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K’ung-fu-tzu (551-479 BC) The Analects
Matteo Ricci
Caitlin Lu
Chinese International School, Hong Kong
Reforms of Gaius Marius
Andrew Crumrine
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Kristina Solvik
Richard Montgomery High School, Rockville, Maryland
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Peter the Great
Preeti Varathan
Singapore American School, Singapore
Headscarf Ban
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Roman Britain
Molly Pickel
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Slaves in the Revolution
Caroline Carson Mullins
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Jiweon Kim
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Jewish Community
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Caitlin Lu
Matteo Ricci in China
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Andrew Crumrine
The Reforms of Gaius Marius
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Kristina Solvik
The Rights of Muslim Women
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Preeti Varathan
Peter the Great of Russia
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Fatima Hosain
Headscarf Ban in France and Turkey
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Roman Britain
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Slaves in the American Revolution
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Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt
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Jewish Community in the U.S.
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Tito’s Yugoslavia
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CONCORD
REVIEW
1
MATTEO RICCI AND THE JESUIT MISSION
IN CHINA 1583-1610
Caitlin Lu
Abstract
T
his essay considers the question: What strategies did Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) employ in his mission to spread Catholicism
in China, and how effective were they? Matteo Ricci was an Italian
Jesuit scholar and priest who entered China in 1583 to lead the
Jesuit missionary movement. After mastering the Chinese language
and the Confucian classics, he became the first foreigner allowed
by the Ming Emperor into the Forbidden City in Peking. He died
there in 1610 and was the first non-Chinese to be officially allowed
burial in the capital city, an immense honor to this day. This essay
will document Ricci’s pioneering work in bridging Chinese and
Western culture, critically analyze his strategy of evangelism, and
conclude that while he largely failed in his proselytizing mission,
his secular and spiritual works hold lasting significance in China
and the outside world. They represent the highest form of scholarship, scientific exchange and cross-cultural understanding. In
short, this remarkable East-West scholar succeeded in opening
China to the West and vice-versa like no man has done before or
after. His distinctively humanistic legacy endures four centuries
after his death, as strongly in China as it does in Europe.
Caitlin Lu is a Junior at the Chinese International School in Hong Kong,
where she wrote this paper for Mr. Christopher Caves’ IB Higher Level
History course in the 2010/2011 academic year.
2
Caitlin Lu
Introduction
Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) was a brilliant and learned Italian
scholar-priest who led the Jesuit missionary movement in China at
the end of the 16th century. He was a formidable pioneer, bridging
Chinese and Western culture through Jesuit proselytism. Although
he largely failed in his evangelical mission, his secular and spiritual
works hold lasting significance in China and the outside world. A
remarkable train of events inspired this astonishing man to leave
Italy, serve in Goa and Macao, and spend the last quarter century
of his life as Superior of the Jesuit mission in China. The path of
his life, and his impact on the Eastern Hemisphere in particular,
is fascinating to analyze.
The year 2010 marks the 400th anniversary of Ricci’s death.
Celebrations were held in Macerata, his birthplace, and in Rome,
where Pope Benedict XVI hailed Ricci as “a Jesuit endowed with
extraordinary cultural and intellectual gifts, and a daring and
intelligent messenger of Christ’s Gospel...in China.”1 The most
elaborate festivities, however, took place across China: in Beijing,
where he lived for the last decade of his life and is buried; and
in Macao, Zhaoqing, Nanchang, Nanjing and Shanghai, places
where he lived, worked and left an enduring legacy. Thousands of
Chinese each year make the pilgrimage to the Zhalan Cemetery
in Beijing to pay their respects to the man they call Li Madou Xi
Tai, or “The Scholar from the West.”2
The Chinese revere Matteo Ricci, and many consider him
the foreigner who did the most to open up China to the Western
world and vice-versa. In the fall of 2009, the official Xin Hua News
Agency wrote that Ricci was “beloved by all Chinese—Catholics and
non alike. He is a ‘model of exchange between East and West’…a
pioneer seeking a common basis for dialogue and scientific and
cultural exchange. With his extraordinary, timeless cultural and
theological talent, he indicated an alternative route of incorporation of culture and science for all.”3 Westerners similarly laud
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3
his life and work. According to Sinologist Wolfgang Franke, Ricci
was “the most outstanding cultural mediator between China and
the West of all time.”4 Historian and Ricci biographer Jonathan
Spence experienced Ricci’s impact first-hand:
From the first moment I went to China as a student, the one Chinese
name of a Westerner that I found recognized by everyone was Li
Madou, Matteo Ricci. To say I was interested in Li Madou evoked
smiles and nods all over China. This Italian Jesuit, who went to China
in 1583, has a kind of special resonance in the hearts of the Chinese
even now...a remarkable tribute to one particular missionary.5
As a testimony to his stature, Ricci became the first nonChinese visitor to be allowed entry into the Forbidden City in
1601, by the Ming Emperor Wan Li. Wan Li was so impressed with
Ricci’s vast intellect and command of the Chinese classics that he
provided lifelong housing and a generous stipend for Ricci and
his mission. He then accorded Ricci the highest tribute by permitting his body to be buried in Peking, the first such honor for any
foreigner.
Ricci’s intellectual prowess and scholarly achievements
are legendary. Schooled in the Jesuit tradition, he mastered
mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, geography and cartography,
in addition to the Catholic canon. He studied classical Chinese
to the point where he could converse intelligently with the most
accomplished Chinese scholars and literati, who formed the pinnacle of Ming Dynasty society. His command of Chinese was so
great that he translated the Confucian classics, The Four Books,
into Latin, and co-translated six books of Euclid’s Elements into
Chinese.6 He devised the first Portuguese-Chinese dictionary,
inventing his own system of romanization. He developed and
taught a special mnemonic memory system, which enabled him
to memorize voluminous amounts of information in Latin, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Chinese. In addition, he produced
many world maps, some of enormous scale and complexity, with
full annotations in Chinese. He did this intensive intellectual
work while tirelessly endeavoring to spread Catholicism and the
revelations of the Gospel across Confucian China.
4
Caitlin Lu
Education
Ricci was born to an affluent noble family in 1552 in
Macerata, a town in central Italy overlooking the Adriatic. In 1572,
he went to Rome to study law at the Jesuit Roman College. He
came under the tutelage of three mentors, each a distinguished
scholar who would have a lifelong influence on him. Alessandro
Valignano (1539-1606) was master of novices and imbued Ricci
with an appreciation for the importance of cultural sensitivity and
adaptability. Ricci would later apply these principles with creativity
and devotion to his mission in China. Christopher Clavius (15381612) was a noted German astronomer and mathematician in the
movement to reform the Gregorian calendar. His seminal books
on astronomy were used by missionaries for much of the late 16th
and early 17th centuries. Clavius inspired in Ricci a lifelong passion for mathematics and astronomy, which he would later use
to great benefit in impressing Chinese scholars, mandarins and,
ultimately, the Ming Emperor.7 Roberto Bellarmino (1542-1621)
was an Italian Jesuit Cardinal in Rome. His teachings on dogmatics and his revisionist catechisms made him one of the most
influential Cardinals of the Catholic Church during that period.
Under Bellarmino’s tutelage, Ricci would develop the formidable
apologetics skills of reason, persuasion and dialogue which would
prove invaluable in his intellectual and spiritual interchanges with
his Chinese counterparts.8 Apprenticing under this trio of mentors
gave Ricci the religious, scientific and intellectual foundation that
would deeply impress the highest echelons of Chinese society—and
ultimately open the doors to dialogue with the imperial court.
In 1577, Ricci was sent to the Portuguese mission in Goa
to teach Latin and Greek. He was ordained priest in 1581, and
stayed there for almost six years. In 1583, Valignano, by then head
of the Jesuit mission for all of Asia, instructed him to go to Macao.
His task was to assist Father Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607), the
Superior of the mission in the Portuguese enclave, who had been
struggling to gain entry into China. Ricci arrived in the middle of
that year and promptly immersed himself in studying Chinese. As
THE CONCORD REVIEW
5
a testament to his brilliance, he succeeded in mastering the language in a few years. Cambridge historian of science and Sinologist
Joseph Needham considered Ricci “one of the most remarkable
and brilliant men in history,” and noted the enormity of the task:9
There was of course the almost insuperable difficulty of language at
a time when sinology hardly existed and no good dictionaries had
been made.10
At the end of 1583, Ricci moved with Ruggieri to Zhaoqing, a small city near Canton where the Governor-General of
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces had his official residence.
Ricci would never again return to Europe or leave China.
Historical Context
It is important to understand the historical, ecumenical,
geopolitical and intellectual context of Ricci’s entry into the Middle
Kingdom, and how these factors impacted the nature of his mission. In Europe, the Counter Reformation had commenced four
decades earlier with the Council of Trent (1545-1563). By 1583,
the Catholic revival was in full force, most notably led by the Jesuit
movement. The Society of Jesus, as the Jesuits were officially known,
had been formed in 1540 by St. Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556), a
Spanish nobleman and former soldier. As disciplined and devoted
as he was charismatic and organized, Loyola quickly established
the Jesuit order as a quasi-military brotherhood, almost fanatical
in their zeal to restore the reputation of the Catholic church and
stem the Protestant tide. Beyond the monastic vows of poverty,
chastity and absolute obedience, St. Ignatius placed great emphasis on careful selection, iron discipline and rigorous educational
training for his members.11
St. Ignatius’s overarching mission was to spread the
Gospel of Catholicism into the new worlds being opened by the
explorers, armadas and traders of Europe, and convert as many
non-Christians as possible.12 St. Francis Xavier (1506-1552), one
of the Jesuits’ more forceful founders, assumed responsibility for
6
Caitlin Lu
spreading Catholicism in the Far Eastern dominions. After a brief
sojourn in India, he settled in Japan and made some headway in
converting non-Christians. In 1552, he determined that China
held more importance to the evangelical cause, and proceeded
to its southern coast. He died late that year on Shangchuan, an
island off the coast of Guangdong, failing in his quest to enter the
mainland. Before his death, however, he wrote several exhortations
to the Jesuit leadership on the strategic importance of establishing
a Catholic mission in China.13
In the late 1500s, the Mediterranean world was split by
the economic, political and military rivalry between Portugal
and Spain.14 Each nation was trying to assert its dominion over
the New World, mainly the central and southern Americas, and
the territories to the east of the Mediterranean. The Treaty of
Tordesillas (1494), mediated by Pope Alexander VI, divided this
expanse longitudinally west of Africa at the Cape Verde Islands.15
With the exception of the Philippine Islands, the Asian domains
fell under the auspices of the Portuguese. Out of consideration
for the Pope’s peacemaking role, the Vatican missions in these
territories were to receive safe haven from their Portuguese and
Spanish settlers. The Jesuit missions in Asia toward the end of the
century focused on Portuguese-controlled India, Japan, Korea,
Taiwan and China. The rival Dominican and Franciscan missions
used the Philippines, under Spanish protection, as their base to
enter China. This rivalry was to cause much trouble for Ricci later
on during the so-called Chinese Rites Controversy.
In China, the end of the 16th century marked the apex of
the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Spence notes:
In the year AD 1600, the empire of China was the largest and most
sophisticated of all the united realms on earth….the Ming Dynasty
seemed at the height of its glory. Its achievements in culture and
the arts were remarkable, urban and commercial life were spreading new levels of prosperity, while Chinese skills in printing and the
manufacture of porcelain and silk exceeded anything that could be
found in Europe at the time.16
Moreover, the Chinese had for centuries considered themselves
the Middle Kingdom, a civilization superior to all other societies,
THE CONCORD REVIEW
7
and they were particularly dismissive of Europeans, whom they
considered barbarians. Buccaneering Spanish and Portuguese
traders only reinforced this stereotype through their behavior in
coastal China. As Immanuel Hsu writes:
On the whole, foreign traders in China, who were mostly profit-seeking
adventurers and uncouth men of little culture, made a poor show
of themselves. Their violent and reckless conduct confirmed the
Chinese view of foreigners as barbarians. They were not welcomed
but tolerated.17
Ricci was entering a country whose rulers and people were
leery of foreign evangelists and traders alike.
Intellectual and Religious Background
Intellectually, Europe stood at the dawn of the Age of
Reason. Perhaps the greatest intellectual controversy involving the
Catholic Church in the late 1500s was the debate between faith and
science sparked by the Copernican revolution. Nicolas Copernicus’s (1473-1543) heliocentric theory of the universe was blasted
as heretical by Catholic doctrinaires. At the same time, pressures
to reform the Julian calendar were intensifying, particularly given
the need for dioceses around the Catholic world to coordinate
festivals and rituals.18 Events were leading to the trial of Galileo,
who would be denounced just two decades later during the Roman Inquisition. The Gregorian calendar was officially adopted
by Rome in 1582, just one year before Matteo Ricci embarked
on his journey into China. Ricci, trained not only in the Catholic
canon but also in mathematics, the physical sciences, astronomy
and rhetoric, must have felt torn by these competing intellectual
forces. Representing the best of the Jesuit apologetist tradition,
he remained loyal to both the theological catechisms and the
principles of rationalism, debate and scientific evidence.
