Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
103
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
By Jaewoo Choo*
Since the revelation of North Korea’s reactivation of nuclear weapons
development program in October 2002, China has been under enormous
international pressure to assume the leading role in bringing the North to
discussion table that would allow the concerned states to have the
opportunity to find a peaceful solution. With China’s acceptance of such
role, a talks in multilateral setting finally got underway, beginning with
three-way talks in April 2003 and expanding into a six-party format in
August 2003. The paper fundamentally explores two questions. One is the
reason behind the concerned states’ obsession with multilateral solutions,
despite their inexperience with multilateral cooperation in security realm.
The other is the impetus behind China’s decision to assume a leading role
*
Dr. Jaewoo Choo is the Professor of the Department of International Relations, Kyung
Hee University, Republic of Korea. He is the Ph. D. in International Relations, School
of International Relations, Peking University and specialized in international relations,
China’s foreign policy and relations with a particular emphasis on Northeast Asia;
Energy security and Central Asia; China’s domestic politics and political development;
Security issues and international relations in Northeast Asia; North Korea’s foreign
policy and relations, US’ relations with the Northeast Asian states and its policy. Dr.
Jaewoo Choo can be reached at <[email protected]>.
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in organizing the six-party talks. Based on the analyses, the paper then
attempts to draw some implications that the ongoing six-party talks may
have for the future security concerns in East Asia, such as the US’
imminent plan to field the missile defense system(MD) in the region. It,
however, approaches the question with one preposition that the talks must
be institutionalized to achieve its purposes and goals. Without
institutionalization, six-party talks would fail to solve the North’s problem
in any meaningful ways, like the way the 1994 Agreed Framework and
four-party talks failed to achieve their original purposes and goals. The
paper safely assumes that the causes for failure stem from the lack of trust
and confidence among the participatory states in these efforts. For these
efforts to succeed, the paper emphasizes the importance of institution that
could oversee and observe the implementation of the agreed solution,
especially when states perceive one another as untrustworthy. Thus, for
the six-party talks to achieve what it was called for, it would have to
transform into an institution to avoid the similar consequences generated
by the previous efforts and recurrence of another similar crisis.
Keywords: China, North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis, Agreed Framework,
Peaceful Solution, Six-Party Talks, Institutionalization,
Multilateralism, Security Arrangement, Missile Defense
System(MD), East Asia
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
105
1. Introduction
A long-sought roundtable meeting for an opportunity to seek
possible diplomatic measures to solve the North Korea’s aspiration to
become a nuclear power state was finally realized in August 2003. No one
expected the road toward this end would be without troubles. It was
particularly the case, as argued by many, for China’s persistent hesitance
to assume a leading role in persuading the North to accept the invitation to
the meeting.1 Those who criticized China’s passive posture, namely the
US, Japan and South Korea, mainly did so out of their own understanding
of and belief in its sole and unique ability to achieve this end for its
traditional ties as an ally with North Korea.2 It managed to re-esteem the
world’s expectation when it successfully hosted the talks between the US
and North Korea in its capital city Beijing in April 2003. However, it was
not enough to convince the world and other concerned states in particular,
especially South Korea and Japan, of its stance on the peaceful way of
solving the nuclear crisis.
Beginning in July, however, China began to show some sign of
change by making an abrupt shift in its way of approaching the crisis and
1
Pressure on China to assume a leading role in calling North Korea to discussion table
is well reflected in numerous articles. For examples, please refer to, James Dao, “Bush
urges Chinese president to press North Korea on Arms,” New York Times, February 8,
2003; Robert Scalapino, “Will China confront North Korea?” Taipei Times, March 18,
2003; Doug Bandow, “Give China reason to pressure Pyonyang,” Ibid. April 4, 2003;
Shiping Tang, “What China should do about North Korea,” Asia Times Online, April 18,
2003; Peter Brookes, “How to defang Pyongyang,” Press Room Commentary
(Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation) May 19, 2003; and John J. Tkacik, Jr.
“China Must Pressure Pyongyang,” Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2002. Some
views China’s reluctance with skepticism as to doubt on its diplomatic capability in
assuming such role. Please read, Tom Plate, “Can Chinese diplomacy turn over a new
card?” Straits Times, January 4, 2003; Jasper Becker, “China’s influence is limited,”
International Herald Tribune, January 10, 2003; Antonaeta Bezlova, “Beijing’s influence
on North Korea overstated,” Asia Times Online, January 11, 2003.
2
On the assessment of such when the three-party talks was realized, please refer to
Karen De Young and Doug Struck, “Beijing’s Help Led to Talks: US Cuts Demands on
North Korea,” Washington Post, April 17, 2003.
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North Korea and the United States in particular.3 It first dispatched Vice
Foreign Minister Wang Yi to North Korea to speculate and study its
position on multilateral talks for its nuclear development program, and
then sent Wang Yi to relay the message to the US counterparts.4 Another
round of the same trip was made before the final blueprint for the
multilateral talks was presented in early August. When it was announced
that the talks would additionally include all the states around the Korean
peninsula, namely Russia, Japan, and South Korea, they all highly
appraised China’s effort and role in fulfilling its principles on the crisis.
To the speculators of the Chinese moves, however, a chain of
questions naturally arises: what were the causes behind China’s sudden
shift in its once seemingly unyielding reluctance to deeply engage itself
on the idea of multilateral talks. What motivated the Chinese leadership to
finally push the North to accept the idea? If a nation’s foreign behavior is
driven to protect, if not to expand, its national interests, what are these
interests that overwhelmed the Chinese leaders to assume a much more
aggressive role in bring the multilateral talks into reality? If this change
has to do anything with the changes in Chinese leadership’s perception on
the validity and viability of multilateral measures for its future security
concerns, what are they? What kind of implications would this have on
the future course of China’s security behavior, at least, in the regional
context? Is it possible to equate China’s current efforts to its future action
when an international conflict, and to the same extent, a crisis arises?
