By
Varun Jain
Introduction
Florida 2000 election fiasco, drew
conclusion that paper ballots couldn’t be
counted
 Computerized voting system, DRE
(Direct Recording Electronic System)
was assumed to be the only way out.
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The Good
Accurate election counts
 Replaced machines that were virtually
impossible to rig
 Reported the results shortly after the
polls close
 Proved cheaper and more reliable than
the old systems

Few Horror Stories
In January 2004, only one contest was included on
the ballot. Yet, of the 10,844 votes, 134 were for no
one.
 In November 2003, in Boone County, Indiana, more
than 144,000 votes were cast—even though Boone
County contains fewer than 19,000 registered voters,
and, of those, only 5,532 actually voted.
 When the polls opened in Hinds County, Mississippi,
in November 2003, voters arrived to find that the
DREs were down. One report claimed the machines
had overheated, making all the voters stand in long
lines till 8 p.m. until a new election was scheduled.
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The Bad
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Security threat - Diebold voting machine software is
available on an open FTP Web site
Diebold uses a single DES key to encrypt all data.
Thus, an attacker with access to the source code
would have the ability to modify voting and auditing
records
Diebold officials don’t understand cryptographic
security
Diebold system is so complicated that security risks is
always there because of poorly trained election officials
Reports revealed physical security problems
Threat involving the supervisor’s card
Software bug that prevents Audit
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Diebold and ES&S had count of something
between two-thirds and 80 percent of the ballots
cast in the November 2004 election
The audit log contained results for some
nonexistent machines, and it also failed to report
all the results for the machines that were in
operation.
Bug One—triggered by a low battery condition—
caused corruption in the event log
Bug Two caused the election management system
to misread the machine’s serial number
Computer crash made backup, necessary
Alternatives
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DREs can be equipped with earphones and various
devices
DREs that produce voter-verifiable paper ballot
Optical scan voting machines can be used
Precinct-based optical scanners allows the voter to
recheck his vote.
Hybrid models offers a touch screen like a DRE the
machine marks the optical scan ballot
Another system includes a screen that operates with an
attached stylus.
Cryptographic voting systems provide an encrypted
receipt
The OVC (Open Voting Consortium is building an open
source voting system that will run on PC hardware and
produce a voter-verifiable paper ballot.
Conclusion
Technological issue mixes with politics
 Election officials had a painful learning
experience
 Education process continues