Christianity in China can be traced back to the Tang Dynasty
(618-907), with the arrival around 635 of the first missionaries
from Persia (the so-called “Jinhjau”) in the capital city of Chang-
8
Caitlin Lu
an, or present day X’ian.19 But there is little documented activity
thereafter until the 13th century, when several Mongol tribes were
thought to have adopted Nestorian Christianity.20 There is also
evidence of Papal representatives making contact with officials in
the Yuan Dynasty capital of Khanbaliq, current-day Beijing.21 In
1289, Franciscan friars from Europe initiated missionary work in
China, often in tandem with the Nestorians. The Christian movement was halted, however, in 1369, when the incoming Ming rulers
moved to expel all foreign influences, including Buddhism.22
The Ricci Mission and Method
It was against this two centuries’ void that Matteo Ricci set
forth on his journey into China. His mission was clear: to determine
and implement an effective strategy to evangelize the country and
bring China into the Catholic realm.
As he was new to China, Ricci did not have a well-formulated
strategy at the outset of his odyssey. He was influenced by the
thinking of St. Ignatius and the practices of St. Francis Xavier. St.
Ignatius advised his missionaries:
Show that you conform, as far as the Institute of the Society permits,
to the customs of the people there….teach matters of faith and morals
in a way that is accommodated to those people...without taking away
from them anything in which they especially value, try to get them to
accept the truths of Catholicism...do everything gently.23
Valignano, Ricci’s longtime mentor, also had great influence
on his thinking. All three emphasized the importance of respect,
tolerance and pragmatic accommodation of local customs where
necessary, so Ricci adopted a flexible, rather than doctrinaire approach.
After living in the southern city of Zhaoqing for two years
and immersing himself in local life, Ricci decided on an evangelical strategy with four guiding principles: achieving linguistic and
cultural mastery; focusing on how to influence the top echelons
of Chinese society, rather than the masses; impressing Chinese
THE CONCORD REVIEW
9
literati and officials with the science and technology of the West
as a means to pique curiosity in and acceptance of Christianity;
and finally, accommodating Chinese values, rituals and customs
in an attempt to harmonize them with Christian teachings.24
These guiding principles became known as “The Ricci
Method” and showed Ricci’s informed, pragmatic and nuanced
style. Ricci’s strategies were also remarkably sensitive for the era.
Undoubtedly, the historical, theological and intellectual context
of the Counter Reformation (and its attendant primary mission
of recapturing lay members), the emergence of the zealous Jesuit
movement, the Church’s ambivalence about yielding to science and
adopting the Gregorian calendar, and St. Francis Xavier’s dying wish
to enter China, spurred Ricci to formulate and deploy a strategy
which would best realize his mission’s objectives. He would need
to be pragmatic, given the opaque and complex nature of China.
At the time, China was an insular, intensely proud and inherently
conservative culture that prized intellectual accomplishment. Ricci
realized that he would need to employ finesse, cultural sensitivity and accommodation along with intellectual “shock and awe”
to gain trust, respect and ultimately acceptance by the powers in
question.
Valignano’s thinking formed the foundation for Ricci’s
initial guiding principle of linguistic mastery. The former’s first
official act upon arriving in Japan was to require all new missionaries to spend at least two years in intensive language study.25 In
China, he instructed the Jesuits to find the best teachers and learn
to read, write and speak Chinese so as to “Sinicize” themselves
rather than to “Portugalize” their converts:
The work of evangelization, of making Christians, should be carried
on both in Peking and in the provinces...following the methods of
pacific penetration and cultural adaptation. Europeanism is to be
shunned.26
Valignano preferred to see progress in furthering Jesuit
influence over blind adherence to Christian principles. His strategies stood in marked contrast to those of the Dominican and
Franciscan missionaries, who pursued a more rigid, Eurocentric
and less culturally sensitive approach to the conversion process.
10
Caitlin Lu
Ricci’s thoughtful method of linguistic immersion and
acculturation was unique at the time in China. He understood
that the bureaucratic and scholarly elite were largely suspicious of
foreigners, whom they generally considered to be uncivilized and
mercenary. He took on the role of learner rather than proselytizer,
judiciously choosing to present Christ in Chinese terms and not
in European ones.27
Ricci not only immersed himself in the study of Chinese,
but he also adopted the dress of Buddhist clerics upon entering
China. Probably inspired by Valignano and his experience in Japan,
Ricci felt that this appearance would allow him and his companion
Ruggieri to blend in as men of the spirit, rather than be seen as
foreign aggressors.28 He replaced this attire with the robes of the
Confucian literati around 1595, when he modified his method to
concentrate on influencing the top echelons of the elite.29
Ricci was politically savvy enough to realize that acceptance
and approval at the highest level of Chinese society would greatly
enhance his cause. This approach ran counter to the conventional
evangelical method at the time, which was to attract the masses.
He understood that China was a profoundly hierarchical society
and that at the apex stood the Emperor. Accordingly, he worked
hard to find ways to approach and influence Wan Li, the Ming
Emperor. The basic assumption behind the strategy was that if the
Emperor and his mandarins accepted Christianity, then conversion of the masses would follow in due course. Indeed, the Jesuits
“dreamed of a new Constantine for China.”30 Ricci cleverly sent
gifts to the Forbidden City, including beautiful Italian clocks, a
clavichord, astronomical measuring devices and oil paintings to
entice a meeting with the Wan Li Emperor.31
As noted, Ricci was a man of extraordinary intellectual
versatility. It was his skill in cartography, however, that led him to
Beijing and a direct contact with the ruler. Starting in 1584, Ricci
created a series of sixteen world maps, all annotated in Chinese.
The Western concept of a world map was alien to the Chinese at
the time, who envisaged their country and its civilization as the
Middle Kingdom that lay between Heaven and Earth. The rest of
THE CONCORD REVIEW
11
the world’s land and sea masses were of little concern to them.
Typical indigenous maps of the time showed the 15 Chinese provinces surrounded by a small area of sea, with a seemingly random
group of foreign countries often misidentified.32 Ricci’s maps
opened Chinese eyes to the outside world. Building on his growing reputation as a memory expert, mathematician, astronomical
genius and accomplished Confucian scholar, Ricci supervised the
drawing and production of a series of large scale maps which accurately positioned the Middle Kingdom in relation to countries
in Europe, the subcontinent, and the New World. As he noted
in his diaries:
This was the most useful work that could be done at that time to
dispose China to give credence to the things of our Holy Faith...their
conception of the greatness of their country and of the insignificance
of other lands made them so proud that the whole world seemed to
them savage and barbarous compared with themselves.33
He astutely placed China in the center of his maps, and
made sure to feature it larger than scale. He annotated his drawings
with fascinating facts, figures and allegories about specific regions,
particularly those important in Christian scriptures. This maneuver
proved highly effective on two fronts: it piqued the interest of the
Emperor and the Ming Court, resulting in an official invitation to
visit the Forbidden City in 1601; and it allowed Ricci to insert into
each map the location of Rome and the Holy Land, with stories,
verses, psalms and other Church teachings to hint that behind
the grandeur and beauty of the world lay the divine Christian
God and his teachings.34 He revealed the real significance of this
endeavor in a journal entry: “Making the maps was not only an
instrument of missionary strategy, but it involved a religious world
view....Understanding the universe precisely scientifically means
to know God and Creation.”35
Ricci was also successful at impressing the top tier of the
influential Confucian elite. The system of power and patronage
at that time was meritocratic, centering on performance in grueling imperial civil service examinations. Excelling at these brought
power, prestige and economic security. Examination success
required mastery of the Confucian classics. The core curriculum
12
Caitlin Lu
comprised “The Four Books of Confucianism” (si shu), namely The
Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects of Confucius,
and The Book of Mencius.36 Mastering these texts involved rigorous
rote memorization and regurgitation.
Ricci spotted an opportunity and shrewdly capitalized
on his prodigious memory techniques. He made every effort to
demonstrate his carefully developed mnemonic system, which
he referred to as his “memory palace,” and was happy to impart
this skill to the scholar-elites he wished to cultivate. According
to Spence, “Ricci was able to recite long passages from Chinese
texts after only a fleeting glance.”37 Ricci noted in his diaries: “In
order to increase their wonder, I began to recite the characters
all by memory backwards in the same manner, beginning with the
very last until reaching the first. By which they all became utterly
astonished as if beside themselves.”38
During the Ming Dynasty, scholars sat imperial examinations
on average once every three years. Eager prospective mandarins
soon made their way in increasing numbers to Ricci’s door to
acquire this key to scholastic and career advancement.
Beyond phenomenal memory techniques and dazzling
world maps, Ricci enthusiastically showcased his formidable arsenal
of intellectual ideas, teachings, scientific and rhetorical skills to
demonstrate the sophistication and beauty of Western civilization.
He participated in open debates with Confucian scholars, Taoist
and Buddhist monks, and high officials, engaging these masters
in themes ranging from science, mathematics and technology to
ethics, theology and philosophy. In 1603, he published The True
Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (tianzhu shiyi), a brilliant dialogue
between a fictitious Chinese scholar (zhongshi) and his Western
counterpart (xishi) in which the Chinese scholar is won over to
the Westerner’s views on the existence of a Celestial God, Creation, and Christian ethics and teachings.39 Ricci’s brilliance and
humility attracted three renowned top scholars, Xu Guangqi, Li
Zhicao and Yang Tingyun, who soon converted to Catholicism
and became Ricci’s most trusted and influential disciples. They
are known as the “Three Great Pillars of Chinese Catholicism.”40
THE CONCORD REVIEW
13
Xu proved to be the most illustrious of these early converts.
He was celebrated for having attained jinshi, the highest possible
ranking in the imperial civil service examinations, and was a
member of the elite Hanlin Academy, a very prestigious think-tank
patronized by the Emperor.41 Baptized by Ricci with the name Paul,
Xu studied under Ricci from 1604 to 1607 before returning to
his native Shanghai. There, he established the famous Xujiahui
Church, literally meaning “Xu Family Church.” It stands today
as a Shanghai landmark and still holds regular services. Among
their many important collaborations, Xu and Ricci translated the
first six books of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry into Chinese, further
cementing both men’s sterling academic reputations.
Overall, the first three principles of the The Ricci Method
proved highly effective. Ricci endeared himself to the literary
elite as he slowly made his way from Zhaoqing in southern China
and travelled north through the cities of Nanchang, Nanjing and
Shanghai. He successfully established missions in each of these
cities, although the number of Christian converts remained painfully small—less than 600 in the entire country in the year 1600,
according to Jesuit mission estimates.42 He achieved his greatest
success when in 1601, after nearly two decades of relentless effort,
he won an audience with the imperial court and was permitted
entry into the Forbidden City. This invitation marked the first time
any foreigner had penetrated the inner sanctum of the Chinese
empire. It was at this point that Ricci began to implement his
fourth principle, that of cultural accommodation. In the short
run, his choice proved a highly successful addition to The Ricci
Method. In the long run, however, cultural accommodation precipitated the Chinese Rites Controversy, which proved disastrous
to his mission and the entire Catholic and Christian movement
in China.
The Chinese Rites Controversy
Creatively adapting Valignano’s accommodation method,
Ricci showed tolerance for the traditional Chinese rituals of an-
14
Caitlin Lu
cestor worship and the veneration of Confucius. Ricci considered
these practices to be civil rites and not religious ones, arguing that
Confucianism was not a religion per se, but rather a code of ethics
residing within the human person. He referred to it in his writings
as governed by a form of “natural law.”43 However, conservative
elements within the Church, particularly the Dominicans and
Franciscans who were also actively proselytizing in China, blasted
this accommodation policy as a breach of Catholic orthodoxy.
They argued that Confucian rites and rituals smacked of idolatry
and paganism, and were wholly inconsistent with the notion of a
Heavenly Father and Holy Spirit.44 This dispute gave rise to the
Chinese Rites Controversy, which was to consume the Papal office
and the missionary movement for centuries to come.