3
John Ruwitch, “China cranks up diplomacy over Korean nuclear row,” Reuters, July 6,
2003.
4
It was assumed, however, China begun to pressure North Korea to settle the nuclear
problem with the United States as early as in April 2003. Please read, John Pomfret,
“China urges N. Korea dialogue,” Washington Post, April 4, 2003; Antonaneta Bezlova,
“China get tougher with North Korea,” Asia Times Online, April 10, 2003.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
107
To answer these questions, the paper will first introduce a brief
historical background on North-East Asia’s experience with multilateral
security cooperation so as to explain the regional actors’ obsession with it
and their continuing effort to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis in
such setting. Against this background of analysis, it will proceed to make
an attempt to analyze the benefits and advantages of such measures in
solving the nuclear crisis with a special reference to the previously failed
efforts. The paper touches upon the core issue of the theme by utilizing
the circumstantial evidence of the recent developments in mainland China
to explain the possible motives behind China’s decision to pressure North
Korea to join the multilateral talks. Under the assumption that the success
of the six-party talks will correlate with the degree of institutionalization,
as a part of the conclusion, it then examines the implication of such
institution may have for the future security arrangements in East Asia with
a special emphasis on the US’ planning of missile defense system in the
region.
2. Push for Multilateral talks (I): Refuting Reality?
Indeed, the regional states’ preoccupation with multilateral
solution is somewhat controversial considering how the region that they
all belong to had never come close to having an international framework
in which multilateral talks and cooperation could even convene, not to
mention any experience of actually handling a case involving a
multilateral number of international players. 5 The North-East Asian
5
Desmond Ball rather thinks that “the progress with the institutionalization of
multilateral security cooperation in Asia-Pacific region has been very slow, painful and
frustrating.” Please refer to his notes presented for the 2000 Asia-Pacific Cooperation
Forum on Security Cooperation and Conflict Prevention in the Asia-Pacific, organized
by the Institute of International Relations(IIR), National Chengchi University, Taipei,
13-16 December, 2000.
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region has long been regarded as a region that was nearly impossible to
have a multilateral cooperative security system to replace the Cold War
international security structure for several reasons. 6 Such skepticism
stems from both theoretical and realistic reasoning.
In theory, the region is consist of international actors who do not
trust one another, nor do they have any confidence-building measures to
boost their trust, tremendously missing the fundamental prerequisites to
realize such a system. The main reason for the lack of trust and
confidence-building measures is often, and usually, attributed to the wide
range of diversity among the regional states in terms of ideology, value,
system, and outlook in their social, political, and economic system.7 The
differences are too big for these nations to concord with the intention and
purpose of multilateral cooperative security system. That is, to peacefully
solve an international crisis through dialogue among the concerned
nations and cooperate in implementing the adopted resolution. In other
words, for a multilateral cooperative security system to fulfill its mission
and goal requires a certain degree of trust and confidence among the
system’s member states.
Under the circumstances, the North-East Asian region did not fare
any better in its experience with multilateral cooperative security system .
Following the end of the Cold War, scholars, experts, and pundits of the
regional affairs began to challenge with the idea of the possibility of
efforts were subsequently proved not to be futile at all as they building a
6
For an overall review on the region’s shortfalls to have a multilateral cooperative
security system even after the end of the Cold War, please read, Aaron L. Friedberg,
“Ripe for rivalry: Prospects for peace in multipolar Asia,” International Security, 18:3,
Winter 1993/94, pp. 1-56.
7
Andrew Mack, “Security cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and prospects,”
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 1992.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
109
multilateral cooperative security system in the region.8 Their successfully
managed to launch a multilateral security dialogue system at Track-II
level at least. The dialogue, known as Northeast Asian Security
Dialogue(NEASD), was founded by academicians and scholars from all
the regional states but North Korea in 1992. It continued to proceed
toward its ultimate goal of creating a multilateral security dialogue at
Track-I level by holding subsequent meeting on annual basis. In the end,
it succeeded in adopting a resolution that called for the first meeting at
Track-I level to be held in 1994. However, also known as the Northeast
Asian Cooperation Dialogue(NEACD), the meeting was never held for
many but one salient reasons: North Korean nuclear crisis. Furthermore,
for some reasons, even after a resolution for the first nuclear crisis, “1994
Framework of Agreement,” was peacefully adopted by North Korea and
the US, Track-I meeting did not seem to worth an attention for these five
regional states as it simply disappeared from their regional security
agenda.9
Since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993,
however, concerned parties, namely US, China, Japan, and South Korea,
have all seemed to want to solve the crisis in multilateral fashion for some
reasons. 10 When it comes to choosing the tactics for this strategy,
however, the concerned parties seemed to keep running into difficulties in
8
Such idea was first surfaced in 1988 at the suggestion by former Soviet Union
president Mikhail Gorbachev during his speech at Krasnoyark in Far East Soviet, and
was followed by former US president Bill Clinton’s call for building a “New Pacific
Community.” For a detailed study on the latter, please refer to Sejong Institute, Korea
and the Idea of New Pacific Community, (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1994).
9
Chronically speaking, considering the timing of the outbreak of crisis (1993/4) and
subsequent escalation of tension in the Taiwan Strait (1995/6), it is also quite
understandable why Track-I meeting was never been able to get underway.
10
A brief introduction on the interests and stakes of the concerned nations in the North
Korean nuclear dispute is described in Gaku Shibata, “US firm despite N. Korean
brinkmanship,” The Daily Yomiuri, February 5, 2003.
