Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma:
Strategic Challenges of Basque and Islamist
Terror during the Aznar and Zapatero Eras
Anthony N. Celso
While global terror has emerged as today’s dominant issue, countries have
grappled with terrorist attacks for generations.1 Violent movements and the
terrorist attacks they inspire have bedeviled policy makers in Algeria, Colombia, England, India, Israel, Russia, Spain, and Sri Lanka for many decades.
The case of Spain is especially complex, because it comprises simultaneous
terror threats from two networks (Basque and Islamist) that radically diverge
in their origins, goals, and methods. In this essay I compare the security
problems created by the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) with those posed by Islamist al Qaeda affiliates in Spain.
Though diminished by ETA’s 22 March 2006 announcement of a “permanent cease-fire,” Basque and Islamist terror groups continue to compromise Spanish security. ETA has directed attacks against the Spanish state for
more than forty years and is responsible for more than eight hundred deaths;
Islamists loyal to al Qaeda executed the single worst terror attack in modern
Europe on 11 March 2004 when ten cell-phone-triggered bombs exploded on
four commuter trains, killing 192 people and wounding 1,500 others. Basque
and Islamist terrorism continues to haunt the Spanish political scene, and
the terrorism issue has accelerated partisan divisions.
The Socialist Party’s electoral victory on 14 March 2004 was widely inter-
1. Yonah Alexander, ed., Combating Terrorism: Strategies from Ten Countries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
Anthony N. Celso is assistant professor of government at Valley Forge College in Pennsylvania.
Mediterranean Quarterly 17:4 DOI 10.1215/10474552-2006-026
Copyright 2006 by Mediterranean Affairs, Inc.
122 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
preted as a reaction to the 3-11 attacks and as a public rebuke to the conservative administration that erroneously blamed ETA for the attack and
allegedly covered up evidence linking the attack to Islamist militants. 2 Once
police authorities were able to establish conclusive links between the commuter-train attacks and Islamist militants seeking to punish Spain for its
participation in the Iraq war, the Socialists were able to effectively exploit
the issue to their advantage and, defying all predictions, won the election.
The electoral and political legacy of 3-11 continues to dominate the Spanish
political landscape, and the Madrid attack has fractured partisan unity on
counter-terrorism policy. No single issue divides Spanish society like terrorism and what to do about it.
This essay is organized in three sections: (1) a comparison of Basque and
Islamist terror and where ETA and al Qaeda fit in the larger field of terrorism
studies, (2) an examination of antiterror policies with a concentration on the
differences between the governing Socialists and their conservative opposition,
and (3) a preliminary assessment of the Socialists’ counter-terrorism policies
and their likely impact on mitigating Basque and Islamist security threats.
A Theoretical Framework for Identifying and
Assessing Security Threats from Terror Groups
Terrorist groups have been analyzed through many historical, psychological, and political lenses. 3 In a comprehensive review of the issue, Walter
Laqueur identifies terror networks based on ideological association and he
arrives at four groups: Islamist, Far Right, Far Left, and the Third Position.
By the Third Position Laqueur means anarchistic groups whose main reason
for existence is to challenge the spread of globalization and its diffusion of
Western secular liberal capitalism.
As Laqueur readily acknowledges, neat ideological classifications of terrorists and terror groups are difficult to make in a postindustrial age. Many
of the older micronationalist terror groups like ETA and the Irish Republican
2. José Manuel Romero, “Cien dias de vertigo para el cambio tranquilo,” El País, 23 July 2004,
14, 16 – 7.
3. Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theories and States of Mind
(Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 123
Army (IRA) combine conservative nationalism with communist ideology.4 In
ETA one can see patterns of crossgenerational recruitment and mobilization
of young militants fueled by both Basque nationalism and Marxist-Leninism,
which make for a very combustible and nihilistic mix. 5 The quest for an
independent Basque homeland stretching from northern Spain to southern
France encouraged militants to attack Spanish and French interests. ETA’s
recent announcement of a permanent cease-fire has raised as many doubts
as it has hopes.
Laqueur’s Third Position could cover some Islamist groups, given that
these movements have borrowed much from the ideology, charismatic leadership, and organization of past European fascist and communist movements.6
Paul Berman sees many parallels in the anti-Semitic ideology and culture
of death of al Qaeda and the Nazis.7 These similarities are evident in the
nihilistic rage against Western liberalism that led the Nazis into a war of
catastrophic proportions and may explain the fanaticism of al Qaeda’s relentless terrorist campaigns across the globe.
Islamist movements include the Muslim Brotherhood of the 1920s, its radical and violent splinter group Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the transnational al
Qaeda, and the Lebanese and Palestinian liberation movements of Hezbollah
and Hamas. Such an amalgamation suggests a complexity that defies easy
categorization. The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a scion of the secular Palestinian al Fatah, could be categorized as a fusion of secular nationalist and
Islamist ideas.
Given how imprecise ideological designations are, greater specificity is
needed. In order to better identify groups, one can look at a number of variables — leadership, organization, tactics, and scale of terror operations — and
analyze these networks through these factors to assess the nature of the secu-
4. Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the 21st Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Westview,
2002).
5. Antonio Remiro Brotóns and Carlos Espósito, “Spain,” in Alexander, 163 – 86.
6. Walter Russell Meade, Power Terror, Peace and War: America’s Grand Strategy in a World at
Risk (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004).
7. Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003); David C. Rapoport,
“Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example for Islam,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1998),
103 – 30.
124 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
Figure 1
Matrix of Terrorist Groups
International Terrorist
Groups
Nationalist Terrorist
Groups
Terrorist Groups Not
Using Suicidal
Terrorism
International Anarchists/
Marxists (Red Army, Red
Brigades)
Secular Micronationalists
(ETA, IRA,
PLO 1960 – 93)
Terrorist Groups
Using Suicidal
Terrorism
International Islamists
(al Qaeda and affiliates,
Armed Islamic Group,
Salfist Group for Preaching
and Combat, Abu Hafs alMasri Brigade)
Religious Nationalists
(Hamas, Hezbollah,
Islamic Jihad, al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade, Tamil
Tigers)
rity threat they pose. In this essay I look at two aspects of terror organizations — the use of suicide bombings and territorial scale of the group — to
delimit terrorist groups and the challenges they pose for states. Utilizing
these concepts, I develop a matrix (see figure 1) to identify groups including
al Qaeda and ETA. These different groups pose unique security challenges.
The first category of International Terrorist Groups — International
Anarchists/Marxists — probably reached its apogee in the 1970s with groups
like the Red Army, Red Brigades, and Baader-Meinhoff. These movements
intended to defend the “oppressed” of the capitalist working world and the
impoverished masses of the Third World from the depredations of international capitalism through violence against the “establishment.” Prominent in
Italy with the kidnapping and killing of former Italian prime minister Aldo
Moro, the Red Brigades and their ideological brethren have lost much of their
potency as many of their followers have died, been imprisoned, been amnestied, or simply retired from the terrorist business.8
The rise of a new generation of international anarchist-terrorists reacting
against globalization has been slow and sporadic. It is represented by groups
8. Laqueur.
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 125
like the Black Bloc, which organizes violence at international globalization
summits. Like their predecessors they avoid suicidal terrorism and aim their
violence against political, military, and business centers. The limited nature
of these groups, their lack of real commitment, and their scarce resources
restrict the damage they can do.
The matrix’s second category under International Terrorist Groups — Inter­
national Islamists — demarcates groups that utilize suicidal terrorism to
inflict massive civilian deaths on a global scale. Terror networks like al Qaeda
are waging a life-and-death struggle against the secular West and Muslim
governments tied to Western (mainly American) interests. Encouraged by the
ideas of Egyptian Islamist scholars Sayyid Qutb and Abd Al-Salam Faraj,
the suicidal warriors of jihad seek to roll back Western influence by directly
attacking the West and by overthrowing pro-Western Muslim governments.9
Taking Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri at their word, the Islamists
envision a new Islamist caliphate stretching from southern Spain to North
Africa to Arabia and beyond to combat globalization and the “crusader
states” that promote secular liberal capitalism.10
Al Qaeda affiliates like the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and the
Moroccan Salfist Group for Preaching and Combat have operated in Spain for
decades.11 Aided and abetted by Spanish, Colombian, and Moroccan criminal gangs, al Qaeda is involved in a world of illicit activities and used black
markets to finance the fabrication of forged passports vital to the sending
of North African and European jihadis to Afghan terrorist-training camps
in the 1990s. Spanish al Qaeda cells, moreover, were instrumental in planning and organizing both the 9-11 attacks on the United States and the 3-11
attacks in Spain and have committed themselves to the cause of global jihad
against the “secular infidel.”
Not all Islamist groups have global ambitions, and some have operations
against particular states that have oppressed nationalistic aspirations. These
terror organizations are exemplified by Chechen, Palestinian, Lebanese, and
Kashmiri independence movements fighting against foreign occupiers. The
9. Berman.
10. Rohan Gunartna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Penguin, 2002).
11. “El Congreso examina las pistas previas al 11-M,” El País, 18 July 2004, 19 – 20.
126 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
Palestinian case is especially striking for the diverse numbers of groups that
occupy this category, from Hamas to Islamic Jihad to the al Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade that use “martyrdom” operations against Israeli civilians to drive
the Zionists from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Not all groups that use
suicide as a tactic need be Islamic. The Tamil Tigers (a Hindu group) have
used suicide bombings to gain independence for its minority group in Sri
Lanka.
Fusing nationalistic and religious fundamentalism, these terrorist organizations are lethal and merciless. Since the second Intifada of 2000, Islamist
militants have killed more than one thousand Israelis in suicide bombings of
buses, shopping malls, restaurants, nightclubs, university centers, concert
venues, and pool halls. The rise of Hamas as the governing power in the
occupied territories presents a major security challenge for Israel even after
its forces withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Hamas’s fanaticism, its unwillingness to accept Israel’s right to exist, and
its sponsorship of hundreds of “martyrdom” operations provide a striking
counterweight to the relatively limited Palestinian terrorism of the 1970s and
1980s and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) eventual recognition of the Israeli state in 1993. In fact, the PLO represents an older breed of
terrorist organizations quite similar to the IRA and ETA. These organizations
combine nationalist and secular ideology and have traditionally used nonsuicidal terrorism to achieve statehood for oppressed peoples. Encouraged by
far-left revolutionary doctrine, the IRA and ETA have employed repeated
violence at both state actors and their citizens. Since ETA’s creation in the
late 1950s, Basque terror organizations have repeatedly compromised Spanish security. From 1968, some 294 civilians have been killed by ETA, in a
great variety of operations including bombings of civilian centers.12
Both the IRA and ETA have utilized kidnappings, targeted assassinations,
criminal enterprise, and bombings to put pressure on governments to capitulate to secessionist demands. Recently, both organizations have been greatly
weakened by counter-terrorist operations and government-granted autonomy
for Northern Irish Catholics and for Basque peoples.13 Despite these suc12. Remiro Brotóns and Espósito.
