FROM THE ASHES
Government and Non-Profit
Cooperation in Emergency
Management
A policy paper written by graduate students in
Ryerson's Masters of Public Policy and
Administration Program
Table of Contents
Chapter One: Overview of the Fort McMurray Wildfire ............................................................. 4
By: Rina Giacalone, Tara Muzumdar, and Lianna Woollard
Chapter Two: Mapping Disaster Response in Canada and Ontario .......................................... 20
By: Jennifer Manalac and Justine Wadhawan
Chapter Three: Jurisdictional Scan: Japan................................................................................. 38
By: Bishwambhar Ghimire, Erin Alexis Mander, and Carrie Wiebe
Chapter Four: Jurisdictional Scan: Australia ............................................................................. 51
By: Deirdre Boyle, Kara Kanhai, and Anastasia Tziortzis
Chapter Five: Jurisdictional Scan: California ............................................................................. 66
By: James Hutchins and Liam Stormonth
Chapter Six: Recommendations ................................................................................................ 80
By: Naveed Ahmed, Tim Gao, Helen Harris, and Alanna Wierenga
Editors: Eglantina Bacaj-Gondia, Junn Peter Hur, and Zoe Soper
June 2016
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Forward
By Alex Gill, Instructor
I am pleased to offer a brief forward to this policy paper written by the 20 students in the 2016 cohort of
PA 8209: The Changing Boundaries of the Public Sector.
Ryerson is a university that embraces innovation of many types and at many levels in the institution. This
course offers a unique take on service learning, as the students lend their considerable intellectual and
research abilities to an effort to supplement the limited bandwidth that the charitable and nonprofit
sector has to identify and address broad public policy concerns. It is also a good example of something
that I think Ryerson – and specifically our Masters in Public Policy and Administration program – does
very well. We are teaching students to prepare for a fast-driven knowledge economy where they will
have to quickly digest complex information and restructure it into something useful for a range of
audiences. It is a mark of success of a university, a program, and its students that, in just several weeks, a
diverse group was able to come together, select a research topic, conduct research and analysis and then
produce a policy document of this breadth and quality.
The 2016 edition of the class looked at an issue that was very much in the minds of Canadians in the
spring of this year – the Fort McMurray forest fire. We chose to look at a specific aspect of that disaster –
namely the collaboration between nonprofit groups and governments in providing disaster relief in
Canada. Like many of the services we enjoy, this unique part of the government-nonprofit partnership is
unheralded, cost-effective, misunderstood and often overlooked. Hence our desire to look at it more
closely and offer recommendations that will, hopefully, inform future iterations of disaster relief.
I would like to thank my students for their hard work that has produced this document, and hope that it
adds a modest resource to what should be a growing body of work as jurisdictions around the world look
for new ways to respond to disasters driven by climate change and other factors.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Purpose: To analyze past natural disasters and learn how the governments of Ontario and Canada, in
partnership with the non-profit sector and local communities can prepare, mitigate, and respond to
similar crises.
Key Findings: Based on the experiences of and responses to natural and human-made disasters in
Australia, Japan, and California, the following lessons emerged:

Hierarchical state structures hinder timely emergency response.

Decentralized (or shared responsibility) disaster management is beneficial as it allows responders
with ‘on the ground’ expertise to collaboratively solve problems with better awareness of the
situation than a central command.