The controversy centered on three issues: a semantic issue
relating to whether the Chinese classical terms for “Heaven” (tian
shang), “Master of Heaven” (tian zhu) and “Most High” (shang di)
should, as Ricci advocated, also be construed to represent the
Christian God; a procedural issue relating to whether Christians
should prohibit ceremonies and rituals worshipping ancestors and
venerating Confucius; and finally an interfaith issue relating to
whether or not Chinese Christians should be allowed to participate
in festivals honoring non-Christian deities.45
Ricci wrote elaborately and eloquently on all three topics,
and provided several reasoned, nuanced and well-researched defenses of his positions. In his most celebrated Chinese book, The
True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (tianzhu shiyi), he masterfully
crafted a fictional dialogue between a Western scholar and his
Chinese counterpart. The book was designed to harmonize the
basic Christian tenets of Divinity, the Holy Trinity, redemption and
eternal life with the essential concepts of Confucianism. However,
the Dominicans and Franciscans were intransigent, and escalated
the controversy all the way to the Vatican. Their missionaries,
supported by rival Spanish colonial interests in the Philippines,
approached evangelism in China in an uncompromising, Europeanist manner. They viewed non-Christian cultures as the work of
the devil and tolerance of these cultures as a betrayal of Christian
principles.46 Dominican and Franciscan methods in every aspect
THE CONCORD REVIEW
15
opposed the subtle, culturally sensitive, and integrative approach
of St. Ignatius.
Notwithstanding this vehement attack on Ricci’s method, a
succession of Popes did nothing following Ricci’s death to overturn
the accommodation method in dealing with the Chinese rites issue.
Jesuits continued to administer papally-approved Chinese rites,
and also embraced ancestor worship and veneration of Confucius
on the grounds that these practices were civic and not religious in
nature. It was not until the time of Pope Clement XI (1700-1721)
that the internecine dispute reached its most bitter—and ultimately
destructive—turning point. In 1704, the Holy See issued an edict
forbidding all missionaries in China from sanctioning Chinese
rites; Clement XI reaffirmed this judgment in 1715.47
These actions proved disastrous not only to the Jesuit mission in China but to all Christian evangelism. Confused and angered by the Church’s internal dissension, and by mixed messages
and loss of Chinese face, the Qing Kangxi Emperor ordered all
missions closed in 1721 and Church officials banished.48 Chinese
Catholics were persecuted and books burned. This prohibition was
to last for two centuries until Pope Pius XII (1939-1958) reversed
Clement XI’s decrees in 1939.49 But the Chinese Rites Controversy
had already caused irreparable damage to the Jesuit and Catholic
missions.
Ricci was finally vindicated by Pope John XXIII in 1958,
when by decree in the encyclical Princeps Pastorum he declared
that “Matteo Ricci would become the model of missionaries.”50
But as historian Arnold Toynbee lamented, “Christianity had
during Ricci’s time and after the chance to become a true world
religion—but rejected it over internal squabbles over semantics
and local customs. Never again would history present itself on
such favorable terms.”51 Had Ricci’s method of accommodation
been embraced and supported by Rome, the religious history of
China might well have been quite different.
16
Caitlin Lu
Conclusion
If judged by the metric of Catholic conversions, one might
easily conclude that Ricci’s mission in China was a failure. By 1600,
after nearly two decades of effort, there were barely 600 Chinese
Catholics on record and only five missions operating in the entire
country.52 By the time of Ricci’s death another decade later, the
number had grown to only 2,000.53 This statistic compares with
17,000 converts to Catholicism in Taiwan, 300,000 in Japan, and
350,000 in the Philippines around the same period.54
The infighting that was precipitated by the Chinese Rites
Controversy and which undermined the Catholic movement was
certainly a major impediment to Ricci’s efforts during his lifetime.
However, by 1640, the total converts to Catholicism in China
had grown to almost 70,000; by 1651, the number had reached
150,000.55 By any measure, the Jesuit endeavors in China must be
seen as having been highly successful over the longer run.
With the hindsight of four centuries, it is far easier to
appreciate Ricci’s immense significance. Chinese and Western
thinkers hold him in equally high regard. Even the Chinese
Communist Party respects Li Madou Xi Tai as “the greatest and
least predatory of the culture bearers from the West.”56 He was
the first Western scholar to immerse himself completely within
local Chinese communities. In so doing, he became an accepted
and admired member of the literary elite. He had considerable
personal influence over the Emperor. He introduced European
mathematics, science, philosophy and technology to the Chinese
and likewise opened the West to the exquisite richness of Chinese
civilization through his voluminous translations of key texts, poetry,
his reflections on life in China, and his astounding maps of the
world—with the Middle Kingdom, of course, at the center.
The obstacles Ricci faced were daunting, and included
physical hardship, danger, loneliness, linguistic and cultural differences, xenophobia, and attacks by Dominican and Franciscan
rivals. It was a testimony to his extraordinary will and intellect that
THE CONCORD REVIEW
17
Ricci was able to overcome these hardships, to such a degree that
many of his writings in Chinese are considered classics of Chinese
literature, moral philosophy, mathematics and science.
Toynbee accords Ricci the highest place in Eastern and
Western civilization, and frames his life’s work in the larger Jesuit
perspective:
The Jesuits’ approach to their enterprise of propagating Christianity
in China was so different and so promising in itself, and is so much to
the point today, that our discussion of Asian peoples’ encounter with
the West would be incomplete if we did not take into consideration
the line which the Jesuits in China and India opened out.57
In Beijing today, where Christianity is tightly controlled,
there is a stunning monument to Ricci’s legacy. In 1601, Emperor
Wan Li issued an imperial decree bestowing upon Ricci the land
and funds to erect a chapel and permanent residence in central
Peking.58 Built in 1605, the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception (popularly known as the “South Cathedral”) stands in the
busy Wang Fu Jing district of the capital. Two tablets inside the
east and west walls at the front of the cathedral were gifts from
the Emperor himself, and bear tribute to Ricci’s standing in late
Ming China.59
Before Ricci’s death, all Jesuit priests who died in China
had to be carried to Macao for burial. Ricci was the first foreigner
allowed to be buried in Peking. In a country where symbolism
often speaks louder than words, Ricci’s entombment in China is
proof of the respect and reverence he is accorded to this day.
Father Luis Sequeira, former head of the Jesuit order in
Macao, wrote poignantly about Ricci: “He showed respect for the
other. His mission was to show the humanity of Christ and open
the door to all, and not behave as in Europe, where people were
killing each other over religion.”60
Ricci’s gentle, culturally embracing, nuanced and tolerant methods, embodying the ethos of St. Ignatius, stood in sharp
contrast to the belligerent, arrogant and contemptuous disregard
shown by many foreigners who followed in his footsteps. The
history of Western interaction with China in the 17th, 18th, and
18
Caitlin Lu
early 19th centuries is marked by predatory mercantilism, gunboat
diplomacy, the opium trade, unequal treaties, and war. Rather than
peaceful accommodation, mutual respect and inculturation, this
epoch was characterized by colonial aggression, subjugation and
humiliation.
Chinese memories are long, and the life and work of Matteo Ricci, the Scholar from the West, go some way to assuage the
resentment Chinese people still harbor about foreign aggression.
More importantly, the deeply humanistic values that underlay his
approach transcend religion, theology, customs and rituals. They
speak to the glory not so much of God as of the human spirit. This
is the essence of what makes Ricci’s example one for the ages; an
indomitable, tolerant, accepting and accommodating spirit that
reached out to the best in people irrespective of race, creed or
faith. This is what makes Matteo Ricci’s life, with its lasting impact
over four centuries, so important and inspiring to humankind.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
1
Benedict XVI, “Message of His Holiness Benedict XVI
on the Occasion of the Fourth Centenary of the Death of Fr.
Matteo Ricci,” Libreria Editrice Vaticana (6 May 2009) http://
www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/pontmessages/2009/documents/hf_ben xvi_mes_20090506_ricci_
en.html (accessed 9 August 2010)
2
Vincent Cronin, The Wise Man from the West: Matteo
Ricci and his Mission to China (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1955)
p. 3
3
“Matteo Ricci: Sage of the West,” Xinhua News Agency
(23 November 2009)
4
L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds.,
Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1976) p. 1144
5
Jonathan D. Spence, “Claims and Counter-Claims:
The Kangxi Emperor and the Europeans (1661-1722),” The
Chinese Rites Controversy: Its History and Meaning (Nettetal:
Styler Verlag, 1944) p. 16
6
Jean-Pierre Charbonnier, Christians in China, AD 6002000 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007) p. 152
7
Cronin, p. 22
8
Charbonnier, p. 143
9
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China Vol. 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954) p. 148
10
Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 173
11
Rene Fulop-Miller, The Power and Secret of the Jesuits
(London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1930) pp. 78-79
12
John P. Donnelly, Ignatius of Loyola, Founder of the
Jesuits (New York: Pearson, 2004) p. 90
13
Fulop-Miller, pp. 221-222
14
Yves Camus, SJ, “Matteo Ricci’s Legacy: A Loving
Patience,” Thinking Faith (11 May 2010) p. 2, http://www.
thinkingfaith.org/articles/20100511_1.htm (accessed 10
August 2010)
15
Ibid., p.2
16
Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1990) pp. 3, 7
17
Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 96
18
John W. O’Malley, SJ, et al., The Jesuits: Cultures,
Sciences and the Arts, 1540-1773 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1999) p. 117
19
Caitlin Lu
20
Bob Whyte, Unfinished Encounter: China and
Christianity (London: Collins, 1988) p. 35
20
Ibid., p. 41
21
Ibid., p. 42
22
Ibid., pp. 46-47
23
Camus, p. 2
24
Anthony E. Clark, SJ, “Matteo Ricci, SJ: An Apologist
for Dialogue,” This Rock (November-December 2009) pp.
