Spying conference vocab Amnesty- A pardon or forgiveness of transgressions. Asylum- The political concept that a person guilty of something in their home country can seek refuge in another sovereign nation. Many countries (Like U.S.A., France, and the United Kingdom) allow people who are persecuted for religious/political freedoms to seek asylum in their borders. Edward Snowden- An American former C.I.A. operative and former NSA contractor. He came to international attention when he disclosed a large number of classified NSA documents to media outlets. The leaked documents revealed operational details of global surveillance systems and outlined how the U.S. used mass surveillance (including phone tapping and email reading) on its citizens. Extradition- The official process whereby one country transfers a suspected/convicted criminal to another country. NSA- National Security Agency. The NSA is an America agency that is tasked with the global monitoring, collection, decoding, translation, and analysis of information for intelligence and counter-intelligence purposes. Sanctions- Penalties or other means of enforcement, used to persuade a country to follow laws and agreements. In the United Nations, economic sanctions are generally used. These sanctions can affect financial aid, bar certain items from being imported/exported, etc. Sovereignty- The idea that a nation has the power to make and abide by its own rules and laws. For example, the maximum speed limit in America and Canada are different because they are both independent sovereign states. Whistleblower- A person who exposes misconduct or illegal activity occurring in an organization. Edward Snowden is considered to be a whistleblower. 1 Is the United States the only nation that collects intelligence on its citizens? Hardly. Here’s a quick list of 12 other nations that are known to be monitoring their populace. 1) Germany German Chancellor Angela Merkel is not happy that the United States is spying on her. And Germans are not happy that the United States is spying on them. But does anyone care that Merkel’s government was one of the National Security Agency’s “key partners”? Der Spiegel reported that German intelligence agencies worked with the NSA to collect data on its own citizens. The software, XKeyScore, allows users to monitor and store data, some from personal messages. The government recently ended its Cold War pact with the United States and the United Kingdom to prevent any spying on German citizens. But what if that spying is done by the German government? 2) France France’s Le Monde newspaper reported that the French government is spying on its citizens in much the same way as the United States. According to the paper, the Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure collects data daily from phone calls, emails, text messages and social media accounts. It then stores the information for years. The government says the allegations are false. 3) China China spies on its own citizens — that’s no secret. The country has a vast digital empire to perform such tasks. But the domestic spying has gotten so out of control in China that its public officials are even spying on each other. Many Chinese officials have found wires in their offices and cars. Some have even found them in their showers. Communist Party member Bo Xilai went as far as wiretapping the president. Before meetings, Chinese officials now often hug so they can pat each other down. 4) Russia If surveillance were an Olympic sport, Russia would likely take the gold this year. It has installed a surveillance system so the government can listen to athletes and visitors at next year’s Sochi Olympic Games. The system, known as SORM, was first developed in the 1980s and has been used in Russia to spy on the opposition. During the Games, law enforcement agencies will have the authority to tap all internet and phone communications without notifying communication providers. 5) Zimbabwe The government of Robert Mugabe is really good at winning elections. It’s almost like it has some kind of unfair advantage. Recently, the government asked all broadband providers and phone companies to begin saving information on its users for up to five years. The information will be stored in a national database. They say such monitoring is an effort to fight crime; but many suspect it’s just another way for the government to spy on the political opposition. 6) Syria Syria’s internet is in the control of two main corporations, both of which were founded by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. These companies record all online and offline activities. They also block text messages and shut down internet access to deter protesters. According to a report from Reporters Without Borders, Syria is one of the most spy-happy countries in the world. Iran, China, Vietnam and Bahrain also made the group’s list. 7) Iran The Iranian government does not just censor websites. It’s also a fan of “deep packet inspection,” which is just a fancy way of saying that the government likes to collect personal data, with the help of Western 2 companies like Nokia and Siemens. According to the Wall Street Journal, the government has access to emails, Facebook and Twitter accounts, and any internet phone calls. 8) New Zealand New Zealand? Really? A new law allows the country’s main intelligence agency to spy on its own citizens. The government realized that the Government Communications Security Bureau had been spying on New Zealand citizens illegally, anyway — so it introduced the new law to make it a lot less illegal. As in other countries, there’s been a lot of public opposition to the law; as in other countries, the government claims that the added surveillance is needed to protect the people. Aww, thanks government! 9) Bahrain The Bahrain monarchy, which has been brutally stamping out a protest movement for several years now, uses FinFisher, a spyware software sold by Gamma Group, a UK company. The government uses the software to monitor opposition activists in both Bahrain and abroad. The software works by sending activists an email about some pertinent subject, like political prisoners or torture methods used by the government. Hidden in the email is the software, and once opened it allows the government to copy files, log keystrokes and intercept Skype calls. 