What kind of politics does
an assemblage ontology
become?
Brian Marks
Assistant Professor
Department of Geography and Anthropology
Louisiana State University
Symposium on Assemblage
Thinking, June 4th, 2017
Research questions:
 If
the ‘minor’ philosophy of
assemblage ontology is against
State Philosophy, what are the
implications of enacting such an
ontology for political practice?
 If State political practices are
‘bad’ / have negative
consequences, would political
practices based on assemblage
be different, ‘better’?
Comparing ontologies
Deleuze and Guattari and …
Aristotle, Plato & Hegel
Nomadology
Molecular
Nomadic / itinerant
Rhizome
Minor philosophy
Assemblage
Nomos
Map (following)
Exteriority
Smooth space
Vectors
Flows
Deterritorialization
Quanta
Line of flight
Crabgrass, ants
History, genealogy
Molar
Sedentary / Statist
Arborescent
State Philosophy
Identity
Logos
Tracing (reproduction)
Interiority
Striated space
Subjects
Lines
Overcoding
Segments
Apparatus of capture
Fleur-de-Lis, oak tree

Is the molecular / rhizomatic / etc. a more
liberatory mode of political action than
arborescent / molar forms of politics? Do
they constitute an alternative form of ‘the
political?’

Short answer: Yes, and no; it depends. An
assemblage ontology is more ambivalent
about normative political objectives than a
quick reading of it suggests.

Long answer: You have to first base your
assertions on careful and thorough empirics,
‘draw a map’ in D&G terms, test and
question concepts not just reproduce them
from a priori. In other words, practice
‘itinerant / ambulant science.’
There are indeed assemblages that
tend toward the molecular (vs. the
molar) and they do function
differently.
 But, molecular / rhizomatic forces are
part of all assemblages; molecular
forces are what gives power to molar
practices (like the macro-political).
 Molecular processes can thwart State
power, but they also (necessarily)
make State action possible.

There’s nothing inherently liberatory in
the molecular per se. ‘Primitive’ societies
inhibit the institution of State power
through supple, short, molecular
segmentation and territoriality.
State power also gains strength through
the capture of molecular forces (such as
war machines, micropolitical practices,
deterritorializing non-state social
formations and reterritorializing and
overcoding them in the State’s grid)
The political agency of the micro-political /
molecular / rhizomatic is highly ambivalent
in 1,000 Plateaus.
May 1968 in France was, for D&G, fundamentally a
molecular, unaccountable imperceptible slippage of
students and workers from the overcoding of the
State, party politics, the French Communist Party …
BUT, in the same text, they assert that fascism is
axiomatically a molecular political form; namely the
takeover of the State by a War Machine following on
the molecular contagion of the population with a
multitude of ‘microfascisms’ instantiated in everyday
life and thought.
Fascism as a
molecular form of
totalitarian politics
The ‘wise prince’ can capture, conjugate,
and employ molecular flows, rhizomatic
assemblages, and itinerant or nomadic
people. The State’s failure to do so can
lead to rupture, flight, and State decline.
Francois I and the possibilities of refugee flows of
Protestants into France (mere soldiers or the
springboard for a Reformation a la Francaise?)
Ming China’s enclosure of trade and travel rebounding
against the State as commerce allies with piracy,
disorder, and unregulated outmigration
The itinerant metallurgist / scientist + State apparatus
assemblage (Leonardo, Vauban, …)
Is a molecular / rhizomatic
assemblage that is selfsustaining and self-reinforcing
possible?
Molecular
Molar
Self-destructive
Fascism
War machine capture of
the State; Suicidal state;
deep molecular reserves
of microfascisms
throughout the social
Authoritarianism
Rigidity, overcoding,
leading to escape of
molecules, rupture, lines
of flight and
deterritorialization
Self-reinforcing
Societies against the
State
‘Primitive societies’
inhibition of the State
through supple, circular
segmentation
The ‘Wise prince’
Capture and stratification
of molecules, nomads,
itinerant artisans; 20th
Century social
democracy?
In the 2010s, I argue (in Europe
and the U.S., at least) rightist
politics has taken a molecular,
deterritorializing direction while
leftist politics has taken a molar,
restratifying direction.
Our collective imagination (from 1789, 1848,
1917, 1968, 1977…) assumes the opposite.
So perhaps our current moment is more
resonant with 1815, 1924, 1938, 1945, or 1989.
The American (and European?) ‘Alt-Right’ is a
thoroughly molecular, rhizomatic social
assemblage distributing not arguments, but
memes, horizontally through social media,
chatrooms, online gaming, which is now bursting
forth into molar macro-political arboresences (like
Steve Bannon and Breitbart).
What passes for ‘left’ or ‘resistance’ thought in America now
includes:
*Defending the autonomy of the FBI, CIA, and other militaryindustrial-intelligence agencies
*Embracing NATO, NAFTA, and the European Union
*Replaying the 1950s Cold War Russian ‘Red Scare’
*Hailing Germany and China as the defenders of Western
civil society and ‘Western Values’
Europe…?
D&G claim in 1,000 Plateaus the most
deterritorialized flow determines the location of the
subsequent overcoding / reterritorialization in a
given historical/geographical moment.
The Eurozone debt crisis:
The deterritorialization/reterritorialization of capital flows,
Schengen-area migration, and currency into a ‘single (macromolar) Europe’
Molecular flows of debt, trade deficits North/South lead to
accelerating spatial differentation within this ‘smooth space’
Reterritorialization of Europe into North and South through debt
crisis; ‘Troika-Occupied Europe’ and creditor countries
D&G claim in 1,000 Plateaus the most
deterritorialized flow determines the location of the
subsequent overcoding / reterritorialization in a
given historical/geographical moment.
Greek wildfires of 2007, 2009:
*Relatively deterritorialized Greek land cadastre means land
ownership was ‘fuzzy’
*Drought due to regional, global climate patterns
*Escalation of real estate speculation under surging flows of
credit and tourism-driven boom of 2000s
*Land abandonment (due to EU’s CAP, free trade,
outmigration…) produces new, ‘feral’ fire-prone ecologies
*Disinvestment in fire suppression, fire fighting infrastructure
*Arsons intended to physically deterritorialize land boundaries
through fire (to illegally grab land for development);
‘asymmetric threat’ declared by ruling party, becomes ensnared
in inter-party Greek political arguments