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drawing a consensus among them. While the US, Japan and South Korea
persistently preferred to solve the crisis in a multilateral setting with
active Chinese participation whom they believe to have the strongest
leverage to North Korea’s foreign behavior, and thereby, consequences of
its action, China had insisted that the North Korean nuclear problem
should be solved by the concerned nations. In justifying its position,
China presented its own principle for the case at the outbreak of the first
North Korean nuclear crisis, also known as the “concerned parties
principle.”11
Although China then did not, and still does not, precisely define
the concept of the “concerned parties” in any accurate manner, it
consistently supported and welcomed the subsequent talks at either
bilateral levels(North Korea-US/North-South Korea) or at trilateral
levels(North and South Korea and the US), even at the heat of the
moment when North Korea threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.”12
Whether China intentionally or not avoided to give a much more precise
definition for its principle, it, in the end, worked out well to its own
advantage, allowing itself to have a much more room for maneuverability
and flexibility when it faced pressure from the “concerned parties” to
11
China’s passiveness or unwillingness to dip its feet into the crisis can be reasoned in
many ways, for its ally-type relations with North Korea and uncomfortable position with
the North as well for its recognition of the South in August 1992. In other words, from
these perspectives, there was not much ground left for China but to resort to
equi-distance diplomacy against both Koreas. However, to look at the problem from
Chinese feeling of uncomfortable to engage itself in multilateral efforts for solution, a
work by Susan Shirk would be very helpful. See Susan Shirk, “Chinese views on
Asia-Pacific security cooperation,” National Bureau Research(NBR) Analysis, 1995:5,
pp.
1-13.
12
Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton:
Princeton Paperbacks, 1998), pp. 214-15.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
111
exert influence on North Korea for their own causes and benefits.13
3. Push for Multilateral Talks (II): Need for Grand Jury?
Since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993,
concerned states have been consistent in holding their views that to
effectively keep North Korea from developing nuclear weapons requires
multilateral efforts after its devastating experience with bilateral ones
such as in the 1994 Geneva Agreement of Framework (hereafter
“Framework”).14 The concerned states, namely the US, China, Russia,
Japan and the two Koreas, have remained persistent in their posture for
that the solution must be sought based on multilateralism.15 Their belief
was once realized with the launch of the so-called “four-party talks” that
comprised of the US, China and the two Korea. Although the talks lasted
for two years from 1997 to 1999 and ended in a very abrupt fashion in
1999 at North Korea’s demand, the concerned states did not seem to have
all folded their hopes on and belief in multilateralism as an answer to
peaceful solution of the North’s nuclear problem. In other words, they all
seem to date unwilling to renounce their hopes and vision on the efficacy
of multilateral solution to international crisis in the era of post-Cold War.
Their resilient efforts to approach and solve the North Korean
13
Despite its reluctant stance to reveal a clear definition on the “concerned parties,” the
closest attempt to do so by a Chinese official was made by Vice Chairman of the Central
Military Standing Committee, Zhang Zhen in October 1994 when he met with the North
Korean premier Lee Jong Ock, and said that China maintains a non-intervention posture
on all the allegation made by the US regarding the North’s nuclear program. Kim Ick Do
and Lee Dae Woo, Modern Chinese Politics (Busan: Busan University Press, 2003) p.
479.
14
A detailed analysis and studies of the US and the North’s experience with the
Framework is well depicted in Leon V. Sigal’s book etitled, Disarming Strangers:
Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea.
15
Balbina Y. Hwang was one of the early advocates on the extension of multilateral
cooperation opportunity to the regional states. Balbina Y. Hwang, “Resolving the North
Korean nuclear crisis,” Executive Memorandum, (Washington DC: The Heritage
Foundation, May 8, 2003) No. 875.
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nuclear problem in multilateral fashion relived when the second crisis
broke out in October 2002. Leading the effort, the US was the first to
officially present the idea of peaceful solution based on multilateralism in
January 2003. Such idea, however, entailed a stipulation that China would
play an active role in bringing the North to a dialogue in multilateral
setting. Thereafter, the US spared great efforts in formalizing international
pressure and opinion on the matter against China.16 Conscientious of the
North’s unwillingness to discuss the matter with the US on bilateral terms,
the US may have pushed toward this end with its utmost efforts. The US’
obsession with multilateral talks was hastened with snowballing support
from other concerned states but China. It was only when China intervened
that the multilateral talks was finally realized, growing from a three-way
setting at the outset in April 2003 to a six-way format in August 2003.
While the international community highly appraised China’s
positive contribution in taking the necessary leadership in bringing the
North to the talks and the North’s respect to peace by accepting the idea
of the talks, there is one thing that went without much notice. That is, why
did these nations and the US in particular seem unwilling to choose any
other measures but multilateral talks for solution? In other words, what
are the reasons and rationale behind their firm belief in the multilateral
setting? Furthermore, were they left with no other choices but multilateral
talks for a peaceful solution of the North Korea’s nuclear problem? Is it
not ironic for a region that has never had a multilateral security institution
to seek for a multilateral solution for an international conflict at a critical
16
As if only to show its reaction to constant pressure and demand from the US to bring
North Korea to discussion table, China maintained to keep a very low profile at the talks.
See Mure Dickie, “Beijing will play low key role in three-way meetings,” Financial
Times, April 17, 2003.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
113
stage? How should their strong adherence to multilateralism be justified
and explained?
Answers to these questions may be inferred to the lessons from
previous bilateral efforts to peacefully solve the first nuclear crisis that
occurred in 1993, subsequently resulting the signing of the Framework in
by the United States and North Korea. The ensuing measures to curb the
North’s effort in developing weapons of mass destruction were followed
in 1996 when the two states discussed of a multilateral framework as a
possible way of strengthening the efficacy of the talks. The discussion had
its own consequences as revealed in the launch of the four-party talks that
included the US, the two Koreas and China. In the end, however, all these
efforts and attempts proved to be ineffective to subdue North Korea’s
ambition to become a nuclear power in any manner as its nuclear problem
resurfaced in recent times.