Both governments and NPOs are at risk when operating independent of one another. Without
NPOs, the government can become overwhelmed by large-scale disasters, and without
government direction, NPO efforts will be dispersed and ineffective.
Recommendations: The following section outlines four recommendation areas for Canadian stakeholders
to consider in disaster management planning and practice.
Mitigation and Risk Reduction: This involves all actors anticipating potential harms and implementing
measures to prevent catastrophes or reduce their impact.
Improving our Understanding of Natural Disasters: The scientific consensus is that climate change
significantly increases the risk of natural disasters. Understanding the relationship between climate
change and natural disasters is the first step in long-term disaster mitigation.
Enhancing Our Use of Technology: Technology can be incorporated by all agencies to improve disaster
response.
Strengthening Community Resilience: Building community resiliency plans can be accomplished through
inter-sectoral group partnerships, education, community services, and building financial structures for
disaster management.
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Chapter One
OVERVIEW OF THE FORT MCMURRAY WILDFIRE
By: Rina Giacalone, Tara Muzumdar, and Lianna Woollard
Summary
At the time of publishing, the Fort McMurray wildfire, though now considered controlled, is
still burning. The swift and highly publicized response of governments, private companies, and
not-for-profit organizations to this disaster is the inspiration for this paper. This chapter seeks
to give an overview of the wildfire and the response. The concepts introduced here including
collaboration, mitigation, and preparation will be further developed in subsequent chapters.
Introduction
Fort McMurray, a major city in Northern Alberta, is surrounded by boreal forest and
serviced by Highway 63 (Gillis et al., 2016). The 2016 wildfire in Fort McMurray, which became
widely known as ‘The Beast,’ was a devastating disaster. This chapter is broken down into four
sections followed by a conclusion. The first section introduces the emergency management
theoretical framework; the second provides a brief overview of the Fort McMurray wildfire; the
third discusses the fire within the emergency management framework; and the fourth discusses
social capital and identifies the major players involved in the emergency management
framework.
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Modern Emergency Management: A Theoretical Framework
According to Daniel Henstra (2013), an emergency management expert at the University
of Waterloo, modern emergency management consists of four domains or stages. These four
domains are: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. He refers to mitigation as the
anticipatory measures taken to prevent disasters or reduce its impact, such as land use
regulations. Preparedness refers to strategies that increase the community’s ability to respond
effectively to a disaster, such as preparing thoughtful evacuations. The response stage accounts
for actions implemented during and immediately after an emergency in order to assist victims,
exemplified by food and shelter provision. The final domain, recovery, consists of actions taken
to restore, rebuild, and rehabilitate the affected area.
Overview of Fort McMurray’s Wildfire
According to statistics from the Canadian Natural Fire Database (2016), forest fires are
very common throughout Canada. Over the past 25 years, 8,300 forest fires have occurred in
Canada each year, burning 2.3 million hectares of land (Natural Resources Canada, 2016).
According to Gillis et al. (2016), the forest fire in Fort McMurray that began May 1, 2016 is still
being controlled as this paper is being written, and is Canada’s most recent uncontrolled forest
fire. The events that have unfolded throughout this natural disaster will be discussed below.
On May 1, bushfires were spotted south-west of Fort McMurray on a trail used for All
Terrain Vehicles, or ATVs (Gillis et al., 2016). The dry conditions with 70km/h winds are believed
to have contributed to the rapid spread of the fire. By sunrise on May 2, the blaze had grown
exponentially and burnt through approximately 750 hectares of land. On May 3, high
temperatures, low humidity, and shifting winds caused the fire to grow even larger (ibid.).
According to CBC News: “[a]t its peak, the fire moved at 30 to 40 metres per minute and
created its own weather patterns” and “[a] black funnel cloud emanating from the heart of the
flames became so monstrous it was visible from space” (Snowdon, 2016b, para. 5).
Furthermore, as of June 13, the fire had consumed more than 589,617 hectares of land (ibid.).
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The fire caused substantial damage to Fort McMurray’s agriculture, infrastructure, and
ultimately, its economy (Gillis et al., 2016). The authors also mention that the oil sand
companies, regarded as the economic powerhouse of Fort McMurray, had to cease operation,
causing a disruption of 1 million barrels of oil per day, or 40% of the usual output, worth
millions every day. While 85% of the city remained intact (including the hospital, downtown
core, and airport), over 2,400 structures, or 15% of all structures sustained damage beyond
repair. However, no one was physically harmed by the flames (ibid.).
As mentioned earlier regarding the cause of the wildfire, the winter and spring seasons
of 2016 experienced the driest conditions in the last 72 years (Gillis et al., 2016). Since the
1960s, the temperature of Fort McMurray has increased by 3.4°C, with precipitation decreasing
from 161mm to 80mm. May 2016 also saw the second warmest temperatures on record,
reaching as high as 24°C in early May (ibid.). The combination of dry conditions and high
temperatures set the stage for the raging fire—and all that was needed was a tiny spark.
These conditions have led to a conversation regarding climate change in Alberta. Kolbert
(2016) notes the common belief that climate change increases the frequency and severity of
extreme natural disasters. Although some contend that blaming natural disasters solely on
climate change is controversial, the author states that it appears to be a convincing argument
for the extended wildfire season in North America. He continues by stating that climate change
has lengthened the wildfire season to an average of 78 days longer than it was in 1970.
Furthermore, over the past 30 years, the area impacted by forest fires has doubled, and will
likely double again by 2050.
Discussing ‘The Beast’ Through a Modern Emergency Management Framework
The following section describes the events of Fort McMurray’s wildfire through the lens
of the four previously mentioned dimensions of modern emergency management: mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery.
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Phase 1: Mitigation
Alberta is a member of FireSmart Canada, a program organized by a multidisciplinary
non-profit association known as Partners in Protection Canada or PiP. According to the
FireSmart Canada website (2016), PiP Canada consists of members who represent national,
provincial and municipal associations. The FireSmart program is committed to educating,
preventing, and managing uncontrolled wildfires (FireSmart Canada, 2016; Government of
Alberta, 2015a). Alberta’s FireSmart program has partnerships between governments, industry,
fire fighters, and community members (Government of Alberta, 2015a). The program is led by a
representative stationed within the department of Agriculture and Forestry (FireSmart Canada,
2016). According to the Government of Alberta (2015b), Fort McMurray is eligible for, and has
previously received FireSmart government support grants to reduce the risk of local wildfires.
Mitigation is also apparent within the context of the Fort McMurray forest fire through
its usage of fireguards that surround the city. The use of fireguards was implemented in 1995,
after a wildfire broke out in the area of Marianna Lake, located within the Regional Municipality
of Wood Buffalo (RMWB) (Government of Alberta, 2010). According to Guy Boutilier, the
former mayor of Wood Buffalo, it was this fire that led the oil sands companies Syncrude and
Suncor to build a large fireguard around Fort McMurray (Gillis et al., 2016). In addition, RMWB
regularly clears the dry underbrush of their surrounding forest, while provincial authorities
(who have ownership of crown lands) make regular attempts to educate the municipality’s
residents regarding the dangers that ATVs can pose if not regularly maintained (G. Hale,
personal communication, May 30, 2016; Gillis et al., 2016).
Phase 2: Preparedness
The RMWB’s Emergency Management Branch has a generic Emergency Management
Plan that is revised regularly and reviewed annually (“Emergency Management Branch,” n.d.).
The plan contains information regarding fan-out lists, communication plans and evacuation
procedures, and there is also a 24-hour hotline which provides up-to-date information at critical
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times of the year (ibid.). The municipality also encourages residents to take out insurance and
have their home audited with respect to fire hazards and emergency supplies. In addition, the
RMWB has a website specifically dedicated to the stages of an evacuation. According to Dr.
Hale (personal communication, May 30, 2016), the RMWB emergency management plan
worked effectively and is one of the reasons Alberta recently spent $1.2 billion converting
Highway 63 into a 4-lane highway to Edmonton.
RMWB learned from previous wildfires in Northern Alberta as evidenced by the 1995
Marianna Lake wildfire. After this fire, the RMWB decided to shift the headquarters of Fort
McMurray’s emergency operations centre to a space resembling a bunker in the municipal
water treatment plant (Gillis et al., 2016). Similarly, the 2011 Slave Lake wildfire had a powerful
impact on the RMWB for preparedness measures in colossal wildfire. These past disasters
prepared the Fort McMurray Fire Department and other stakeholders for the 2016 disaster.
(Giovannetti, 2016; G. Hale, personal communication, May 30, 2016). For instance, the local
hospital displayed a “relatively smooth” evacuation of patients, suggesting they had undergone
evacuation drills in the “not-too-distant past” (ibid.). Previous disasters had pushed insurance
companies to improve their rapid-response and recovery programs (Nelson, 2016). In 2014, TD
Insurance developed a “catastrophic event playbook” and increased the size of their teams
responsible for handling major disaster claims (ibid., para. 7). Furthermore, the Slave Lake
wildfire resulted in the strengthening of Edmonton’s emergency social services (ESS) capacity,
which benefitted Fort McMurray’s residents as Edmonton was well prepared to shelter large
numbers of evacuees at their Northlands Expo Centre (G. Hale, personal communication, May
30, 2016; Gillis et al., 2016). Furthermore, the Slave Lake wildfire helped prepare Fort
McMurray in the handling of contaminated soil, which, based on lessons learned, was sent to
landfills to be entombed in clay, and the need for provincial and municipal governments to take
a leadership role in coordinating rebuilding efforts (Giovannetti, 2016; “Rebuilding Fort
McMurray,” 2016), which will be discussed in the recovery section.
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Phase 3: Response
On May 1 around 4pm, when bushfires in Fort McMurray were first spotted, wildfire
crews, including firefighters and fire patrol helicopters, were immediately alerted and their
response commanded (Gillis et al., 2016). By 10pm that evening, Mayor Melissa Blake declared
a local state of emergency and the mandatory evacuation of certain communities to a
downtown recreation complex (ibid.). Residents of Fort McMurray were informed about the
mandatory evacuation by the local radio station and social media updates. Critical information
was also posted on the Government of Alberta’s emergency webpage, which encouraged
residents to call the emergency telephone number and download the Alberta Emergency Alert
and Alberta Wildfire apps (Gillis et al., 2016; “Fort McMurray evacuation,” 2016).
On May 3, any previously voluntary evacuations became mandatory; and residents from
all neighbourhoods were forced to leave the city to evacuation centres in Edmonton, Anzac, Lac
La Biche, Athabasca, Beaumont, and at various oil sands camps (Gillis et al., 2016). Oil
companies, such as Shell, Suncor, and Syncrude, provided food, water, and shelter for
thousands of evacuees on short notice. According to Dr. Hale (personal communication, May
30, 2016), this showed that the province had engaged the oil industry in “an apparently
cooperative fashion.” As residents left on Highway 63, volunteers from surrounding
communities helped to fill cars with gas, provide refreshments, and local businesses donated
immediate supplies (Gillis et al., 2016).
The Fort McMurray Fire Department was joined by neighbouring fire services, and after
ten days, the Alberta Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) reported an average of 3.8 ‘outof-control’ fires, 3.7 fires ‘being held’, and 16.3 forest fires ‘under control’ each day, spanning
an area larger than central and eastern Ontario combined (G. Hale, May 30, 2016). As a result of
mutual-aid agreements between fire crews across Alberta and assistance received from fire
crews across Canada, the US, and broader international community, there were roughly 2,000
firefighters at the height of the response (Warnica, 2016).
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In the early days of the wildfire, Guy Jette, manager of the water treatment facility in
Fort McMurray and his crew worked 20-hour shifts pumping water to firefighters during the
evacuation (Reith & Stewart, 2016). Although the facility was equipped with four newlyinstalled water filters that could double the water output, Jette was not given permission to
operate them because municipal regulations required that they be first tested for bacteria.
Because of the urgency of the situation, Jette developed a back-up plan to pump water straight
from the Athabasca River by asking an oil company to install a pump to facilitate the process.
Luckily, Jette did not implement the plan as it would have led to the spread of contaminated
water (ibid.). In the early days of the wildfire, Premier Notley enforced a fire ban on “all open
fires” on public lands in Northern Alberta (Government of Alberta, 2016b, para. 2 and 3). This
message was communicated on the Alberta Fire Bans website, as well as a ban until further
notice on all Off-Highway Vehicles (e.g. ATVs) on all public lands (Government of Alberta,
2016b; Gillis et al., 2016). The insurance industry was quick to provide immediate relief to
victims at evacuation centres. According to the Globe and Mail (Nelson, 2016), on May 9, TD
and RBC insurance experts from Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta began their work and established
temporary offices (in RVs) so they could easily reach customers and provide monetary relief
(i.e. preloaded visa and debit cards, cheques, and instructions for saving receipts).
The response from not-for-profit organizations in the Fort McMurray fire was notable.
The Canadian Red Cross (CRC), “an institution in Canada’s disaster-response system” was quick
to provide evacuees with up-front cash, food, and other immediate necessities (Mahoney &
McFarland, 2016, para. 6). According to The Globe and Mail (“Return to Fort McMurray,” 2016),
the CRC attracted the “vast majority of all individual donations during a crisis” as they had “the
powerful stamp of government approval through partnerships”; both the federal and provincial
governments pledged to match all donations made to the CRC before May 31. Furthermore, the
Alberta government provided the organization with 2 million dollars in seed-money and the
Government of Ontario gave $500,000 (Mahoney & McFarland, 2016). As of early June, the CRC
had received over $125 million in donations (“$125M in donations,” 2016). They openly
committed to immediately distributing $50 million to evacuees: $600 per adult and $300 per
child (Mahoney & McFarland, 2016). According to CRC’s CEO, Conrad Sauvé, it was “the most
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important cash transfer” they had ever conducted and the fastest (ibid., para. 10). Of all funds
collected, the CRC promised that 93.5% would go directly to the wildfire response, up to 5%
would go towards fundraising costs, and no more than 1.5% would be saved for future disasters
(ibid.).
United Way was another not-for-profit organization that became heavily involved in the
response effort and the Fort McMurray branch set up a temporary workspace in the United
Way Edmonton office. By May 13, they had raised and distributed over $250,000 to their
member agencies (e.g., food banks). To the United Way’s disappointment, there was no pledge
from any government to match these funds as there had been for the CRC (Mahoney &
McFarland, 2016). However, as of early June, the CRC committed to providing $50 million to
local Fort McMurray organizations such as the food bank and the YMCA (“$125M in donations,”
2016).
Phase 4: Recovery
Alberta announced that a state of emergency would be declared until the end of June,
which would enable Fort McMurray to receive government funding in order to help cover the
costs of recovery and rebuilding (Giovannetti & Jones, 2016). According to Gillis et al. (2016) the
costs of this last phase of the emergency management framework will most likely be substantial
and long-lasting. A report by Moody’s Investor Services Inc., which was released in mid-May,
estimates that damages could be valued at $5 billion or higher (Nelson, 2016).
According to Ben Dutton, CEO of the Casman Group of Companies (a Fort McMurray
construction firm), having the oil sands industry resume operations must be the absolute first
step in the recovery phase of Fort McMurray’s emergency management plan, as "the oil sands
operations are critical to the existence of Fort McMurray, they're critical to the GDP of Alberta”
(“Rebuilding Fort McMurray,” 2016, para. 4). Consequently, in mid-May, Dutton sent his
employees to major oil sands sites north of Fort McMurray to begin cleaning and get systems
running (ibid.). It should be noted, however, that not all business owners and residents are
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eager to return and rebuild. This is not surprising, considering the already low global oil prices
(Gillis et al., 2016). Fort McMurray’s Chamber of Commerce has anticipated this and
understands that business owners who do choose to return will likely need support
(Cryderman, 2016). In early June, the Chamber of Commerce asked Alberta to provide local
small and medium-sized business owners with direct financial assistance.
In mid-May, the Government of Alberta agreed on five criteria that would have to be
met in order for re-entry to Fort McMurray to begin: 1) the wildfire is no longer an imminent
threat to the city; 2) the city’s critical infrastructure is repaired to provide basic services; 3)
essential services (e.g., police and healthcare) are restored to a basic level; 4) all hazardous
areas are fully secured; and 5) local government is re-established (Government of Alberta,
2016a). On May 31, Premier Notley announced that these five criteria had been met and that a
voluntary phased re-entry process could begin on June 1 (ibid.).
Before June 1, municipal crews had to get necessary businesses, such as banks, grocery
stores, and pharmacies functioning again (“Rebuilding Fort McMurray,” 2016; “Fort McMurray
businesses,” 2016). Furthermore, municipal crews had to spray all destroyed homes with a
composite material that hardens into a shell in order to keep carcinogenic ash and debris from
spreading (Snowdon, 2016a). According to Dr. Hale (personal communication, May 30, 2016),
the recovery phase was accompanied by “a high degree of caution and realism in managing
community and evacuee expectations.” Alberta gave Fort McMurray residents a realistic sense
of what they would encounter upon return. For instance, residents were warned of air, soil, and
water quality concerns (Government of Alberta, 2016a). Additionally, returning evacuees were
told to wear appropriate clothing to protect their skin from toxic ash and avoid sifting through
debris for items (Ross, 2016). They were also asked to bring 14 days of supplies to allow grocery
stores time to recover and re-open (Government of Alberta, 2016a).
In early June, the provincial government hired a private contractor to drain each of
RMWB’s 10 reservoirs, clean, disinfect, refill, and test the entire system so that boil-water
advisories could be lifted by the end of June (Reith & Stewart, 2016). While some residents
were able to return to live in their homes, others living next to destroyed homes were warned
not to move back permanently until they had arranged with their insurance companies to get
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their land tested for dangerous compounds (Giovannetti, 2016). Dr. Maen Husein of the
University of Calgary stated that all contaminated soil and ash must be carefully removed
(ibid.). As of early June, municipal officials in Fort McMurray did not know precisely when this
removal would take place, but from the experience of the 2011 wildfire at Slave Lake, the
contaminated soil and ash will need to be entombed in clay within a landfill.
The re-entry of residents went just as smoothly as the evacuation: on June 1, only 8,000
of 13,000 evacuees were eligible to return and on June 2, only half of the eligible 40,000
evacuees returned (Giovannetti & Jones, 2016; “Residents of hardest-hit,” 2016). It is important
to note that three communities remained excluded from re-entry: Abasand, Beacon Hill, and
Waterways (“Return to Fort McMurray,” 2016). As of mid-June, these neighbourhoods were
declared unsafe until further notice, as municipal authorities found their land to be dangerously
contaminated with toxins (Giovannetti, 2016; “Return to Fort McMurray,” 2016). Around the
same time, Mayor Blake declared that it was uncertain whether these communities would ever
be rebuilt and emphasized the need for a broad public consultation (Giovannetti & Jones,
2016).
As of mid-June, many aspects of the recovery phase have seen the involvement of lesser
known not-for-profit organizations, such as Team Rubicon, a debris management not-for-profit
made up of military veterans and formed after the Haitian earthquake (Huncar, 2016; Ross,
2016). The group came to Fort McMurray to sort through toxic debris and find items
meaningful to home and business owners. According to their membership manager, Team
Rubicon can “eliminate [[the]] political red tape” that many traditional organizations often face
(Huncar, 2016, para. 16). Initially, the group in Fort McMurray was made up of 10 volunteers,
however by June 9, the group announced that they would be growing their number to 300
(ibid.).
According to Scott Long, Executive Director of Operations at AEMA, the rebuilding
process will be “driven through the regional authorities supported by the [[provincial]]
government” and governments have “committed to hiring and contracting locally” (Healing,
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2016, para. 14). As early as mid-May, the Alberta recruiting agency Spirit Staffing & Consulting
posted 500 jobs on behalf of an industrial client that chose to remain anonymous;
approximately 1,900 people applied (“Rebuilding Fort McMurray,” 2016). According to Ben
Dutton, CEO of the previously mentioned construction firm, The Casman Group, it may take
longer than two years to rebuild Fort McMurray homes and businesses. Jim Rivait, CEO of the
Alberta branch of the Canadian Home Builders' Association emphasized that it is critical for the
municipal and provincial governments to carefully coordinate all the different groups that come
to Fort McMurray, and track their role in the rebuilding process (ibid.). Remembering the
rebuilding process of the Slave Lake disaster, Rivait (who revealed that Fort McMurray is
receiving interest from contractors as far away as Newfoundland) stated that "you can't just
start 2,000 houses all at once, there's absolutely no way...it's going to have to be done in some
sort of a sequencing, and it's going to have some focus to minimize the number of companies in
a particular area at a particular time...otherwise, it will be a free-for-all” (“Rebuilding Fort
McMurray,” 2016, para. 16). As of mid-June, Fort McMurray is still in recovery mode—the final
stage of the modern emergency management framework.
Section 4: Social Capital and the Major Players
In Robert Putnam’s (2000) book, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community, he refers to social capital as the “connections among individuals – social networks
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise” (p. 19). As such, social capital is a
common term used by social scientists to refer to networks within societies and how, with time,
communities can change. According to Brenda Murphy (2007), when a community has strong
social capital they are less vulnerable and are expected to be more resilient in a crisis.
Reflecting on the Fort McMurray wildfire, specifically the outreach and support from the
community, there seems to be strong social capital. It is apparent that there were visible signs
of vertical and horizontal levels of collaboration among the public, private, and non-profit
sectors (Gillis et al., 2016). It was also clear that while governments were heavily active in all
four domains (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery), charitable organizations and
businesses assisted largely with the response and recovery phase. This collaborative community
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effort supports a positive holistic approach which most emergency management experts
advocate (Murphy, 2007).
Conclusion
Fort McMurray reacted and developed ways to manage the wildfire through the four
stages of emergency management. The oil companies, non-profit organizations, municipality
and local community came together and provided assistance with the materials that were
readily available to them (i.e. oil companies provided shelter and insurance companies provided
immediate financial relief). Given the trend in Alberta forest fire history, this fire of 2016 might
be a springboard for future emergency management methods as has been the case with the
Marianna Lake and Slave Lake fires.
Beyond examining the lessons learned from an emergency management stand point,
Alberta may be more inclined to face the challenges posed by climate change (Kolbert, 2016).
The importance of factoring climate change into mitigation strategies is discussed in the
recommendations chapter. The problem, however, is that this conversation is not easy to have
immediately after a disaster as there is risk of insensitivity. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
recognized this dilemma when he stated at a recent press conference, “any time we try to
make a political argument out of one particular disaster, I think there’s a bit of a shortcut that
can sometimes not have the desired outcome” (Kolbert, 2016, para. 8). This may especially be
the case with Fort McMurray, a city whose very existence centers around the tar sands which
inevitability “produce a particularly carbon-intensive form of fuel” (para. 7).
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Giovannetti, J. (2016, June 7). Tests reveal toxic levels of contaminants in Fort
Mac soil and ash. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/alberta/tests-reveal-toxic-levels-ofcontaminants-in-fort-mac-soil-and-ash/article30346538/
Government of Alberta. (2010). Review of some of the disaster events in Alberta
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since 1986. Retrieved from http://apsts.alberta.ca/online-courses/bem/chapter-1-thecontext-of-disasters/disaster-events-in-alberta-since-1986/
Government of Alberta: Agriculture and Forestry. (2015a, June 10). FireSmart.
Retrieved from http://wildfire.alberta.ca/fire-smart/default.aspx
Government of Alberta: Agriculture and Forestry. (2015b, Dec 11). FireSmart
Community Grant Program. Retrieved from http://wildfire.alberta.ca/fire-smart/firesmart-communities/fire-smart-community-leaders/fire-smart-community-grantprogram.aspx.
Government of Alberta. (2016a, May 31). Premier’s statement on re-entry to Fort
McMurray. Retrieved from http://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=418494EBC8F32B4A4-3AD0-DA629F7D6C9DAF0B
Government of Alberta. (2016b, June 8). Alberta fire bans. Retrieved from
https://www.albertafirebans.ca
Healing, D. (2016, June 3). Restoration companies poised to help Fort McMurray
fix fire damage. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/restoration-companies-poised-tohelp-fort-mcmurray-fix-fire-damage/article30257506/
Henstra, D. (2013). Introduction: Multilevel governance and Canadian emergency
management policy. In D. Henstra (Ed.), Multilevel governance and
emergency management in Canadian municipalities (pp. 3 - 24). Montreal: McGillQueen's University Press.
Huncar, A. (2016, June 3). From war to wildfire: Veteran volunteers help Fort
McMurray. CBC News. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/from-war-to-wildfire-veteran-volunteershelp-fort-mcmurray-1.3613979
Kolbert, E. (2016, May 5). Fort McMurray and the Fires of Climate Change. The
New Yorker. Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/fortmcmurray-and-the-fires-of-climate-change
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Mahoney, J., & McFarland, J. (2016, May 13). Behind the largest response to a
disaster in Canadian history. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/red-cross-working-fast-to-distributefunds-to-fort-mcmurray-to-residents/article30025068/
Murphy, B. L. (2007). Locating social capital in resilient community-level
emergency management. Natural Hazards, 41(2), 297-315.
Natural Resources Canada. (2016) Canadian wildland fire information system.
Retrieved from http://cwfis.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/ha/nfdb
Nelson, J. (2016, May 9). In Fort McMurray, insurers face key test of disaster
readiness. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/intact-begins-tallying-cost-offort-mcmurrays-unprecedented-devastation/article29936667/
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American
community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Rebuilding Fort McMurray will need coordinated approach, contractors say.
(2016, May 13). The Canadian Press. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/rebuilding-fort-mcmurray-will-need-coordinated-approach-contractors-say-1.3580801
Reith, T., & Stewart, B. (2016, June 6). Fort McMurray's water warrior fought to
keep the flow to firefighters going. CBC News. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/fort-mcmurray-water-treatment-plant1.3617505
Residents of hardest-hit Fort McMurray neighbourhoods still waiting to return.
(2016, June 4). CBC News. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/fort-mcmurray-reentry-delays-1.3616574
Return to Fort McMurray: What’s happening now.(2016, June 6). The Globe and
Mail. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/alberta/fort-mcmurrayreturns-thursday1/article30216735/
Ross, A. (2016, June 9). Rubble search team expands in Fort McMurray as
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demand skyrockets. CBC News. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/rubble-search-team-expands-in-fortmcmurray-as-demand-skyrockets-1.3624285
Snowdon, W. (2016a, May 31). Condemned Fort McMurray properties could
remain uninhabitable until September. CBC News. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/condemned-fort-mcmurray-propertiescould-remain-uninhabitable-until-september-1.3608701
Snowdon, W. (2016b, June 13). Fort McMurray fire largely contained thanks to
rain, firefighters' efforts. CBC News. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-mostly-contained1.3632949
Warnica, M. (2016, May 24). Alberta rallies international help for Fort McMurray
wildfires. CBC News. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/alberta-rallies-international-help-for-fortmcmurray-wildfires-1.3597807
$125M in donations raised for Fort McMurray recovery, says Red Cross. (2016,
June 2). The Canadian Press. Retrieved from
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Chapter Two
MAPPING DISASTER RESPONSE IN CANADA
AND ONTARIO
By: Jennifer Manalac and Justine Wadhawan
Summary
Canada must be prepared to respond to a variety of emergency situations. Where the
previous chapter examined the specific response to Fort McMurray, this chapter seeks to
outline the key players and legislative frameworks that guide emergency management in
Canada broadly and Ontario specifically. Understanding the complexity of these
frameworks and the interconnectedness of the involved actors is fundamental to improving
cross-sectoral collaboration.
Introduction
The Fort McMurray fire is one example of the types of disasters that Canadians are
vulnerable to. With its vast geography and diverse environment, Canada is prone to a number
of disasters, including floods, severe winter weather, and heavy rainfall. With such exposure to
potential disasters and emergencies, the question becomes: who is responsible for
management and coordination in an emergency and how?
This chapter will provide an overview of emergency management in the Canadian
context, the key players involved, and an analysis of best practices. Finally, the chapter will also
provide a brief account of a number of notable emergency situations, which exemplify how
parties involved coordinate response efforts.
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Emergencies in Canada
Like many other countries worldwide, Canada is subject to its fair share of emergencies
and disasters. This warrants the definition of emergency to be all encompassing, referencing a
variety of disasters, which includes natural disasters (e.g. environmental, meteorological, or
health related hazards), conflict (e.g. war), and technological (e.g. 2003 Blackout in Ontario)
(Canadian Disaster Database, n.d.). While there are certain similarities in mitigation,
preparation, and response efforts for all types of emergencies, the primary focus of this paper
is on natural disasters. To that end, most of the analysis in this and other chapters will focus on
natural disaster emergency management, though responses to other disasters will be
considered where there are important lessons to be learned. For example, in the chapter on
Japan, the meltdown of the reactor at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant, a
technological disaster, is discussed because of the causal link to a natural disaster. This example
also serves to illustrate that while there are different types of disasters and emergencies, they
are not always easily differentiated and discreet.
In Canada, emergency management is overseen by Public Safety Canada (PSC). PSC
provides national leadership in the development and implementation of policies, plans, and
programs, which employ a collaborative approach with multiple parties (Public Safety Canada,
2011). Thus, multiple networks and stakeholders mobilize by planning and managing
catastrophic events once they have occurred. The Canadian Disaster Database is a national
resource that provides a record of emergencies that have occurred in Canada since the 1990s.
To date, the Database has recorded 1,028 disasters and provides information on the number of
individuals impacted, the geographical location of the disaster, and a rough estimate of the
costs related to the disaster (Canadian Disaster Database, n.d.). Disasters recorded in the
Database are those where more than 100 people are significantly impacted or a disaster that
has significant social, historical, and/or economic impacts. While the data indicators in the Fort
McMurray fires have not yet been recorded into the Database, as of 2015, there have been 91
wildfires meeting the aforementioned threshold recorded with varying costs per incidence
ranging up to $700 million (Canadian Disaster Database, n.d.).
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Emergency Management
Emergencies are unpredictable, however, having plans and resources to address
emergencies allows the degree of risk to be mitigated. Many countries, including Canada, have
plans in place to allow for an enhanced response. In developing a response plan, the primary
focus is often to save lives, preserve the environment, protect property, and protect the
economy. Emergency management in Canada involves understanding various levels of risk and
contributing to a more safe and prosperous society through ensuring that sustainable practices
and policies are in place (Public Safety Canada, 2011). Public Safety Canada developed the
Emergency Management Framework document, which regards the protection of life as the
number one priority of emergency management. The Framework highlights four components
that are important in supporting emergencies, which include Prevention and Mitigation,
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery (Public Safety Canada, 2011, p.4). Figure 1 below
provides a brief definition of each component.
Figure 1: Four Components of the Emergency Management Framework
Component
Description
Prevention and
An emphasis should be placed on eliminating or reducing the impacts of
Mitigation
disasters, via:
Preparedness

Structural measures (e.g. construction of floodways)

Non-structural measures (e.g. building codes and land-use planning).
Governments and communities should be ready to respond to a disaster and
manage its damaging effects through measures enacted prior to an event,
such as:

Emergency response plans, mutual assistance agreements, resource
inventories and training, equipment and exercise programs.
Response
A plan of action during, immediately before, or after a disaster should also be
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included to manage consequences. For example:

Emergency public communication, search and rescue, emergency medical
assistance and evacuation to minimize suffering and loss associated with
disasters.
Recovery
This includes the restoration of affected areas to conditions of an acceptable
level through post-disaster measures. This may include:

Return of evacuees, trauma counselling, reconstruction, economic impact
studies, and financial assistance.
There is a significant interrelationship between effective and sustainable
recovery with prevention and mitigation of future disasters. Recovery efforts
should focus on a framework of disaster risk reduction.
These four components are defined with core principles that guide how each activity is
undertaken and are reflective of the key underlying beliefs and goals behind emergency
management in Canada. Primarily, the principles aim to “support the design, implementation
and ongoing improvement of policies, programs, procedures, guidelines and activities” that
together form the framework in Canada (Public Safety Canada, 2011, p. 6). Key principles
include responsibility and partnerships, where all levels of society are expected to have a role
and contribute to emergency management and response. This indicates that there are shared
responsibilities, while recognizing that local leadership is often the initial response to an
emergency. Additional principles of the framework include the development of comprehensive
strategies and plans, an “all-hazards” perspective on emergency (i.e. recognizing that Canada is
vulnerable to several types of emergencies and disasters), and planning that is risk-based and
focused on continuous improvement (ibid.). These guiding points inform the Emergency
Management Framework to ensure that there is a structure in place that is multi-faceted and
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comprehensive, to allow Canadians who are involved in emergency and disaster situations to
mobilize quickly and work towards managing the impacts.
Defining Roles – Key Players
In Canada, emergency management is considered a collaborative effort in which
multiple parties have a unique role to play in ensuring that disasters are managed. Partners in
emergency management can include the public sector (including federal, provincial-territorial,
and municipal governments), Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), the private sector, and the
general public.
Federal Government
The federal government has an overarching role in emergency management through the
implementation of policies and initiatives across the country. Public Safety Canada and the
Emergency Management Act are the primary mechanisms through which the federal
government exercises this function. Supports and policies implemented across the country can
be regulatory, such as the requirement for provincial-territorial regions to have emergency
management plans in place (Government of Canada, 2011); financial, as is the case with cost
sharing agreements for recovery efforts; or take on other forms as discussed below.
Public Safety Canada integrates the federal component of an emergency response
through operations, situational awareness, risk assessment, planning/logistics, and financial
administration. Initiatives and resources provided under these federal departments are
designed to develop coordination and provide resources/services that allow local governments
to mobilize and address the disaster at hand (ibid.). The federal government is seen as the
body not involved “on the ground” but that supports the coordination of efforts evidenced by
its significant investment in emergency management and planning. The federal government
budgets approximately 75% of the annual programming budget Public Safety Canada receives
(approximately $8B in 2014-15) to emergency management activities (“Report on Plans,” 2016).
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Figure 2 Public Safety Canada Budget 2014-2015
According to the Government of Canada, most Canadian emergencies are local in nature
and are managed by the community or by provincial/territorial governments (“Federal
Emergency Response,” 2011, Section 1.1). The Federal government becomes involved in
situations where the event has expanded beyond the capacity or the scope of the government
body involved. Such cases include emergencies that deal with “increased urbanization, critical
infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies, terrorism, climate variability and change,
scientific and technological developments (e.g. nanotechnologies), animal and human health
diseases, and the increased movement of people and goods around the world” (Section 1.1, p.
1).
Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP)
The Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) is the Government of Canada’s “allhazards” response plan. According to the Emergency Management Act, emergency
management is defined as “the prevention and mitigation of, preparedness for, response to,
and recovery from emergencies” (“Federal Emergency Response,” 2011, Section 1.1, p. 1). The
FERP was designed and developed by Public Safety Canada in consultation with other federal
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government institutions. This document includes the processes and mechanisms to facilitate
an integrated governmental response to an emergency, which eliminates the need for federal
government institutions to coordinate a wider response. The FERP was developed to harmonize
federal emergency response efforts with those of other levels of governance, such as the
provinces/territorial governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.
During an integrated response by the government, all federal departments involved
assist in determining the overall focus. Depending on the scope of the emergency, a national or
regional level of action is determined to contribute to collaborative planning and maximizing
the utilization of accessible resources. The FERP is composed of three levels of response, which
includes enhanced reporting, risk assessment and planning, and coordination of a federal
response (“Federal Emergency Response,” 2011, Section 2.5.1, p. 11).
Figure 3: Three Levels of Response in FERP
 Level 1 – Enhanced Reporting
 Attention is focused on an event or incident deemed an emergency, which includes detailed
authoritative reporting of significant information. This information is then processed and
distributed to federal emergency response partners to support their planning or response
efforts. Specific information gathered by federal liaison officers and subject matter experts may
be forwarded to the Government Operations Centre upon request during this level of
escalation.

 Level 2 – Risk Assessment and Planning
 Federal response becomes more evident and involves an attempt to gain a full understanding
of an incident, including the degree of risks presented by the event.