1-2, http://www.catholic.com/thisrock/2009/0911fea3.asp
(accessed 9 August 2010)
25
Hsu, p. 97
26
George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants: The Story of the
Jesuits in China in the Last Decades of the Ming Dynasty (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962) p. 44
27
Steve Hu, “Newbigin, Syncretism and the Emerging
Church,” Morehead’s Musings (17 April 2008) p. 10, http://
johnwmorehead.blogspot.com/2008/04/steve-hu-newbiginsyncretism-and.html (accessed 12 August 2010)
28
Andrew C. Ross, “Alessandro Valignano: The Jesuits and
Culture in the East,” in O’Malley et al., pp. 343-345
29
Charbonnier, p. 151
30
Ibid., p. 194
31
Whyte, p. 61
32
Dunne, p. 117
33
“Matteo Ricci,” Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. 3 (1913) p. 56
34
Dunne, p. 119
35
Gianni Criveller, “China: Hong Kong: Matteo Ricci maps
did not put China at the centre of the world,” Spero News (26
January 2010) http://www.speroforum.com/a/26207/China-Hong-Kong--Matteo-Ricci-maps-did-not-put-China-at-centre-ofthe-world (accessed 9 August, 2010)
36
Hsu, pp. 75-76
37
Spence, p. 138
38
Ibid., p. 139
39
Charbonnier, pp. 154-155
40
Ibid., p. 161
41
Ibid., pp. 161-162
42
Ibid., p. 168
43
William T. DeBary, “Reflections on the Chinese Rites
Controversy,” in O’Malley et al., pp. 301
44
John D. Young, Confucianism and Christianity: The First
Encounter (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1983)
p. 118
19
THE CONCORD REVIEW
45
Beverly Foulks, “Duplicitous Thieves: Ouyi Zhixu’s
Criticism of Jesuit Missionaries in Late Imperial China,” in The
Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal (Taipei: Chung-Hwa Institute of
Buddhist Studies, 2008) p. 58
46
Hsu, p. 101
47
Cronin, p. 281
48
Young, Confucianism and Christianity, p. 122
49
John D. Young, “Chinese Views of the Rites Controversy,
18th-20th Centuries,” The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its
History and Meaning ed. David E. Mungello (Nettetal: Styler
Verlag, 1994) p. 106
50
Gianni Criveller, The Parable of Inculturation of the
Gospel in China: A Catholic Viewpoint (Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press, 2003) p. 32
51
Arnold Toynbee, The World and the West (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1953) p. 65
52
David B. Barrett, World Christian Trends, AD 30-AD 2200:
Interpreting the Annual Christian Megacensus (California:
William Carey Library, 2001) p. 132
53
Ibid., p. 132
54
Ibid., p. 132
55
Dunne, pp. 212, 314
56
Kenneth Rexroth, “Matteo Ricci’s China Journals,” The
New Republic (21 December 1953)
57
Toynbee, p. 64
58
Gianni Criveller and Cesar Guilen Nunez, Portrait of a
Jesuit: Matteo Ricci (Macau: Matteo Ricci Institute, 2010) p. 38
59
Ibid., p. 39
60
Mark O’Neill, “Matteo Ricci,” Macau Magazine (October
2010)
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en.html (accessed 9 August 2010)
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22
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Clark SJ, Anthony E., “Matteo Ricci, SJ: An Apologist for
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Cohen, Paul A., China and Christianity Cambridge,
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in China: A Catholic Viewpoint Hong Kong: Chinese University
Press, 2003
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Criveller, Gianni, “Matteo Ricci Maps Did Not Put China
at the Centre of the World,” Spero News, 26 January 2010,
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(accessed 9 August 2010)
Criveller, Gianni, and Cesar Guilen Nunez, Portrait of a
Jesuit: Matteo Ricci Macau: Matteo Ricci Institute, 2010
Cronin, Vincent, The Wise Man From the West: Matteo
Ricci and His Mission to China New York: E.P. Dutton & Co.,
Inc., 1955
Donnelly, John P., Ignatius of Loyola, Founder of the Jesuits
New York: Pearson, 2004
Dunne, George H., Generation of Giants: The Story of the
Jesuits in China in the Last Decades of the Ming Dynasty Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962
Foulks, Beverly, “Duplicitous Thieves: Ouyi Zhixu’s Criticism
of Jesuit Missionaries in Late Imperial China,” The Chung-Hwa
Buddhist Journal Taipei: Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist
Studies, 2008
Fulop-Miller, Rene, The Power and Secret of the Jesuits
London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1930
Gernet, Jacques, China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict
of Cultures Trans. by Janet Lloyd, Cambridge: Cambridge
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Goodrich, L. Carrington, and Chaoying Fang, Eds.,
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Harris, SJ, George, “The Mission of Matteo Ricci, SJ: A Case
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Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China New York:
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23
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Hu, Steve, “Newbigin, Syncretism and the Emerging
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History and Meaning Nettetal: Styler Verlag, 1994
Mungello, David E., The Great Encounter of China and the
West, 1500-1800 Lanham, Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield, 2009
Needham, Joseph, Science and Civilization in China Vols. 1
and 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954, 1959
O’Connell, Marvin R., The Counter Reformation, 15591610 New York: Harper & Row, 1974
O’Neill, Mark, “Matteo Ricci,” Macau Magazine October
2010
Rexroth, Kenneth, “Matteo Ricci’s China Journals,” The
New Republic 21 December 1953
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and China, 1542-1742 Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1994
Ross, Andrew C., “Alessandro Valignano: The Jesuits and
Culture in the East,” The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences and the
Arts, 1540-1773 Eds. John W. O’Malley, SJ et al., Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999
Spence, Jonathan D., The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci
New York: Penguin, 1984
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Spence, Jonathan D., The Search for Modern China New
York: W.W. Norton, 1990
Spence, Jonathan D., “Claims and Counter-Claims: The
Kangxi Emperor and the Europeans (1661-1722),” The
Chinese Rites Controversy: Its History and Meaning Ed. David
E. Mungello, Nettetal: Styler Verlag, 1994
Standaert, Nicolas, “Jesuit Corporate Culture as Shaped by
the Chinese,” The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and The Arts,
1540-1773 Ed. John W. O’Malley et al., Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1999
Standaert, Nicolas, “Christianity in the Late Ming and
Early Qing as a Case of Cultural Transmission,” China and
Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Future Ed. Stephen
Uhalley and Xiaoxin Wu, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
2001
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Oxford University Press, 1953
Whyte, Bob, Unfinished Encounter: China and Christianity
London: Collins, 1988
Young, John D., East-West Synthesis: Matteo Ricci and
Confucianism Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1980
Young, John D., Confucianism and Christianity: The First
Encounter Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1983
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Cultural Imperative,” The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its
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Verlag, 1994
25
Paul Johnson
Pages 47–48 of “A Relativistic World” in
Modern Times, The World from the Twenties to the Eighties
New York: Harper & Row Colophon edition, 1985
The disturbances in Europe and the world which followed the
seismic shock of the Great War and its unsatisfactory peace were, in
one sense, only to be expected. The old order had gone. Plainly it could
not be fully restored, perhaps not restored at all. A new order would
eventually take its place. But would this be an ‘order’ in the sense the
pre-1914 world had understood the term? There were, as we have seen,
disquieting currents of thought which suggested the image of a world
adrift, having left its moorings in traditional law and morality. There was
too a new hesitancy on the part of established and legitimate authority
to get the global vessel back under control by the accustomed means,
or any means. It constituted an invitation, unwilled and unissued but
nonetheless implicit, to others to take over. Of the great trio of German
imaginative scholars who offered explanations of human behavior in
the nineteenth century, and whose corpus of thought the post-1918
world inherited, only two have so far been mentioned. Marx described
a world in which the central dynamic was economic interest. To Freud,
the principal thrust was sexual. Both assumed that religion, the old
impulse which moved men and masses, was a fantasy and always had
been. Friedrich Nietzsche, the third of the trio, was also an atheist. But
he saw God not as an invention but as a casualty, and his demise as in
some important sense an historical event, which would have dramatic
consequences. He wrote in 1886: ‘The greatest event of recent times—
that “God is Dead,” that the belief in the Christian God is no longer
tenable—is beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe.’ Among the
advanced races, the decline and ultimately the collapse of the religious
impulse would leave a huge vacuum. The history of modern times is
in great part the history of how that vacuum had been filled. Nietzsche
rightly perceived that the most likely candidate would be what he called
the ‘Will to Power,’ which offered a far more comprehensive and in the
end more plausible explanation of human behaviour than either Marx or
Freud. In place of religious belief, there would be secular ideology. Those
who had once filled the ranks of the totalitarian clergy would become
totalitarian politicians. And, above all, the Will to Power would produce
a new kind of messiah, uninhibited by any religious sanctions whatever,
and with an unappeasable appetite for controlling mankind. The end of
the old order, with an unguided world adrift in a relativistic universe, was
a summons to such gangster–statesmen to emerge. They were not slow to
make their appearance.
Copyright 2011,THE
The Concord
Review,
Inc., all rights reserved 27
CONCORD
REVIEW
THE MARIAN REFORMATION: HOW THEY CONTRIBUTED
TO THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC
Andrew Crumrine
Abstract
T
his essay examines the ways in which the Marian reforms of the Roman military contributed to the decline of the
Roman Republic between 107 BC and 81 BC and caused the
shift from a Republican government to an autocratic Empire, by
investigating the intent and consequences of the reforms. Marius
revolutionized the Roman military and increased efficiency of the
army as a whole with the intent of making it a stronger and more
successful force in wars against Rome’s enemies, but his reforms
had non-military consequences as they changed the loyalties,
motivations, and social status of soldiers and gave power to the
military leaders. The Marian reforms not only affected the Roman
military but also caused major changes in the social and political
systems of the Republic because they provided a means for the
lower class citizens of Rome to become successful. The reforms
caused soldiers to become much more loyal to the generals who
paid them than to the Roman Republic for which they technically
fought, which allowed the generals to manipulate the army for
Andrew Crumrine is at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He wrote
this IB Extended Essay for Robert Thomas at Richard Montgomery High
School in Rockville, Maryland in the 2009/2010 academic year.
28
Andrew Crumrine
political means and put the power in Rome in the hands of a few.
This reduction of power in the Republican system and the Senate
foreshadowed the rise of individual rulers of Rome and thus the
end of the Republic and the beginning of the Empire.
Introduction
Gaius Marius reformed the Roman military at the end of the
second century BC with the goal of making the Roman Army more
efficient but the results of his reforms were vast and stretched far
beyond simply military efficiency. The Marian reforms contributed
to the decline of the Roman Republic by significantly changing
the attitudes, loyalties, and structure of the Roman legion, which
led to the Social War and Sulla’s March on Rome. The Marian
reforms were an important set of alterations in the Roman military
and they had several drastic consequences, due to the complete
reversal in certain military policies from the long-standing rules
created by the Servian Constitution. Historians agree that the
Marian reforms dramatically altered the Roman military but the
political ramifications of these reforms are disagreed upon and
thus the extent to which these reforms led to the fall of the great
political institution that was the Roman Republic must be fleshed
out. The Marian reforms not only made the Roman army more
efficient and powerful but they also changed the types of people
who served, the loyalties and motivations of the soldiers, and the
relationship between generals, soldiers, and the state, which in
combination led to the Social War in Rome and the fierce rivalry
between Gaius Marius and Cornelius Sulla for power which marked
the beginning of the transition from Republic to Empire.
External Conflict
Gaius Marius was born in 157 BC and grew up in a family
of some wealth and power. He saw his first military action as an
THE CONCORD REVIEW
29
eques in a legion at Numantia, later becoming a military tribune,
and finally reaching the Senate.1 The army before Marius was
primarily recruited using the class system outlined in the Servian
Constitution created in the 6th century BC, which placed Roman
citizens in classes based on property size and placed all those
without property in the capite censi. Roman laws restricted military
service to those of the higher classes but as the need for more
soldiers became urgent the property requirements were gradually
lowered.2 During the second century BC, Roman territory saw
an overall decline in population, partially due to the huge losses
incurred during various wars which were accompanied by severe
social stresses and the growing collapse of the middle classes into
lower classes of the census and the proletarii, resulting in the
Roman military becoming increasingly proletarianised.3 Before
Marius, the Roman army was drawn from the propertied Roman
citizens and was organized in the traditional manipular legion,
but Marius changed the structure, discipline, and composition of
the army through his reforms.
Marius’ reforms were aimed at increasing the efficiency
and success of the Roman military in battle against the enemies
of Rome, which they did extremely well. The Marian reforms
truly revolutionized the Roman military and made them a nearly
unstoppable force when it came to external enemies. Marius
reformed the basic structure of the Roman military battle formation by converting the army from a set of manipular legions to
the cohortan style of fighting. The manipular legion formed in
three main lines of 10 maniples each, a maniple consisting of 120
men, with the first line consisting of hastati, the youngest men in
the army, the second line consisting of principes, the middle aged
men, and the last line consisting of triarii, the oldest and most experienced men.4 Marius did away with this layout of the army and
converted the Roman army to the cohortan system. A cohort was
composed of six centuries of 80 men each for a total of 480 men.
Marius created 10 cohorts per legion, and took one maniple from
each of the old lines to create a cohort so that it was composed of
all three types of infantry. The switch to cohorts made the military
much more versatile and easier to manipulate on the battlefield,
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Andrew Crumrine
which led to military successes in the Jugurthan war and the war
against the Cimbri.
As a result of the switch to cohorts the distinctions based
upon age, wealth, and equipment disappeared from the Roman
military ranks and removed any class differences or struggles from
the soldiers, allowing for a more unified group which Marius could
control and thus gave him support across classes.5 The use of the
cohortan style of organization increased in Marius’ legions and
was copied by Sulla who by the end of his time in power used the
cohort almost exclusively as the main sub-unit on the battlefield.
The success of the cohort inspired soldiers in the army to remain
in the army as they were rewarded with the many victories that
the cohortan system brought to Marius and his successors. The
Roman historian Veetius described the ranking system in the
cohortan legion by saying, “Note that in a legion there ought to
be ten cohorts. But the first cohort exceeds the remainder in the
number of soldiers and in rank, for it seeks out the most select
men as regards birth and instruction in letters.”6 This reveals
the continued presence of the social ranking and mixed in with
ranking ability within the Roman military and demonstrates the
reason that the introduction of the capite censi could cause social
problems among the soldiers.
The capite censi was the lowest class of citizens, those without land and thus people not of the nobility or middle classes.
Before Marius, the senate had only ever impressed the capite censi
in the most dire of circumstance such as the time after the Roman
military suffered humiliating defeats at Carnae,7 Lake Trasimene,8
and Trebbia,9 but Marius revolutionized the Roman military by
drafting from the capite censi for regular service in the army. The
inclusion of the capite censi in the Roman military changed the
basic makeup of the Roman military by adding the poorer class
of Rome to the military.10 The shift in the composition of the
Roman military allowed for a shift in public opinion regarding
the military as it became an army of the Roman people and not
just of the landed upper classes. Marius’ addition of the landless
peoples in the army gave him the necessary men to successfully
THE CONCORD REVIEW
31
suppress Rome’s foreign enemies which gave him support among
the people and allowed him to gain political power in Rome and
become consul seven times.
Another battle strategy reform of Marius was to better
train his soldiers. Marius made his soldiers carry their own gear,
which helped the army in two ways: it cut down the size of the impedimenta11 and it made soldiers stronger with more endurance.
The new self-reliant soldier allowed Marius’ army to become more
independent of Rome and thus less connected to the Republican
government as they fought enemies hundreds of miles from home
on the edges of the Repubic.12 The territories controlled by Rome,
and thus the borders patrolled and protected by the Roman army,
were rapidly expanding in the late second and early first centuries
BC, which meant that soldiers could be fighting battles for the
Roman Republic in completely foreign lands. The army could no
longer wait for orders from the government back in Rome and so
soldiers instead turned to their generals, which meant that each
legion acted somewhat autonomously based upon the general’s
orders. The many conquests of Rome brought with them wealth
for the generals and opportunity for the common soldier. Senatorial power, which had been the foundation of Rome’s dominance,
was fading relative to the power of individual generals due to the
fact that many successful generals were beginning to act in their
own self-interests in order to gain political power and, since soldiers often benefitted from their general’s successes, they were
inclined to follow the lead of their generals instead of the orders
from distant Rome, which brought much less reward.13
Another reform that was meant to increase endurance,
confidence, general expertise, and morale in the soldiers was
increased training and public works projects such as the fossa
Mariana which was a canal dug by soldiers at the mouth of the
Rhone River. The effect of a well-disciplined and -trained army can
be seen in the statement that “However, those generals who have
instilled discipline in their army through hard work and routine
are more praiseworthy than those whose soldiers are forced into
submission by fear of punishment.”14 Marius also redesigned the
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Andrew Crumrine
basic spear of the Roman infantry, which was called the pilum. He
replaced one of the two iron rivets that held the iron shank to the
wood shaft with a wooden rivet so that it would snap upon impact.