10) Canada Yes, even Good Guy Canada spies on its own. The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association recently accused the government of illegal domestic surveillance. The group said Canada’s intelligence agency, known as Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), is collecting personal information on its citizens. The head of CSEC denied the accusations. If you can’t believe the head of an intelligence agency, who can you believe? 11) Vietnam Vietnam’s communications networks may not be as strong as in some other countries, but it’s still under tight government control. After the passage of Decree 72, Vietnamese bloggers and social media users are prohibited from publishing material against the government. Vietnam is also using the same UK-developed software as Bahrain. And, like Bahrain, it is accused of using it to spy on the political opposition. 12) United Kingdom The United Kingdom and the United States have a beautiful friendship. They share everything, even records of your phone calls. The UK intelligence agency, known as the Government Communication Headquarters, or GCHQ, has been sharing information collected on its own citizens with the NSA through a program known as PRISM. Many in Britain say such sharing, and the original surveillance, is illegal. The government, to no one’s surprise, says it committed no crime. 3 What are some of the tools of the spying/intelligence gathering trade? This is a USB key logger. A person can plug this into your computer, plug your keyboard into the device, and then save everything you type. Some even have the power to remotely send the data. Passwords, emails, instant messages, everything is saved. GPS trackers (like the IGotU shown above) are fairly common. They function like a standard GPS, but instead of providing directions to places they follow the whereabouts of people. The data collected can be pulled up in Google Maps and other mapping software to see where a person is/has been. Smart phones also contain GPS technology and have been used to locate/track people. The U.S. government (among others) uses various software to track a person’s web usage. The right software can capture everything; from what sites a person visits, to what they read, who they contact, etc. Hidden cameras are still quite popular. Technology has made it so they are smaller and can be disguised as anything; pens, plants, smoke detectors, dvd players, alarm clocks, keys, watches, books, etc. This is a survelliance drone. These quadcopters are small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). On average, they can go 400600 feet in the air and reach speeds of 30mph. A camera is mounted to the underside of the drone to record/take photos. Governments have used them for videotaping protesters, looking for suspects, and neighborhood surveillance. Many local law enforcement groups have a quadcopter drone. Military drones are similar to the UAVs used by local law enforcement, except they’re much more powerful. They can go farther distances, detect underground bunkers (see above image), carry weapons and supplies, drop bombs on suspects, and explore regions that are hard to reach by foot. 4 US diplomats spied on UN leadership • Diplomats ordered to gather intelligence on Ban Ki-moon • Secret directives sent to more than 30 US embassies • Call for DNA data, computer passwords and terrorist links Robert Booth and Julian Borger The Guardian, Sunday 28 November 2010 13.14 EST A directive from Hillary Clinton ordered US diplomats to gather biometric information on the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon. Photograph: Bernat Armangue/AP Washington is running a secret intelligence campaign targeted at the leadership of the United Nations, including the secretary general, Ban Ki-moon and the permanent Security Council representatives from China, Russia, France and the UK. A classified directive which appears to blur the line between diplomacy and spying was issued to US diplomats under Hillary Clinton's name in July 2009, demanding forensic technical details about the communications systems used by top UN officials, including passwords and personal encryption keys used in private and commercial networks for official communications. It called for detailed biometric information "on key UN officials, to include undersecretaries, heads of specialised agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG [secretary general] aides, heads of peace operations and political field missions, including force commanders" as well as intelligence on Ban's "management and decision-making style and his influence on the secretariat". A parallel intelligence directive sent to diplomats in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi said biometric data included DNA, fingerprints and iris scans. Washington also wanted credit card numbers, email addresses, phone, fax and pager numbers and even frequent-flyer account numbers for UN figures and "biographic and biometric information on UN Security Council permanent representatives". The secret "national human intelligence collection directive" was sent to US missions at the UN in New York, Vienna and Rome; 33 embassies and consulates, including those in London, Paris and Moscow. The operation targeted at the UN appears to have involved all of Washington's main intelligence agencies. The CIA's clandestine service, the US Secret Service and the FBI were included in the "reporting and collection needs" cable alongside the state department under the heading "collection requirements and tasking". The leak of the directive is likely to spark questions about the legality of the operation and about whether state department diplomats are expected to spy. The level of technical and personal detail demanded about the UN top team's communication