13. Terence Taylor, “United Kingdom,” in Alexander, 187 – 226.
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 127
cesses and some recent pledges by the IRA and ETA, neither group has
completely disarmed. The heralded Good Friday Accords in Northern Ireland continue to be imperiled by both sectarian violence and plagued by
doubts of the sincerity of the IRA’s commitment to peaceful negotiation and
disarmament. Similarly, ETA’s permanent-cease-fire declaration leaves many
questions unanswered and has been met with much doubt and skepticism by
victims’ rights organizations and the conservative Popular Party (PP).
Prior to its most recent announcement, ETA’s war against the Spanish
state had been confined to preannounced nuisance attacks. The Basque
terrorist group’s willingness to kill large numbers (no one has died in two
years) remains a great unknown. ETA’s past history, moreover, is replete
with lulls shattered by idiosyncratic and brutal attacks. The organization’s
lethality could resurface if ETA’s militants desire it, and Basque terrorists
have repeatedly demonstrated their capacity to strike out against the Spanish
state. Given the nonnegotiability of ETA’s demands for Basque independence
and the Spanish government’s refusal to move beyond autonomy and regional
decentralization for Basque peoples, a peaceful end to this conflict is difficult to forecast.
The four terrorist classifications that I develop in figure 1 — International
Anarchists/Marxists, International Islamists, Secular Micronationalists, and
Religious Nationalists — are distinct categories, but this should not hide
the fact that these groups overlap with common enemies and have histories of intergroup cooperation. This is especially true regarding the support
that international and national Islamists lend each other. Al Qaeda attacks
against Israeli interests in Kenya and Egypt, for example, indicate such cooperation.14 The Iraqi insurgency, moreover, appears to be a synthesis of international, nationalist, secular, ethnic, and religious groups that cooperate in
the financing, mobilization, training, and execution of terrorist activities.
Cooperation between ideologically dissimilar groups can be seen beyond
the Middle East. The relationship between ETA and the Islamists and the
role of both organizations in jointly financing and orchestrating terrorist
operations continues to be a source of controversy in Spain. Some within the
conservative PP have alleged a relationship between the Islamists and ETA,
14. Gunartna.
128 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
both of whom are united in their hostility toward the Spanish state and are
engaged in illegal enterprise to finance terrorist activity.15 Many PP activists
and leaders still cling to notions of ETA complicity in the 3-11 attacks.
While interrelationships exist, each cell represents a different security
challenge. This is especially true in Spain, which confronts simultaneous
challenges from International Islamists and Secular Micronationalists. Of
the two threats, the Islamist is more complex and dangerous. ETA’s decline
within the last decade and its recent cease-fire announcement needs to be
compared with the explosion of the Arab population in Spain and the growth
of Islamist terror networks committed to inflicting mass civilian casualties.
Even after Spain’s withdrawal from the Iraq war, its participation in Afghanistan and prosecution and trials of Islamist militants for the 9-11 and 3-11
attacks leave it vulnerable to future Islamist violence.
Diagnosing the Islamist threat in Spain is problematic given the differences
in opinion on the ultimate goals of al Qaeda’s Spanish cells. Some analysts
argue that the Islamists want to annex Andalucía to facilitate an Islamist
caliphate along the lines of what existed prior to the Christian reconquest of
Spain during the Middle Ages.16 Bin Laden’s commentary on the “tragedy” of
the Christian reconquest of al Andalus seems to suggest that Islamists have
territorial designs on the Spanish state. From this perspective, continuous
Muslim migration to Spain is an effort to construct a fifth column to eventually
recover Andalucía and challenge the sovereignty of the Spanish state.
Conventional wisdom suggests that al Qaeda and its affiliates have a
more pragmatic, two-fold strategy as it relates to Spain.17 The first objective,
obtained in the mid-1990s, was to use Spain as a logistical hub for terrorist operations to recruit and send jihadis to train in Taliban Afghanistan.
Spain’s geographical connection to North Africa, serving as a pathway for
both Muslim immigrants and drug money to finance terror operations, makes
it an ideal location. The growth of Muslim immigration in the 1990s (the
Moroccan population stands at half a million) and its concentration along
Spain’s eastern, northern, and southern seaboards has encouraged the growth
15. “El PP advierte: ‘Hoy no acaba la busqueda de la verdad’ con el cierre de la commission del
11-M,” elmundo.es, at www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2005/06/30/espna/1120151736.html.