This caused the shank to bend and thus rendered the spear useless so the enemy could not pick it up and throw it back at the
advancing Roman troops. The broken pilum also sometimes got
lodged in enemy’s shields or bodies and would be very difficult
to remove or carry around. The evidence for the benefit of these
military reforms is seen in Marius’ ability to completely defeat
his enemies in both the Jugurthan War and the war against the
Cimbri. These wars illustrate the efficiency of Marius’ reforms, as
his troops achieved great victories quickly and with fewer casualties, and thus illustrates the success Marius had in convincing his
troops to follow him.
Critics of Marius’ reforms say that many were not drastic
changes in the system and that he may have just pushed along
gradual changes that had been occurring in the Roman military for
many years. For example, his transition to the cohort really began
with the war with Spain and did not finish until the end of Sulla’s
reign. However his decision to use the cohort as the standard unit
shows the key shift in structure as it reflects a standardization of
the troop types by combining them into a single military unit.
Social War: Italy vs. Rome
While the Republic was gaining land and power outside of
Italy due to Marius’ reforms, within Italy the Republic was turning
into a battleground and the Republic was in a state of turmoil.
Rome was enveloped by a Social War in 91-88 BC against rebel
Italians who wanted Roman citizenship, led by the Marsi and the
Samnites. In 91 BC the assassination of Livius Drusus, a tribune
who supported giving civil rights to the Italians and allowing them
to become citizens, sparked a violent reaction by his supporters
against the Roman Senate which would not grant their Italian allies
citizenship, which led to the Social War.15 The Roman Army suffered humiliating defeats against the Northern Italians but when
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33
the general in command, P. Rutilius Lupus, was killed Marius took
his place and the effects on the war were immediate, as Marius
revolutionized the army fighting in the North and brought success
to the armies of Rome.
Marius eliminated the need for Rome to be involved in
the raising of legions by removing the restrictions placed on allied
Italians regarding service in the army. The sense of equality that
Italians got from being allowed to fight in the army in the same
manner and units as Romans made them believe they should be
allowed to become Roman citizens and thus ignited the Social
War.16 Whereas Italians had previously always been auxiliary troops,
they were now full legionnaires and thus were equipped in the
same manner as Romans and they fought in the same manner as
Romans. Thus the Italians who were being drafted into the Roman
legions were being trained and equipped in the same fashion as
Roman soldiers, which helped the Italians match up against the
legions of Rome in the Social War because the Italians had been
trained as the Roman soldiers’ equals. The lack of control of the
Republic over legions that were being raised contributed to the
decline in power of the Republic as an institution.17
In 88 BC, Sulla was the elected consul and had command
of the army in the Mithridatic war, but Marius tricked Sulla by
drafting a bill that transferred control of the Roman army to
himself which was signed after Sulla began marching East. When
Sulla learned of the bill he turned his army around and became
the first Roman general to march on Rome, an unimaginable
crime. Because he was marching on Rome, many of his generals
were unwilling to march with him on ethical grounds and since
he could not draft Roman soldiers, much of his attacking army
was composed of Italians and other allies of Rome which had been
hired into his legions.18 The pure Italian legions that Sulla organized when he marched on Rome had no ties to the government
in Rome and were thus more willing to fight against Rome. The
introduction of Italians into the Roman legions resulted in the
disappearance of the auxiliary legions as they were pure Italian
legions and since the Social War resulted in the loss of the Italian
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Andrew Crumrine
classification and the re-classification of these people as Romans,
the need for a separate auxiliary legion disappeared.
Although the Italians lost militarily in the Social War, they
were not unsuccessful in gaining their political goals, as they were
granted Roman citizenship and thus received the same rewards and
benefits that someone living in Rome did. The Social War between
the Italians and the Romans illustrated how Marius’ reforms shifted
the power over the legions from the Republic and the Senate to
outside forces such as rebel Italians. The inclusion of Italians in
the Roman military demonstrated the gradual increase in power
that individuals had over legions, as Sulla commanded an almost
all-Italian army to march on Rome and take over the Senate.19 The
lack of power exhibited by the Senate caused the people to rally
around individuals such as Sulla or Marius and thus contributed
to the fall of the Republican form of government and the rise of
the more autocratic Empire ruled by one man.
Marius, Sulla, and Beyond: Rome vs. Rome
Marius’ first reform had been to allow the capite censi, or
those who were assessed in the census but did not own land, to
serve in the army, which dramatically increased the number of
soldiers available to be drafted into the army and the economic
diversity within the army. This new class in the army had no land
and thus generally had no wealth. Because of this they relied on
their generals for financial support including gear, weapons, and
other essential wartime materials. This created a reliance on the
generals by the army and thus a fierce loyalty among soldiers for
their general as he provided for their welfare.20 The soldiers of
Marius were convinced to stay in the army because they received
monetary support and rewards for their services at the end of their
tenures. About 20 years later Sulla took Marius’ ideas a step further
and allowed his legions to freely sack the towns they conquered
and provided his soldiers with hefty land rewards after full service.21
These land grants were often sold or forfeited though because
THE CONCORD REVIEW
35
the long tenure of the soldiers of Sulla disillusioned the veterans
from a simple farming life and made them seek to re-enlist in the
army. The disillusionment with simple life made soliders remain
in the army for much longer periods of time, allowing them to
become much more experienced than in previous armies, which
had consisted of soldiers fulfilling mandatory terms of service. The
long service also increased the loyalty of the legions to Sulla, which
allowed him to use his legions in whatever manner he wanted,
even if it meant marching against the state of Rome as he did in
the First Civil War. The bribing of soldiers started by Marius created an army that was completely loyal to their general who could
then ask these soldiers to do anything they wanted. The soldiers’
loyalty to generals rather than to the state would lead to their use
in open rebellion against Rome, civil war, military political power
and eventually the crowning of Emperors.
Another example of one of Marius’ reforms being more of
a gradual change, the property requirements for Roman citizens
to serve in the army had been falling for over a century before
Marius asked those without property to volunteer. The qualifications had been falling from 11,000 asses around the Second Punic
War to 4,000 asses around 160 BC to 1,500 asses by about 129 BC.
The announcement of Marius occurred in 107 and thus was right
around the time the qualifications should have been dropped
again.22 The decision of Marius was, however, influential because
it marked the complete abolition of the property requirement,
which introduced a completely new kind of citizen into the army.
Whereas before it had been the “middle class” who had been let
in and those people who were only a little bit less wealthy than the
current soldiers, Marius’ reforms allowed the masses of Rome into
the army and those included the poor, who changed the dynamics within the army. The recruiting of the masses would change
the entire relationship between citizens, generals, the Senate and
Roman institutional ideology.
Prior to Marius, the armies may have been loyal to a general,
but they were fighting in theory for the survival or expansion of
the state, including their own lands. With Marius, officers began
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Andrew Crumrine
to be recruited from within the ranks of a legion and political
appointments and promotions based on social or client status
were less and less common.23 This allowed the common soldier
a way of advancing based on merit which improved the strength
of the legion as a whole and instilled confidence in the soldiers,
knowing their officers were capable leaders, not favored clients
of Senators in Rome. Marius increased pride in the army by its
soldiers by making his legions more standardized and permanent.
He removed the five unique standards that each legion had previously carried and gave all legions a single silver eagle that would
represent the Roman army from then on. This standardization
of the legions increased the loyalty of the soldiers as well as their
morale and sense of brotherhood among soliders.24 The standardization of the legions’ symbol also reflected the merging of
the old class divisions within the army facilitated by the increased
use of the cohort, which reduced tensions within the ranks. Due
to Marius, soldiers began to look at the army as a career and not
just as a duty to their state or home or general. The legionnaires
began to identify with their legion and there was an increase in
corporate spirit, which unified the legions and made the soldiers
more loyal to the legion than to the state.
Sulla took advantage of the loyalty he received from his
soldiers when he manipulated them into performing actions that
benefitted him politically. During the Civil War, Sulla needed his
soldiers to fight against other Roman legions, which he accomplished by manipulating his legions, who completely trusted and
respected him. In the battle against Norbanus, Sulla did not line
up his legion in standard battle formation but instead made his
veteran troops immediately charge Norbanus’ new recruits because he did not want either side standing and staring too long,
since it would make them face the reality that they were going
into battle against fellow Romans.25 The increased individualism
of legions following the Marian reforms allowed for the civil wars
that marked the end of the Roman Republic. The first major civil
war between Sulla and Marius was a clear example of how loyalty
within the army had shifted from the state to individual generals.
When Sulla became dictator in Rome, he revolutionized the Roman
THE CONCORD REVIEW
37
government by using his army to kill off opponents and enforce
his reforms, which marks the beginning of the use of the army by
one man for political means and oppression. After Sulla’s death,
the power continued shifting into the hands of the military elite,
who were also becoming the political elite, and away from the
Senate and the Republican government of Rome. Such generals
as Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar all used their military successes
to increase their political influence and glorify themselves in the
eyes of Romans in order to gain power in Rome.26 The power in
Rome continued to be consolidated into the hands of a few elite
men, who were both generals and politicians, until Octavian finally
destroyed the Roman Republic and transformed Rome into an
autocratic Empire.
Conclusion
Marius revolutionized the Roman military and increased
the efficiency of the army as a whole, while changing the loyalties,
motivations, and relationships of the soldiers. Marius reformed
the military so that it would be a more effective and efficient
fighting force against the enemies of Rome, which it did become.
The armies of Marius were able to claim victory in the Jugurthan
War in Numidia, the war against the barbarous Cimbri from the
North, and the wars within the Republic. Marius’ reforms allowed
for the recruitment of many more people into the Roman legions
than had ever been allowed before such as those without property,
those from outside of Rome itself in Italy, and others. This allowed
for complex changes in the social system of the Republic as well
as the political system since it allowed for people to enter the
military and gain ranks or wealth. Marius’ reforms converted the
loyalty of Roman soldiers from the state of Rome to their general,
which allowed these generals to use the Roman legions in fighting against Rome as well as against other generals for power. The
soldier’s loyalty to one man would precipitate the ability of one
man to become military ruler of Rome and eventually Emperor.
1
Lawrence Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army: From
38
Andrew Crumrine
Republic to Empire (London: Routledge, 1998) p. 57
2
Fritz M. Heichelheim, A History of the Roman People
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962) p. 63
3
Adrian Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army
(London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2003) p. 70
4
The term astati translates to “spearmen,” the term
principes refers to the “chief men,” and the term triarii refers
literally to the “third rank men.”
5
Paul Erdkamp, A Companion to the Roman Army
(Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2007) p. 86
6
Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science (Liverpool:
Liverpool University Press, 1993) Sec. 2.6
7
The Battle of Carnhae took place in 216 BC.
8
The Battle of Lake Trasimene took place in 218 BC.
9
The Battle at Trebbia took place in 218 BC.
10
Keppie, p. 59
11
The impedimenta was the baggage train of the army
which carried supplies using asses and could stretch many miles
long.
12
Arthur Keaveney, The Army in the Roman Revolution
(Hoboken: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2007) p. 40
13
Nic Fields, The Roman Army: The Civil Wars 88-31 BC
(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008) p. 5
14
Vegetius, Sec. 3.4
15
Keppie, p. 68
16
Charles Merivale, The Fall of the Roman Republic
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874) p. 47
17
Keaveney, p. 40
18
Cambridge University Press, The Cambridge Ancient
History, Volume 9 The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146-43
BC (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 169
19
Merivale, pp. 99-100
20
Ibid., p. 47
21
Sallust, The War with Catiline (Loeb Classical Library,
1921) Sec. 11.5-11.6
22
Keppie, p. 61
23
John Rich, War and Society in the Roman World (New
York: Routledge, 1993) pp. 101-104
24
Keppie, p. 67
25
Erdkamp, p. 83
26
Karl Christ, The Romans (Munich: C.H. Becksche Verlag
Sbuchhandlung, 1979) p. 46
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Bibliographic Sources
Cambridge University Press, The Cambridge Ancient
History, Volume 9: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 14643 BC New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994
Christ, Karl, translated by The Regents of the University
of California, The Romans Munich: C.H. Becksche Verlag
Sbuchhandlung, 1979
Erdkamp, Paul, A Companion to the Roman Army Oxford:
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2007
Fields, Nic, The Roman Army: The Civil Wars 88-31 BC
Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008
Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Complete Roman Army London:
Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2003
Heichelheim, Fritz M., and Cedric A. Yeo, A History of the
Roman People Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1962
Keaveney, Arthur, The Army in the Roman Revolution
Hoboken: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2007
Keppie, Lawrence, The Making of the Roman Army: From
Republic to Empire London: Routledge, 1998
Merivale, Charles, The Fall of the Roman Republic London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874
Rich, John, and Graham Shipley, eds., War and Society in
the Roman World New York: Routledge, 1993
Sallust, translated by Rolfe, John C., The War with Catiline
Loeb Classical Library, 1921
39
40
Andrew Crumrine
Winston Churchill
Triumph and Tragedy Volume VI of The Second World War
London: Houghton Mifflin, 1953, pp. 154-155
In the Pacific the organization and production of the United
States were in full stride, and had attained astonishing proportions.