systems could be seen as laying the groundwork for surveillance or 5 hacking operations. It requested "current technical specifications, physical layout and planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks and technologies used by top officials and their support staff", as well as details on private networks used for official communication, "to include upgrades, security measures, passwords, personal encryption keys and virtual private network versions used". The UN has previously asserted that bugging the secretary general is illegal, citing the 1946 UN convention on privileges and immunities which states: "The premises of the United Nations shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the United Nations, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action". The 1961 Vienna convention on diplomatic relations, which covers the UN, also states that "the official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable". The emergence of the directive also risks undermining political trust between the UN leadership and the US, which is the former's biggest paying member, supplying almost a quarter of its budget – more than $3bn (£1.9bn) this year. Washington wanted intelligence on the contentious issue of the "relationship or funding between UN personnel and/or missions and terrorist organisations" and links between the UN Relief and Works Agency in the Middle East, and Hamas and Hezbollah. It also wanted to know about plans by UN special rapporteurs to press for potentially embarrassing investigations into the US treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay, and "details of friction" between the agencies co-ordinating UN humanitarian operations, evidence of corruption inside UNAids, the joint UN programme on HIV, and in international health organisations, including the World Health Organisation (WHO). It even called for "biographic and biometric" information on Dr Margaret Chan, the director general of WHO, as well as details of her personality, role, effectiveness, management style and influence. The UN is not the only target. The cables reveal that since 2008 the state department has issued at least nine directives to embassies around the world which set forth "a list of priorities intended to guide participating US government agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information". They are packed with detailed orders and while embassy staff are particularly encouraged to assist in compiling biographic information, the directive on the mineral and oil-rich Great Lakes region of Africa also requested detailed military intelligence, including weapons markings and plans of army bases. A directive on "Palestinian issues" sent to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus and Riyadh demanded the exact travel plans and vehicles used by leading members of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, without explaining why. In one directive that would test the initiative, never mind moral and legal scruples, of any diplomat, Washington ordered staff in the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi to obtain biometric information of leading figures in business, politics, intelligence, military, religion and in key ethnic groups. Fingerprints and photographs are collected as part of embassies' consular and visa operations, but it is harder to see how diplomats could justify obtaining DNA samples and iris scans. Again in central Africa, embassy officials were ordered to gather details about countries' military relations with China, Libya, North Korea, Iran and Russia. Washington assigned high priority to intelligence on the "transfer of strategic materials such as uranium", and "details of arms acquisitions and arms sales by government or 6 insurgents, including negotiations, contracts, deliveries, terms of sale, quantity and quality of equipment, and price and payment terms". The directives, signed simply "Clinton" or "Rice", referring to the current and former secretaries of state, Hillary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice, form a central plank of America's intelligence effort and reveal how Washington is using its 11,500-strong foreign service to glean highly sensitive information on both allies and enemies. They are compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, which is approved by the president, and issued by James Clapper, the director of national intelligence who oversees the CIA, the Defence Intelligence Agency, FBI and 13 other intelligence agencies. Washington circulated to its Middle Eastern embassies a request for what was effectively a counterintelligence operation against Mukhabarat, the Palestinian Authority's secret service, and Istikhbarat, its military intelligence. The directive asked for an assessment of the foreign agencies' "signals intercept capabilities and targets, decryption capabilities, intercept sites and collection hardware, and intercept operation successes" and information of their "efforts to illicitly collect classified, sensitive, commercial proprietary or protected technology information from US companies or government agencies". Missions in Israel, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were asked to gather biometric information "on key Palestinian Authority and Hamas leaders and representatives, to include the young guard inside Gaza, the West Bank", as well as evidence of collusion between the PA security forces and terror groups. Taken together, the directives provide a vivid snapshot of America's perception of foreign threats which are often dazzlingly interconnected. Paraguayan drug traffickers were suspected of supporting Hezbollah and al-Qaida, while Latin American cocaine barons were linked to criminal networks in the desert states of west Africa, who were in turn linked to Islamist terrorists in the Middle East and Asia. High on the list of requests in an April 2009 directive covering the Saharan west African countries, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal, was information about the activities of fighters returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. Information was wanted on "indications that international terrorist groups are seeking to take advantage of political, ethnic, tribal or religious conflict". Diplomats were told to find out about the links between drug traffickers in the region to Latin American cocaine cartels, as well as terrorist or insurgent groups' income derived from the drugs trade. Sometimes the directives appear linked to forthcoming diplomatic obligations of the secretary of state. In a cable to the embassy in Sofia last June, five months before Clinton hosted Bulgaria's foreign minister in Washington, the first request was about government corruption and the links between organised crime groups and "government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography". Washington also wanted to know about "corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders … details about defence industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and actors. Weapon system development programmes, firms and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems". 7 Top tips for dealing with defectors and turncoats One cable offered a detailed and practical guide for embassies on how to handle possible defectors, known as "walk-ins", who turned up at embassies offering to switch sides. It called for them to be treated with considerable care because they "may be sources of invaluable intelligence". "Walk-ins may exhibit nervous or anxious behaviour, particularly because access controls and host nation security forces around many of our diplomatic posts make it difficult for walk-ins to approach our facilities discreetly," it warned. "All briefings should also stress the importance of not drawing attention to the walk-in or alerting host nation security personnel." Embassy staff should immediately copy the person's identification papers or passport, in case they got cold feet and ran off, it said. A walk-in who possessed any object that appeared potentially dangerous should be denied access even if the item was presented "as evidence of some intelligence he offers, eg, red mercury [a possibly bogus chemical which has been claimed to be a component of nuclear weapons] presented as proof of plutonium enrichment". 8 5 Key Points from President Obama’s NSA Speech From St. Louis Pubic Radio (http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/5-takeaways-presidents-nsa-speech) Shortly after the New Year, President Obama made a speech about reforming the NSA. His remarks came after widespread backlash against U.S. surveillance practices as revealed by the documents that Edward Snowden leaked. Here are five key points from that speech. Do you think the goes far enough? Or do you think he is taking too much power from the NSA? What would you do to reform the NSA? 1.) The Real Battle Over Bulk Phone Record Collection Could Come Next Year President Obama left it to Attorney General Eric Holder and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to decide who will store billions of records of American phone call metadata. He asked the officials to figure out a solution before March 28, when the secret foreign intelligence surveillance court will need to do a regular renewal of the government's authority of that provision of the Patriot Act. But telecom companies don't want the job, a third-party consortium doesn't yet exist to hold the data, and the NSA really doesn't want to give it up. In the words of privacy advocate Julian Sanchez, a fellow at the Cato Institute, "the frustrating thing is the details are so up in the air we can't even really say yet whether this means an end to bulk collection." Beyond that, the president asked the intelligence community to look over the next year for a technical solution that would allow targeted data collection, instead of the dragnet being performed now. But NSA chief Gen. Keith Alexander has testified the agency has no short term fix and would welcome help from the private sector. The Patriot Act expires in 2015 and the part that covers phone metadata, known as Section 215, will require congressional approval—which means the real battle could come next year. 2.) The Limits Of Privacy Protections For Foreign Persons The President unilaterally stopped surveillance on some foreign allies after the Snowden revelations and ordered the intelligence community to submit collection priorities for high-level review on an annual basis. He also extended some privacy protections to people internationally — not just Americans. And he ordered the attorney general and the director of national intelligence to develop new restrictions on the government's ability to retain, search and use information under section 702 of the Fisa Amendments Act it's collected on Americans who are communicating with targets overseas. But privacy advocates say the details, which are not yet apparent, will make all the difference here. Among the key questions: how long will that data be retained, how can it be searched, and in what kinds of cases? 3.) About Those Privacy Advocates The president has asked Congress to create an independent panel of advocates who might help judges on the foreign surveillance court in select cases that involve groundbreaking areas of law and technology. 9 4.) Congress As Wild Card For any of the changes President Obama made today to stick, and for most of the policy prescriptions he recommended, Congress will need to act. Whether Democrats, libertarians and Tea Party Republicans can work together long enough to form a stable coalition that survives House and Senate review is an open question. 5.) The Snowden Issue And then, there is the issue of Snowden himself. In an unusual move, the president went out of his way to mention the former NSA contractor who's been charged with violating the 1917 Espionage Act, closing the door on calls for clemency or lenient treatment. "Our nation's defense depends in part on the fidelity of those entrusted with our nation's secrets," Obama said. "If any individual who objects to government policy can take it in their own hands to publicly disclose classified information, then we will never be able to keep our people safe, or conduct foreign policy." Snowden is in Russia on a grant of temporary asylum – and the clock is ticking on his one-year sanctuary from Vladimir Putin. Will Russian leaders evict him, shepherd him to yet another country, or try to send him back to the U.S.? 10 U.S.