 Level 3 – Coordination of Federal Response
 The Government Operations Centre becomes the coordination centre for the federal response.
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Regular situation reports, briefing, and decision-making documentation is provided to support
ministers and senior officials in decision-making. The Centre also coordinates requests for
information with relevant government departments given their mandate and capacity to carry
out and/or support response requirements.
In line with the contingency planning process, relevant Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs) are utilized to identify specific departmental roles and responsibilities (“Federal
Emergency Response,” 2011). As a part of the ESF framework, the Federal government appoints
Federal Liaison Officers and Subject Matter Experts from each institution and other public
sector partners into consultation. These officers and experts may be asked to provide
information specific to the situation or provide support to provinces and territories (“Federal
Emergency Response,” 2011, Appendix A, A-4).
Provincial Government
Like the federal government, provinces are also committed to emergency management.
Each province and territory is responsible for overseeing and implementing management and
response policies within their jurisdiction. As discussed above, the federal Emergency
Management Act mandates emergency management plans at the provincial level. Ontario’s is
the Province of Ontario Emergency Response Plan (2008).
The government of Ontario is responsible for the protection of public health and safety,
property, and the environment. Provincial-Territorial governments are likely to be among the
first organizations involved in emergency response, therefore in order to protect health, safety,
and the environment it behooves a province to have a plan. The overall provincial emergency
management organization responsible for the promotion, development, implementation, and
maintenance of effective emergency management programs in Ontario is known as Emergency
Management Ontario (EMO) (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2016).
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EMO coordinates the provincial emergency response through the Provincial Emergency
Operations Centre. This centre is responsible for providing advice and assistance to
communities and ministries in all areas of disaster management. This includes an incidence
management system, critical infrastructure, hazard identification and risk, emergency
management program, and the Ontario disaster relief program (ibid.).
There are significant and relevant legislative documents and authorities that govern
emergency management in Ontario. The Constitution Act of 1867 provides exclusive jurisdiction
to the provinces for matters regarding property and civil rights and for all matters that affect
public health, safety, and the environment (Public Safety Canada, 2011). EMO has two primary
ways of responding to emergencies: the first is a systematic, coordinated and effective
framework in responding to emergencies, identified as the Provincial Emergency Response Plan
(PERP); the second is specifically related to a nuclear or radiological emergency, which is the
Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP) (Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services, 2016). To further ensure that adequate strategies are in place, each
ministry has formulated their response to emergencies dependent on their area of expertise.
The province of Ontario has developed region-specific plans such as the Mass
Evacuation Plan Part 1: Far North in October 2012 (Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services, 2016). This document lays out the plan and implementation of possible
evacuations from the beginning phase of activation straight through to the demobilization. In
this document, specific roles and responsibilities of the many partners who assist in evacuation
are identified. The Guideline for the Development of the Municipal Evacuation Plan is the main
document for an Ontario Mass Evacuation Plan (ibid.). The purpose of this document is to assist
a municipality in preparing for an evacuation dependent on the size and scale of evacuation.
Ontario recognizes the cultural and societal differences with respect to emergency
response and First Nations communities. The First Nations Emergency Assistance Agreement
has made arrangements with the federal government, First Nations, and with the province
related to emergency preparedness and response plans in Ontario (“Emergency Management”,
n.d.). These agreements state that the province agrees to provide assistance in emergency
preparedness and response to First Nations communities. The Indian and Northern Affairs
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Canada (INAC) or a First Nations community has to initiate the request for assistance. In other
cases, there is “a protocol between the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation (NAN), INAC and the
Government of Ontario by which NAN is responsible for emergency preparedness, planning and
evacuation; the federal government provides support and funding; and the province of Ontario,
through EMO, provides liaison and coordination with provincial ministries” (Ministry of
Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2016, PERP 2008, 1.3.1.d).
Non-profit Sector
In the field of emergency management, NPOs are regarded as a crucial actor in
emergency management (Brudney & Grazley, 2009). However, little information is available
about specific roles or mandates of NPOs with respect to disaster management in Canada.
NPOs are considered to be those who provide “on-the-ground” support and resources in the
event of an emergency. For instance, this may include the provision of basic necessities such as
food, shelter, and health services (“What is the Charitable”, n.d.). NPOs have the opportunity to
leverage expertise on a variety of issues and using resources and networks that governments
may not have (Lin Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006). In Canada, there are over 170,000 NPOs who
provide a variety of supports and resources to Canadians (ibid.). While not all NPOs are involved
in responding to emergencies, many do play a role in disaster management. Well-known NPOs
that have been historically involved in emergency management include the Canadian Red Cross,
Salvation Army, and St. John’s Ambulance (Public Safety Canada, 2011). The federal
government recognizes these agencies as common partners in emergency management.
In 1998, NPOs with emergency management experience were identified through the
development of a NPO database developed by the federal government. The database set out
key criteria for NPOs that could be included in this list, which included an expertise in a
particular area of disaster management and activities undertaken by the NPO that are
dedicated to emergency response (Newton, 1999). Unfortunately, the list has not been updated
since it was released in 1998. NPOs provide benefits that extend beyond basic resource
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provisions. For example, the mobilization of organizational and individual volunteers provides a
social-psychological purpose by bringing communities together (Waugh & Streib, 2006). This
phenomenon has been described by sociologists as a process of convergence in which those
wishing to help mobilize quickly on disaster areas to minimize the degree of harm and damage
(ibid).
Public and Communities
While the government and NPOs are considered to be the main players in emergency
management, there are roles for other parties including individuals and community members,
and other organized groups such as the military. Attention must be paid to these groups,
including special interest populations, such as First Nations communities. First Nations
communities have differing cultural and social norms and customs that may influence the way
they address emergencies and coordinate response efforts.
Often in emergencies, informal non-profit organizations develop, comprised of local
community members responding to the event. This might include very simple one-off
situations, such as a neighbour offering another neighbour a resource, or more of a coordinated
community response, such as a neighbourhood watch activity. These networks become
“informal NPOs” and play an important role in responding to emergency situations.
Military
Emergency Management Ontario maintains a close relationship with the military, who is
responsible at the domestic level of operations in Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety &
Correctional Services, 2016). This headquarter provides direct access to the Department of
National Defence and the Canadian Forces. Military assistance, communities, and ministries are
directed to the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre. Each request must indicate the need
for military assistance and identify that no other resource suitable is available to assist.
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Case Studies
Two case studies are included for readers to provide a greater understanding of how actual
emergencies have been managed in Ontario in recent years.
2003 Blackout – Ontario (and United States)
The 2003 blackout affected 50 million Canadians and Americans in Ontario and several US
states.
At the provincial level, the 2003 blackout was considered a disaster requiring “a state of
emergency” to be declared (Murphy 2004). This disaster facilitated an initiation of the
Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), which called upon the services from firefighters, police,
and emergency medical services—all deployed to aid the public caught in subways, elevators,
people requiring assistance in high-rise buildings, and commuters that could not make it home
due to transportation shutdowns.
At the community level, people gathered together within their neighbourhoods for barbeques,
which is representative of the altruistic behaviour discussed in the literature. One family
stated, “we were among the fortunate who had power restored shortly after midnight Friday
morning. But our families in Oshawa still hadn’t by early afternoon so my husband, Paul, packed
up our Y2K generator and headed to Oshawa where he went from house to house powering up
refrigerators” (Murphy 2007, p. 308). This case is a prime example of how municipalities and
communities respond during disasters and demonstrates the close relationship that
communities, both formally and informally, each play in managing and responding to
emergencies.
2000 E. Coli Disaster - Walkerton, Ontario
The Walkerton E. coli disaster in 2000 involved a small town of 5,000 people in South Western
Ontario.
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The town’s water supply was contaminated with E. coli bacteria after a heavy rainstorm caused
the runoff from a nearby farm to enter one of the wells. Investigations found that
incompetence and negligence on behalf of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) had allowed
the pathogens to spread due to an improperly treated water supply (Murphy 2007).
According to Murphy (2007) “ongoing provincial restructuring and downloading of
responsibilities onto municipalities had significantly reduced the provincial Ministry of
Environment’s capacity to enforce drinking water regulations” (p. 309). An inquiry determined
that clear reporting structures were not in place upon the privatization of water testing. In
addition, the forced amalgamation of several rural areas and towns into the municipality of
Brockton had created political instability and challenges to effective governance.
Initially, the Brockton municipal government refrained from declaring a state of emergency
fearing that they would be blamed for the political instability within the new municipality
(Murphy 2007, p. 309). Due to a lack of clear leadership, the response mechanisms laid out by
the emergency operations centre (EOC) were not activated. Emergency medical services
responded but other services, such as fire and police were said to be underused with little
organized coordination. “For residents, the main infrastructure problem related to the ‘boilwater’ order that left them with no readily available source of potable water” (Murphy 2007, p.
309). Bottled water was initially supplied by donations across Canada and not by the province.
Murphy (2007) argues that the value of social capital is illustrated in the events of the
Walkerton disaster as trucks began to follow local residents’ lead in delivering clean water for
the community to the local arena. The unloading and distribution of the water was coordinated
by a team of local municipal employees, available fork-lift operators, business owners, service
clubs, and anyone willing to volunteer. A simple sign-up sheet was posted on the wall and
community members worked within their networks until a provincially appointed manager was
hired in July, approximately two months following the outbreak. This case warrants the need
for further understanding of the key players in community emergency management and their
ability to collaborate in times of great need.
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Analysis: A Coordinated Response
Emergency management is frequently cited as requiring a collaborative approach where
multiple parties are involved. There is a need to emphasize the importance of a holistic
emergency management system that emphasizes proactive hazard and risk mitigation, while
continuing to strengthen response and recovery capabilities (Public Safety Canada, 2011).
Currently, both governments and NPOs are at risk when operating alone. For instance, Public
Safety Canada identifies two risks present with its emergency management strategy (Report on
Plans & Priorities, 2016-17). First, the Government Operations Centre (GOC) infrastructure may
be unable to support a coordinated response for a large-scale disaster or multiple and
concurrent events affecting the nation. Second, the current approach to emergency
management may not be able to sustain the increasing risk, cost, and complexity of disasters.
With respect to NPOs, they have been criticized for being scattered and unprepared,
which often render them ineffective during unexpected events due to the lack of a
comprehensive and cohesive approach to emergency situations (McEntire & Myers, 2004). The
development of informal community networks can also be a challenge in ensuring robust
emergency management techniques. For instance, the importance of informal NPOs is
emphasized in responses; however, identifying such groups is difficult until after the disaster
has occurred. There are challenges associated with preparing and mobilizing local community
groups before a disaster occurs. To respond to emergency management, one approach is to
improve collaborative efforts by ensuring greater coordination between all parties. It is
important to recognize the complementary benefits that governments, NPOs, and the general
public can contribute. Public perception also reinforces the importance of cross-sector
collaboration, with the perception that "actual or potential failures cannot be fixed by the
sectors acting alone" (Bryson et al., 2006, p.46).
In order to support the development of a thorough emergency management response
plan, it is important to recognize the key principles that underlie any good strategy (Kapucu et
al., 2010). First, an integration of governmental and NPO stakeholders is required to ensure that
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all involved parties are represented. Second, there must be efforts made to support and
enhance collaboration between multiple sectors. This includes trust building, reaching
consensus, establishing team spirit, and effective communication. Finally, flexibility is required.
Recognizing that by nature emergencies are unplanned and/or unexpected, being flexible is
necessary for contingencies in emergency situations.
Bryson et al. (2006) outline the six pillars of collaboration: forging initial agreements;
building leadership, legitimacy, and trust; managing conflict; and planning. They also emphasize
that although informal agreements are useful, formal agreements are more helpful in fostering
agreement on purpose, resources, formal leadership, and decision making all of which lead
naturally to the articulation of next steps and long-term implementation strategies. This is an
area in collaborative efforts that Ontario could possibly benefit from as past experiences
illustrate. It is important to note that organizations and groups have varying perspectives and
approaches to emergency management and the perception of cooperation may vary
significantly due to differences in organizational goals, objectives, and cultures.
The modernization of Canada's emergency management system needs to be based on
openness and inclusivity in order to draw upon the expertise and resources of various actors
across society (Public Safety Canada, 2011). However, modern emergency management
presents Canadians with a paradox (Bryson et al., 2006). It requires a significant degree of
planning and organization, however, the nature of emergencies is such that they occur
spontaneously and often without warning. In order to develop a robust framework, it is
necessary to blend these conflicting factors that may involve an opportunity for all parties
involved to foster greater collaboration.
Preparing for Success: How Ontario Can Move Forward
There is a need for a ‘paradigm shift’ in emergency management to focus on proactive
measures, which identify and reduce community risks and vulnerabilities (Brudney & Gazley,
2014). In the future, Ontario would likely benefit from an increase in collaborative efforts
emphasizing clear communication, which would facilitate strategies to improve public
preparedness and overall emergency response. Kapucu and Garayev (2012) argue that effective
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emergency preparedness and response is reliant on the development of network relationships
and investment into information communication technology as important factors that increase
network sustainability. Ontario’s emergency management practitioners could consider revising
this area in disaster management.
During a time of crisis as described in the cases reviewed earlier, formal and informal
partnerships develop in environments and organize to work together to achieve shared goals,
address common concerns and interests, and/or attain mutual benefits. Kapucu (2006) argues
that in recent years, such inter-organizational collaboration has become a prominent aspect of
the functioning of many different types of organizations. As a result, there has been a
significant increase in the number of collaborative forms of organizing, including interorganizational teams, partnerships, alliances, and networks.
Emergency management in Ontario, and also globally, would likely benefit from a
deeper understanding of the importance of the interdependency between key players, such as
the government and NPOs. Trust is a key factor in allowing effective coordination in emergency
management response operations, which promote multi-sectoral collaborations (Kapucu,
2006). Brudney and Gazley (2014) suggest that including volunteer organizations into routine
operations would increase their emergency preparedness. As a result, the inclusion of these
parties into set routine responses would foster and develop trust in collaboration with private
sector actors in emergency management. It is apparent that emergency management takes
place on both vertical and horizontal levels, which is essential in the development of an allencompassing plan of action where time and resources affect the preservation of human life.
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References
Brudney, J. L., & Gazley, B. (2009). Planning to be prepared: an empirical examination
of the role of voluntary organizations in county government emergency planning. Public
Performance & Management Review, 32(3), 372-399.
Bryson, J.M., & Crosby, B.C, & Stone, M.M. (2006). The design
and implementation of cross-sector collaborations: Propositions from the literature.
Special issue, Public Administration Review, 66, 44-55.
Emergency Management (n.d.). Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. Retrieved
from www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309369889599/1309369935837
Federal emergency response plan (2011). Government of Canada. p. 1-D-4. Retrieved
from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mrgnc-rspns-pln/mrgnc-rspnspln-eng.pdf
Kapucu, N., & Garayev, V. (2012). Designing, managing, and sustaining functionally
collaborative emergency management networks. The American Review of Public
Administration, 0275074012444719.
Kapucu, N., Arslan, T., & Demiroz, F. (2010). Collaborative emergency management
and national emergency management network. Disaster Prevention and Management:
An International Journal, 19(4), 452-468.
Kapucu, N. (2006). Public‐Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Action in Dynamic
Contexts of Emergencies. Public Administration, 84(1), 205-220.
Lin Moe, T., & Pathranarakul, P. (2006). An integrated approach to natural disaster
management: public project management and its critical success factors. Disaster
Prevention and Management: An International Journal,15(3), 396-413.
McEntire, D. A., & Myers, A. (2004). Preparing communities for disasters: issues and
processes for government readiness. Disaster Prevention and Management: An
International Journal, 13(2), 140-152.
Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services. (2016). Province of Ontario
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emergency response plan [2008]. Retrieved from
http://www.emergencymanagementontario.ca/english/emcommunity/response_resour
ces/plans/provinicial_emergency_response_plan.html#P6_0
Murphy, B.L. (2007). Locating social capital in resilient community-level emergency
management. Natural Hazards, 41(2), 297-315.
Murphy, B.L. (2004) Emergency management and August 14th, 2003 Blackout. ICLR
Research, Paper series #40, Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction.
http://www.iclr.org/pdf/Emergency%20Preparedness%20and%20the%20blackout2.pdf
Newton, J. (1999). Emergency roles and responsibilities of NGOs in Canada.
Emergency Preparedness Canada. Retrieved from
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D82-49-2000E.pdf
Public Safety Canada. (2011). An emergency management framework for Canada, 2 nd
ed. p. 1-16. Retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mrgncmngmnt-frmwrk/mrgnc-http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mrgncmngmnt-frmwrk/mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk-eng.pdf
Report on Plans and Priorities 2016-17. Government of Canada. (2016, March).
Canada.
The Canadian Disaster Database. (n.d.). Retrieved June 16, 2016, from
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/cndn-dsstr-dtbs/index-eng.aspx
Waugh, W. L. Jr. & Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and Leadership
for Effective Emergency Management. Public Administration Review, 66, 131-140.
What is the Charitable and Nonprofit Sector? (n.d.). Retrieved June 16, 2016, from
http://sectorsource.ca/research-and-impact/sector-impact
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Chapter Three
JURSIDICTIONAL SCAN: JAPAN
By: Bishwambhar Ghimire, Erin Alexis Mander, and Carrie Wiebe
Summary
This chapter explores Japan’s evolving response to natural disasters. The confluence of
deference to authority and the frequency of catastrophic events create a unique
environment in which to study emergency management. It is valuable to explore what
Canada and Ontario can learn from a country that is so well versed in emergency
management and response.
Introduction
Japan has a long history of natural disasters including earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons,
volcanic eruptions, floods, and landslides. These disasters have had significant economic and
social consequences which resulted in one of the world’s most sophisticated disaster
management systems. This chapter explores how the government and non-profit organizations
(NPOs) in Japan have responded to such crises by examining three specific disasters occurring in
1959, 1995, and 2011. In addition to studying the intertwining roles of governments and NPOs
in responding to natural disasters, the current chapter will also examine how cultural
dynamics/norms influence collective action in the hopes that Canada can learn from the
Japanese experience.
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Disaster Management Systems from 1950 to 1995
While Japan has experienced a variety of natural disasters, the most common are
earthquakes and tsunamis. Japan is situated in the collision zone of at least four lithosphere
plates: the Eurasian, North American, Pacific, and Philippine. It is the continuous movement of
these plates that generate a lot of energy which causes earthquakes varying in size and
intensity (Nazarov, 2011). Up until the 1950s, Japan did not have an organized disaster
management system. After the Isewan typhoon in 1959, which killed more than 4,600 people,
the country enacted the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (DCBA) in 1961 with the aim of
enhancing organizational structures surrounding disaster management. The Central Disaster
Management Council was established, naming the prime minister as Chair. The council is the
main organization responsible for disaster management activities including “prevention, relief,
recovery, and coordination with local governments and designated public institutions”
(Matsuoka & Shaw, 2012, p. 2). The council also serves as the main decision-making body that
incorporates all ministers, the Minister of State, the heads of major public institutions, and
other experts in disaster reduction. In addition to the DCBA, which is still in existence today,
there are several strategic organizations that aid in combating disasters, including “national,
prefectural, municipal, citizens, government organizations, and public corporations” (Matsuoka
& Shaw, 2012, p. 2). A major characteristic of the Japanese disaster management system is its
hierarchical structure. Under the Japanese system, the national government is at the top of the
chain, followed by prefectural governments and municipal governments (Okada & Ogura,
2014). The Prime Minister formulates and implements the Basic Disaster Management Plan and
the governor of each prefecture leads a Prefectural Disaster Management Council, which
formulates and implements Local Disaster Management Plans at the prefectural level. Similarly,
mayors lead Municipal Disaster Management Councils and implement Local Disaster
Management Plans at the municipal level. However, Local Disaster Management Plans cannot
be implemented without approval from the national government. Public agencies play a crucial
role in dealing with disaster preparedness, response, and recovery at the local level. “Under the
protocol of the Basic Disaster Management Plan, designated administrative institutions and
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public institutions create Operational Plans for Disaster Management, and local public
organizations create Local Disaster Management Plans” (Matsuoka & Shaw, 2012, p. 4).
The DCBA was in effect for many decades, and initially, it served its purpose. However,
the magnitude and scope of the Great Kobe Earthquake in 1995 revealed significant
deficiencies in the DCBA as the earthquake destroyed more than 150,000 buildings, damaged
expressways, and a major airport. The casualty list from the earthquake totalled 6,434 people
with more than 300,000 injured or made homeless (Okada & Ogura, 2014). The DCBA had not
been changed since its establishment and was primarily designed to address small-scale
disasters. Japan had not faced a large-scale disaster between the Isewan typhoon and Kobe
earthquake, so services were not concentrated to strengthen their emergency management
systems at that scale. As a result, the Kobe earthquake revealed that the measures outlined in
the DCBA before 1995 could not cope with large-scale disaster preparedness, response, and
recovery (Okada & Ogura, 2014).
As a result of the Kobe earthquake, hierarchical order was found to create problems in
organizing timely emergency responses and relief processes. Local levels of government,
including prefectural and municipal levels, were required to seek approval from the level above.
In addition, “the Prime Minister lacked authority to take decisive action unless [s/he]
proclaimed a national state of emergency” (Matsuoka & Shaw, 2012, p. 5). This was especially
problematic given that the Prime Minister could not declare a state of emergency when Japan’s
bicameral legislature was closed or the House of Representatives was dissolved, a fact that
hindered rapid response. Moreover, mayors and governors were not given clear and specific
roles, which in turn created confusion in the aftermath of the earthquake. Similarly, citizen
participation was not clearly articulated in the disaster management process, so smaller scale
volunteer efforts were not utilized (ibid).
Disaster Management System after 1995
In the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, a number of questions were raised about the
disaster management system. These included questions of empowering NPOs and how to
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better prepare communities for disasters. The review of the disaster management processes
initiated major advancement in information sharing and redefining command chains (Okada &
Ogura, 2014). The Great Kobe Earthquake was a lesson for Japan in responding to large-scale
earthquakes and other natural disasters. In the aftermath, more attention was given to increase
resources for prevention and preparation. As a result, revisions were made to disaster-related
acts and plans at different levels, including the DCBA and the Local Disaster Management Plan
(Matsuoka & Shaw, 2012). The central government also underwent reformation and
established the post of Minister of State for Disaster Management to “integrate and coordinate
disaster reduction policies and measures of ministries and agencies” (Matsuoka & Shaw, 2012,
p. 8). Most importantly, mayors and governors were given greater authority to initiate local
disaster management plans and policies in response to the observed deficiencies of power at
the local level. The revised acts and chains of command were tested in 2011 through the Great
East Japan Earthquake and received positive reviews in disaster management plans and policies
(Okada and Ogura, 2014).
An important initiative in disaster management governance was the cross-prefectural
cooperation model established in 2010 in the Kansai region. This model is still in effect today
and serves as a better way to advance Japan’s disaster management capacity (Matsuoka &
Shaw, 2012). It is the first of its kind in the country, focusing on seven different areas including
“disaster prevention, tourism and cultural promotion, industrial development, medical care,
environmental conservation, qualifying examination and licenses, and staff training” (Matsuoka
& Shaw, 2012, p. 11). The Hyogo Prefecture was selected as the first cooperation model
because of its extensive knowledge and expertise in the field of disaster management, drawing
on their experience from the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake. The model illustrates a bridge
between local government and national government to facilitate decentralization and
delegation of authority. Under this structure, the main implementations of disaster prevention
measures are local governments that encourage community participation.
After the 1995 earthquake, Japan implemented further disaster mitigation measures
including “earthquake-resistant buildings, disaster preparedness drills, the building of seawalls,
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a reliable early warning system, the dissemination of disaster preparedness information, and
the incorporation of disaster education in official curriculum guidelines” (Parwanto & Oyama,