A single example may suffice to illustrate the size and success of the
American effort. In the Autumn of 1942, at the peak of the struggle for
Guadalcanal, only three American aircraft-carriers were afloat; a year later
there were fifty; by the end of the war there were more than a hundred.
This achievement had been matched by an increase in aircraft production
which was no less remarkable. The advance of these great forces was
animated by an aggressive strategy and an elaborate, novel, and effective
tactic. The task which confronted them was formidable.
A chain of island-groups, nearly two thousand miles long,
stretches southward across the Pacific from Japan to the Marianas and
the Carolines. Many of these islands had been fortified by the enemy and
equipped with good airfields, and at the southernmost end of the chain
was the Japanese naval base of Truk. Behind this shield of archipelagos
lay Formosa, the Philippines, and China, and in its shelter ran the supply
routes for the more advanced enemy positions. It was thus impossible
to invade or bomb Japan itself. The chain must be broken first. It would
take too long to conquer and subdue every fortified island, and the
Americans had accordingly advanced leap-frog fashion. They seized only
the more important islands and by-passed the rest; but their maritime
strength was now so great and was growing so fast that they were able
to establish their own lines of communication and break the enemy’s,
leaving the defenders of the by-passed islands immobile and powerless.
Their method of assault was equally successful. First came softening
attacks by planes from the aircraft-carriers, then heavy and sometimes
prolonged bombardment from the sea, and finally amphibious landing
and the struggle ashore. When an island had been won and garrisoned,
land-based planes moved in and beat off counter-attacks. At the same
time they helped in the next onward surge. The fleets worked in
echelons. While one group waged battle another prepared for a new leap.
This needed very large resources, not only for the fighting, but also for
developing bases along the line of advance. The Americans took it all in
their stride.
Copyright 2011, THE
The Concord
Review,
Inc., all rights reserved 41
CONCORD
REVIEW
THE HIJAB AND THE WORLD: A DEBATE
ON MUSLIM WOMEN’S RELIGIOUS
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Kristina Solvik
The Veil, My Body, by Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf
It’s just a piece of cloth
It rocks the world
It shapes a civilization
A civilization misread
It’s trapping, says the untutored
It’s oppressing, echoes the unlearned
The veil is my body
The veil is also my mind
The veil defines my cultural identity
The veil is who I am
Your slurs and instructions
That I rip it off my head
Is a rape of my body
An invasion of my land
It’s just a piece of cloth
But after Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Maluku, Kosova
This is all I have.1
Kristina Solvik is a Senior at the Athenian School in Danville, California,
where she wrote this paper for Kal Balavenkatesan in the 2009/2010
academic year.
42
Kristina Solvik
Scholars who have generated insider portraits of Islamic gender relations have revealed that Muslim women’s motivations for veiling can
vary dramatically. Some Muslim women veil to express their strongly
held convictions about gender difference, others are motivated to do
so more as a means of critiquing Western colonialism in the Middle
East. It is this complexity surrounding the veil that leads Elizabeth
Fernea to conclude that the veil (or hijab) “means different things
to different people within [Muslim] society, and it means different
things to Westerners than it does to Middle Easterners.”2
A flurry of debate surrounds the issue of the hijab.3 Is it a
symbol of oppression, outdated cultural pressure, deliberate exclusion? Or is it a symbol of choice, faith, revivalism of modesty? This
is the disagreement that plagues the world; Muslims and Christians,
women and men, Middle Easterners and Westerners, are not all in
agreement with fellow members of their demographics over what
the hijab means in modern society, and more importantly, if it
should be accepted. Veiling is not a religious requirement of Islam,
as many Westerners think. As seen in the aforementioned quote,
there are many complexities within the reasoning for wearing the
veil. With no one group agreeing on the meaning of the hijab, it
is only natural that discord in the world ensues, chiefly however
between the Middle East and the West. One thing is for sure: “The
hijab, especially as worn in the West, may be many things but it is
never neutral. It pulls focus, it makes a statement.”4 It is for this
reason that Muslim head coverings have been a subject of debate
for many years, one that seems nowhere near reaching a conclusion. Wearing the hijab, although it has been deemed an act of
submission under misogynistic Muslim culture and ‘unwarranted’
Qur’anic verses by some critics, is for the most part a voluntary act
that is based more on cultural reasoning than religious reasoning. Nevertheless, the mixed sentiments and misunderstandings
about the hijab have caused a variety of approaches to the widely
debated issue, from requiring it by law in some Middle Eastern
countries, to banning it in some public domains in France, and
finally to legally but not socially giving hijab-wearers equal rights
THE CONCORD REVIEW
43
and the freedom of expression in the U.S. The hijab, like all other
religious clothing, should be worn as a way of expressing one’s
identity, and forcing a woman to wear it or not wear it infringes
on her human rights;5 giving her the freedom to choose if and
how to wear it without being persecuted is the proper way to approach this controversial issue.
With so many Muslim women around the world donning
different forms of coverings, one would suspect that this dress code
is stipulated in the Qur’an; however, nowhere in the Qur’an does it
say that women must cover themselves, and many women choose
to cover only out of cultural tradition or a personal inclination
towards modesty. Contrary to popular belief, “Muhammad did
not introduce the custom of veiling.”6 In fact, the Qur’an never
explicitly states that women must cover their heads with a hijab.
The section of the Qur’an that even comes close to mandating
that specific type of dress only encourages women to cover their
body parts below the neck:
And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze
and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty
and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that
they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their
beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husband’s fathers,
their sons, their husbands’ sons, their brothers or their brothers’
sons, or their sisters’ sons, or their women, or the slaves whom their
right hands possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small
children who have no sense of the shame of sex; and that they should
not strike their feet in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye Believers! Turn ye all together towards Allah, that
ye may attain Bliss.7
The Qur’an states that what “must ordinarily appear” is allowed to
be shown; would that not include hair and the face, which is not
covered by ordinary, necessary clothing? In fact, the “veil” that is
so often seen as a religious obligation for all Muslim women is
only deemed obligatory for the ‘wives’ of Muhammad when seen
by other Muslim men:
O Ye who believe! Enter not the dwellings of the Prophet for a meal
without waiting for the proper time, unless permission be granted
you. But if ye are invited, enter, and, when your meal is ended, then
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Kristina Solvik
disperse...And when ye ask of them (the wives of the Prophet) anything, ask it of them from behind a curtain. That is purer for your
hearts and for their hearts. And it is not for you to cause annoyance
to the messenger of Allah, nor that ye should ever marry his wives
after him. Lo! That in Allah’s sight would be an enormity.8
With the amount of significance the Prophet has in the history of
Islam, it is not surprising that his ‘wives’ are given respect through
a lack of immediate visual contact. However, for the common
everyday Muslim woman, the veil is far from necessary. Just as the
Qur’an suggests, covering is not for the sake of religion, but for
the sake of the woman’s personal need for modesty. Often the
instigator of women’s covering is not religion, but the men who
follow it themselves:
Those who harass believing men and believing women undeservedly,
bear on themselves a calumny and a grievous sin. O Prophet! Enjoin
your wives, your daughters, and the wives of true believers that they
should cast their outer garments over their persons (when abroad).
That is most convenient, that they may be distinguished and not
harassed.9
If anything drives women to wear hijabs, niqabs, burqas, etc., it is
the society in which they live. It is clear through even the words
of the Qur’an that life is easier for Muslim women when they are
protected from the demoralizing stares of their male counterparts. The Qur’an does not beg women to clothe their heads or
faces in scarves at all; rather, it asks them to clothe their spirit in
righteousness: “O children of Adam! We have indeed sent down
to you clothing to cover your shame, and (clothing) for beauty
and clothing that guards (against evil) that is the best. This is of
the communications of Allah that they may be mindful.”10 With
the Qur’an never explicitly stating that women should or should
not cover, it is up to each woman to decide for herself what suits
her lifestyle. However, this does not keep differently-choosing
women from criticizing others’ decisions. Rather, the lack of clear
guidelines on covering has escalated the debate among some:
The proponents of covering see those who say it is not mandated
as ignorant; those who say it is not required see those who advocate
covering as fundamentalists. The important point is that young
THE CONCORD REVIEW
45
women who wear hijab and jilbab interpret the above passages as
requiring covering, and act accordingly.11
The debate on whether Muslim women should or should not wear
veiling is far from solved by the Qur’anic evidence. With only these
verses to guide them, women have the freedom to choose whichever dress code they see fit. Furthermore, there is the significant
verse in the Qur’an that protects these women from being forced
to cover themselves: “There is no compulsion in religion; truly
the right way has become clearly distinct from error; therefore,
whoever disbelieves in the Shaitan and believes in Allah he indeed
has laid hold on the firmest handle, which shall not break off, and
Allah is Hearing, Knowing.”12 There are Muslims who assert that
this verse only applies to the act of converting to Islam,13 but by
looking closely at this verse, it is evident that any person who follows
Islam is already on the right path—as long as a person has the five
fundamental beliefs, then that person is a legitimate follower and
should not be compelled to do anything ‘in the name of Islam.’
This is how the situation of Muslim women and the hijab should
be approached: a woman should not be compelled to wear it or
even not to wear it. No matter where they live, whether it be in
heavily-policed states of the Middle East, France, or the United
States, Muslim women should have the right to this choice that is
given to them by their religious book.
To try to come to a conclusion on the debate over the
hijab, one must first ask, what is the hijab, or as it is more commonly known amongst its adversaries, the veil? Its many definitions
can be categorized under four headings: interpersonal emotion,
modes of communication, organic matter, and dressing. “Celibacy” under interpersonal emotion, “concealment” and “shame”
under modes of communication, and “invisibility” under organic
matter all play into the Western view of the dressing veil as the
Muslim world’s form of oppressing women.14 But what is the veil
in a modern context; what article of clothing that Muslim women
wear is the veil? In fact, “‘veil’ has no single equivalent. Numerous
terms are used to refer to diverse articles of women’s clothing,
that vary by body part, region, local dialect, and historical era.”15
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Kristina Solvik
Examples of these articles include the hijab, niqab, jilbab, burqa,
’abayh, tarhah, burnus, jellabah, hayik, milayah, gallabiyyah, dishdasha,
gargush, gina’, mungub, lithma, yashmik, harabah, izar, qina’, khimar,
sitara, ’immah...The diversity of Muslim women’s clothing is vast.
Yet none of these literally translate to “veil.” The only piece of
clothing that resembles a literal veil is the niqab, which is a piece
of cloth that covers the face from the eyes down and is attached
on either side of the head. The jilbab, another article often used
by Western press, translates to “outergarment” and is a modest
garment designed to cover everything but the face and hands,
worn by more conservative followers. The hijab comes from the
word “hajaba,” which means “to hide from view;” it is meant to
cover the hair and neck of girls who have reached puberty.16 This is
the preferred word to veil when writing about the issue of Muslim
women’s coverings. “The widespread use of the term ‘hijab’ to
refer to the modern Islamic headscarf thus highlights its deployment as the physical expression of the symbolic and ideological
curtain separating women from men.”17 Although there is a wide
variety in the types of veiling, all forms are grouped together and
labeled by many Westerners not as a valued cultural habit, as it
is seen by many of the women who wear them, but as a form of
female degradation:
Harems and hammams then and the “veil” now evoke a public sexual
energy that early Christianity, puritanist Western culture, and contemporary elements of fundamentalist Christianity have not been
able to come to terms with, comprehend, or tolerate. In the West,
harem, veil, polygamy, evoke Islam and are synonymous with female
weakness and oppression.18, 19
When a symbol of modesty is seen as the equivalent of sexual exploitation and plural marriage, then clearly there has been some
miscommunication between the two cultures. With conflict in
communication between two worlds, conflict in the types of people
who are accepted by society is bound to follow: the Western world,
with its misunderstanding of Muslim female garb, is less and less
accepting of its Muslim citizens and potential immigrants who wear
it, while the Middle Eastern world shuns Western influences and
strives to keep its culture pure and intact. Thus, this discord over
THE CONCORD REVIEW
47
a piece of cloth has grown to massive proportions and is currently
the debate of the moment.