16. Pedro Canales and Enrique Montachez, En el nombre de Alá (Madrid: Planeta, 2002).
17. Jane Corbin, Al Qaeda (New York: Thunder Mouth, 2003).
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 129
of mosques, charities, and criminal networks, some of whom have aided
and abetted Islamist terrorist groups.18 Spanish al Qaeda affiliates, moreover, played a key role in planning the 9-11 attacks. The July 2001 meeting
between Mohammad Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh in Tarragona is viewed as
decisive in finalizing the operation details of the World Trade Center and
Pentagon attacks.19
The second al Qaeda objective appears to be to force Spain into a neutral
position on the ongoing “war on terror.” Within this regard, the 3-11 terror
attacks were aimed at sending a signal to Spanish voters and politicians that
continued prosecution of Islamist militants and foreign adventures against
Muslim peoples in Afghanistan and Iraq will invite terrible retaliation. The
political and electoral legacy of the 3-11 terror attacks and the sharp rhetoric
between the conservative PP and the Socialists over the nature of Spain’s
counter-terrorism policy and whether or not al Qaeda has achieved this goal
with Socialist Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero’s withdrawal of Spanish
troops from Iraq have become a central controversy in contemporary Spanish
politics. It is to this issue that we now turn.
Zapatero and Rajoy:
Contrasting Strategies to Combat Islamist and Basque Terror
Spain has a generation of experience in combating Basque terrorist violence.
Despite the threat of such violence, there was high degree of unity between
political parties in terms of how to handle ETA. Underscored by the 2000
Anti-Terrorist Pact, the PP of José María Aznar and the opposition Socialists
envisioned eliminating ETA through strict law enforcement and prosecution
efforts.20 Both parties in power, moreover, have negotiated past truces with
Basque terrorists and have agreed with the Spanish Supreme Court’s 2003
decision to illegalize Batasuna (a nationalistic Basque party with strong links
to ETA).
18. Anthony Celso, “The Tragedy of Al-Andaluz: The Madrid Terror Attacks and the Islamization
of Spanish Politics,” Mediterranean Quarterly 16, no. 3 (2005).
19. “Los antecedentes que presagiaran el 11-M,” El País, 9 May 2004, 16 – 7.
20. “Documentos: Acuerdo por las libertades y contra el terrorismo,” elmundo.es, at www.elmundo.
es/eta/docpactolibertades.html.
130 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
The growth of the Islamist terror network and its willingness to inflict
mass civilian casualties has drastically transformed the political and security context in Spain. The electoral ramifications of 3-11 and the partisan
wrangling over the parliamentary commission conclusions that former prime
minister Aznar failed to protect the Spanish public and manipulated intelligence information have sharply accelerated the partisan divide.21 Zapatero’s
withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq, his pacifistic discourse, and his offer
to open a dialogue with ETA if it puts down its arms have inspired numerous
PP-orchestrated protests and heated parliamentary debates. PP parliamentary leader Mariano Rajoy has repeatedly denounced the Socialists as soft on
terror and as betraying the victims of terrorist violence.
This characterization should not mask the hard measures the Socialists
have taken against both Islamist and Basque terrorist groups. Zapatero’s government has prosecuted Islamist militants, uncovered and broken up terror
plots, expelled radical militants, and strengthened its fight to infiltrate and
destroy ETA. The 3-11 terror trials in Spain promise stiff sentences for more
than one hundred Islamist militants, and the Socialists have refused to relegalize Batasuna.22 Even Zapatero’s promise to negotiate with ETA is hardly
revolutionary given Aznar’s 1998 truce with ETA and his willingness to work
out a political deal.
The Socialists have largely continued Aznar’s tough and effective policy
vis-à-vis ETA. Zapatero’s policy contains a mix of law enforcement measures
and negotiation that is more traditional than the PP’s new hard-line policy.
Previous PP and Socialist administrations, for example, have repeatedly used
negotiations as a tactic to establish truces and amnesty deals for terrorists
that renounce violence.23 When it came to the strategic challenge of Basque
terror and how Spain should go about dealing with terror there was remarkable partisan unity and policy continuity. After 3-11 this situation changed
dramatically.
The PP’s electoral shift to the right on antiterror policy and its hard
21. Pilar Marcos, “Rajoy: Usted traiciona a los muertos y ha revigorizado a una ETA muribunda,”
El País, 12 May 2005, 20.
22. “Quien es quien en el macrojuicio contra la celula de Al Qaeda,” elmundo.es at www.elmundo.
es/elmundo/2005/04/21/espana/1114107834.html.
23. Luiz R. Aizpeolea, “Mejores expectativas, iqual escepticismo,” El País, 22 May 2005, 20.
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 131
approach to Islamist and Basque terror are driven by many political factors. 24
Undoubtedly the PP’s desire to avenge its electoral defeat and its anger over
the 3-11 commission’s findings that Aznar manipulated intelligence have
accelerated the party’s conservatism. The dominance of Aznar, who seeks
vindication by continuing to justify his hard-line policy, continues to be felt
in the party. The former prime minister, for example, has used prominent PP
think tank La Fundación para Análisis y los Estudios Sociales to critique
Socialist exploitation of 3-11 and Zapatero’s “weak” policies.25
The Socialists, furthermore, have exacerbated the partisan divide. Zapatero’s withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq, his decision to negotiate with
ETA, and his proposal for an “alliance of civilizations” between the Western and Muslim worlds have been presented by the Socialists as “heroic.”26
Zapatero’s rhetorical excesses have, moreover, led to increasingly sharper
parliamentarian debates and have created a perception of a pioneering leadership with “brave solutions” that depart greatly from traditional policy.