-Germany Intelligence Partnership Falters Over Spying By DAVID E. SANGER and ALISON SMALE BERLIN — Nearly two months after President Obama assured Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany that the United States would never again target her cellphone, a broader effort to build a new intelligence relationship with Germany is floundering, with each side increasingly reluctant to make major changes in how it deals with the other. American officials have refused to extend the “no spying” guarantee beyond Ms. Merkel, telling German officials in private sessions that if the White House agreed to forgo surveillance on German territory, other partners would insist on the same treatment. “Susan Rice has been very clear to us,” one senior German official said, referring to Mr. Obama’s national security adviser. “The U.S. is not going to set a precedent.” How aggressively to continue targeting the leaders of countries allied with the United States is one of the most delicate questions facing Mr. Obama as he weighs the still-confidential report of an outside advisory group that submitted 40 recommendations to him on Friday, including several dealing with spying on the United States’ closest allies and partners. The director of the National Security Agency, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, said in an interview after the monitoring of Chancellor Merkel was revealed that the United States may soon have to choose between spying on partners and making them full participants in combating digital threats. Ms. Merkel has also responded to the disclosures: Among the ministers she named to her new coalition government on Sunday was a former intelligence official. “This is a consequence of the N.S.A. matter, or affair,” she said, using the common reference in Germany to the reports on American intelligence activities. It is “a justified response to the new challenges we face.” According to officials familiar with the advisory group’s report to Mr. Obama, it concluded that the White House must regularly review the N.S.A.’s surveillance programs to determine whether the intelligence gathered is worth the damage that would be done if a program were revealed — a process that C.I.A. operations go through annually. Officials said elements of that recommendation were already being adopted ahead of Mr. Obama’s broader announcement, expected in January, about the N.S.A. overhauls he plans to make. But as Mr. Obama considers his options, the effort to repair the damage to the United States’ relationship with Germany appears to have stumbled. American officials have so far refused to 11 pull back from electronic spying in the country, save for Ms. Merkel’s own communications, even though German officials argue that the United States is violating German law. At the same time, Germany is equally reluctant to enter into a deeper cooperation agreement, at least on American terms. Germany has for years participated in American counterterrorism operations, especially those tracking suspected Al Qaeda or other terrorist cells inside Germany, but it has refused to provide the United States with information that it believes could help provide targets for drone strikes. Now, officials are reluctant to join in some types of bulk collection of telephone data or preparations for offensive digital strikes against other countries. “We simply don’t have the capability or the legal authorities,” said one senior German official involved in the talks, who, like other officials interviewed, spoke on the condition of anonymity because the negotiations are confidential. The White House has tried to engage the German leadership quietly, hoping to avoid further public confrontations while Ms. Merkel formed her new government. “At the president’s and chancellor’s direction, we continue to talk with our German partners about how we can strengthen our intelligence cooperation and address some of the concerns that have been raised,” Caitlin Hayden, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council, said Saturday. “We’ve agreed that these talks are best held confidentially, so I’m not going to provide any details at this stage.” Nonetheless, in interviews in the past week, American and German officials described a continued wariness in the countries’ relationship after documents that the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel received from Edward J. Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor, revealed the apparent tracking of Ms. Merkel’s personal cellphone and suggested that other surveillance operations had been run out of the United States Embassy here. While Mr. Obama tried to make amends, several senior German officials expressed suspicions that the United States might be using its surveillance technology to strengthen its negotiating hand in trade talks with the European Union, in which Germany is the most important player. The dispute also reflects very different views of how far the state should go in conducting surveillance, both at home and abroad. In an angry conversation with Mr. Obama in October after the phone monitoring was revealed, Ms. Merkel said that the N.S.A.’s activities reminded her of growing up as the daughter of a Protestant minister in East Germany. “She told him, ‘This is like the Stasi,’ ” said one person who had discussed the conversation with the chancellor. Another person familiar with the conversation said Ms. Merkel had told Mr. Obama that she was particularly angry that, based on the disclosures, “the N.S.A. clearly couldn’t be trusted with private information, because they let Snowden clean them out.” 12 American officials said that the German accounts accurately