Although it is often assumed that veiling began during
Muhammad’s time and is inherently linked to Islam, it actually was
a common cultural practice in the Mesopotamian/Mediterranean
region even before then; simply because the practice was centered
near the region where Islam began, it has been designated as a
principle of Islam. Pre-Islam, there were only secular patterns of
veiling among those who were not Christian or Jewish; these were
“(1) complementary, as in Sumeria; (2) exclusionary and privileging
as in the Persian-Mesopotamian case; (3) egalitarian, as in Egypt;
(4) hierarchical, as in Hellenic culture; and (5) seclusionary, as
in Byzantine culture.”20 In the complementary case,
Women were de facto heads of household with responsibilities in internal and external affairs...This autonomy, independence and authority
can be seen in contemporary rural Shi’a villages in Bahrain where
“each home is locked with a padlock...[and] each woman carried the
key to her house tied to her headcloth or to one of her braids.” It is
particularly interesting that the symbol of control and autonomy, the
key to the house, is attached to the woman’s “dress” – i.e. headcover
and hair braids.21
Equating the veil with power seems oxymoronic to many Westerners
today, yet one must acknowledge that many of these current views
of the veil as oppressive to women arise from the misogyny that
slowly appeared amongst some Muslims over time. The wearing
of the veil was not a controversial political statement manipulated
by men, but rather a cultural one that came from women. Veiling
not only represented domestic power in ancient times, but socioeconomic power as well: “in ancient Mesopotamia, head covering
distinguished ‘decent’ women from prostitutes: there was even an
enforceable Assyrian dress code to this effect.”22 This dress code
was defined by the rule that “Women, whether married or [widows]
or [Assyrians] who go out into the (public) street [must not have]
their heads [uncovered]. Ladies by birth...whether (it is) a veil (?)
or robe or [mantle?], must be veiled; [they must not have] their
heads [uncovered].”23 Once again, the veil proves not to have been
oppressive, but rather advantageous—this time to class standing.
48
Kristina Solvik
Egypt represents the rare pattern of no veiling whatsoever: “it is
discussed for perspective and...it seems, as noted by many scholars,
to be the only Mediterranean/Middle Eastern society on record
in which women show no evidence of head or face covering.”24
Other Mediterranean countries, however, seem to have followed
that which resembles most the principle of modesty that is central
to many women’s reasons for wearing the hijab: in ancient times,
“Men and women led separate lives, men...in public areas, such as
the marketplace and the gymnasium, while ‘respectable’ women
stayed at home. Women were expected to confine themselves to
their quarters and to manage their household...Their clothing
concealed them from the eyes of strange men.”25 Seclusion, too,
is often associated with the modern hijab, and arose as a practice
linked with veiling before the rise of Islam:
Veiling and body coverings mentioned in three contexts in [11thcentury Byzantine author and political figure Michael Psellos’ work]...
One observation is about his mother at her daughter’s funeral, when
she raised her veil in the presence of men for the first time in her life.
A second concerns “the Cesarissa Irene...[so] scrupulously observing the imperative of concealing the flesh that she covered even her
hands.” And the third refers to a tenth-century Byzantine patrician
defending his daughter’s custom of going to the baths, explaining
that she went out “veiled and suitably chaperoned.”26
The idea of a woman needing to be covered and chaperoned
by a man in public may remind many people of Middle Eastern
practices now, especially the practices among Muslims. However,
the Western feminists that decry the status quo in these predominantly Muslim countries and call their practices discriminatory,
even if that label is correct in some modern contexts, are making
a significant mistake in characterizing the practices as derived
from a misogynistic principle of Muhammad’s Islam.
...they fail to understand that, in some Muslim societies, gender
inequalities have much less to do with the religious requirements of
Islam than with the old cultural traditions. If headscarves were inherently linked to female suffering, then women probably would have
experienced particular hardships in the earliest days of Islam, during
the life of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. Yet Muslim
women of the time were prominent professional members of society.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
49
They experienced neither the brutality that Afghani women endured
under the Taliban nor the repression that Saudi women still endure.
Over time, though, equality deteriorated in most of the Muslim world
and women were coerced into more traditional household roles.27
Muhammad’s Islam cannot be blamed—and neither can these
ancient practices—for the presence of oppression of women in
the Muslim world; the cultural and religious practices and principles from hundreds of years ago have been warped over time by
changes in leadership in both Islam and the Middle East. What is
crucial to learn from this evidence that women wore head coverings before Islam came about is that veiling is more of a cultural
practice in the purest sense than a religious one.
Veiling in a modern context is often misunderstood as
being only a religious obligation; yet Muslim women all over the
world are wearing the hijab for diverse reasons, from creating a
religious identity to benefiting from freedom from harassment.
With all of the change that is occurring at the moment in Muslim
women’s lives—whether it be immigration to the West or the creation of new, more liberal laws concerning women in the Middle
East—women “feel acutely the lack of stability and the challenge
to accepted norms of behavior...In these times of uncertainty, a
woman may well find reassurance in her religion. The hijab is
the outward symbol of that religion, reinforcing her faith...”28
Whether they are Muslims in America, or in Egypt, women are
finding their identities in an ever-changing, ever-shrinking world,
chiefly through the physical expression of their religion. When it
seems like the surrounding population is becoming less and less
religious, it can be comforting and empowering for a woman to
decide to follow her religion more traditionally, whether or not
the tradition is more religious or cultural (only related to the
people of that religion). For Egypt, for example, the debate on
the headscarf is about “the embracing of ‘Western values,’” their
argument “centered not on feminism versus antifeminism but
on Western versus indigenous ways. For neither side was male
dominance ever in question.”29 However, religious and cultural
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Kristina Solvik
reasons are not the only ones playing into these Muslim women’s
decision to don the hijab:
The veil serves a practical purpose as well. As a Lebanese university
student remarked, “I wear the hijab because it allows me to go out
into society.” In the bazaars of a Syrian city, for example, the head
covering allows a woman to move about freely and not be bothered
by men, whereas an unveiled woman would likely receive cold stars,
jostlings, and muttered insults...A woman veiled may say that she feels
greater freedom and safety than she did before adopting the hijab.30
Although it seems quite misogynistic and negative that Middle Eastern societies are pressuring women into veiling—and that certainly
is the case in some countries—comfort and ease while in public
are not the only practical reasons for which women are covering.
Yes, it is true that in many societies, “Mainstream Islamic tradition
considers the headscarf an obligation for Muslim women because
it conceals their physical allure.” But women actually benefit from
this social tendency, for “Muslim women can be recognized not
only for their religious beliefs but for their appearance.”31 Muslim
women voluntarily wearing the hijab do not see their clothing as
representative of regressive thinking; rather they see it as a way
to move into the next era, an era of new social developments and
victories for women, who can be judged by the same qualities by
which men are judged. Men may not have to cover themselves to
receive that right, but this is still a significant accomplishment for
women, as they have been in veils for centuries, while men have
not. Western feminists may argue that “the Islamic veil sends us
all—Muslim and non-Muslim—back to a discrimination against
women that is intolerable,”32 but Muslim women are not alone
in their head covering: “The two other Abrahamic religions...
originally mandated female covering. (Today some Christian and
Jewish women still choose to wear the headscarf.)”33 It is impossible
to classify all Muslim veiling as misogynistic, backwards, forced by
men, or religiously required; along with these often-cited reasons
for veiling that are more negative, many women see veiling as a
means of expressing their identities as Muslims, as Middle Easterners, and/or as females—and what could be more in line with
the human right of self-expression than that?
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51
The Middle East is seen as the homeland of the hijab,
although it ranges from forbidden in some countries to required
by law in others; considering Saudi Arabia, the country with the
most extreme policies on the hijab, one can observe that there
are many women who are coerced into wearing head covering
that they do not want, limiting their human right of freedom of
self-expression. Contrary to popular belief of some of the more
ignorant Westerners, the hijab is not legally required throughout
the Middle East: in some countries it is completely outlawed, while
in others it may be only worn by members of certain socioeconomic
classes.
The percentage of women who do “cover” differs from country to
country and community to community. Any estimate of how many
do so at present is guesswork; we can only say the numbers range
from very few in Tunisia, to half or more of the middle-class women
in Egypt, to 100 percent in Saudi Arabia.34
Although there is great variation in the outlook on the hijab in
the Middle East, this essay focuses on Saudi Arabia, as its laws represent the most extreme interpretation of veiling. The infamous
“morals police”—also known as the mutawwa’un, or simply, the
mutawa—patrol the streets, enforcing all sorts of laws on citizens
that are not necessarily in the Qur’an:
In recent years, the “morals police” force has been expanded and
reinforced. The mutawwa’un, or religious enforcers, as they are called,
ensure compliance with the strict moral codes of Wahhabi Islam,
ascertaining, for instance, that all shops close when the call to prayer
is made by the muezzin, that women do not drive cars, and that they
are properly covered when in public places.35
With such tight control over Saudi women’s actions, some women
buck under the authority and contest the mutawa, by doing so
preserving their freedoms. One woman, Sarah [no last name for
protection] was quoted in an article by Maureen Dowd (New York
Times, March 13, 2010) on the progress of women’s rights as saying,
“Personally, I push the envelope. I don’t cover my hair.” If she is
approached by the mutawa—the religious police—she’s willing to
back chat. “So if a guy is yelling at me, telling me to cover my hair,
there’s something we say in Arabic that means, ‘You really shouldn’t
be looking in the first place,’” she said. “And actually, Islam argues
52
Kristina Solvik
that men should keep their gaze down. So you can argue back to the
mutawa, if you know how to do it properly.”
While there are women in Saudi Arabia who openly oppose the
hijab, many others have been swayed to agreement with the policies.
In that same article, Sarah goes on to explain why she withholds
her last name: “You can’t push the envelope too much or you
start alienating a part of our society, because a part of our society
is very conservative, and you have to respect that.” Saudi Arabia
represents an interesting mix of conservative and liberalism: while
more and more women are encouraged to go to university and
become doctors, teachers, secretaries, etc., conservative Wahhabi
culture still has a hold on many aspects of life.
It is clear from these debates that there is much confusion of values
within Saudi society, that anxieties are spreading over the possible
consequences of allowing women the freedom to work outside the
home, over the possible threat to the stability of the family, over the
possible subverting of traditional male dominance. Women themselves
appear to share the confusion, pursuing education and professions
with single-minded determination and vigor, at the same time professing an abiding belief in the suitability for their society of the veil,
of the segregation of the sexes, of the restrictions on travel abroad.36
Living in a society defined by a unique mix of the traditional
Middle Eastern culture and more modern Western thought, women
do not necessarily feel stifled. In fact, one “highly professional
educator in Saudi Arabia” feels quite the contrary: “‘Women,’
she claimed, ‘are not restricted by imposed law.’ Rather, ‘We restrict ourselves. We want to work for the good of the society as a
whole.’”37 Although some Westerners may recoil at this thought
and believe that Middle Eastern women have been indoctrinated
to think this way—which could be the case for some women in
very oppressive families and societies—it is this freedom of opinion
and expression that feminists are fighting for around the world.
Saudi women are not always pressured to accept the hijab and
other cultural traditions from birth and never question them. In
fact, many, though not all, women enjoy this freedom to explore
both sides of the debate on these issues:
The greatest source of liberal ideas appears to be travel abroad. Many
young Saudi women spend part of each year vacationing in Europe
THE CONCORD REVIEW
53
where some of them dress in fashionable western clothing. There they
are exposed to a different style of life, new concepts and ideas, and
liberal attitudes. Although not all of them come back enamoured of
the West, and some decry much of what they see, particularly sexual
promiscuity, still foreign travel has an impact on attitudes. At the very
least it makes many young Saudis question some of the traditions and
customs prevalent in their society. Many of them end up speaking out
on women’s issues, calling for changes and liberalization, although
others return more than ever convinced that the traditional Saudi
lifestyle is the better one.38
Saudi Arabia is a unique case, as although there are laws requiring the hijab, the society seems to be progressive in some aspects,
and many women have the freedom to travel and broaden their
horizons (as long as they have their husbands’ or fathers’ assent
to leave the country, as required by law). Women with a wide
diversity of opinions can be found in this country, such as those
who openly oppose and protest the obligatory hijab; those who
wholeheartedly believe in protecting Saudi Arabia from Western
ideology; and those who wear the hijab willingly, just as an expression of being Muslim. However, no matter what these women
desire, Saudi government still demands that women cover their
heads, most likely due to a fear of the country being flooded by
Western ideology and customs:
It seems that although there might be no turning back the clock
where education and work are concerned, that fear of western cultural
penetration, of loss of indigenous traditions and values is making it
essential in today’s political climate to uphold at least the outward
forms of piety. This seems evident in the continued wearing of the
veil, the continued segregation by sex of all public life, and the continued strictures on the activities of women.39
Although Saudi Arabia has the right to protect its country from
becoming a carbon copy of Western civilization, it should not be
able to determine how women live, especially when its religious
book, the Qur’an, forbids compulsion in religion. Living in a
country that enforces the hijab takes away these women’s rights;
however they wish to approach the veil is no longer their decision;
it has become the decision of a controlling state that appears to
be determined to limit the human rights of half of its citizens.