2014, p. 131). The Japanese believe that emergency management should be “comprehensive,
progressive, risk-driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, flexible, and professional”
(Nazarov, 2011, p. 4). In responding to deficiencies in emergency management, the government
of Japan looked at delays in first response and identified key structures of disaster
management. This resulted in technological investment and the development of information
networks (Okada & Ogura, 2014). The government introduced an Earthquake Early Warning
System (EEWS) with the aim of preventing deaths from a disaster. The EEWS includes stopping
high-speed trains and people working in high-risk areas at the earliest stage of warning. As a
result of the EEWS, residents of Tokyo received mobile text warnings roughly a minute before
the shockwaves of the 2011 earthquake hit the city, granting them enough time to take lifesaving cover (Matsuoka & Shaw, 2012).
The 2011 Earthquake-Tsunami and the Role of NPOs
The triple crisis began on March 11, 2011 when the North American and Pacific plates
collided 130 kilometres off Japan’s north-eastern coast. The collision triggered a magnitude 9
earthquake that struck the district of Tohoku at 2:46 PM (Suzuki & Kaneko, 2013). The
earthquake was swiftly followed by a tsunami with 40 metre waves, inundating much of Tohoku
district, and wiping entire communities in the Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima prefectures off the
map (“Japan quake: loss,” 2012).
The tsunami created much of the disaster. Like the earthquake, its strength was
unprecedented and structures that were built to survive the earthquake were devastated and
washed away by the churning waves. Over one million buildings were damaged or destroyed,
and many of the deaths were drowning-related, as Japanese citizens were swept into icy winter
seawater (Suzuki & Kaneko, 2013). In 2013, death toll estimates were just under 16,000 with an
additional 2,668 missing persons (Japanese Red Cross Society, 2013). Overall, the 2011
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earthquake and tsunami were the most damaging natural disasters that the country had ever
experienced.
NPOs have proven to be a useful resource to the overextended governments in Japan.
The role of NPOs was first expanded after the 1995 Kobe earthquake. The crisis prompted
change within disaster management plans and paved the way for direct NPO involvement in
such events. With the government’s recognition of the role played by NPOs during the 1995
disaster, legislation was tabled that provided formal recognition of NPOs in disaster
management and pledged the operational support of the government and its authorities
(Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014). Today, when a disaster hits Japan, NPOs act to “fill in” where the
central government cannot. Organizations are able to engage in a broad variety of activities
that include direct relief activities, fundraising, awareness campaigns, and management of
volunteers (ibid.). There is space made for NPOs at every size and level to engage in relief and
recovery during disaster management, and coordination with the central government prevents
overlap and ensures the effective use of resources (Choate, 2011).
Immediately after the earthquake and tsunami occurred the central government began
communicating with NPOs throughout the country. An MP was chosen from parliament as the
go-between for the course of the disaster and organized support service delivery to ensure
relief operations were proceeding without unnecessary overlap. At the local level, small
volunteer organizations and “impromptu” community groups organized shelters and
distributed food received from larger NPOs (Lah, 2011). Larger groups including the Central
Community Chest of Japan and the Red Feather Campaign gathered donations (Ranghieri &
Ishiwatari, 2014). Japan Platform, a major international NPO, applied its global experience to
domestic affairs and assisted the government with coordinating the relief and recovery
contributions of international NPOs (IRIN: The Inside Story on Emergencies, 2012).
While the efforts of many NPOs stand out, the work of the Japanese Red Cross Society
(JRCS) continues to resonate as the most expansive and best known. The JRCS is the largest
humanitarian organization in the country and has experience working independently from and
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collaboratively with central and local governments in disaster mitigation. During the 2011 crisis,
the JRCS took part in extensive relief and recovery operations – many that are ostensibly
continuing today.
Five hours after the earthquake, the JRCS coordinated with the government’s Disaster
Medical Assistance Teams in affected areas, set up a disaster management unit, transported
relief goods, and established support centres for survivors (Japanese Red Cross Society, 2013).
The distribution of relief goods marked a turning point in the JRCS’ mandate because, prior to
the 2011 crisis, the organization was not involved in the delivery of food and non-food items to
survivors. The JRCS also played a pivotal role in providing medical services to elderly survivors.
Building off lessons learned during the 1995 earthquake and with the death toll of the 2011
crisis significantly skewed towards the elderly, the JRCS ensured that vulnerable seniors were
given pneumonia shots and engaged in psychosocial services. In collaboration with the
government, the JRCS also allowed their donations to be distributed through a government
committee, which ensured fair distribution of all donations and cash grants. Today, the
recovery operations continue, and the JRCS is engaged in helping communities and NPOs
improve their disaster preparedness activities (Japanese Red Cross Society, 2013).
Fukushima: Revealing Gaps in Japan’s Disaster Management
As previously discussed, the tsunami was the harbinger of much of the destruction on
March 11. Only 41 minutes after the initial earthquake, a massive wave of seawater hit the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Another wave followed 8 minutes later and the
massive swell of water submerged the generators which cut power to the station. The three
reactor cores went into meltdown, a hydrogen explosion occurred, and radioactive materials
were expelled into the prefecture (Suzuki & Kaneko, 2013). The immediate severity of the
meltdown was not clear, but by April 2011, the central government declared that the plant had
experienced a level 7 accident equivalent to the Chernobyl incident (Japanese Red Cross
Society, 2013).
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The cause of the meltdown was ostensibly the tsunami, which easily breached the walls
of the plant. However, behind the immediate damage of the tsunami, an independent panel
launched to investigate the disaster revealed that both the government and the Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO) had known (as early as 2006) that the plant was at risk of collapse in
the event of a severe natural disaster. The warnings were ignored (The National Diet of Japan,
2012). The panel’s report blamed this ignorance on Japanese cultural conventions:
Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese
culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to
‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity …. What must be admitted
– very painfully – is that this was a disaster ‘Made in Japan’” (The National Diet of Japan,
2012).
The failings of the government and TEPCO were reflected in NPOs. Following the Fukushima
meltdown, the NPO response was significantly smaller and short-term. Few organizations
involved themselves in the prefecture, and when they did, they could not remain long. They
were entirely unprepared to deal with the long-term effects of a meltdown which required
knowledge and experience most did not possess (Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014). The JRCS was
only able to help by providing radiation detecting machines and an information centre on
radiation awareness (Japanese Red Cross Society, 2013).
The ingrained conventions of Japanese culture are not unique to TEPCO and the
government. NPOs failed to prepare for a nuclear meltdown caused by a natural disaster,
despite years of warnings from experts. Instead, they chose to prepare only for what had
always been anticipated before – sticking with the program. Despite the general understanding
that Japan was ready for any natural disaster, the NPOs and government were entirely
unprepared for the realities of relying on nuclear power in a geographically vulnerable location.
While “the fact that damages caused by the earthquake and tsunamis were
overwhelmingly vast and grave,” survivors commended NPOs’ work and dedication (Suzuki &
Kaneko, 2013). Future disaster management plans must take into account the likelihood of
natural disasters creating human-made disasters and the intersection of government and NPO
responsibility in such circumstances. The conventions of Japanese culture that helped create
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the Fukushima disaster are ineffective to disaster management planning, for both governments
and NPOs.
The Role of Culture and Community in Disaster Management
It is useful to examine cultural norms and practices in relation to disaster management
because of their influence on decision-making and implications for a country’s natural disaster
plan. Japanese society is characterized by its adherence to rules and systems promoting
orderliness. A visit to the Japan National Tourism Organization extols the virtues of ‘queuing,’
bowing, and general rules of etiquette related to dining out and greeting different people
(Japan: the Official Guide, 2016). In the days after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, numerous
media outlets reported the lack of looting, and adherence to orderliness as defining traits of the
Japanese response to crisis. Even in instances where people expressed anger with the
government, MacKinnon (2011) remarked that the expressions of frustration were
accompanied by orderly lining up for services from the government and NPOs.
The issue of hierarchy is an important one in Japanese culture. When dealing with
business etiquette, rank and station are important, as they reveal the hierarchical relationship
of negotiations. Additionally, job titles and age are important factors, revealing who the
“honoured guest” is in each encounter (Japan: cultural etiquette, 2016). This is reflected in
various work environments, including government offices, and the issue of hierarchy played a
factor in the government’s actions during the Great Kobe Earthquake. While adherence to
hierarchy may aid in maintaining order after a natural disaster, it can also become a hindrance
if it impedes the actions of government workers and NPOs on the ground. The revisions to the
DCBA after 1995 allowed for greater emphasis on disaster management tactics at the central
and local level, thus empowering smaller branches of government and community groups as
partners in the disaster management system.
The issue of responsibility in the wake of a disaster is important to examine, as
evidenced by reports after the 2011 Fukushima accident. The Independent Panel Report,
previously mentioned, delivered a somewhat scathing account about who was responsible for
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the Fukushima accident. The Report does not blame specific individuals or companies. Rather,
it aims to convey “the mindset that supported the negligence behind this disaster” (The
National Diet of Japan, 2012, p. 9). The report highlights three key factors which contributed to
the Fukushima disaster: 1) a strong government mandate supporting nuclear power 2) a lack of
regulated, independent oversight of the nuclear industry, and 3) a bureaucracy made up of
individuals focused on defending the interests of the organization. What is most telling in the
report, from a cultural perspective, is the desired effect that these findings are to have in
Japanese society, specifically, the admonishment that “each of us should reflect on our
responsibility as individuals in a democratic society” (The National Diet of Japan, 2012, p. 9).
The Report was very clear in revealing the deficiencies of Japanese society that led to
the Fukushima disaster. One of the most telling stories to come out of the disaster was the
emergence of a large number of senior citizens who volunteered to clean up the nuclear spill.
Yasuteru Yamada, a 72-year-old retired engineer said that “volunteering . . . is not brave, but
logical. I . . . probably have 13 to 15 years left to live . . . cancer could take 20 or 30 years or
longer to develop. Therefore, us older ones have less chance of getting cancer” (Buerk, 2011).
While the report was quick to criticize elements of Japanese culture for its role in the
catastrophe, Yamada’s story and the demonstrated rule of law and orderliness in the aftermath
of the crisis reveal some of the more caring and compassionate elements of Japanese culture
which shaped the response to disaster.
Conclusion and Lessons Learned
It is clear that there are aspects of Japan’s disaster response that can, and perhaps
should, be emulated in Canada. David Edgington, Professor of Geography at the University of
British Columbia, was asked the question of whether a country can ever be prepared for an
event the size of the Fukushima disaster. In response, he stated, “If any country can be
prepared for an event of this magnitude, it’s Japan” due to their high-tech early warning
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systems, strongest building codes in the world, community participation in disaster drills, and
investment in infrastructure (Edgington, 2012).
When asked whether Canada can learn anything from Japan’s disaster management
systems, Edgington pointed to the utilization of the army and other services, including NPOs, in
arriving at the disaster area within 48 hours. This is indicative of strong government support
and the top-down structure discussed earlier. It is interesting to note that the same hierarchical
structure that originally hindered the relief efforts after the Kobe earthquake was viewed
positively in the 2011 disaster response. This reveals that multiple types of systems can be
effective in managing crisis, provided that they are nimble enough to react to emerging issues.
The top-down structure of the Japanese disaster management system is augmented with
empowerment of mayors and governors, and infused with the knowledge and expertise of
NPOs. All these factors play a role in creating a more effective disaster management system.
Perhaps the most important lesson from Japan’s experiences is their ability to learn
from and actively correct past mistakes. The report after the 2011 disaster was decisive in its
findings, but took care to note learning outcomes that could affect positive change: “This report
singles out numerous individuals and organizations for harsh criticism, but the goal is not—and
should not be—to lay blame. The goal must be to learn from this disaster, and reflect deeply on
its fundamental causes, in order to ensure that it is never repeated” (The National Diet of
Japan, 2012, p. 9).
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New York: Springer.
The National Diet of Japan. (2012). Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission. The National Diet of Japan. Retrieved from
http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
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Chapter Four
JURSIDICTIONAL SCAN: AUSTRALIA
By: Deirdre Boyle, Kara Kanhai, and Anastasia Tziortzis
Summary
Australia is shaped by the challenges of meeting the needs of a population spread over
vast, sparsely inhabited lands, a government that has firmly embraced neo-liberal
ideology, and a culture of individualism. This chapter will explore how these factors have
shaped Australia’s emergency management regime and how Ontario and Canada can
learn from their experiences.
Introduction
The 1992 Australian government transformed the political landscape into one that was
robustly neo-liberal. As a result, the decentralized ‘contract state’ was developed, where
several services were contracted out to non-profit organizations (NPOs) and private sector
organizations (Leonard & Howitt, 2010; Jones & Webber, 2012). In terms of disaster
management, there was a shift from a command-and-control structure to one of shared
responsibility, due to the increase in frequency and intensity of extreme events in Australia
(Singh-Peterson et al., 2015). It is important to note that the capacity of a community to
respond, withstand, and adapt to disasters is not a product of its physical nature or dimensions
but instead, a combination of social and environmental factors that support resilience. The
shift towards shared responsibility is an acknowledgement of this combination.
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Although there are many benefits that result from collective resilience, there are also
substantial challenges, such as accountability and sustainability (Leonard & Howitt, 2010; Jones
& Webber, 2012; Singh-Peterson et al., 2015). The Australian government requires state
governments to re-organize their emergency response systems, originally established from the
top-down centralized model of governance. Such changes challenge public dependence on
formal government-funded institutions, such as emergency service providers, and concern
exists that political discourse does not support the decentralization of responsibility to
individuals and NPOs (Singh-Peterson et al., 2015).
This chapter will focus on the shared responsibility approach adopted by the Australian
government and non-profit organizations in their strategies for managing natural disasters. It
will take a case study approach and examine Black Saturday: The 2009 Victorian Bushfires with
a brief overview of the event, the public and NPO response, and lessons from this experience.
Australia’s experiences will be analyzed at a level that can be related back to that of Ontario
and Canada.
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR)
The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) was translated from the Council of
Australian Governments’ (COAG) vision of enhancing Australia’s capacity to withstand and
recover from disasters through increased coordination and cooperation (Singh-Peterson et al.,
2015). The strategy “identifies the shared responsibility of individuals, households,
communities, governments, and businesses to build disaster-resilient communities” and is
proposed to be the “first step in a long-term, evolving process to deliver sustained behavioural
change and enduring partnerships” (Australian Government 2011, p. 2).
The NSDR has been criticized for not explicitly stating the delegation of responsibilities
and roles in the shared objective goals. The four underpinning characteristics of disasterresilient communities, according to the NSDR, are: individuals and organisations functioning
well under stress; successful adaptation; self-reliance; and social capacity (Australian
Government 2011). Due to the ambiguous nature of these characteristics, cultural and
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community differences may affect their interpretation, and therefore would complicate
applying a national strategy at a local level (Singh-Peterson et al., 2015).
These issues create a discrepancy in the delegation of responsibility between the
government and the community. There is a perception that responsibility remains with the
government as the first responder in the traditional model of governance (Singh-Peterson et al.,
2015). On the other hand, community groups and NPOs consist primarily of volunteers, often
engaged in other community responsibilities, who are increasingly part of the delivery of
services and goods during natural disasters. The Black Saturday case study will examine the
community and government response, as well as the overarching objective of shared
responsibility and the challenges it presents.
Black Saturday: The 2009 Victorian Bushfires
On Saturday February 7, 2009 a series of severe bushfires swept across the Australian
state of Victoria, killing 173 people, injuring 414, destroying 2,133 homes, and costing
approximately $4 billion AUD (Taylor, Meredith, & Shannon, 2014). Although the worst of the
disaster occurred in early February, fires persisted over the course of January and February and
firefighters were called to several hundred fires. On February 7 alone, over 4,000 firefighters both staff and volunteers - responded to 300 fires (Leonard & Howitt, 2010).
For the next three years, reconstruction efforts were in place and consisted of
government authority as the controlling body, a government-NPO partnership which controlled
appeals-funds, and some independent voluntary Christian-denominated NPOs. Subsequently,
the Victorian State Government established the Royal Commission to investigate disaster
mitigation plans, early detection systems, and manage power dynamics related to this event
(Taylor et al., 2014).
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Response and Key Players
Aside from local emergency responders (i.e. police, fire, and paramedic), some of the
key players involved in the Victorian bushfires included the Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund
(VBAF), the Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (VBRRA), the Australian
Red Cross, the Salvation Army Victorian Emergency Services, Emergency Management Victoria,
and the Environment Protection Authority to name a few. These organizations and their main
roles in relief and recovery will be briefly outlined below.
Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund (VBAF)
The Victorian government established the Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund to assist those
affected by Black Saturday. VBAF assisted by providing psychological support services, support
for property recovery, and clean-up assistance. Following these initiatives, VBAF also provided
support services for those who lost family members during the bushfires (Victoria State
Government, 2014). VBAF is an example of a partnership between a government funding entity
(the Australian Federal Government) and a non-profit organization (the Australian Red Cross).
On April 17, two months after the disaster, VBAF ended and a total of $379 million AUD had
been raised (ibid.).
Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority
The Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (VBRRA) was established
in the days after Black Saturday, and given a mandate by the Premier of Victoria and the
Australian Prime Minister to “. . . lead and coordinate the reconstruction and recovery of all
areas affected by the bushfires” (VBRRA, 2011, p.6). VBRRA’s additional responsibilities
consisted of authorizing the distribution of funds from the Appeal Fund to be used for
emergency reconstruction, recovery, and support payments (Taylor et al., 2014). The VBRRA
partnered with all levels of government in Australia including commonwealth, state, and local
levels.
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The Australian Red Cross
The Australian Red Cross was tasked with “. . . implementing and managing VBAF’s
processes for collecting public donations and acquitting the allocations from the fund” (Taylor
et al., 2014, p. 635). Together with the VBAF, the Australian Red Cross formed a governmentNPO partnership. Their volunteers were on the front lines and provided aid to those affected by
the bushfires. In addition, they provided emergency response personnel and a variety of first
aid services through the State Health Emergency Response Plan (EMV, 2013).
The Salvation Army
The Salvation Army raised approximately $23 million AUD in donations for those in need
after the bushfires (The Salvation Army, 2015). In addition to monetary support, necessities
and services such as food, water, bedding, clothing, personal support services, emergency
accommodation, and transportation services were provided (EMV, 2013). After the bushfires,
the Salvation Army remained involved with many of the communities that were impacted and
continued to assist with the recovery process.
In addition to the Salvation Army, Uniting Care and Baptcare were two other prominent
Christian NPOs that were actively involved with the recovery process. These organizations
assisted with fundraising, providing food, clothing, and other personal services to affected
communities (Taylor et al., 2014).
Emergency Management Victoria (EMV)
Emergency Management Victoria is a department of the federal government of
Australia responsible for emergency management in the state of Victoria. EMV is responsible
for the development and implementation of emergency management policy, providing disaster
management advice to the Minister for Police and Emergency Services, and collaborating with
the Australian government to resolve related issues (EMV, 2013). Other responsibilities of EMV
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include communicating and coordinating with the public on emergency management and
disaster relief.
The Environment Protection Authority
The Environment Protection Authority is responsible for implementing the Environment
Protection Act 1970, assessing the impact of emergencies on the environment, and advising
what services could be employed to protect the environment (EMV, 2013). At the time of the
recovery and clean-up, they assisted the Department of Environment, Land, Water and
Planning with the coordination of waste pollution management and disposal. During natural
disasters or soon after their occurrence environmental protection is extremely important with
regards to reducing the impact of the relief effort on the environment.
2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Report
Following the events of February 7, the Australian government realized "that the
community needed to understand this tragedy and how to minimise the risk of a similar tragedy
occurring in the future" (Royal Commission, 2009, p.1). Members of the Royal Commission
were appointed a week after the event and began consulting with communities in affected
areas to learn about the experiences and concerns of individuals affected by the fires. The Royal
Commission found that leadership during the disaster was inadequate and made 67
recommendations to help Victoria learn from this event and prepare for future disasters. Many
of these recommendations support a decentralized but highly coordinated approach to
response.
Throughout the report there is a strong focus on shared responsibility, the need for
improved organizational structure, rigorous research, and continuous evaluation and
improvement. In addition, the report stresses that all actors and agencies including all levels of
government, individuals, and the broader community, should bear responsibility for ensuring
safety during future bushfires (Royal Commission, 2009). The report explicitly states that “the
absolute priority is to improve operational performance” through “stronger coordination and
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unambiguous command and control, greater interoperability, and a strengthened capacity to
provide an integrated response” all of which could be achieved through organisational reform
and policy changes (p. 18).
The 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission (VBRC) noted that inadequate leadership
during the disaster stemmed from divided responsibilities and unstandardized organizational
response procedures (Royal Commission, 2009). The Commission thus recommended stronger
coordination but not a merger of organizations as this would undermine any efforts to
implement a shared responsibility approach.
Centralization in Australian Emergency Management
In order for a centralized system to work, variable and specific information and
instructions need to be communicated correctly across several locations and response areas.
However, Leonard and Howitt (2010) argue that the few decision-makers at the central
command centre can easily get overwhelmed by the multitude of local problems and situations,
which may lead to a breakdown in communication and result in the implementation of
ineffective disaster responses.
Leonard and Howitt (2010) discuss the ‘theory of emergence,’ where the most
appropriate responses will 'emerge' out of a decentralized model. This is a result of many
responders with ‘on the ground’ expertise working in cooperation to solve problems instead of
being 'engineered' from a central command that may not know or understand the diverse
scenarios occurring during an emergency. This concept is referred to as “decentralized
intelligent adaptation” (p. 378). The decentralized model allows existing response structures
and organizations to be utilized rather than creating them or forcing them through an
expensive merger and training process. As Leonard and Howitt (2010) note, many firefighting
agencies and militaries also take this approach, which is known as “bringing power to the edge”
(p. 378). Centralization, on the other hand “offers the advantage that fewer decision makers
need to be thoroughly trained in assessment, analysis, and decision making – the great
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expertise of a few is shared across the many disparate actions sites” (Leonard & Howitt, 2010,
p. 377). This is particularly important when the expertise required is resource-intensive and
necessitates high skill levels. However, the above authors argue that a centralized response
system is vulnerable “when confronted by a larger-than-normal, highly variable event that is
out of the normal operating range” (p. 377).
In the 2009 bushfires, local first response teams initially responded within their own
communities. Multiple government and non-profit organizations were located in different areas
and responded in various ways. All of these separate agencies have distinct reporting
structures, some of which are legislated. Leonard and Howitt (2010) suggest that if
decentralization is to be the natural way for organizations to respond, then it must be
embraced in order to be successful. Australia has done this by adopting the Incident
Management System (IMS), which “provides a scalable and practical structure and set of
procedures for assessing and addressing evolving events” (p. 380). Three key features of the
IMS include (1) an agreement between agencies on an organizational framework guiding
collaborative disaster response activities (2) a systematic structure for identifying challenges,
priorities, and appropriate responses and (3) consistent use and regular practice of processes in
order to foster familiarity in the face of an unexpected immediate emergency (Leonard &
Howitt, 2010). The overall response of NPOs and the government was highly decentralized
during Black Saturday, which emphasizes the notion that no one organizational form will suit all
emergency situations.
Accountability in Emergency Management
Accountability is often considered “integral to the performance management, reporting
and governance of public sector and not-for-profit entities” (Taylor et al., 2014, p. 636). There is
an increasing weight on the importance of accountability in non-profits because they are
absorbing more of the responsibility to provide goods and services to the public (Candler &
Dumont, 2010).
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Taylor et al. (2014) identify three different types of accountability in reference to
Australia: upward accountability to NGO funders, downward accountability to the recipients of
services and funds from NGOs such as the beneficiaries and community users of services,
and internal accountability to the organizations themselves. Throughout their article, the
authors analyze the effectiveness of downward accountability practiced by various key players
involved in the response and recovery of the 2009 Victorian bushfires. Specifically, the authors
examine the readability and accessibility of organizational reports for service recipients. After
analyzing the responses and reports, Taylor et al. (2014) found that Australia had a downward