captured the spirit of the heated conversation, but that the quotations given by German officials were more direct and pointed than what was actually said. But the exchange set the tone for a dialogue between Washington and Berlin that has only underscored how differently the two countries see the issue. United States officials talk about conducting surveillance, whether of adversaries or allies, to protect American interests; German officials emphasize the importance of reaffirming the alliance. American officials are intent on gathering the data needed to quickly determine the whereabouts of terrorism suspects; the Germans start with privacy concerns. The man Ms. Merkel tapped for the new post in her coalition government is a veteran of the German security apparatus. Klaus-Dieter Fritsche, 60, now a top Interior Ministry official, was previously deputy head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany’s domestic intelligence service. The distaste within the German political establishment for the United States’ approach extends beyond former citizens of East Germany, like Ms. Merkel. Sigmar Gabriel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party and deputy chancellor in Ms. Merkel’s new government, took time in a speech last month to emphasize Germany’s dismay that the United States could engage in the kind of surveillance Mr. Snowden has disclosed. “The United States, the country we Germans have so much to thank for,” Mr. Gabriel said at a party congress in Leipzig, “is at the moment endangering the most important foundation of our trans-Atlantic partnership.” 13 Creative Ambiguity – International Law’s Distant Relationship with Peacetime Spying By Craig Forcese for JustSecurity.Org Thursday, November 14, 2013 at 8:30 AM In all the sound and fury over “five eye” intercept programs, commentators appear so far to have paid relatively little attention to international law. This is no simple oversight. International law is unusually anemic when it comes to pronouncing on the rights and wrongs of peacetime spying. This is not to say, however, that international law is silent on matters directly implicated by spying. Indeed, the Snowden revelations to date suggest a number of ways in which “five eyes” spying raises international law doubts. Spying from the Territory of Another State First and most obviously, spying by a foreign power on the territory of another state raises sovereignty concerns. State “sovereignty” includes, among other things, “the right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and over all persons and things therein, subject to the immunities recognized by international law”.1 Actions by a foreign state’s agents, done on another state’s territory, may violate the latter’s sovereignty. This is most acutely true where these actions are illegal under the territorial state’s laws. In this respect, running a covert wiretap program from another state’s territory in violation of domestic privacy laws is no different from snatching someone from the streets of that state in violation of its kidnapping rules. This is true even if the operation is mounted under diplomatic cover, in sheds on the roofs of embassies. The precise functions of a diplomatic mission consist, among other things, of “ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State”.2 Using a diplomatic mission to intercept communications protected by domestic privacy law might easily exceed the “lawful means” requirements. Spying and Human Rights International human rights principles might also be implicated by spying. This conversation is normative, asking what rule human (and civil) rights law should play in this area. And this forward-looking thinking is particularly timely. Not least: there is good reason to doubt that human rights treaty law actually reaches the conduct at issue so far in the Snowden releases. Covert electronic surveillance indisputably impairs privacy, a right guarded by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). But these privacy guarantees are limited – making them a modest constraint on state electronic surveillance so long as certain basic protections are observed. 14 In addition, whatever its content, it is doubtful that Article 17 reaches extraterritorial spying. Under Article 2, a state’s ICCPR obligations extend to “all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”. While the issue is sometimes contested, the Human Rights Committee and the International Court of Justice have concluded that the ICCPR does have a modest extraterritorial reach. Specifically, a person may be within a state’s jurisdiction when that person is within the power or “effective control” of the state, even if not on the state’s territory.3 Covert extraterritorial surveillance almost by definition will not be of persons within the spying state’s effective control. It follows that the ICCPR privacy protections are inapplicable, unless there is a dramatic re-construal of the treaty’s reach. For these reasons, the ICCPR is of modest use in critiquing the extraterritorial activities of signals intelligence agencies. Purely Transnational Intelligence Gathering There is even less to say when the spying is “transnational” — that is, the intercept is conducted by agencies physically located on the territory of the spying state, drawing on communications transiting between states (and indeed, often intercepted on the territory of the spying state). Human rights preoccupations can be dismissed on the jurisdictional basis described above – the individuals whose communications are intercepted are far from the effective control of the spying state. Likewise, it is difficult to see how the intercept of electronic leakage from one state in the territory of another state violates a sovereignty interest. The International Telecommunications Convention does provide (in Article 22) that members will “take all possible measures, compatible with the system of telecommunication used, with a view to ensuring the secrecy of international correspondence.” This is, however, hardly a resounding