Reasons for failure in previous efforts could be attributed to the lack
of institutionalism, the structural problem of the multilateral talks, and the
economic cost for solution.17 When North Korea and the United States
signed the Framework in 1994, they had a high expectation on its efficacy
to create a nuclear-free peninsula.18 In retrospect, however, they were
also very naïve to indulge in such fantasy by overlooking one simple fact
of requirement for such scheme to be effective. That is, trust and
17
As early as in 1999, Chinese scholars also foresaw the necessity and imperative of
institutionalization for settling a peace structure on the Korean peninsula. See Ding
Shizhuan and Li Qiang, “Chaoxianbandao heping jizhi jiqi qianjing (Prospects for a
peace structure on the Korean peninsula),” Xiandai guoji guanxi(Contemporary
International
Relaions), April 1999, pp. 42-44.
18
For a detailed analysis on the expectations on and consequences of the Agreed
Framework, please see Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States, North Korea, and the
End of the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review, LVI:3, Summer 2003, pp.
1-34. However, worthy to note is that Pollack overlooks lack of institutionalism in his
analysis of the failure of the Framework.
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confidence in one another must have pre-installed. Going against the
conventional wisdom of multilateralism school of though, they may have
thought that this prerequisite could be replaced by all the incentives that
the two had offered to each other in the Framework. If the North was to
halt its nuclear program and does not further pursue its nuclear ambition,
for instance, the Framework stated that it was guaranteed of getting what
it sought with its nuclear card, ranging from lifting of economic and trade
sanctions to provision of economic aid and support, from peace to
political recognition from Washington. At the time, the North’s
brinkmanship tactic seemed to have paid off. As long as the North
fulfilled the requirements and other condition set out by the Framework,
the United States seemed to have left with no other choices but to grant
the compensations and incentives it was supposed to in return.19
In reality, however, all these expectations were not realized for one
decisive factor. That is, lack of institutionalism. 20 There was not an
institution that could make a judgment call on the North’s fidelity to the
Framework. In other words, there was not a governing body that could
truly oversee and observe the implementation of the rules and conditions
imposed on the North. With lack of trust and confidence between
Pyongyang and Washington, there should have been a third party that
could have made such an observation if the Framework were to live up to
19
Please refer to the text of the Agreed Framework attached in the Appendix of the
paper, especially Part II and III. Also for a detailed analysis on the appropriateness of the
Frameworks, see Ralph A. Cosa, The US-DPRK Agreed Framework: Is it still viable? Is
it enough? Pacific Forum, E-book, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/opUSDPRK.pdf
20
Importance of institutions in realizing cooperation among a multiple set of nations is
well studied and read in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, ed., Pacific Cooperation:
Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region(Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995), especially chapter 5 and 9. Theoretical aspect is well documented in Joseph
M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal
institutionalism,” International Organization, 42:3 Summer 1988, pp. 485-507.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
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115
its expectation. Throughout the course of assessment and evaluation on
the North’s commitment, it received much criticism for not sufficiently
implementing what it was obligated to. On such occasions when it was
suspicious of another possible establishment of a nuclear site in 1999 in
Kumchang-ri and in 2002 resulting the outbreak of the second nuclear
crisis, both Clinton and Bush administrations came to a firm conclusion
that the North clearly violated the Agreement, thereby disallowing them to
trust and have faith in Pyongyang’s leadership.21
On the other hand, North Korea, for similar reasons, eventually lost
all its hopes on the possible gains as guaranteed by the Agreement, despite
its well-preserved behavior as guided by the Agreement.22 Indeed, it is
very difficult to draw a discernable conclusion as to who was not
violating the rules and playing better game of the Framework because the
discrepancy in the mutual trust and confidence between Pyongyang and
Washington was simply too wide on each other. Under the circumstances,
it was realized by the United States that it would be much more efficient
to play the game with the North in multilateral setting where a multiple
21
However, Clinton was relatively much more linear than Bush in his assessment of the
North’s implementation of the Agreement as he tried to engage with the North in his last
years of presidency as reflected in lifting up some sanctions and dispatching former State
Secretary Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang in late 2000. For a comparative analysis of
the Clinton and Bush administrations’ policy to the North Korea, please refer to C.
Kenneth Quinnones, “Dualism in the Bush administration’s North Korea policy, Asian
Perspective, 27:1, 2003, pp. 197-224. For Bush’s firm belief on the North’s “violation”
of the Agreement is well presented in Sebastian Harnish, “U.S.-North Korean relations
under the Bush administration: From ‘slow go’ to ‘no go’,” Asian Survey, 42:6, pp.
856-882.
22
One controversial fact involving the North’s respect to the Framework underlies its
halt on development of weapons of mass destruction and their testing. However,
according to Selig Harris, during the course of the negotiation of the Framework, North
Korea was scheduled to have a missile test on May 23, 1993, and it was by the US’
persuasion to put off the scheduled test for the next five years, which was due on August
31, 1998. Thus, in factual terms, North Korea’s missile test in 1998 was not in violation
of the Framework. Selig Harris, “Solution to North Korea’s missile problem,”
Hangyoreh, August 29, 1999 (in Korean).
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set of nations can play a role of grand jury in governing and supervising
what the two states may adopt to solve the nuclear problem.
Some can balk at this idea of formalizing a resolution based on
multilateralism, however, especially considering the fact there was
already a precedent effort similar to that in part to guide the Framework,
the so-called “Four-party talks.” 23 The talks was formalized in 2+2
format, comprising of North Korea-China on one side and South
Korea-US on the other, further diminishing the possibility to make a fair
implementation of its mission and purposes by deepening the cleavage
between the two camps. From a retrospective perspective, it indeed did
not progress further than the traditional one-on-one bilateral mechanism
in handling matters, despite the rise in number of players. In other words,
it was no more than an attempt to seek a multilateral solution through
bilateral dialogue and cooperation. Thus, the structure of the talks itself
already reduced the role that the talks could play in realizing its original
goals and objectives, thereby making the idea of multilateralism obsolete
already at the outset.