accountability approach. However, the authors critique the downward approach, arguing that
an upward and internal approach would have been more appropriate in the context of a
stakeholder oriented accountability framework (Taylor et al., 2014). The upward approach is
necessary to preserve donor contributions and the internal approach to rally existing volunteers
behind the cause, as well as to get new volunteers to join.
The reports of the various participant organizations were evaluated against the
following criteria: the readability of the reports, themes, phrases, keywords, and also
photographs and other images used in the report (Taylor et al., 2014). One of the most striking
findings of the analysis was that the financial and quantitative sections were difficult to read
and contained a level of complexity that required an audience with post-graduate
qualifications. These reports should have been clearer and it may have been beneficial to have
two versions of the reports: one aimed toward experts in the field and another for the general
public. It is important for the general public to understand the report’s contents as most NPO
volunteers come from this group. Specifically, internal accountability is important for
volunteers of NPOs because it relates to the mission and mandate of the organization and can
be considered an incentive for individuals to volunteer with these organizations, while still
being accountable to their donors. This highlights the importance of having a mix of the
different types of stakeholder-direction accountability.
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Sustainability of Non-profit Responses
Non-profits in Australia have become accustomed to the new government regime of
funding in which services have increasingly become contracted out to NPOs and private
organizations. In addition, church-related NPOs deliver around 50% of welfare, labour market,
health, and education services in Australia which often come in the form of contracts (Jones &
Webber, 2010). Literature in this area has revealed that NPOs face a variety of negative
consequences related to the sustainability of their programs and the costs involved in preparing
applications for contracts that may not succeed. Organizations must change their practices in
order to meet the government’s funding requirements leading to low morale in staff who “are
often unhappy about the dissonance between the organisation’s values and government
policy” (Jones & Webber, 2010, p. 413). Furthermore, successful programs are often
terminated because funding has run out (Jones & Webber, 2010).
Jones & Webber (2010) found that increasing the success of non-profits was dependent
on several things. First, there is a need to build strong relationships among organizations in the
public, private, and third sector so when crises arise these organizations are ready to form
partnerships. This will reduce response time and create a more unified and comprehensive
approach. Second, the priority should rest on what the community needs rather than on
developing new programs. Lastly, there is a need for programs to be flexible in order to capture
the changing needs of communities as disasters evolve.
Lessons Learned
Like many natural disasters, including those in Ontario, the scope and complexity of the
2009 bushfires in Australia made it "difficult to extract the right lessons, because its
precipitating causes and consequences are so numerous and so deeply intertwined” (Leonard &
Howitt, 2010, p. 373). This is at the centre of the challenge in designing response models.
From the early 1980s until now, governments at all three levels in Canada underwent
drastic transformations in administering their public policies. This path to change has been
referred to as new public management (NPM) and is a result of a several factors. For example,
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the adoption of neoliberalism, advancement of information and communication technologies,
globalization with its related economic, social, and political changes, as well as deficit budgets
and continued pressure on governments to maintain financial order have all influenced this
shift in governance.
NPM allows the public sector to operate with a more business-like approach using key
performance indicators to measure its progress. This involves governments downloading
services to NPOs and charities by way of subsidies, while other government services are
contracted out or privatized. Regarding the non-profit sector, “Canadians would like more
information about how their donations are used and the programs that charities deliver, as well
as information about the impact of their activities” (Hall et al., 2005, p. 27). As a result of the
shift towards NPM and decentralization, there has been an increased demand for
accountability in both the public and non-profit sectors.
Due to these substantial changes in the principles of governance, it is crucial to
implement mechanisms that uphold high standards of accountability and promote the
sustainability of NPOs. Canada possesses many similarities to Australia in shifting governance
towards a decentralized model (due to the adoption of NPM) and so there are useful lessons
that can be learned from the Australian experience.
Due to Canada’s geographic size, coordinating the efforts of a large network of
organizations may be more useful than unifying diverse and independent organizations into
one entity controlled by a single command centre (Leonard & Howitt, 2010). Perhaps the most
compelling reason to adopt a decentralized model to disaster response is that communication
lines are much shorter and important information is less likely to get lost or misconstrued as it
travels through the chain of command. The Incident Management System used in Australia
employs a unified command approach where “each organisation continues to work under the
authority and direction of its own command structure, but those structures are brought
together around a table so that organisational leaders can jointly consider the best course of
action” (Leonard & Howitt, 2010, p. 381). IMS results in a quicker, more accurate, and
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successful response both during the emergency event itself and in recovery efforts. In addition,
the system provides structure and consistent procedures for assessing and addressing
situations. Decentralization results in better training of local leaders and teams to recognize
situations and respond without having to wait for instructions and approval; local teams that
are willing and trusted to operate on their own; and a centralized structure in place to assist
with coordination, communication, support, and resource allocation.
Local, provincial, and federal governments in Canada could focus on the bottom-up
approach to improve accountability, as the control and command approach is not suitable for
disaster management in this context. Canadian governments could adopt upward and internal
accountability to promote donations from various organizations, assemble volunteers to help
promote the cause, and make the organizations more attractive for volunteers to join. In
addition, having manuals and reports that are easily accessible, comprehensible, and
manoeuvrable by the general public is essential as volunteers are often from the general public.
To promote sustainability, non-profits in Canada and Ontario may aim to create
relationships with other organizations, should their area be easily or frequently affected by
natural disasters. In addition, these non-profits would maintain strong associations with local
governments as disasters often affect communities differently; and programs should therefore
be flexible in order to sustain community specific needs. Canadian disaster management policy,
whether federal or at a local level, should be clear in terms of roles and responsibilities. Having
language that is too general, such as the four pillars of the Australian NSDR, will limit its
application and confuse different jurisdictions and organizations over the appropriate course of
action.
A few specific recommendations made by the Royal Commission (2009) that may be
considered by policy makers in Ontario include: implementing disaster resiliency training for
schools and communities; new and better evacuation planning; more emergency shelters in
high-risk areas; graded scale of emergency declaration and improved warning systems; buying
land from homeowners in the most at-risk areas; major policy changes regarding responsibility
to stay or leave; and the appointment of an independent fire commissioner for the province.
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Conclusion
The 2009 Bushfires in Victoria provide an opportunity to learn about emergency events
that affect many communities and involve multiple responders. The environmental
circumstances that led to the disaster in Victoria were much like those of the Fort McMurray
fire in Alberta, but were spread out over many small communities. In Ontario, there is a
potential for an emergency that impacts many different communities with multiple
organizations involved in response efforts. In many parts of the province, even in geographically
smaller areas than those impacted by the bushfires, emergency management would involve
multiple responders including the government, private sector, and non-profit organizations.
Lack of strong leadership and organizational design is a common theme when reviewing
responses to emergency events. Criticism over the response and inadequacy of central
leadership during the bushfires in Victoria suggests that a decentralized model in combination
with coordinated centralized supports would be a more appropriate model to apply in
emergency management. As Australia continues to promote the idea of shared responsibility in
disaster management through decentralization, subsequent issues on accountability and
sustainability may arise. Governments at all levels should work to promote flexibility and
autonomy in disaster management response in order to increase the sustainability of nonprofits, and encourage bottom-up accountability. This will increase the services and goods
provided to several communities in need as the third sector continues to increase its role in this
area.
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References
Australian Government (2011) National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, Attorney General’s
Department, Barton ACT. Accessed 12 June 2016.
Candler, G., & Dumont, G. (2010). A non-profit accountability framework. Canadian Public
Administration,53(2), 259-279.
Emergency Management Victoria (EMV). (2013). Emergency management agency roles in
emergency management manual Victoria. State of Victoria (Emergency Management
Victoria). http://fire-com-live-wp.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/20140626040548/Part-7-EMMV1.pdf
Jones, K., & Webber, R. (2012). Looking for sustainability in not‐for‐profit program delivery: An
experiment in providing post‐bushfire recovery programs. Australian Journal of Public
Administration, 71(4), 412-422.
Leonard, H. B., & Howitt, A. M. (2010). Organising response to extreme emergencies: The
Victorian bushfires of 2009: Organising response to extreme emergencies. Australian
Journal of Public Administration, 69(4), 372-386.
Royal Commission.(2009). 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report. Retrieved
from: http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/finaldocuments/summary/PF/VBRC_Sum
mary_PF.pdf
Singh-Peterson, L., Salmon, P., Baldwin, C., & Goode, N. (2015). Deconstructing the concept of
shared responsibility for disaster resilience: A sunshine coast case study, Australia.
Natural Hazards, 79(2), 755-774.
Taylor D., Meredith T., & Shannon S. (2014). Downward accountability for a natural disaster
recovery effort: Evidence and issues from Australia's Black Saturday. Critical Perspectives
on Accounting, 25(7), 633-651.
The Salvation Army. (2015). Victoria bushfires – 2009. The Salvation Army Australia Southern
Territory. http://www.salvationarmy.org.au/en/Who-We-Are/our-work/Emergencyservices/-Attended-Emergencies/Victoria-bushfires---2009/
Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (VBRRA). (2011). Legacy report
overview. 1-56.
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https://www.rdv.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/1151090/VBRRA-LegacyReport-Summary.pdf
Victoria State Government. (2014). 2009 Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund. State Government of
Victoria, Australia, Department of Human Resources
http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au/bushfireappeal
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Chapter Five
JURISDICTIONAL SCAN: CALIFORNIA
By: James Hutchins and Liam Stormonth
Summary
As a result of its location on the San Andreas Fault line and its arid climate, California faces
threat of flooding, landslides, heat waves, wildfires, and earthquakes. The near omnipresent
threat of disaster coupled with a duality of individual and collective action makes California
an interesting case study for emergency management.
Introduction
Located on the Southwest coast of the United States, California’s population is over 38
million people, which makes it the most populous constituent unit in the United States and
larger than Canada. Its community is relatively heterogeneous with large White and HispanicLatino communities. This makes for a diverse state with multiple social and political viewpoints.
Although California supports a vibrant community, there are significant environmental
and climate issues that affect its citizens. In addition to extreme weather, California is prone to
a wide variety of natural disasters. This poses both a public policy problem for government, and
a private problem for the community at large. In California, first responders to natural disasters
are generally community organizations and/or non-profit organizations who aim to alleviate
some of the pressures of natural disasters. This is specifically the case in the U.S where large-
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scale organizations such as the Red Cross will partner with local groups to respond to natural
disasters.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the development of disaster management
strategies in California and analyze some of the underlying characteristics and processes that
have shaped the state’s particular style of crisis response. This chapter will be divided into four
key sections. Initially, there will be a discussion regarding the competing ideologies in
California. This section will identify the combination of individualistic and collectivist
approaches Californian culture has developed and how those approaches influence their
disaster management systems. Secondly, the paper will distinguish between bottom-up and
top-down approaches to disaster response. In California, residents originally pinpointed
disaster management as a pressing concern. This is in contrast to the government directing
disaster management planning, which emphasizes the importance of top-level decision-making
and citizen compliance with those decisions. Thirdly, the hidden processes that mold a society’s
ability to adapt to natural disasters will be examined in an analysis of resilience theory and the
ways that it interacts with intrinsic societal characteristics and shapes the directional velocity of
crisis response. The fourth section will introduce the 2003 Cedar Fires of San Diego as a case
study and examine the degree to which individualist/collectivist values, top-down or bottom-up
crisis response structures and resilient adaptation were involved in the ultimate response to the
aftermath.
Individualist and Collectivist Mindsets in California Disaster Management
Ideologically, cultures have been divided into two major categories; those that exhibit
collectivist tendencies and those that feature individualism. Most of the United States is
typically labeled by scholars as a largely individualistic culture that focuses upon self-reliance.
This culture has formed from distinct liberal thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and
Alexander Hamilton and is thus deeply rooted into American culture. This individualistic label
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extends to California wherein the state has developed strong values such as individual
autonomy, uniqueness and self-fulfillment.
However, there is an odd association in California between individualist and collectivist
cultures due to the specific location of the state on the Western coast of the U.S. As previously
mentioned, California is a vulnerable area in regards to natural disasters. Resting upon the San
Andreas Fault Line, it is is subject to earthquakes, forest fires, flooding, landslides and droughts.
While California has developed systems to respond to these specific natural disasters, the
ideological mindset of the state is affected by its geographic vulnerability.
According to Dr. Harry Triandis (2009), a professor of psychology at the University of
Illinois, the environment and climate in which a community develops affects its ideological
culture. In California, the need to collectively plan disaster management systems to ensure
community safety has impacted their culture. Planning in this environment requires additional
citizen engagement, coordination and resources to ensure a strong response to natural
disasters. In California, natural disaster management and community planning representatives
have had to collaborate to safeguard the public. This has mutated the traditionally
individualistic culture of California and created one that recognizes the need for collectivist
action.
Alternatively, it is worth noting that some scholars disagree with Triandis’ position.
According to a study published by the Association of Psychological Science, natural disasters
have an inverse effect upon culture. The authors suggest that natural disasters actually
reinforce the dominant values of the community’s culture (Grossman & Varnum, 2015). In
California, for example, the dominant values of individualism and self-reliance are then
exacerbated by natural disasters.
Fundamentally, both of these ideas have value in California. There is ample evidence of
citizens having demonstrated both individualistic and collectivist values in response to disaster
management. For example, some older citizens feel self-reliant and resistant to engaging in
community based planning. In response to the flooding in the District of Sacramento in the
early 1970s, certain property owners refused to remove themselves from the endangered area.
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These residents were aware of the environmental consequences of having property there, but
decided to remain. Their decision stemmed from a strong belief in their own self-reliance and
ability to overcome a natural disaster that had been bolstered by surviving the first flood
(Sacramento District, 2013).
From the collectivist standpoint, it is also evident that the necessity to collaborate when
addressing disaster management is vital to an organized response. For example, the
Neighborhood Emergency Response Team (NERT) is an organization based in San Francisco,
California. Comprised of employees of the San Francisco Fire Department, the goal of the
organization is to train proactive citizens in disaster management (“Neighborhood Emergency
Response,” n.d.). Some of the topics covered in the training include initiating a strong first
response, basic first aid and resource management. This demonstrates the collectivist
orientation as citizens are actively engaging in their community in an effort to help alleviate
potential community pressures.
Lastly, it is important to reiterate the significant link between culture and environment.
Ecological environments heavily influence culture behaviours and characteristics. For instance,
if there are fish located in the environment of a specific culture, it is likely that the community
will be dependent on fish as a source of food (Triandis, 2009). Similarly, in California, the
prevalence of natural disasters as a result of the environment and climate has dictated that the
culture adapt to the need to respond to disaster, including create a need for greater community
organization and planning.
Bottom-Up Approaches to Disaster Management
Normatively, citizens should want to participate and enact change in their communities.
This is especially true in California where natural disasters can dictate the plans of the state.
Fortunately, there are measures that have been put in place that urge citizens to approach their
governmental leaders with strategies to mitigate risk and disaster. This has been well received
in California with programs such as NERT developing due to citizen interest.
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However, this bottom-up approach was originally seen as outside the norm. Following
the traditional methods of creating policy, governments would often consult with citizens
instead of fully integrating them into the decision-making process. This was even furthered with
the initial rationale behind engaging citizens concerning natural disaster planning. Originally,
government officials operated under the impression that being transparent and offering public
deliberation regarding disaster management would cause panic and possible fleeing (Pearce,
2003, 217). However, with the success of neighbourhood programs and NERT, communities
began utilizing their right to understand and participate in the disaster planning process.
Bottom up, or citizen driven engagement is thus becoming an important aspect of the
disaster management process in California. By creating these avenues wherein citizens can
engage publicly about the resources required to mitigate disaster risk, they are actively
safeguarding their community. They are also properly developing their democratic right of
gathering information and responding to that information based on their own personal values
(Pearce, 2003). More than just accessing information from government though, citizens need to
engage non-governmental institutions to gain a holistic view in which they can evaluate the
disaster management issues.
One specific case in California that utilized a strong citizen engagement was in Portola
Valley. In the 1960s, the municipality of Portola Valley decided that they would develop the
community and incorporate it into San Francisco. The goal was to preserve the community,
maintain the beauty of the area and build additional real estate.
There were clearly some problems with the development. On the East bank, where the
majority of the real estate development was planned, there were significant hazards that
community planners acknowledged during the process including the potential threat of
landslides. A committee was established to maintain the beauty and safety of the community.
They made several recommendations such as avoiding fault lines, acknowledging geological
safety and retaining a geological engineer (Pearce, 2003). However, the municipality decided to
proceed with the project and constructed multiple properties in a hazardous zone.
Approximately two years after the first subdivision had been completed, landslides began
decimating the development plans (ibid.). This decision was made without community
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participation or positive acknowledgment from disaster management planning. which hindered
the project and the relationship between the municipality and its constituents.
In response, the city asked the original committee leader, Dwight Crowder, to reorganize a panel drawing from the experiences of past and recent landslides. The committee
essentially came to similar conclusions as the original, except it added that there should be a
user-friendly public document that exhibited all the areas in the region prone to natural
disasters. The geological hazards map was useful in engaging the public, especially considering
much of the project required technical knowledge that individuals in the community would not
likely have (Pearce, 2003). This actually helped bridge the technical redesign of the
development project with citizens and property owners. The committee, with help from
Portola Valley officials, also created slope density regulations in zoning. This decision was done
in collaboration with citizens, whose primary desire was to preserve the natural beauty of their
community (Pearce, 2003). The citizens found consensus in developing properties in lowdensity areas and as a result, there was a 60% reduction from the initial amount of land.
Resilience Theory and Transformational Adaptation
While cultural factors such as collectivism and individualism have an important part to
play in shaping the response of societies like California to natural disasters, scholars have in
recent years been examining the interplay between cultural institutions and knowledge transfer
in the study of resilience (Turner & Burkes, 2006). Resilience theorists argue that, while natural
disasters are capable of destroying entire cultures, they are also unique opportunities for
cultures to build community knowledge and catalyze new ways of responding to threats - so
long as knowledge can be transferred to future generations. While hurricanes, tsunamis, and
earthquakes can all be important determinants of the palatability of different terrains for
human settlement, brush fires such as those that occur in California annually can be unique
opportunities for societies to reflect on their relationships with the natural world and for
dialogue to occur on a large scale. Out-of-control wildfires become international news stories,
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and the natural emotional response of terror and awe can be powerful delivery devices for new
knowledge about the ecological order of things. These fires act as signal events, letting the
public know that there is something wrong with the balance between populations and their
environments (Slovic, 1991).
Resilience theory relies on a balance between collectivist and individualist values,
hinging on the ability for societies to co-opt radical and new responses to crisis proposed by
individuals while also requiring a collectivist approach to societal management that facilitates
the transmission of experience and new ideas. The earliest to be described as “resilient
societies” were nomadic tribes wandering the grasslands of Africa, such as the Sahelian nomads
who formed relationships with settled communities and adapted migration routes in order to
overcome recurring droughts (Lovejoy & Baier, 1975). These cultures relied on oral traditions
and social structures that allowed for innovative practices while facilitating the communal
transfer of knowledge.
Resilience theorists argue that transformational adaptation occurs in a double loop
structure. Signal events like wildfires catalyze the formation of new knowledge about humanecosystem relationships. This knowledge is then transformed into new practices, such as the
deviation from traditional migration routes in the Sahelian case. The development of
knowledge into practice constitutes the first loop of adaption. The second loop occurs over
time, as new practices influence the formal structures and codes of society as well as the
customs and informal norms that constitute institutions (Turner & Berkes, 2006).
Beyond the structural necessities for adaptational transformation, resilience theory also
relies on societal openness to new solutions or ideas in response to signal events. Increasingly,
resilience theorists have examined the long amount of time it takes for primeval resilient
societies to adapt knowledge into traditional institutions to find shortcuts to transformation
(Turner & Berkes, 2006). This research has found a correlation between looser hierarchical
structures and the lasting sustainment of innovation (Gunderson, 1999). Informal networks
between communities help to cut down the amount of time that adaptational transformation
has traditionally required.
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While disasters present an opportunity for the catalyzation of new ideas and ways of
relating to the natural world, there is a societal pressure in modern communities for a return to
the status quo. Resilience theorists assert that this normalization of disastrous events can occur
in two different ways: one that facilitates adaptation and resilient transformation and one that
inhibits it. Resiliency theory is a useful lense in which to examine post disaster response. In
democratic societies like California, a bungled response to a crisis can end political dynasties.
Democratic governments therefore expend a great deal of effort on erasing the visible effects
of a natural disaster as quickly as possible (Goldstein, 2007). Facilitative normalization of
natural disasters for resilience theorists occurs where the post-crisis opportunity for the
evolution of crisis response is leveraged to create new knowledge and practices. In turn, these
shape the cultural perception of disasters and by extension the relationship between a
community and their natural surroundings. The effects of this pressure on California’s crisis
response mechanisms will be discussed in the case study analysis in the following section.
Case Study: The Cedar Fires of 2003
In his article “Skunkworks in the Embers of the Cedar Fire: Enhancing Resilience in the
Aftermath of Disaster,” Bruce Evan Goldstein (2007) adopts a resilience theorist analysis of
what was at the time the largest wildfire in California history. The Cedar Fire began when a lost
hunter lit a signal fire to call for help. Every Autumn Southern California experiences a dry
season when low humidity and the infamous “Santa Ana” winds stir small brush fires into
uncontrollable wildfires. The brushland of Southern California and coastal Mexico is covered in
a scrub brush called “chapparal” that, while highly flammable, is a native species and part of
California’s natural fire cycle. Climate change and continued human interference with the
natural environment has resulted in seasonal wildfires over the past three decades.
Unfortunately, because the signal fire was lit in October, the chapparal was dried out and acted
as tinder, with the fire rapidly spreading through the surrounding shrublands. The roadless
shrubland area where the fire began was adjacent to a complex patchwork of houses and
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twisting roads, complicating initial efforts to combat the blaze and putting people and homes in
harm’s way (Goldstein, 2007). The flames spread overnight, covering 100,000 acres by the next
morning and threatening the suburbs of San Diego. Firefighters and disaster management
agencies were already strained with the eleven concurrent wildfires occurring across Southern
California concurrently, leading to reduced resources available to allocate to the Cedar Fire. The
fire ultimately spread to burn 273,246 acres around San Diego, killing 14 people and consuming
2,232 homes (ibid.).
Goldstein (2007) argues that, in California’s case, government and societal need for a
cessation of trauma and return to the status quo has resulted in a negative form of
normalization of natural disasters like fire. There are immense pressures for cleanup,
rebuilding, and a return to routine. The increased frequency of wildfire occurrence has led to a
protracted normalization period, and the unique societal characteristics of California have
combined in a counterintuitive way to result in an ever-expanding urban sprawl that pushes
further into the highly flammable shrubland on an annual basis. In the months immediately
following major fires, inordinately high expenditures are poured into fire research and
containment facilities. Government spends on awareness campaigns and neighbourhood
prevention programs like the aforementioned NERT and a widespread network of programs
called “FireSafe Councils” (Goldstein, 2007). Citizens are indirectly discouraged from accepting
the wildfires as a natural part of California’s ecological cycle and instead led to believe that such