prohibition. The treaty also states that members “[n]evertheless, …reserve the right to communicate such correspondence to the competent authorities in order to ensure the application of their internal laws or the execution of international conventions to which they are parties.” Put another way, a domestic law steering international communications to a security agency on national security grounds is plausibly an “internal law” that trumps the secrecy proviso found in the Convention. Conclusion In sum, public international law rules pertaining to spying are best described as a checkerboard of principles, constraining some practices in some places and in relation to some actors, but not in other cases in relation to other actors. The clearest principle is a simple expression of sovereignty preoccupations: don’t spy on the territory of another state, in violation of its laws. Beyond that, there is no simple rule governing the international legality of spying. This may not be a happy situation, but it is fair to say that this is the world that states have quite clearly set out to create. After all, all states spy at one time or another. 15 1. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 1949 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2 at 278, containing the draft “Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States”. While the declaration has never been adopted, and is not in its own rights international law, it has had a “long-term effect on the development of international law”. B. Grafrath, The International Law Commission Tomorrow: Improving Its Organization And Methods Of Work, (1991) 85 A.J.I.L. 595. It is fair to say that many of its provisions reflect core precepts in modern international law. [↩] 2. Vienna Convention, Art 3 (emphasis added). [↩] 3. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, UN GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. 1, at 175, 177, UN Doc. A/59/40 (2004) at para. 12 [↩] Filed Under: Civil Liberties, International and Foreign 16 | <xrun.esc // nsa1013841934/PRISMexx//E-S-encryption> <=isch&sa=X&ei=06z9UrbZKum2yAHS-IDQDg&ved=0CAcQ> <ex//: the-EDWARD-SNOWDEN-files /011843941 > Pictures and black text from “A timeline of Edward Snowden’s life” (The Washington Post, http://archive.is/lrRRG) <run://e=lnms&sa=X&ei=9a_9UtemBOOayAGuo4DoBg&ved=0CAYQ_AUo CHILDHOOD-EDUCATION-andFAMILY/1983-2004 / <?searchode+run+ c <enc:EncryptedData> <encryption xhlns’’urnalskdj-1902983129skdjlfs9801293812’’ xnlnsinc==0101000100101010010101101011 <EncryptData.exe:// CAREER/2004-2010/> /program&source=lnms&sa=//> June 21, 1983 Edward Joseph Snowden is born. May 7, 2004 At age 20, Snowden enlists in the Army Reserve as a Special Forces recruit. 1980s and 1990s Snowden and his family live in North Carolina for many years, and then move to Maryland. He attends Crofton Woods Elementary School, Crofton Middle School and then Arundel High School for 1 ½ years. Sept. 28, 2004 Snowden is discharged from the Army without completing any training or receiving any awards he says he broke both his legs in a training accident. 1998 Snowden attends the first semester of 10th grade but drops out before continuing the second semester. He would have been in the class of 2001. His father says this was because he got really sick sophomore year. 1999 Snowden enrolls in credit courses at Anne Arundel Community College. He continues attending classes for the next six years, taking breaks during the spring semesters of 2002 and 2003. February – May 2002 “Ed Snowden” takes classes at the Computer Career Institute, a forprofit college then affiliated with Johns Hopkins University. Snowden says he left the CIA to work for a private contractor and was based at an NSA [National Security Agency] facility in Japan. <?source=Patrick-Semansky/Associated-Press> 2005 Snowden gets a job as a security guard at the federally funded University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language, which conducts classified and unclassified research. Snowden is in the job for less than a year. Summer 2009 Snowden enrolls in classes through the University of Maryland University College, which offers online classes. Fall 2005 Snowden takes his last classes at AACC. He never earns a degree or certificate. March 2012 Snowden makes a $250 donation to Ron Paul's presidential campaign. In May, he gives another $250 to Paul's campaign. 2007 The CIA stationed him with diplomatic cover in Geneva. 2009 2011 Snowden registers to study computer security through an online program offered by the University of Liverpool. Early 2013 Snowden works for Booz Allen Hamilton as an "infrastructure analyst" for the NSA based in Hawaii, he said. The company said in a statement in early June that Snowden worked there for fewer than three months. May 16, 2013 Snowden's first direct exchange with Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman. May 20, 2013 Snowden tells his supervisors at the NSA that he needs time off for treatment for epilepsy and leaves for Hong Kong, according to the Guardian. GLOBALSURVEILLENCE-LEAKS-ANDNSA-FALL-OUT/2013--Present/> April 2013 The dated listed on the PRISM PowerPoint that Snowden leaked to the news media. </?source-‘‘Photos of Edward Snowden on the front pages of local English and Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong on June 11.’’/Bobby Yip/Reuters> June 6, 2013 The Washington Post and the Guardian break the story about PRISM. June 9, 2013 Snowden's identity becomes public. May, 2013 Snowden and girlfriend move out of their Oahu, Hawaii house. June 23 to August, 2013 Flies to Moscow. This was supposed to be a oneday layover en route to Ecuador, but the U.S. revokes his passport, leaving him stranded in the Russian Airport until August. American officials have charged him with espionage and stealing government property August, 2013 Russia grants Snowden amnesty. He is assumed to be there currently. Sources refer to him as </?source=’’Booz Allen Hamilton's cyber solutions center in Maryland’’/Jeffrey MacMillan/The Washington Post> </encryptdata.exe/ <xKeystroke://10232xlkjcxlk?