Current PP leader Rajoy has moved his party decisively to the right. The
PP has opposed the Socialists’ counter-terror initiatives, including the legalization of undocumented aliens (many of whom are Moroccans), and has
resisted the government’s recent efforts to negotiate with ETA if it renounces
violence. Repeated parliamentary debates have focused on the “radical,”
“dangerous,” and “improper” nature of Zapatero’s antiterror policy.27 The
conservatives, moreover, have offered only contingent support for the Socialists after ETA’s announcement of a permanent cease-fire and have repeatedly
criticized the government’s approach.
The conservatives have been active at both the parliamentary and street
level. Organized by the PP in summer 2005, the 500,000-person Madrid
street protests against Zapatero’s dialogue with ETA were a calculated effort
to stake out a new conservative position. Repudiating any dialogue with ETA
reflects a new post – 3-11 conservative consciousness that any negotiation
24. “Rajoy relama a Zapatero que reflexione porque ETA presenta el mismo discurso de hace 20
anos,” elmundo.es, at www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2005/06/17/espana/1119012407.html.
25. Jesús Rodríguez, “La FAES, Fort Apache de Aznar,” El País, 22 May 2005, 1 – 3.
26. “Blair respalda la propuesta de Zapatero para una alianza de civilizaciones,” El País, 28 July
2005, 1 – 18.
27. Luiz R. Aizpeolea, “El Gobierno insiste en que usará el Estado de derecho para acabar la
violencia,” El País, 26 July 2005.
132 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
with terrorists is a folly and is a break with previous PP doctrine and policy.
Aznar’s failed 1998 policy to lure ETA into a truce with promised amnesty
for ETA terrorists and prisoners who renounced violence was quite close to
the current Zapatero initiative. The PP disagreement with the Socialists over
whether Zapatero has broken the 2000 Anti-Terrorist Pact between the parties is similarly based on a fanciful interpretation of Zapatero’s radical departure from traditional policy.
The PP’s conservatism on terror issues cannot be divorced from the larger
political environment. Zapatero’s legalization of gay marriage, divorce reform,
gender equality laws, and fights with the church have sharpened Spain’s
social divide. As a defender of traditional Christian values, the PP sees
Zapatero as creating a culture war in Spain that affects the family, the state,
and the societal fabric. Given the sharply contentious nature of the issues
involved, the conservatives feel obliged to mount strong opposition.
While personality conflicts and political considerations have prompted PP
conservatism, it would be a mistake to see the hard-line approach as devoid
of substantive consideration. The unprecedented scope of the 3-11 attacks
and the unique challenge of Islamist terror have created a different security
context. Al Qaeda affiliates’ tendency to attack without warning and trigger mass civilian deaths needs to be juxtaposed with ETA’s recent penchant
to provide pre-attack warnings to minimize the number of casualties. Given
such radically different foes, there can be no great surprise that there is so
much discord on how to combat this new phenomenon.
Both parties have genuine disagreements on what foreign and domestic
policies are necessary to combat the Islamist menace. This is especially true
on the issue of how to deal with state sponsors of terror and whether military
solutions are the best means to deal with Islamist terror. Aznar’s willingness to involve Spain in the Iraq war and side with the United States was
widely repudiated by the Socialists as illegal, immoral, and anti-European.
Zapatero’s 2004 Iraq pullout and the Socialists’ alliance with France and
Germany are presented as a repudiation of Aznar’s close relationship with
the Bush administration and as a new effort to combat Islamist terror through
police and legal measures.
The Socialists believe that al Qaeda (once removed from its Taliban sanctuary) is an entity that is not linked to a system of state patronage and there-
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 133
fore cannot be defeated by military means. Echoing the sentiments of Charles
Kupchan, who notes “there will be no D-Day in the war against terror,” the
Socialists see combating al Qaeda as more of a fight that involves intelligence, police, and judicial services.28 Committing themselves to wider European cooperation on the prosecution and extradition of Islamist and Basque
terrorists, the Socialists see their approach as more enlightened, effective,
and humane.29
The PP continues to defend Aznar’s controversial pact with the United
States and its war on terror and has denied the relationship between the
3-11 attacks and Spanish participation in the Iraq war.30 Former ministers in
Aznar’s cabinet have criticized Zapatero’s “anti-Americanism” and his close
relationship with France and Germany, both of whom were staunch opponents of the Iraq war. For many PP analysts, the entire trajectory of Zapatero’s foreign policy has greatly undermined the war on terror, and they view
the Socialists’ pullout from Iraq as a capitulation to Islamist terrorists.31
Similar controversies have erupted over the government’s immigration policies and its relationship with Morocco. Zapatero’s 2004 decision to legalize
undocumented workers was presented by the Socialists as a vital measure
to assimilate vast numbers of Moroccan and Algerian migrants before they
fall into the hands of Islamist radicals.32 Hoping that stable employment and
better economic conditions will lure young Muslims from criminal and terror
networks, the Socialists have steadfastly maintained that the problem of terror cannot be solved without addressing its socioeconomic roots. The legalization of undocumented workers, the Socialists argue, will help facilitate better
28. Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era (New York: Vintage, 2003).