Lastly, but not least, as proclaimed by many international theorists,
the cost of solving an international conflict by an individual state effort is
widely perceived to be uneconomical and unaffordable for a state in the
post-Cold War era. In other words, a state can no longer resort to its own
efforts and might in solving an international conflict and problem alike.
As vividly seen in the US and the world’s efforts in liberalizing Kuwait
from Iraqi invasion in 1991 and recent US’ liberalization attempt of Iraqi
23
For a Chinese evaluation and assessment on the talks, please read Wang Qiaobao,
“Sifang huitan yu chaoxianbandao jushi(Four-party talks and developments in the
Korean peninsula), Waiguo wenti yanjiu(Foreign Affairs Studies), November 1996, pp.
28-31.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
117
people in 2003, the economic burden for a single state is well beyond a
state’s capacity and capability. Such economic problem in dealing an
international conflict is also clearly reflected in the economic costs for a
peaceful solution of the North Korean nuclear problem. In the latter case,
the costs include not only financial compensation and economic aid24 at
the expense of the North’s halt of all its nuclear development program, but
also expenses arising from the supply electricity that the concerned states
agreed to provide by replacing the North’s nuclear power plant that is
allegedly utilized in promoting its nuclear ambition with light-water
reactors(LWR).25
Another imperative for multilateral cooperation over the use of
non-peaceful measures or a single individual effort could be detected in
the fact that the latter measurements often have costly effects on
non-security goals. According to Barry Buzan, in the 21st century world
national interests are extended well beyond security realm, unlike in the
Cold War era. Buzan, based on his sketch of the 21st century international
relations featuring no major division in ideology and no major dominating
power, adopts a bigger lens to define security in his works. According to
his definition, “security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from
threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent
identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they
24
From 1995 to 1999, the US spent nearly 400 US dollars worth of food commodities
through the World Food Program(WFP). Joel S.Wit, “North Korea: The leader of the
pack,”
The Washington Quarterly, 24:1, p. 78.
25
According to a report, from 1995 till August, 2001, the US spent 290 million US
dollars on providing North Korea of crude oil, and Korea and Japan are estimated to
have invested in 3.2 billion US dollars and 1 billion US dollars respectively by the time
light-water reactors are built, which was originally scheduled to be 2003 and was
recently postponed to 2008. The building of light-water reactors project is also known as
KEDO(Korea Energy Development Organization). Office of Planning for Light-Water
Reactor Project, Ministry of Unification, Korea Current report on the status of
light-water reactors project in North Korea, , September 2001.
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see as hostile.”26 From this perspective, indeed, the security is not only a
concern of a nation’s survival but also a substantial range of concerns
about the conditions of a state’s existence. Thus, contemporary world of
security interests encompass military, political, economic, societal and
environmental security. In the world of interdependence and globalization,
all these national security interests are no longer conceived to be
achievable by a single individual nation-state’s efforts and desire. They
are, according to the (neo-) liberalists, sufficiently realized through
cooperation with others, and with help from an institution, international
organization, and to an extent, international regime, if possible to arrange
on for the purpose.27
Given these lessons from previous experiences on the same issue of
nuclear problem, the US and North Korea probably have become much
wiser in their reciprocal approach in solving the issue.
4. Circumstantial Evidences for China’s Motives to Pressure
North Korea
Ever since the revelation by the North Korean officials of its
activated nuclear development programs in October 2002, China received
as much pressure as did the North, if not less, from the international
community to join its effort to meet its demand, ranging from a total ban
on or conditional provision of economic aid to acceptance of inspection
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the North’s
reactivated programs. However, the international community’s first
attempt to press China was devastated when the North announced its
26
Barry Buzan, “New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century,”
International
Affairs, 67:3 (1991), p.432-33.
27
Utilization of such institutions is positively shared by Joel S. Wit, “North Korea: The
leader of the pack,” Ibid., pp. 90-91.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
119
withdrawal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003.28
North Korea’s unilateral decision seemed to have compelled the Chinese
leadership to acknowledge the reasons why the concerned states wanted it
to join the international pressure. It became quite evident when the
Chinese delegation abstained itself from its traditional voting behavior as
it voted for a resolution to be passed on to the UN Security Council at the
IAEA’s general meeting in Geneva on February 12, 2003.29 In retrospect,
it was the first time China sent a signal to the world that it was about to
join the rest of the world on the North Korean nuclear issue.
Nonetheless, it took much longer than expected for its own
domestic affairs. At the time China was in the midst of power transition
that began at the 16th Chinese Communist Party(CCP) session in
November the previous year, and was due to complete at the 10th National
People’s Congress(NPC) in March. Following the leadership change,
reshuffling of the newly elected leader’s cabinet was pending. Under the
circumstances, it is quite understandable why the Chinese government
remained unyielding towards the pressure from the United States and
other concerned parties around the Korean peninsula. The question,
however, still remains: What were the possible factors that led Chinese
leaders to become part of the international pressure on North Korea?
Even after the three-party talks held in Beijing in April, China did
not seem to be too comfortable with the role that the international
community has asked it to assume in dealing with the North. China’s such
28
For a detailed studies on the meanings of the North’s withdrawal from the NPT, please
read, Jean du Preez and William Potter, “North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT: A
reality check,” Research Story of the Week, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
April 3, 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm
29
Gordon G. Chang, “China has a surprise for Kim Jong Il,” International Herald
Tribune, February 12, 2003. Moonhwa Ilbo, February 13, 2003.