=’’system breach detected’’source=???> <://xKeyscore/enc0294829241/: <?source=’’The front page of South China Morning Post at a news stand in Hong Kong on June 13, 2013.’’/AP/Kin Cheung> June 12, 2013 The South China Morning Post, a newspaper in Hong Kong, posts an interview with Snowden on June 12. ‘‘the world’s most wanted man’’ </x:Keyscore/ enc0294829241 <encryptionAlgo= &source=lnms&sa=X&ei=9a_9UtemBOOayAGuo4DoBg&ved=0/extraditi on.exe/ </encryptionAlgo> <run:extradition10341082.exe/location=????> </run> THE NSA TALKS BACK In response to the intelligence leaks by Edward Snowden, along with subsequent national and international outrage, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has spoken out to defend itself. Here are some key talking points from an unclassified NSA document, responding to the NSA’s critics and defining the Agency’s role in U.S. intelligence. [Text directly from the NSA 2013 Talking Points] Mission NSA's mission is to produce foreign intelligence to protect the U.S. and its allies. We’ve served the nation in silence for over 60 years. Connecting the Dots After 9/11 it was determined that the intelligence community failed to connect the dots. A major challenge in this digital age is that terrorists and citizens use the same communication networks [facebook, cell phones, wi-fi, etc.] History and Tools Post-9/11 we made several changes and added a number of capabilities to enable us to enable us to connect dots Two of those capabilities are the Business Records FISA, or Section 215 and FAA 702 or PRISM Section 215 of the Patriot Act helps the government connect the dots by “enabling the detection of telephone contact between terrorists overseas and operatives within the U.S. Congress enabled the NSA to collect telephone data “with the assistance of US Communications providers” [Comcast, Verizon, etc.] to better track foreign persons outside of the US. Protection of Privacy and Civil Liberties In order to target the content of a U.S. person’s communications anywhere in the world, NSA requires a finding of probable cause under a specific court order. Any allegations that NSA relies on its foreign partners to circumvent U.S. law is absolutely false. This is also true of contractors. The misdeeds of one contractor should not tarnish all the contractors because they do great work for our nation, as well. Industry is a Necessary Partner We could not do this without industry support. In these cases, industry is compelled by the court to provide the required information Disclosures and Damage Public Discussion of NSA's tradecraft, or the tools that support its operations, provide insights that terrorists can and do use to hide their activities. This would be detrimental to national security. Those who wish to do us harm now know how we counter their actions; this has done irreversible harm to our nation's security If we could have an open and public debate without arming terrorists with the information about how to defeat our capabilities, we would jump on it. TERRORIST ATTACKS THE NSA HELPED PREVENT NYC ATTACK PLOT 2009 he tried to depart from Chicago O'Hare airport on a trip to Europe. East Africa network, and an unknown San Diego-based number. In early September of 2009, while monitoring the activities of Al Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan, NSA noted contact from an individual in the US that the FBI subsequently identified as Colorado-based Najibullah Zazi. At the time of his arrest, Headley and his colleagues were plotting to attack the Danish newspaper that published the unflattering cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, at the behest of Al Qaeda. That tip ultimately led to the FBI's opening of a full investigation that resulted in a February 2013 conviction of Basaaly Moaklin and three others for conspiring to provide material support to Al Shabaab, a State-Department designated terrorists group in Somaliz that engages in suicide bombings, targets civilians for assassination, and uses improvised explosive devices. The US intelligence community, including the FBI and NSA, worked in concert to determine his relationship with Al Qaeda, as well as identify any foreign or domestic terrorist links The FBI Tracked Zazi as he travelled to New York to meet up with co-conspirators, where they were planning to conduct a terrorist attack. Compelled collection (authorized under FISA Section 702) against foreign terrorists and meta data analysis (authorized under the Business Records Provision of FISA) were utilized in complement with the FBI law enforcement authorities to investigate Headley's overseas associates and their involvement in Headley's activities Zazi and his co-conspirators were subsequently arrested. Zazi, upon indictment, pled guilty to conspiring to bomb the NYC subway system. CHICAGO TERROR INVESTIGATION In October 2009, David Coleman Headley, a Chicago business man and dual U.S. and Pakistani citizen, was arrested by the FBI as In January 2009, using authorized collection under Section 702 to monitor the communications of an extremist overseas with ties to Al-Qaeda, NSA discovered a connection with an individual based in Kansas City. NSA tipped the information to FBI, which during the course of its investigation uncovered a plot to attack the New York Stock Exchange. NSA queried metadata obtained under Section 215 to ensure that we identified all potential connections to the plot, asissting the FBI in running down lead This plot was characterized as 'the most serious terrorist threat on U.S. soil since 9.11 Compelled collection (authorized under FISA Section 702) against foreign terrorists was critical to the discovery and disruption of this threat against the United States OPERATION WI-FI, APRIL 2009 BASAALY MOALIN, OCTOBER 2007 NSA provided the FBI with information obtained from querying the metadata obtained under Section 215. This information established a connection between a phone known to be used by an extremist overseas with ties to Al Qaeda's
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