29. “Es necesaria una ley para controlar a los imams de las pequenas mezquites,” El País, 2 May
2004, 18, 20. The newspaper interviews former interior minister Alonso, who explains the government’s efforts to consult and dialogue with the Muslim community and isolate and expel radicals.
30. José María Izquierdo and Soledad Gallego-Diaz, “El Paralmento nacional tiene perfecto derecho a opinar sobre los estatutos,” El País, 30 January 2005, 18 – 9. The authors interview PP leader
Mariano Rajoy, who critiques the government’s antiterrorist policies and defends Aznar’s record.
31. “Ni un solo punto en comun en una tarde de puentes rotos,” El País, 12 May 2005, 23. The
article includes comments on the ideological and policy differences between the Socialists and the
Conservative opposition.
32. José Manuel Romero and Tomas Barbulo, “Este proceso ha sido un desahogo moral para la
gente de bien,” El País, 6 May 2005. The authors interview Minister of Work and Social Affairs
Jesús Caldera, who defends the government’s policy of legalizing illegal immigrants.
134 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
relations with Morocco, whose cooperation in the fight against illegal migration, illicit enterprise, and terrorism is vital. To this effect, Zapatero and King
Mohammad VI have had numerous meetings and pacts to control the flood of
migrants, terrorists, and drugs that proceed from Morocco’s borders.
The PP has criticized these policies as opening up the flood gates to prospective Moroccan, Syrian, and Algerian migrants, who form the bulk of the
Islamist terror network in Spain. The conservatives argue that Morocco gains
much from exporting its population problem (émigré remittances are a valuable source of income) and that the Socialists have created a population time
bomb of a vast number of illegal Muslim immigrants lured by the prospect of
future amnesties. Some in the European community see Zapatero’s immigration policy as creating the basis of an Islamist fifth column that will allow
Muslim terrorists to travel across Europe and launch attacks across the continent.33
The electoral legacy of 3-11 and the unique challenges of Islamist terror
have sharpened policy disagreements between the Socialists and the conservatives. Within the PP there is lingering political resentment over both the
Left’s unexpected victory in the 14 March election and the Socialists’ use of
the 3-11 parliamentary investigation to denounce Aznar’s counter-terror policy. The Socialists’ “new course” in antiterror policy to combat Islamist and
Basque terror is in most respects quite traditional. Whether these traditional
policies can work in a world after 9-11, 3-11, and the 7 July 2005 attacks in
London will be a critical issue for the Socialists.
Zapatero’s Hour:
The Socialists Confront the Dual Security Problem
Zapatero’s government has made fighting terrorism a key priority. Given the
complexity of the issue, the Socialists confront two simultaneous terrorist
threats that could rend asunder their government (see figure 2). Zapatero
has crafted a traditional policy relying on both carrot and stick. The Socialists have supplemented law enforcement with efforts to address the needs of
the Basque and Islamic communities. By ameliorating Basque and Muslim
33. Robert Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2005): 120 – 35.
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 135
Figure 2
Nature of Contemporary Basque and Islamist Security Threats
Territorial
Objectives of
Terrorist Group
Policy Objectives of
Terrorist Group
Basque/Secular Micronationalist Groups
Islamist al Qaeda
and Affiliated
Groups
Establish Basque
independent homeland
(Euskadi Herrera)
Annex Andalucía as
part of larger Islamic
caliphate
Amnesty for ETA’s
prisoners
Pull Spain out of
Afghanistan
Greater regional autonomy
for Basque province and
culture
End prosecution of
Islamist militants
Legalization of Batasuna
Establish Spanish neutrality in war against terror
Establish greater rights
and freedom for Islamic
immigrants
Psychological
Objectives of
Terrorist Group
Promote fear and panic
through terror attacks,
forcing politicians into
negotiated settlement
Promote fear and panic
through mass attacks
with severe damage
to achieve policy
objectives
Tactics of Terrorist
Group
Symbolic centers of
Spanish state, police, and
national guard
Transportation,
political, and economic
infrastructure and
civilian centers
National and Basque
economic assets and
enterprises
Targets of Terrorist
Group
Bombings
Kidnapping and ransom
of wealthy Basque and
Spanish businessmen
Assassination of police
officers, politicians, and
national guardsmen
Nonsuicidal and
suicidal operations to
inflict mass civilian
deaths and severe
economic damage
136 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
problems, Zapatero hopes to deny terror groups an environment in which to
recruit more members. How might this “rational” stick-and-carrot approach
work within the context of Islamist and Basque terror challenges that some
have characterized as irrational and nihilistic?34
The Islamist security threat is complex. Since the 1990s Spain has confronted a Muslim terror infrastructure of criminal organizations, community
centers, and militant groups that is heavily concentrated in unassimilated
neighborhoods. Spanish and Moroccan intelligence reports have continuously identified the coastal regions of Tarragona, Granada, and Almería and
the Spanish North African colonies of Ceuta and Melilla as hubs that link
criminal organizations and mosques to various terror groups where the hashish trade, money laundering, and human smuggling provide huge profits to
finance terror operations.35 Both intelligence services, moreover, report that
there are more than one hundred terror cells ready to strike at Spanish interests and that more than six hundred Moroccan jihadis may have crossed the
Straits of Gibraltar.