120
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
position was somewhat reflected throughout the entire course of Hu
Jintao’s first overseas trips in May and June since his inauguration to
assume two of the three highest statuses of the state, Chairman of the CCP
and President of the People’s Republic of China. At the successive
summit meetings on such occasions as G-8, three hundred’s anniversary
of St. Petersburg’s inception as a city and SCO, Mr. Hu persistently, and
explicitly, proclaimed to continue to uphold the nation’s three principles
on the North Korean case. 30 His stance remained very consistent as
witnessed at his subsequent summit meetings with Japanese Prime
Minister Koizumi in May and June,31 and President Roh Moo-hyun of
South Korea in early July of 2003.32
Nonetheless, Mr. Hu displayed some contradictions between his
words and action around Roh’s state visit to China. He first dispatched
Vice Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi to both Washington and Pyongyang to
Mr. Roh’s arrival in an attempt to moderate the differences in opinion on
the formulation of the multilateral talks. While the North asked for a
four-party format, the US was persistent with the six-party setting for the
talks.33 Not much later, did China follow the same diplomatic practice at
the working level this time before it announced the North’s acceptance of
talks in multilateral setting in late July. China was clearly in the driver’s
seat by then when it came to solving the North Korean problem
multilaterally.
China would not have assumed the position if it were not for its own
30
These three principles are: (1) to maintain a peaceful peninsula, (2) to solve the
nuclear
crisis via dialogue; and (3) to create a nuclear free peninsula.
31
Chosun
Ilbo, June 4, 2003.
32
For details, read the joint statement issued at the Sino-Korean summit meeting issued
on
July 8, 2003. Dong-A Ilbo, July 9, 2003.
33
Moonhwa Ilbo, July 3, 2003.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
121
interests that it could preserve was far much greater than it could loose. It
is particularly the case because China has, since 1949, at least tried to
uphold its belief and value in independence, autonomy and sovereignty in
its conduct of foreign affairs.34 If we were to limit the interpretation of
China’s decision to pressure North Korea within the range of an attempt
to preserve its national interests abroad, rather than to expand, then it is
much easier to deduce its reasons from its own circumstances.
First, as the new leadership at the last NPC meeting in March
presented a new national goal to build a xiaokang society in twenty years,
it puts itself in much more need for a stable and peaceful international
environment than ever before.35 Since 1979, the architecture of the open
door policy and reform, the late Deng Xiaoping, had attached so much
significance to such an environment as the prerequisite for the success of
China’s modernization that it became the most important priority in
Chinese foreign policy. It was for this end that China has undergone a few
phases of foreign policy transition.
Second, if China were to really create a xiaokang society, the history
of development economy highlights a very much importance to the
successful hosting of such major international events as the Olympics and
World Expos, as China will do so in 2008 and 2010, respectively. The
consequences of these events will, in other words, decide the faith of the
34
Such value and belief are rooted in the so-called “Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence,” the backbone of Chinese code of diplomacy. It is also the fundamental
basis of the so-called “New Security Concept: that the third generation leadership had
advocated in 1996-1997. According to Jiang Zemin, China’s new security concept is
based on the principles of “mutual respect and equal treatment; expanding consensus and
seeking common ground while reserving differences; increasing exchanges and
coordination.” Cited from the Chinese Foreign Ministry webpage, “UN Security Council
Permanent Members held historic summit.” For a detailed analysis, please read Yi
Xiaoxiong, “Ten years of China-South Korea Relations and Beijing’s view on Korean
unification,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 16:2 Fall/Winter 2002, pp. 315-51.
35
Gongzuo Baogao, cited from Renmin Ribao, March 10, 2003 (Internet version).
122
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
Chinese pursuit of xiaokang society. Furthermore, if China were to
succeed in hosting these events, it is in absolute need for a peaceful and
stable international environment at least in regional terms.36
Third, China cannot afford to see any unfavorable predicament
developing around itself, if not within itself, especially in those states or
region that is either geographically too close or geo-economically too
important. In this case, North Korea stands out as the lone worrisome
state to the Chinese interests. Not only is the North is too close to Beijing
and Shanghai, the hosting cities of the aforementioned international
events, but it is a state that could readily inflict a negative impact on
China’s future events as the world has already witnessed its actions for
such causes from its terrorism that South Korea had once experienced in
1983 and 1987, all prior to its hosting of 1986 Asian Games and 1988
summer Olympic games, respectively.37
Under the circumstances, China is left with not too much time if we
were to consider the domestic political timetable in the comparative
context with that of the United States. As there was a growing speculation
and debate on the appropriate time of the US’ possible strike against the
North if and when diplomatic measures fail by all means in solving the
North’s nuclear problem, it was foreseen to be the second year in Mr.
Bush’s second term if he were to be re-elected. That is, the year 2006. It is
only two years away from 2008 Beijing summer Olympics. Furthermore,
the Chinese leaders had to remind themselves of the consequences of their
36
Frank Ching, “Korean stability matters most to China,” The Japan Times, February 17,
2003.
37
In 1983, it was a terrorist bomb plant and explosion in Rangoon, then Burma, where
most of the then president Chun Doo Hwan’s cabinet members were killed. North
Korean spies succeeded in blowing a Korean civil airplane in the air in 1987. Jaewoo
Choo, “China: National interest=foreign policy” Asia Times Online, August 20, 2003,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EH20Ad02.html
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
123
mishandling of the SARS, loosing its hosting rights of the 2003 Women’s
World Cup to the US. It is too early to make any assessment on the
possibility of any outbreak of such an extreme scenario. Nevertheless, it is
not always too early to prepare oneself for the worst.
