios: Scenario 1 Scenario 2 © Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc Recovery in FTSE to 5,000 in 2003 Fall in FTSE to 3,000 & 20% property fall in 2003 What happens next? - Projection assumptions Followed by: Gilt yield Equity return 4.5% 7.0% Reversionary Bonus Rates: CWP Life UWP Life UWP Pensions 0.5% / 1.5% p.a. 2.5% p.a. 3.5% p.a. Sample policy: Regular Premium Single Premium £50 per month £10,000 © Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc Projected asset shares - 25 year endowment Base scenario 100,000 -1 2% -2 0% -1 9% 50,000 -8 % -8 % -7 % -8 % -6 % -5 % -5 % -5 % -3 % -4 % 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Maturi ty Year (at 31 Decembe r) Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Projected asset shares/payouts - 25 year endowment Alternative investment scenarios 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Asset Shares (FTSE starts at 4,000) Payouts (FTSE starts at 5,000) Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc Payouts (FTSE starts at 4,000) Payouts (FTSE starts at 3,000) Comparison of asset shares and unit funds for regular premium UWP pensions 15,000 AS/UF = 96% 10,000 AS/UF = 79% 5,000 AS/UF = 67% 0 1988 1993 Asset Share at 31/ 12/02 Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc 1998 Unit F und at 31/ 12/02 Issue Year Comparison of asset shares and unit funds for single premium UWP pensions 40,000 AS/UF = 132% 30,000 AS/UF = 109% 20,000 AS/UF = 79% 10,000 0 1988 1993 Asset Share at 31/12/02 Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc 1998 Issu e Year Unit Fund at 31/12/02 UWP bond with a 10 year no-MVA guarantee 2.5% future annual bonus 20,000 10,000 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Guarantee point Asset Share © Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc Unit Fund UWP bond with a 10 year no-MVA guarantee No future annual bonuses 20,0 00 10,0 00 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Asset Share © Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc 2008 2009 Unit Fund 2010 2011 2012 Guarantee point Unitised With Profits Payouts closer to Asset Share for longer durations. Short durations - MVRs will be in place for many years to come Less smoothing/more active MVR policy No MVR guarantee dates are valuable UWP bonus rates - new series required for equity - new Smoothed Managed Funds give an opportunity Approach to new business very important - need to be transparent and equitable to new v existing business Disclosure - transparency please! Media coverage - could have been worse BUT many companies are failing to be transparent This damages everyone and the reputation of our profession Communicate changes in bonuses to policyholders press releases and updates to company websites Transparent approach required with minimum standards Media advertisements may be a good idea Disclosure - Policy Payout Charter Press release should include New bonus rates and previous rates for conventional and unitised products Policy payouts - both savings and mortgage related policies With profit bond payouts With profit pension payouts Latest available return on with profit fund, together with details of the returns on the fund over the last five years Latest information on asset mix of with profit fund Up to date position on MVRs Disclosure - Closed Funds This will become a hot topic! More information is required of Closed Funds Are policyholders not entitled to know? Equity Backing Ratio - an anachronistic term? What is the appropriate equity backing ratio? Forced selling of equities to meet statutory solvency Realistic solvency regime reduces reserving impact Flat markets guarantees biting and close matching needed, further EBR falls Property now significant asset class - well understood? Policyholder expectations? - expect a high EBR Risk Based Capital drives further equity reduction? Available capital greatly reduced Lots of work to be done in building stochastic models to answer this question! Equity Backing Ratio - an anachronistic term? Current Equity Backing Ratios With profit business, including property, at 31 December 2002 No. of Companies 10 5 0 Low (25%-35%) © Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc Medium (35%-55%) High (>55%) Equity Backing Ratio - an anachronistic term? Ratio of yield on 10 year gilt to yield on FTSE 100 at 31 December 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1967 © Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc 1997 Equity Backing Ratio - an anachronistic term? P/E Ratios on FTSE 100 at 31 December 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 1993 1994 © Copyright Towers Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Market consistency - is this the answer? Market consistent approach to options and guarantees “buy out” or reserve for options and guarantees using market pricing techniques is there a liquid market? is such an approach reasonable/sound? Options/guarantees in the money - little or positive impact at/out of the money - substantial impact! Significant extra reserves/capital requirements may result The industry does NOT have enough capital! Charges for guarantees may need to be made to asset shares where PRE allows Market consistency - is this the answer? Sophisticated models needed to cope with management decision making Do such models work in practice for real offices? Common economic models need to be developed Management decisions may need to be complex Untested and untried by most of the industry Time needed to embed these models, test the results and analyse tails of distribution Runtimes are likely to be very challenging We should NOT rush this process Waivers and Realistic Reporting - where is consistency? Realistic reserving MAY lead to lower basic reserves - achieved in short term by Waivers Interaction with Implicit Items not yet clear? Are waivers as much value as Implicit Items? Lack of consistency in approach to realistic reporting - profession needs to provide this consistency - are we capable of defining “realistic”? - GAO take up rates? - persistency? Time required to embed new approach. Dangers through too hasty adoption. BUT change was needed! PPFM - ties it all together Realistic reporting links directly to PPFM Future bonus policy defined under different conditions under realistic reporting - owned by Board and With Profit Committee Glidepath amount defines degree of smoothing Investment policy defined at different FTSE level reflecting the solvency position of the company Management rules on bonuses and smoothing defined for stochastic modelling This provides a substantially improved discipline for running with profits business in the future Conclusions 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Payouts will continue to fall. Annual bonuses reduce to zero. MVRs in place for many years to come. Disclosure of bonus rates/payouts important. Equity Backing Ratios likely to fall further. “Market consistency” - will be very demanding. Realistic reporting - a step forward, but NO consistency. PPFMs substantially improve disciplines when combined with realistic reporting abcd Want copies of slides? [email protected] or www.actuaries.org.uk
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