Some mosques and community centers have assisted in the recruitment
of prospective terrorists and have provided financial support for groups
like Algerian Armed Islamic Group, Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade, and the
Moroccan Salfist Group for Preaching and Combat. In January 2006 the government broke up an Algerian terror network operating out of a Barcelona
mosque that utilized construction funds to send jihadis to fight against US
forces in Iraq.36 The vast explosion of Muslim migration to Spain since the
1990s and the predominance of devout young males in that population have
been key factors in the recruitment and training of terrorists for both foreign and domestic operations. The majority of the 9-11 and 3-11 terrorists
in Spain were foreigners whose religious orthodoxy and internal rage were
accelerated by their exposure to secular, liberal society.37
34. Jerald Post, “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,”
in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies and States of Minds, ed. Walter Reich
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 25 – 42.
35. “Ceuta y Melilla, la frontera de la yihad,” El País, 18 July 2004, 16 – 8.
36. “La red islamista pagó viajes a Iraq con dinero para hacer otra mezquita,” El País, 15 January
2006, 26.
37. “Uno de los suicidas de Leganes, a sus hijos: ’Seguid a los muyahidin, Eso es lo que espero de
vosotros,” elmundo.es, at www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2005/02/15/espana/1108482074.html.
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 137
Following international prosecution of the al Qaeda network after the
9-11 attacks, the terror organization has purportedly lost its centralized command-and-control system. The Islamist terror network in Europe has been
transfigured into a looser system of al Qaeda affiliates using local contacts
and resources to finance and execute terror operations.38 The 3-11 attacks,
for example, were organized locally and financed by the hashish trade, while
the 7-7 attacks in England where done mainly by British nationals of Pakistani origin.
The Islamists have used Spanish and British involvement in the Iraq war
as justification for the attacks. Analysts have noted the growth in recruitment of European jihadists to fight in Iraq and the presence of cells ready to
attack governments that have participated in the Iraq war.39 Having struck
against the Spanish and British governments, al Qaeda continues to threaten
the Italian and Danish governments with future attacks if they do not withdraw their forces.
While the Iraq war has played a role in terrorist recruitment and no doubt
encourages many Islamists to take actions, the war’s role in strengthening of
al Qaeda affiliates should not be overstated. The Spanish case is illustrative.
Zapatero’s withdrawal of troops from Iraq has not diminished the level of al
Qaeda activity or the degree of terrorist recruitment. The seven 3-11 terrorists, who played a critical role in the fall of Aznar’s government, were planning future terror attacks in Spain. Their April 2004 collective suicide, when
surrounded by police in a Madrid apartment building, has been the basis of
Islamist pledges to avenge and honor their deaths.
The danger of al Qaeda affiliates in Spain is growing. This is illustrated
by an October 2004 plot by Islamist militants (foiled by Spanish police) to
destroy a main commercial center in Barcelona and by the November 2004
Operación Nova, in which Spanish and Moroccan intelligence services frustrated an Islamist plot to bomb the Madrid courthouse. The captured terrorists sought to destroy records and data systems pertinent to prosecuting 9-11
and 3-11 Islamist terrorists.40
38. Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2003): 27 – 40.
39. Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe (New York: Prometheus, 2006); Gilles Kopel, “Pérdidias
y beneficios de la guerra contra el terrorismo,” El País, 12 May 2005, 13.
40. Vidino.
138 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
Spain’s involvement in international peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and its high profile prosecution and trials of more than one hundred
9-11 and 3-11 defendants will be sufficient provocation for the Islamists. One
can easily imagine that the Spanish justice system’s conviction of eighteen al
Qaeda militants (including a twenty-seven-year sentence for al Qaeda’s head
in Spain) for conspiracy in the 9-11 attacks and the Spanish justice system’s
desire to eventually try dozens of 3-11 suspects may invite terrorist retaliation.
The Socialists have sought to balance their policy toward the Muslim community with conciliatory gestures. Former interior minister José Antonio
Alonso called for the construction of a formal consultation system between
the Spanish state and the Muslim community to resolve joint problems and
concerns.41 The Socialists in 2005 legalized Spain’s undocumented foreign
worker population in an effort to get at the black market and improve relations with North African countries. The government hopes that these efforts
will enhance the assimilation of Muslim workers, who have remained cloistered in illicit trades and autonomous communities, and thereby deny terror
networks fresh recruits.
Similarly Zapatero’s Alianza de Civilizaciónes, sponsored by the United
Nations, seeks intercivilization dialogue between Muslim and Western
nations. Envisioning it as a not-so-subtle rebuke of Samuel Huntington’s
“clash of civilizations” argument, the UN hopes that contacts between intellectuals, statesmen, and artists may bridge the divide between the secular/
Christian West and the Muslim East.
While theoretically reasonable, the Socialists’ efforts to court Islamic
groups and immigrants are likely to flounder. First, Islamist civil society and
its intricate network of community groups, xenophobic imams, criminal networks, mosques, and radical organizations are fairly impervious to co-option.
Pioneered by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Lebanese Hezbollah,
these networks are constructed to shield Islamist civil society from state
control and patronage and seek to utilize terror and illicit enterprise as the
basis for undermining state authority.42 Dialogues with Islamist civil society
41. “Es necesaria una ley para poder controlar a los imams de las pequenas mezquitas,” El País,
2 May 2004, 18, 20.
42. Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah,” in Origins of Terrorism, 131 – 60.