5. Six-party Talks’ Implications for Future Security
Arrangement in East Asia
As seen above, whether it was for the external pressure or for its own
national interests, China’s initiatives in bringing the talks on North
Korea’s nuclear standoff to a multilateral setting certainly deserve much
more attention than mere appraisal for it bears much more significant
implications in the context of future Asian security layout. 38 It is
particularly so since much uncertainly lies ahead with future security
arrangement in East Asia. Provided that the multilateral talks will
continue to succeed as a viable conflict solving measure, it may able to
transform itself into an effective international institution with legal
bindings endorsed by the participant states. It would the first of its kind in
Asia for ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) is not an enforcement institution
yet.39
Not only will the six-party talks have the chance to institutionalize
itself if there is a strong commitment from the participating states for their
international status, but it can also achieve this end if and when the
number of member states expands. There is a strong possibility that
38
Remin Ribao also earlier presented an explanatory report on as to why “containing”
North Korea does not generate peaceful solution of its nuclear problem, but cooperation
among the concerned states would, instead. “Chaoxian hewenti heren jieling ‘ezhe’ shi
zhong dubo?(Why does ‘containing’ North Korea on its nuclear problem make people
thing a gamble?)” Zonglun tianxia,
www.people.com.cn/GB/guoji/24/20021230/898126.html
39
For the debates on ARF’s enforcement capability, please read John Gaarofano, “Power,
institutions, and ASEAN Regional Forum: A security community for Asia?” Asian
Survey 42:3, pp. 502-21.
124
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
today’s six-party talks may evolve into an institution that as many as ten
representatives in the future. The idea was first presented by the US to
Korean representatives at World Economic Forum in Davos in January
2003.40 The two parties, for instance, also have toyed with the idea of
expanding the talks to a ten-party setting for economic reasons, as
analyzed by many that it would reduce the economic burden for those
involved in North Korea’s brinksmanship tactic. It was concluded,
however, that at the initial stage, it was much more important and urgent
to bring the North to discussion table, instead of worrying about the future
economic cost. What kind of meanings will the institutionalization of the
current six-party talks have to the future security arrangement in Asia?
What if it irons out the North Korea’s nuclear standoff and solves the
matter in peaceful ways? For this respect, one would have to look ahead
of what the great powers are in pursuit of along their national security
interests in the region. One imminent strategic move underlies in the US’
plan to field the missile defense system in East Asia, which is scheduled
to undertake in year 2005 and 2006.
Such success would have a detrimental blow to the US’ plan to
deploy its MD in East Asia, if not Asia. Peaceful solution of the North
Korea’s weapons of mass destruction would significantly undermine the
grounds that the US could hol for its future missile defense strategy in
East Asia. It would, thus, work in favor of China’s opposition to the US’
40
Jaewoo Choo, “North Korea: What's on the table," Asia Times Online, February 4,
2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EB04Dg04.html
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
125
attempt to forward its plan in the Korean peninsula and in Taiwan.41
Whether the subtraction of North Korea’s missile threat would have any
direct meaning to the US’ plan remains to be seen. Under the
circumstances, however, it may possibly lead to a different stage of
conflict involving different actors, namely the US and China.42
To date, the success on Chinese part in bringing the North to the
six-party talks, coupled with its consistent commitment and support to the
US effort against terrorism, have amended the bilateral relationship to an
unprecedented level since the inauguration of George W. Bush to
presidency in 2001. Continuous pressure and talks from the US to move
forward with deploying its MD in East Asia, however, is expected to
surface another possible, and potential, source of conflict for the two
41 Possible effects fielding of MD system might have on the cross-strait relations is well
analyzed in Thomas J. Christensen, "Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan's Security,"
Orbis, Winter 2000, pp.79-90; Thomas J. Christensen, "The Contemporary Security
Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," The Washington Quarterly, 25:4, pp.7-21; James
Mulvenon, "Missile Defense and the Taiwan Scenario," Report 44, Paper presented to
the Stimson/CNA NMD-China Project on January 17, 2002; and John P. McClaran, "US
Arms Sales to Taiwan: Implications for the Future of the Sino-U.S. Relations," Asian
Survey, 40:4, 2000, 622-41. For China’s concern on Korean case, please read, Yan
Xuetong, "Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security," The Nonproliferation
Review, Spring/Summer, 1999, pp.65-74; and Michael Krepon, "Missile Defense and
Asian Security," Report 45, Paper presented to the Stimson/CNA NMD-China Project on
February 20, 2002.
42 Analytical works in relations to the potential problems US and China may confront
from the fielding of MD system in Northeast Asia include: Gao Guliang, “Zhongguode
jungong yingdui celue(China’s military counteraction tactics ),” Zhanlue yu
guanli(Strategy & Management), April 2002, pp. 77-84; Tang Shiping, “2010-2015
niande Zhongguo zhoubian anquan huanjing: juedingxing yinsu he qushi zhanwang
(China’s surrounding security environment for 2010-2015: Determining factors and
prospects on trends),” Zhanlue yu guanli(Strategy & Management), May 2002, pp.34-45;
Dan wenhui, Sun hui, “Houlengzhan shidaide Zhongguo guojia anquan(China’s national
security in post-Cold War era)” Zhanlue yu guanli(Strategy & Management), January
2001, pp. 1-19; Yu yougui, “Houlengzhang shidai zhonggong xinanquanguande shijian
and tiaozhan(Challenges and practice of CCP’s new security outlook in the post-Cold
War era),” Zhongguo dalu yanjiu(Mainland China Studies), 44:2 February 2001, pp.
57-75; and Tang Shiping, “Zailun Zhongguode Dazhanlue(Review of China’s Grand
Strategy),” Zhanlue yu guanli(Strategy & Mangement), April 2001, pp. 29-37.
126
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
nations. Beginning in Japan,43 MD is scheduled for deployment in East
Asia in 2006 at the earliest.44 In addition to the current North Korea’s
nuclear standoff, China will have to confront another emerging security
issue that may have a profound effect on its long-term national security
interests, thereby compelling it to search for a peaceful solution. The
answer to this question may be a dialogue and cooperation at multilateral
level. Since the deployment of the MD system also involves a multiple
number of actors, the possible measurement for solution would require
multilateral effort.