disasters are avoidable with the right combination of citizen and government-led prevention
and control programs. The emphasis on outward displays of individuality that is especially
evident in home construction has resulted in the grounding of construction decisions in
aesthetics rather than logic. Cedar-shake roofing and other flammable materials are commonly
utilized in house design, and complex landscaping involving long, winding driveways and a
patchwork of roads are constructed to connect these new developments (IBID.). The conflict
between bottom-up and top-down responses to crisis management is also evident in this case,
with homeowners making decisions based on individualistic needs for self-expression and
trumping the government’s desire for residential developments to be confined to areas outside
of the chaparral brushlands. But resilience theorists would argue that it is this situation of
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recurring natural disaster that devastates but does not extinguish societies that is best suited to
resilient adaptation. In the case of Southern California, the lack of an informal network of
innovation-minded individuals and the overbearing hierarchy of top-down rules and regulations
around disaster management was effectively stifling this transformation.
The Cedar Fires saw a unique opportunity for resilient transformation in the
establishment of the San Diego Fire Recovery Network (SDFRN) in the days immediately
following the disaster. The SDFRN was founded by a group of scientist-activists, land-managers
and ecological consultants who were all involved in environmental sustainability efforts in the
community and were concerned about the impacts of unfettered urban sprawl on biodiversity
and community resilience (Goldstein, 2007). In the aftermath of the blaze, the SDFRN drafted a
series of general messages that called for the government and general public to adopt land use
practices that were better suited to Californian wildfires’ rhythms (ibid.) While San Diego was
outraged with fire control agencies and the government and saw the impact of the fire as a
direct consequence of public mismanagement, SDFRN instead confined their criticism to four
specific government responses.
Firstly, SDFRN encouraged a shift from dependency on government and erosion control
as disaster management mechanisms to an emphasis on citizen-led initiatives and volunteerism
(Goldstein, 2007). Instead of the proposed plan to hydo-mulch charred areas in order to
prevent potential landslides as a result of erosion, SDFRN encouraged the development of a
citizen brigade to create straw bale barriers and allow the chaparral shrubbery to naturally recolonize the burned shrublands. This would fulfill a dual function, helping to diminish the
perception that government can protect citizens against wildfires while simultaneously
increasing the capacity of the surrounding community to adopt new practices and facilitate
adaptational transformation.
The second response aimed to foster the practice of shelter-in-place after the Australian
model, and the diminishment of the notion that enhancing firefighting capacity could save
people from disaster (Goldstein, 2007). This strategy strove to take advantage of some of the
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individualistic aspects of Californian society, encouraging citizens to take personal responsibility
for their decision to live in fire-prone areas. In order to facilitate this change, SDFRN conducted
workshops and an exhibition to teach citizens fire-resistant home construction techniques,
transmitting both knowledge and new practices to the wider population.
SDFRN encouraged the development of a network of local experts in native vegetation
in response to a government-led chaparral-pruning program (Goldstein, 2007). The government
program mandated the removal of chaparral from within 100 yards of residences, an act that
the experts in the SDFRN knew would lead to the re-colonization of the area by more
flammable non-native grass species. The SDFRN initiated an awareness campaign of native,
flame-resistant species that could be planted in place of chaparral.
Finally, while the SDFRN was supportive of the FireSafe Council program and
community-based approaches to disaster response more broadly, the group was critical of the
massive amounts of money being spent by government on a program that had little influence
over land use decisions (Goldstein, 2007). The SDFRN envisioned the expansion of its message
and proposed practices to the FireSafe Councils, and the enhancement of the FireSafe Councils
into community-planning agencies, rather than just preventative councils.
While the development of the San Diego Fire Response Network represented an ideal
delivery device for transformational adaptation, the bureaucratic and regulatory environment
of Southern California managed to successfully stifle the opportunity. Within six months of the
blaze, the status quo had resumed. The SDFRN had attempted to expand by applying for
government grants for coordinators and office equipment, but after public squabbles with
government officials these applications were denied (Goldstein, 2007). Citizens in turn blamed
fire management agencies and elected officials for the destruction. Government responded to
the criticism by framing the fire as a breach in the fire safety apparatus and advocated for
greater command-and-control capacity. $40 million was spent on a rural chaparral-clearing
program and the government invested in a new helicopter (ibid.). One year after the blaze, the
San Diego Fire Response Network disbanded.
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Conclusion and Lessons Learned
California is the most populous state in the United States and home to one of its most
diverse and vibrant populations. Unfortunately, California is also prone to a wide variety of
natural disasters. As discussed throughout the chapter, the way that California responds to
natural disasters is largely determined by the cultural values and historical norms that have
shaped both the formal responses and institutions responsible for crisis response. To the extent
that these values and norms are shared by Ontarians, there is much for Ontario to learn from
Californian response to natural disasters.
Californian society has been shaped by both collectivist and individualistic cultural
values. These values have been shaped by the prevalence of disasters as much as they have
shaped crisis response. Ontario is not dissimilar form California in this blend of collectivist and
individualist approaches to social behavior. Ontario is inherently shaped by values of fairness
and equality of outcome as well as opportunity that characterize all territories within Canada,
but a strong sense of individual responsibility denotes Ontario’s cultural inheritance from Great
Britain. Third sector organizations with a mandate to provide support in the event of natural
disasters could learn from the ways that similar organizations have harnessed both these
aspects of cultural values in California – leveraging communitarian tendencies to galvanize wide
civic participation while stressing individualist responsibilities for contributing to Ontario’s
wider society.
While Ontario is far less prone to the perennial crises that plague California, non-profit
and charitable organizations in Ontario can benefit from the experience of the SDFRN when
trying to catalyze the transformational adaptation that resilience theorists focus so heavily on.
It is likely that, given the generally closer relationship between government and third sector
organizations in Canada as compared with their American counterparts, Ontarian charitable
organizations would face less entrenched resistance to innovative disaster response. If there is
one sweeping lesson to be drawn from the Californian experience in disaster management visà-vis third sector organizations, it is that those organizations have nothing to lose and
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everything to gain from incorporating cultural values and historical norms in determining their
approach to government and the general public. In order to successfully occupy a space
between citizens and government in Canada, Ontario’s third sector organizations need to
consider the intrinsic characteristics of the communities they serve at least as much as they
consider the institutions and habits of government.
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References
Goldstein, B.E. (2007). Skunkworks In the Embers of the Cedar Fire: Enhancing Societal
Resilience in the Aftermath of Disaster. Human Ecology, 36(1): 15-28
Gunderson, L. (1999). Resilience, Flexibility and Adaptive Management: Antidotes for Spurious
Certitude? Conservation Ecology, 3(1): 7.
Lovejoy, P. E., & Baier, S. (1975). The Desert-side Economy of the Central Sudan. The
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 8(4): 551-581
Pearce, L. (2003, March). Disaster Management and Community Planning, and Public
Participation: How to Achieve Sustainable Hazard Mitigation. Natural Hazards, 28(2),
211-228.
Sacramento District (2013). California’s Greatest Natural Disaster: Do you know your risk?
Retrieved June 18, 2016, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYXgAUvZwdw
Slovic, P. (1991). Beyond numbers: A broader perspective on risk perception and
communication. Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Communication eds.
D.G.H.R. Mayo. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 48-65.
Triandis, H. (2009). Ecological Determinants of Cultural Variation (R. S. Wyer, C. Chiu, & amp; Y.
Hong, Eds.). In Understanding culture: Theory, research, and application. New York:
Psychology Press.
Turner, N. J., and Berkes, F. (2006). Coming to Understanding: Developing Conservation through
Incremental Learning in the Pacific Northwest. Human Ecology 34(4): 495-513.
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Chapter Six
RECOMMENDATIONS
By: Naveed Ahmed, Tim Gao, Helen Harris, and Alanna Wierenga
Summary
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, emergency management is a complex, multilayered, and multi-faceted undertaking. Responding quickly and effectively to disasters, and
ensuring that appropriate measures are in place to prevent or mitigate future events, requires
coordinated efforts between government, NPOs, and the private sector. This chapter will
explore how best to leverage the resources and expertise of all of these actors.
Introduction
As has been highlighted throughout this document, disaster management across the
globe is multifaceted with many intricacies and nuances that impact the approaches countries
take. These variations in disaster management approaches happen despite similar frameworks
being used across jurisdictions to plan, coordinate and implement strategies that address the
four components of a comprehensive disaster management plan: mitigation and prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery (Public Safety, 2011). The cultural context of a country
plays a role in all components of a disaster management plan, therefore Canada's plan must
take into account a decidedly unique Canadian culture and geography.
Canada is a multi-cultural country. Urban centers in particular, have diverse populations
and a substantial proportion of people who speak a language other than English or French as
their primary language. This diversity changes the nature of community organizing in Canada
and presents unique challenges and opportunities for emergency management. Further, much
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of Canada's population is clustered around the southern border of the country and closer to
major cities (Destatis, 2016a). Accounting for the different needs and characteristics of vast,
sparsely populated, rural and northern areas and densely populated urban ones, from a
geographic and cultural perspective makes developing a Canada-wide disaster management
plan challenging. In developing recommendations, these factors were considered.
The previous chapters of this position paper highlighted several key themes in disaster
management, and these were explored and analyzed to develop specific recommendations for
key Canadian stakeholders to consider in disaster management planning and practice.
Interestingly, these themes aligned well with six key research priority areas that the Australian
Centre for Disaster Management and Public Safety (2016) consider to be critical for enhancing
disaster management practice and policy over the next three years. The six areas are:
1. Understanding natural disasters;
2. Enhanced decision making;
3. Technology;
4. Strengthening community resiliency;
5. Mission critical communications; and
6. Policy (Centre for Disaster Management and Public Safety, 2016, p. 1)
Three of these areas serve as the foundation for the development of the current
recommendations for Ontario and, more generally, Canada. They are: understanding natural
disasters; enhancing technology; and strengthening community resiliency. Building upon the
findings presented throughout this paper, recommendations around enhancing mitigation as a
central component of the disaster management framework, are also included.
Mitigation and Risk Reduction
Mitigation and risk reduction in disaster management discourse is defined as actions
taken before or after a hazardous event to reduce impacts on people and property (Godschalk,
1991; Mileti 1999; as cited in Henstra & McBean, 2005, p.304). Further, Gow (2007) states that
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"disaster mitigation reduces or eliminates the long-term impacts and risks associated with
disasters. Measures are generally taken well in advance of a potential disaster situation [...] it is
an investment in our future" (Public Safety Canada, 2005a; as cited in Gow, 2007, p. 3). Risk
reduction requires disaster management policy makers and practitioners to identify the risk of
harm to people and property through the identification of inherent and potential risks and
work to implement plans to eliminate these risks. Examples of disaster mitigation efforts
include structural measures, such as dams or seawalls, constructed to control or contain a
hazard; land-use management, such as zoning regulations which prohibit or regulate
construction in hazardous areas; building regulations, including the enforcement of minimum
standards for disaster resistance; and warning systems to inform people of an impending
disaster (Henstra & McBean, 2005).
Historically, disaster management across the globe has focused on cleanup and recovery
once a disaster has already happened. Researchers are now making a strong case for why there
should be greater focus on mitigation and risk reduction. As Henstra and McBean (2005) state,
climate change, large populations and property, increasing economic and technological
interdependence and environmental degradation are some of the factors converging to
increase the likelihood, magnitude and diversity of disasters in years to come, thus making the
case for greater focus on mitigation and risk reduction. Further, Gow (2007) points to rapidly
rising costs of disaster recovery and human suffering as key catalysts for introducing more
mitigation and risk reduction into disaster management practice and planning.
There is support for mitigation in the Emergency Management Framework for Canada
published by Public Safety (2011) which states that a risk-based approach, "emphasizes the
importance of assessing vulnerability to all hazards in order to determine the optimal balance
and integration of measures to address vulnerabilities and risks" (p. 11). However, the policy
lacks actionable commitments that would enable the implementation of mitigation. It is clear
from the research that mitigation and risk reduction is an important and missing component of
Canadian disaster management planning. In response to this gap, the following
recommendations are made with the intent of increasing the focus on and action around
planning mitigation and risk reduction measures in Canada.
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Recommendations to Enhance Mitigation and Risk Reduction
1. Increase commitment to risk mitigation
Governments at all levels should prioritize mitigation and risk reduction on the policy agenda.
These policies would be further enhanced by increasing opportunities for NGOs to engage in
planning through partnerships. These actions are required to shift planning and practice from
mostly recovery-based projects and initiatives to more mitigation and risk reduction initiatives.
Despite the support of policy makers and the policy community as a whole, there has been little
action taken by levels of government to propose, mandate and/or create comprehensive
mitigation and risk reduction plans in Canada. In terms of mitigation plans, Canada has fallen
behind other countries that have also experienced significant impacts on people and property
due to disasters.
2. Change funding to facilitate mitigation projects and improve cost sharing
Currently, the majority of public expenditures are directed towards recovery. The federal cost
sharing model administered under the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) kicks
in and provides a portion of money to provincial governments once the cost of recovery
exceeds $1 per capita (Henstra & McBean, 2005). While cost sharing agreements between
federal and provincial governments for recovery efforts are clear, there is no robust funding
agreement for mitigation measures. Incentivizing mitigation measures by governments and
NPOs by providing funding for projects in this area requires a new funding regime. This would
have the added benefit of saving money, as the DFAA has no fixed cap and without mitigation,
the costs of providing recovery funding are estimated to increase over the next decade
(Henstra & McBean, 2005).
3. Consistent and coordinated research and advocacy
There is a growing body of research around the necessity of mitigation and risk reduction plans
in disaster management. Further research is needed to demonstrate the value of mitigation and
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risk reduction plans and to create evidence-based support for more initiatives in this area.
Researchers must assess the various ways to engage stakeholders and the public in order to
ensure that mitigation and risk reduction is assigned high priority. This type of research will
facilitate sustained focus on mitigation and risk reduction as a key component to disaster
management planning. Further, it provides an avenue to engage and leverage the resources of
the NPOs and diverse community groups. Engaging these groups in mitigation leverages other
funding and human resources for implementation of initiatives and ensures that programs are
tailored to community needs.
4. Expand mitigation research to assess the social roots of risk and vulnerability
Whether undertaken by the public organizations, NPOs, or as a joint initiative, an exploration of
Canada's population that identifies key community needs and characteristics is necessary.
There are populations that experience greater inequities based on factors like income,
education and gender as compared to other groups, concentrated analysis is required to
determine how to equitably plan mitigation and risk reduction strategies for everyone.
Moreover, involving the general public as stakeholders in disaster mitigation and risk reduction
planning can increase overall awareness and buy-in for plans created.
Improving our Understanding of Natural Disasters
Natural disasters fall into three categories: hydrometeorological, which includes floods,
storms, and heat waves; climatological, including droughts and wildfires; and geophysical, such
as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. There is a growing body of evidence linking the global
increase of hydrometeorological and climatological events to anthropomorphic climate
change.Anthropomorphic climate change is the statistical deviation in global temperature
caused by human economic activities that lead to the release of carbon dioxide, methane and
other greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere. An increase in the global temperature of
2 degrees Celsius as a result of GHG emissions is anticipated to cause catastrophic
consequences (IPCC 2007; Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Rising sea and humidity levels due to
global warming have been shown to contribute to devastating hydrometeorological and
climatological events by creating the conditions for these events to be more frequent and
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intense (Thomas & Lopez, 2015). Furthermore, increasing temperatures can trigger feedback
cycles such as the thawing of permafrost and raising ocean temperatures which, in turn, release
more GHGs into the atmosphere, accelerating the rate of global warming (IPCC, 2007). Since
2000, over 1 million people worldwide have died from natural disasters, with the cost of
damage estimated at over $1.7 trillion (Guha-Sapir, Below and Hoyois, 2015). The scientific
consensus is that climate change is an urgent issue and significantly increases the risk of natural
disasters.
Climate mitigation and climate adaptation should form part of the national actions for
disaster risk reduction. Although it is difficult to attribute precisely how much climate change
has influenced each natural disaster, history shows, and climate models predict, that natural
disasters are becoming more intense and frequent (IPCC, 2007). Understanding this crucial link
between climate change and natural disasters is the first step in long-term natural disaster
mitigation – climate mitigation and climate adaptation should form part of the actions for
disaster risk reduction (Thomas & Lopez, 2015). This would likely require intergovernmental
collaboration to access the resources and convening power of the federal government, and
bottom-up, community-centred practices developed from the provinces and their private and
NPO partners.
Recommendations Related to Improving our Understanding of Natural Disasters
1. Lower GHG Emissions
Developed countries such as Canada would need to follow through with the international
agreement reached at the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Paris, also called COP21, to limit
global warming to 1.5 degree Celsius. To achieve this would require implementing the programs
and initiatives necessary to decarbonize the economy by 40-70% by 2050 and to be carbonneutral or carbon-negative by the end of the century the latest (UNCCC, 2015). Governments
have the ability to accelerate this change through command and control initiatives like carbon
pricing. However, there is also opportunity for governments and NPOs to partner on initiatives
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to change consumer and industrial behaviour in order to achieve these reductions. For
example, the Ontario Climate Change Action Plan (2016) announced a partnership with Plug n’
Drive to encourage adoption of electric vehicles.
2. Maintain the Disaster Relief Public Account
As previously discussed, mitigation can help reduce the risks associated with natural disasters
and while there should be dedicated funding for mitigation measures, it is also necessary to
maintain disaster relief reserves in the order of billions of dollars. This may involve legislation to
establish an automatic transfer payment. This money should be used for all purposes necessary
to relieve the human and economic hardship, as determined provincially by committees
described below.
3. Create Disaster Risk Assessments
Provinces and municipalities should work together with the federal government and relevant
NPO's to assess the natural disaster risks for their respective regions. Key areas of focus should
be around how the geography and climate of each province create unique disaster risks these
regions are naturally prone to (i.e. wildfires in Alberta, ice storms in Ontario).
4. Establish Formal Agreements with Partners
The provinces should establish formal agreements with the private and non-profit sectors
concerning the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved in the immediate disaster
response and community rebuilding to follow. This could be accomplished by expanding the
four working groups outlined in the Canadian Disaster Management Framework to include a
mix of disaster management experts, front-line government and NPO partners, as well as
private partners (i.e. transportation, banking, insurance). Formal agreements are anticipated to
aid in clarifying cost sharing and responsibilities for emergency preparedness, mitigation, and
response.
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Enhancing Our Use of Technology
Given the increasing frequency of natural disasters in Canada, and the accompanying
potential for astronomical damages, it is imperative that science and technology be
incorporated into disaster mitigation and management to ensure that human and economic
consequences are minimized. A recently released report entitled The Third Canada-U.S.
Enhanced Resiliency Experiment (CAUSE III) was completed to examine the potential of the
deployment of technologies in remote areas aimed at improving coordination of
communication (Government of Canada, 2016). The potential for improved communication
could have impacts on the effectiveness of coordinating emergency response between
government and NPOs and agencies, improving response time and allowing rapid reactions to
evolving situations.
One study in CAUSE III explored a hypothetical scenario of a wildfire in North Montana,
Alberta, and Saskatchewan triggered by a lightning storm. On top of the rapid spread of the
forest fire, the scenario is complicated by an additional difficulty of having no previous
communications infrastructure (Government of Canada, 2016). In order to demonstrate the
utility and enhanced efficiency of wireless 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology as
compared to push-to-talk radio systems in such challenging disaster response scenarios,
researchers deployed a network of LTE. One of the systems featured a large helium filled
balloon that flew at approximately 200 metres above ground, equipped with a system that
provides coverage at a range much larger than a regular cellular tower (ibid.). The incremental
time savings demonstrated in this project have important implications in disaster response. In
addition, compared to an immobile cellular tower, the latest communication technology can be
deployed anywhere, and the types of information include e-mails, photos, live stream videos,
and real-time interactive maps. As demonstrated in this experiment, use of these systems has
the potential to change how disaster management is coordinated and managed.
In response to this growing need, an increasing number of OECD countries have
developed programs or incentives to develop and deploy new ICTs. Turkey is implementing a
new National Emergency Management Information System to more efficiently coordinate the
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communication between relevant agencies during disasters. In Australia, communication
through cellular phone technology is increasingly replacing the old voice radio system in
disaster management situations (OECD, 2011). ICTs have been highly effective in emphasizing
risk areas, liabilities and potentially affected populations. Technology deployments also have
potential in mitigation and preparation, for example the use of Wireless Sensor Networks to
monitor physical or environmental conditions, analyze and transmit data has implications for
predicting events (Rahman et al., 2016).
In addition to its utility in disaster prevention and management, ICTs have been found
to play a critical role in the post-disaster recovery process following the Great East Japan
Earthquake in 2011, which caused unprecedented damages to Japanese society (Cheng et al.,
2015). A study found that both ICT and social media have played a critical role during the postdisaster recovery process by increasing levels of social capital through building bonding trust,
network bridging and civic participation (Cheng et al., 2015). How ICTs are best deployed will
depend upon individual agencyor government priorities and resources. Understanding the
available technology is critical to preparing strong response strategies that best leverage the
various distributed resources.
Recommendations Related to Enhancing Our Use of Technology
1. Introduce and Bolster Long Term Evolution (LTE) Technology
As demonstrated by the joint experiment conducted by Canada and the United States, natural
disasters require efficient communication between all relevant parties to minimize human and
economic losses. As such, the voice radio technology used by some disaster management
organizations is outdated, and its replacement by LTE technology can potentially cut hours in
response times, save human lives, and economic properties. Achieving this goal may require
government funding to NPOs for the purchase of improved technology.
2. Utilize Information and Communication (ICT) Technologies
Many natural disasters take place in remote geological regions where it is difficult to implement
regular monitoring, thus a lot of these natural disasters have been discovered long after
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widespread and tremendous damages. To improve the detection and prevention of natural
disasters, the utilization of ICTs can allow the deployment of devices that detect risks 24/7
without human presence, and they can potentially detect the emergence of a natural disaster
long before it begins.
3. Effectively Use Social Media in the recovery period
As previously discussed, the use of social media can be extremely beneficial during the recovery
period following natural disasters since it can build social capital through establishing
community trust, network bridging and civic participation. Compared to traditional forms of
media such as newspapers and television, social media is faster, cheaper and potentially much
more accessible. Therefore the use of social media in post-disaster relief period can potentially
speed up the process and facilitate better community building. NPOs are well positioned to be
leaders in this area as they would be able to tap into their established community networks and
online presence. Further, as community based agencies, NPOs will be best positioned to
communicate in ways that are relevant and of value to their communities.
4. Re-release the National Disaster Mitigation Strategy (NDMS)
A closer look at the forms of regulatory intervention within the communications sector could
facilitate necessary safeguards and positive incentives to promote investment in new
technologies and services for mitigation and risk reduction planning (Gow, 2007).
Communication is a vital area to be addressed within all stages of disaster management.
Technology policies that are created specifically for mitigation and risk reduction are an
important component for Canada to include and work towards.
Strengthening Community Resilience
Over the past decades, the concept of community resilience has been a central
component in discussions about disaster management and preparedness. The RAND
Corporation, a global research organization focused on strengthening communities through
public policy, defines community resilience as “a measure of a community to utilize available
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resources to respond to, withstand, and recover from adverse situations” (Rand Corporation,
2016). Elaborating on this, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC) defines it as “the ability of individuals, communities, organizations or countries exposed
to disasters, crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, prepare for, reduce the impact
of, cope with and recover from the effects of shocks and stresses without compromising their
long-term prospects” (IFRC, 2014, p.6).
Many key characteristics and indicators of strong and resilient communities have been
identified by academics and practitioners. According to the IFRC (2014), the world’s preeminent
disaster response organization, a resilient community:

is knowledgeable, healthy and can meet its basic needs;

is socially cohesive; has economic opportunities;

has well-maintained and accessible infrastructure and services;

can manage its natural assets; and

is connected.
There has been extensive literature produced about the theoretical components of
community resilience and, related to this, social capital and social cohesion (Bretherton & Ride,
201; Buckland & Rahman, 1999; Masterson et al., 2014; Mathbor, 2007; Ronan & Johnston,
2005). This body of work is highly useful though it is often challenging to transform theory into
successful practices and policies at the local level. Therefore, the various toolkits and
frameworks that several diverse organizations have created to assist communities are of
extreme value. While an exhaustive comparison of these resources is beyond the scope of the
current chapter, two particularly thorough ones are worth highlighting for further review. First
the “Community Resilience Framework” developed by the IFRC in 2014, provides a foundation
and key guidelines for communities to utilize during the process of strengthening resilience.
Second, the Canadian Centre for Renewal’s (2000) “Community Resilience Manual” provides
policymakers and planners with 23 key indicators of resilient communities, suggested
interventions to meet these indicators, and worksheets for communities to use in developing
their own strategies.
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Recommendations Related to Strengthening Community Resilience
Based on a review of relevant literature and available frameworks, it is recommended
that communities engage in the following activities and priorities to develop and sustain
resilience:
1. Build Community Resilience Plans
Communities and municipalities should adapt and apply existing resilience frameworks to build,
enhance, measure and continuously monitor community resilience plans. The underlying goal
of these plans should be to develop communities that can be self-sufficient during a disaster.
The less a community relies on higher levels of government, the better it will be able to stabilize
in the event of a natural disaster. This priority will require proactive and extended cooperation
between government and NPOs. Recognizing the potential funding limitations of non-profits,
governments should develop funding agreements that encourage participation from diverse
community organizations. This funding could be dispersed through previously proposed
mitigation funding agreements.
2. Strengthen Relationships Among and Between Various Levels and Groups
Communities must work to develop, strengthen and maintain solid relationships between all
levels of government, the private sector, NPOs, and individual citizens so that these actors are
positioned to work effectively together, and can be quickly mobilized in the event of a disaster.
Beyond strengthening internal relationships, communities must also form ties with other
communities so that services can be shared to support disaster mitigation and recovery.
3. Promote Education through Curriculum Amendments and Community Initiatives
Much of the existing literature states that communities must work to promote education
related to disaster mitigation and management (Colussi, 2000; IFRC, 2014; Ronan & Johnston,
2005; Stone, 2015). This recommendation is multifaceted and must take many forms. To begin,
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disaster preparedness should be incorporated into elementary and high school curriculums so
that children are taught from a young age (Ronan & Johnston, 2005; Stone, 2015). In terms of
engaging the broader community, education could take the form of town hall meetings, social
media campaigns, and the execution of mock emergencies for training purposes. Further, as
Mathbor (2007) has advocated, training related to disaster management and preparedness
should be incorporated into the core academic curriculums of certain professions that work
closely with vulnerable populations (e.g., social workers and nurses) so that these professionals
will be equipped to respond to catastrophic events. Ongoing professional development should
also be encouraged among those who have ongoing interaction with Canada’s most vulnerable
populations (i.e. nursing home staff, child protection workers, street outreach workers).
4. Maintain and Improve Community Infrastructure and Services
A common thread throughout the literature on resilience highlights the importance of wellmaintained and robust infrastructure and services (Colussi, 2000; IFRC, 2014; Stone, 2015).
Communities must ensure that infrastructure, both physical and technological, is modern, wellmaintained and developed to withstand possible pressures. Communities must also approach
service development from an emergency management perspective, particularly in regions
where disasters or unexpected shocks are more likely. Relationships and systems should be
developed within and between services so that quick mobilization and relationships are
possible and, beyond this, organizations and governments must break away from current
neoliberal ideologies that promote lean and bare minimum service models. Instead, they must
begin to incorporate and plan for surplus capacity so that resources are ready and available in
the event of a disaster.
5. Introduce Financial Disincentives and Incentives Related to Disaster Preparedness and
Recovery
Although mandating disaster related insurance for homeowners, private businesses, or NPOs
may not be within governmental jurisdiction, Stone (2015) discusses the tool of promoting
coverage through financial incentives and disincentives. For example, the author advocates for
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the use of tax breaks or credits for those individuals or organizations that voluntarily protect
themselves with insurance. In terms of disincentives, Stone suggests that communities and
governments withhold disaster related funds from organizations that refuse to comply with
specific standards and measures in the rebuilding process following a disaster. While these
initiatives may be challenging to implement, it is recommended that communities engage in
creative ways by utilizing financial means to achieve desired ends related to disaster
management and mitigation.
Conclusion
Canada is an exceptionally diverse country that encompasses many different languages,
cultures, ways of life, and environmental and economic realities. With these considerations,
Canadian communities must engage in disaster planning that is uniquely adapted for their
individual circumstances. While there are many aspects related to this, the areas discussed
above are perhaps among the most important. The recommendations presented in this chapter
are far from exhaustive, however they provide a strong starting point for all levels of Canadian
government and communities, in addressing disaster preparedness and mitigation.
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