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 139
are likely at best to lead to only symbolic cooperation and at worst may end
up legitimating many of the mosques and community organizations that are
embedded in this network of terror.
Second, Zapatero’s decision to legalize undocumented workers (estimated
at around 700,000) may strengthen the Islamist terror network by encouraging a huge exodus of Arab populations to Spain who may be lured by
the promise of future amnesty. This well-intentioned policy may have serious continental consequences. Once granted Spanish citizenship under the
new amnesty law, Islamist terrorists could move freely across Europe and
plan attacks across the continent. Furthermore, it is highly questionable that
legalizing this population will drive them away from terror organizations, for
many of the 3-11 terrorists had jobs in the official economy.
Carefully crafted policies based on the rationality of one’s adversary may
very well produce adverse outcomes if your enemy is irrational and nihilistic.43 Under these circumstances, the Islamists with their “culture of death,”
their martyrdom complex, and their fantasies of a renewed Islamist caliphate
may find both the carrot and stick of Zapatero’s policy overly provocative. The
Socialists’ simultaneous hard and soft approach to Islamist terrorism could
produce counter-intuitive and dangerous outcomes.
Reinforced by successive waves of legalized Muslim immigrants, some of
whom are hostile to liberal and secular Spanish society, the Islamists may
strike at the Socialists in retaliation for their prosecution of 9-11 and 3-11
defendants. Zapatero’s past decision on Iraq and his pacifistic public discourse, moreover, could raise Islamists’ hopes that the Spanish state will
capitulate to al Qaeda demands for a pullout from Afghanistan and end its
prosecution and expulsion of Islamic radicals. Efforts to reduce the autonomy of Islamist civil society through state subsidy and consultation forums
may be interpreted as an attack on Muslim autonomy and also induce violent
responses.
As evidenced by the hopes raised by ETA’s announcement of a permanent
cease-fire, the Socialists may have a greater success when confronting the
challenge of Basque terror. Since the early 1990s ETA has been in decline,
and its militants are divided on the nature of the political-military struggle
43. Vidino.
140 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2006
against the Spanish state. While ETA attacked eleven times in 2006, all of
its attacks have been prewarned and none have produced any deaths. The
generally weak nature of the Basque terror organization, the decline of its
ideological base, the jailing of more than six thousand of its militants, and
the French-Spanish cooperation in breaking up ETA have paid dividends
and they may create the basis for a negotiated settlement of the Basque problem.44 The Spanish parliament in May 2005 passed a resolution authorizing
the government to negotiate with ETA if the group renounces terrorism.45
The measure, rejected only by the PP and endorsed by the Basque National
Party – dominated regional legislature, demonstrates a resolve to deal with
the Basque problem peacefully. The illegal Batasuna, with apparent government urging, has emerged as an interlocutor between the Socialist administration and ETA. The mediating role of Batasuna is likely to be enlarged by
ETA’s 22 March 2006 communiqué that calls for a negotiated solution.
While hopes have been generated by ETA’s call for a permanent ceasefire, a final solution is far from certain. ETA’s 22 March declaration falls short
of a complete renunciation of violence and seems contingent on the Socialists
ending their prosecution of ETA militants. Further demands ranging from
prisoner amnesty to the movement of ETA prisoners to Basque facilities and
the legalization of Batasuna cloud the waters considerably. PP leader Rajoy
has labeled ETA’s announcement a “pause” and has lobbied for further prosecution of militants and no concessions.46
The ETA’s decline may also be exaggerated. Faced with government
unwillingness to grant amnesty for ETA terrorists or to allow for a referendum
on the issue of Basque independence, Basque militants may resume a terror campaign. The general profile of ETA terrorists (young, ideological, and
nihilistic) militate against a peaceful outcome.47 ETA has experienced lulls
in violent activity only to resurface with bloody attacks (dozens were killed
44. Remiro Brotóns and Espósito.
45. “Masiva protesta contra el dialogo con ETA,” El País, 5 June 2005, 20. The PP and victims’
rights organizations organized a five-hundred-thousand-person march to demonstrate against parliament’s approval of a law to negotiate with ETA if it abandons violence.
46. “Rajoy cuestiona el alto el fuego porque es una pausa, no la renuncia definitive de ETA,” El
País, 23 March 2006, 18.
47. Remiro Brotóns and Espósito.
Celso: Spain’s Dual Security Dilemma 141
and hundreds were wounded in the early 1990s) and the organization still
has the capacity to launch attacks against the government with impunity.
The weakening of ETA’s ideological base, its faltering capacity, and its
willingness to negotiate peacefully must be contrasted with Islamist militancy
and the rapid growth of radical Islamic terror groups. ETA’s communist ideology and Basque nationalist identity has lost much of its élan in post – Cold
War, transnational Europe, and its doctrinal weakness pales in comparison
with the powerful apocalyptic worldview of the Islamists who seek to destroy
Western society and attack without warning and with deadly consequences.
The Socialists may resolve the Basque terrorist threat, but they have
inherited a problem impervious to negotiation, reason, and dialogue. Spain
stands at a dangerous crosscurrent between a Socialist government eager for
dialogue and toleration and a growing Islamist terror infrastructure driven by
a nihilistic and fascistic culture of death. Having been born from the carnage
of 3-11, Zapatero’s government may be consumed by the growing threat of
Islamist terror.