From this perspective, it may be safe to assume that the current
six-party talks may have any meaningful implications for the future talks
on this issue. The idea of multilateral talks on MD may be persuasive to
those potential hosting states and region for economic and political
reasons. Economically, hosting of MD system is very expensive.45 It
could upset the political equilibrium in the bilateral relationship between
China and South Korea as well as China and Taiwan for China’s strong
opposition. In addition, deterioration in political relationship with Beijing
would mean too much of an economic consequence for Seoul and Taipei
to bear for their ever deepening economic dependency on China.
6. Conclusion
As seen above, China is very desperate of securing a stable and
43 A scholarly perspective on China’s perception of Japan’s MD program is well
reflected in Kori J. Urayama, "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy
Implications
for Japan," Asian Survey, Vol.XL, No.4, July/August, 2000, pp. 599-621.
44
Carlos Giacomo, “US Changes Won't Weaken Asian Deterrence –Wolfowitz,” Reuter,
June 3, 2003. Giacomo quoted US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wofowitz as saying of
a possible earliest time for deploying missile defense system in Japan at a news
conference at the conclusion of his six-day Asian tour of Singapore, Seoul and Tokyo on
June
3, 2003.
45
It is known that the Japanese government has recently allocated 2 billion US dollars
for the study of the system in its fiscal year of 2004, and 2 trillion US dollars for fielding
the system beginning in year 2005.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
127
peaceful international environment, particularly in North-East Asia.
Motivation and reasoning behind its aggressive initiative to call for
six-party talks for North Korean nuclear standoff may be drawn from its
national interests as well as its successful experience with founding of
Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) 46 and pursuit of “10+1”
scheme with ASEAN states since 2002, 47 not to mention its role in
ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), ASEAN+3, and APEC. 48 With ever
rising confidence in multilateral cooperative organization, China may
have perceived the viability and feasibility of such measures in solving
the current North Korean nuclear standoff.
However, whether the six-party talks would have any meaning for
future security issues or international relations in North-East Asia would
have to be subject to the question of its fate after fulfilling its mission. If
its success would lead to institutionalization, it would have a profound
effect on the rules of the North-East Asian security games. Not only
would it imply a significant changes in the way the regional security
issues shall be handled, but it would also allow the regional international
46
For a comprehensive review of Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), please
read, Zhongguoxiandaiguojiguanxiynjiusuo minzu yu zongjiao yanjiu zhongxin (China
Contemporary Institute of International Relations Ethnics and Religion Research Center),
Shanghai hezuo zuzhi: xinanquanguan yu xinjizhi(Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
New
security outlook and new system), (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2002).
47
Recent works by Chinese scholars on China’s pursuit of a free trade agreement with
ASEAN are well depicted in John Wong and Sarah Chan, “China-ASEAN free trade
agreement: Shaping future economic relations,” Asian Survey, 43:3, 2003, pp. 507-26; .
Also see Sadanand Dhume and Susan V. Lawrence, “Buying fast into Southeast Asia,”
Far Eastern Economic Review, March 28, 2002.
48
For a most recent study on the evolution of China’s role with ASEAN, please read,
Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating relations for a 21st-Century Asia,” Asian
Survey, 43:4, 2003, pp. 622-47. Also read Feng Shaokwei, “10+3: Zouxiang dongya
ziyou maoyiqu zhi lu(10+3: A road to a free trade zone in East Asia),” Shijie jingji yu
zhengzhi(World
Economics
and
Politics),
2002/3,
pp.
21-26;
Zhongguoxiandaiguojiguanxiynjiusuo dongmengketizu(China Contemporary Institute of
International Relations ASEAN task force), “Zhongguo dui dongmeng zhengce yanjiu
baogao(A report on China’s policy to ASEAN),” Xiandai guoji guanxi(Contemporary
International Relations), October 2002, pp. 1-10.
128
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
relations to undergo a great degree of shift in its structure, from a very
hierarchical one to more of a horizontal one. Thus, the game would be
played more on equal and open basis.
Furthermore, the successful institutionalization of the six-party
talks would not only lay a profound foundation for long-sought end to
build a multilateral cooperative security system in a region that has long
received much pessimism for great divergence existing in the areas of
politics, economics, social system, and culture among the potential
players. If and when the six-party talks is institutionalized following its
success with the North Korean case, it would certainly become an
effective institution for its legal binding, unlike ARF, and for its active
engagement based on consensus, unlike NEACED.
<Appendix>
Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
October 21, 1994
Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.)
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in
Geneva from September 23 to October 17, 1994, to negotiate an overall
resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.
Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained
in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK
and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the
U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
129
Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following
actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:
I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated
reactors and related facilities with light-water
reactor (LWR) power plants.
1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the
U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the
provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity
of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium
to finance and supply the LWR project to
be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international
consortium, will serve as the principal point of
contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure
the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of
the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract
talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.
-- As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral
agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the
130
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make
arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the
DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending
completion of the first LWR unit.
-- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating
and electricity production.
-- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of
this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in
accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.
3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's and for
arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its
graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually
dismantle these reactors and related facilities.
-- The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related
facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this
Document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor
this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for
this purpose.
-- Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related
facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
131
-- The U.S. and DPRK will cooperated in finding a method to store safely
the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the
construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe
manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.
4) As soon as possible after the date of this document. U.S. and DPRK
experts will hold two sets of experts talks.
-- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative
energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program
with the LWR project.
-- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for
spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.
II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and
economic relations.
1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will
reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on
telecommunications services and financial transactions.
2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following
resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level
discussions.
3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and
132
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the
Ambassadorial level.
III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free
Korean peninsula.
1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the
threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed
Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.
IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow
implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.
2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR
project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's
safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not
subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract,
inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will
continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.
Strategic Implications of Six-Party Talks
for East Asia’s Future Security
133
3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before
delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full
compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403),
including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA,
following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the
accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear
material in the DPRK.
Kang Sok Ju- Head of the Delegation for the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Robert L. Gallucci- Head of the Delegation of United States of America,
Ambassador at Large of the United States of America
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