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Kristina Solvik
France represents the other extreme of the spectrum of
societal responses to the hijab: its laws forbidding wearing the
hijab while in public schools, in banks, in airports, and even in
cars, restrict its Muslim female inhabitants’ rights—rights that
are given to other Christian and Jewish inhabitants. Muslims in
France are oppressed as if they were small minorities when they
are in fact far from that status:
France today has roughly four or five million Muslim inhabitants,
nearly a tenth of the population. Approximately half have French
citizenship. More precise figures are not available, since the French
state, being officially secular, is forbidden to inquire into questions of
religion. It is generally agreed, however, that France, preponderantly
Catholic, now has more Muslims than either Protestants or Jews, its
historical minorities. Islam has become the country’s second religion.40
These Muslims currently inhabiting France were not there 60
years ago. With the Algerian War ending in 1962, many Algerians who fought for the French were given French citizenship.
Over time, their families followed, and subsequently, the population of Muslims in France has surged. With the past life and
customs in Northern Africa so fresh in these immigrants’ mind,
the children of the immigrants face an interesting dilemma: to
be North African Muslim41 or to be French? “The adoption of
the hijab, French sociologists hypothesize, is part of a search for
identity by the first generation of French-born Muslims to reach
maturity.”42 This explains why the French headscarf debate has
been so concentrated in public schools. The nationwide dispute
began in September of 1989, when three North African teenagers were expelled from their junior high school Gabriel Havez,
in Creil, because they refused to take off their hijabs; the school
had previously decided to enforce secularism43 due to absences
based on religion, and the principal, Ernest Chenière, declared
that the girls could wear their hijabs in the schoolyard, but not
in the classroom. The debate soon escalated, becoming an issue
of national attention for the rest of the school year.
It quickly became the framing mechanism for a wide-ranging polemic
about national identity, involving secularism; the accommodation
of “France’s second religion”—Islam; the problem of “integration”;
racism; religious fundamentalism; and so on. Occasionally, there
THE CONCORD REVIEW
55
were passing and generally tokenistic references to women’s “emancipation.”44
The hijab question has not since ceased to be posed throughout
France. Five years after the incident occurred, a law was passed,
which pleased many umpteenth-generational Frenchmen, but incited dissension amongst the first-, second-, and third-generational
Frenchmen who either were Muslim or had Muslim roots:
In 1994, the government adopted a rule that recognizes a student’s
right to display religious symbols unless they are “outrageous, ostentation or meant to proselytize.” This rule seems to leave room for a cross
or a yarmulke while barring the hijab, but in fact it passes the buck,
leaving interpretation up to the director of each school. Predictably,
the rule satisfies neither side, and the dispute rages on.45
With so many Muslims living in France, one would assume that they
have equal rights compared to other French residents. However,
while a cross or yarmulke is not perceived as suspicious in any way
by many Frenchmen, the hijab carries with it a lot of controversy,
especially when it is seen worn by young Muslims:
Characteristically, the Interior Ministry sees the hijab in terms of national security. Of some 300,000 Muslim girls in French high schools,
it estimates that 15,000 wear the hijab, which it claims is an assertion of
fundamentalism. The Education Ministry sets the figure at 2,000, and
ascribes to them less militant motives. Some Muslim leaders maintain
that any statistic for the wearing of the hijab in schools understates
the extent of the practice because many girls, embarrassed to be seen
bareheaded, avoid school altogether. On the other hand, teachers
say that political militants regularly recruit young girls to take up the
hijab and to pressure their fellow students to do likewise.46
With 60 years of suspicion and distrust of North African immigrants
still fresh in their minds, many French fear Islam as a religion
(especially since it has expanded so quickly), and thus fear the
next generation of Muslims, who in the Christian Frenchmen’s
eyes have the potential to become fundamentalist and dispute
French values. This view is not only shared by the uninformed
public, but by the French government as well: in a 1994 speech
at the opening of a mosque in Lyon,47 the then-Interior Minister,
Charles Paqua, warned that France “would not compromise its
56
Kristina Solvik
secular traditions to accommodate any faith…It is not enough
simply to have Islam in France,” he said. “There must now be a
French Islam.”…France, he seemed to say, would not tolerate
Islamic practices, religious or cultural, at odds with the character
of French society.”48 The French government has not ceased to
believe that Islam’s principles are contrary to those of France.
In an article on the current veil debate in French Parliament
(New York Times, January 26, 2010), Steven Erlanger writes, “Mr.
Sarkozy has said that the veil is ‘not welcome in France because
it is contrary to our values and contrary to the ideas we have of a
woman’s dignity.’ But he stepped back from pushing the broader
ban, concerned about its constitutionality and the possible offense
of Muslims.” However, the French Muslims who are the victims of
these attacks on their customs by the French government believe
that the French aim of protecting women’s dignity is actually hypocritical; Erlanger’s article continues to say, “The whole discussion
has made many Muslims uncomfortable or angry. Muhammad
Moussaoui, the head of a national coalition of Muslim organizations, told the Associated Press that ‘it’s very difficult to talk about
the liberation of women through a law that constrains.’” It is this
statement that epitomizes the restriction on or forced wearing of
the hijab, whether it be in France or in Saudi Arabia. No Muslim
woman can be free when her government tells her that she must
wear a hijab, or must not—even if her own personal preference
is in line with the law, her rights have been revoked. France’s aim
to bring peace amongst its people, Christian and Muslim, will not
succeed by this law:
While it may well be true that some of the small number of French
women who war burquas and niqabs are forced into them, it’s hard
to see how a ban will help liberate them. Instead, it will permit the
French to publicly humiliate them and feel good about it, ratify the
Islamists’ claim that the West is out to get Islam and give more proof
that Muslims are unwelcome in France.49
With no good outcome in sight for this hijab debate in France, it
is evident that the issue must be withdrawn from legislation and
governmental debate; for Muslim women to have the right that
their fellow French residents enjoy, they should legally be able
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57
to wear the hijab when security and identification needs do not
mandate that the face must be seen.
The United States is a country that gives Muslim women
their human right to express themselves by wearing a hijab; however, even a legal safe haven for these women is not enough, as
societal viewpoints on the hijab are often negative and repress the
women in a different way. “Many Muslim women in the United
States, whether covered or not, say they don’t like to draw attention to themselves. The reason: They are a religious minority in
a country that promises religious freedom but has been at times
hostile to those practicing new or ‘different’ faiths.”50 Just as in
France, many Americans fear Islam, and subsequently the hijab, as
it represents to them the unknown, misunderstood Middle East,
a region of the world that has not been very amicable with the
United States as well. Despite these women’s isolation from many
Americans, they are not the smallest minority: many Muslims have
come to America, or are converts. “The number of Muslims has
doubled in a decade, making it one of the fastest-growing religions
in the United States.”51 This fact is often seen as quite threatening
to non-Muslims, as they, like the non-Muslim French, perhaps see
Eastern religion as contrary to American values.52 Nevertheless, this
religion that is widely mistrusted by Americans has become more
widespread among the population than one of the branches of
Christianity: “If those numbers [roughly six million Muslims in the
U.S.] are correct, there are now more Muslims in American than
the two to three million members the Episcopal Church claims
in the United States.”53 Similarly to other parts of the world, the
women wearing the hijab have diverse reasons for doing so: the
most common reasons appear to be expression of identity as a
Muslim woman or as a Muslim convert who is diligently following
the religious and cultural norms that come with Islam. Despite
the reputation Islam has in America for being misogynistic,
Many of these new members [to Islam] say they were first attracted
to Islam by what they perceive as its feminist message…Despite the
message of some leaders in the Muslim world who invoke Islam to
suppress women, most Muslim women in the United States see their
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Kristina Solvik
religion as a liberating force. They say their faith has helped them
develop spiritually and intellectually, and they consider themselves
feminists…Today, a new generation of Muslimah feel they are the new
American feminists, see themselves as part of a sisterhood, and claim
they are better able to balance work and family than other working
mothers in the United States because their religion requires men to
support their children. They also point out that religion’s traditional
separation of the sexes actually helps women achieve.54
These American Muslims have found that feminism and Islam are
not necessarily disparate. However, it appears that the majority of
the U.S. population still views Islam as conflicting with American
values: “Most Muslimah wearing a hijab say they have been harassed
in some way, usually with foul language, threats, or an exhortation
to ‘go home.’”55 It is not uncommon that women or girls wearing
hijabs have been oppressed in the U.S. Covering up the body, and
especially the hair, is quite unusual in the Western world, and thus
attracts a significant amount of attention and critique. This has
been augmented by the attacks of September 11, 2001:
Since 9/11, the American media has vastly expanded its coverage of
Muslim and Arab women through the world. The highly publicized
atrocities of the Taliban have left Americans outraged at what Muslim
men do to their women. They have also assured the American public
of the virtues of American society…For Muslims, the anti-Islamic
themes in the American public square post-9/11 were not seen as a
new phase in Western treatment of Islam and Muslims; rather, they
appeared to harp on familiar themes that permeate Western literature. The American media has consistently treated Arabs, Muslims,
and Islam in derogatory terms. Surveys of the American press have
documented its treatment of Arabs and Muslims as the monolithic
Other whose beliefs are inferior and sexist and worthy of defamation.56
With the increase in media coverage of Islam and its followers, a
heavy emphasis on the hijab as a Muslim icon has created a backlash of various incidents of injustices and hate crimes in the U.S.
against hijab-wearers. One example of such an incident is outlined
in an article about a young Muslim girl who was barred from her
soccer game for wearing the hijab (Press-TV, October 16, 2007):
Iman Khalil has been playing competitive league soccer for two years
and has worn her scarf at every game…On Saturday, she went to the
playground, hoping she would be an effective player for her team.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
59
To her astonishment, the young referee told her she had to take off
her scarf or sit out the game. A previous U.S. Soccer Association
ruling decided that religious articles can be worn if they don’t pose
a safety hazard.
Just as in French public schools, it appears that the young girl was
targeted specifically because of her religion. Although it is a minor
injustice, it is contrary to America’s policy of religious tolerance
and freedom. Another Muslim woman was discriminated against
because of her headscarf: an article by Press-TV (October 19, 2009)
reports that in Newark, California,
The home of a Muslim woman [Nadja Adolf], running for U.S. city
council elections, has been subject to vandalism, after a picture of
her wearing an Islamic headscarf was published…CAIR-SFBA [San
Francisco Bay Area chapter of the Council of American-Islamic Relations] believes the attack followed the publication of Adolf’s picture,
wearing hijab—an Islamic headscarf—in a local newspaper just days
before the incident.
Muslim women seem especially barred from becoming involved
in politics, even in the most minor sense. When President Barack
Obama was on the campaign trail, two Muslim women were kept
from posing in a picture with him by his campaign volunteers
because of their hijabs. In an article by Press-TV (June 20, 2008),
CAIR’s national legislative director, Corey Saylor, is quoted as
having said,
Although we welcome the Obama campaign’s apology, we are extremely concerned about the level of Islamophobia in our society
that would prompt other minorities to view Muslim supporters as
potential liabilities. We hope that Senator Obama will personally
apologize to the two women and (show) that he decries the current
Islamophobic climate in our nation that is not only attacking him,
but has even targeted some within his own campaign.
Discrimination towards Muslim women who choose to wear hijabs
is in fact contrary to American values of tolerance and equity. It
has reached such a point that innocent citizens are being killed
solely for the expression of their faith: one hijab-wearing woman,
Alia Ansari, was gunned down while walking her child to school on
October 19, 2006 in Freemont, California. In an article in the San
Francisco Chronicle (October 24, 2006), Matthai Chakko Kuruvila
60
Kristina Solvik
and Henry K. Lee report that Ansari’s family believed that “it was
a hate crime, since the only thing that would distinguish her to a
stranger was her head scarf.” The Freemont community’s response
to this tragic occurrence is what shows some hope for a future in
America where women can freely wear hijabs: they organized a
“Wear a Hijab or Turban Day” to protest hate crimes and injustices
against humanity.57 However uplifting this small demonstration
of intolerance for Muslim women’s sufferings is, one can still not
dispute that the U.S. is a country with dislike for Muslims who
wear the hijab. Although these women have the legal freedom
to wear hijabs if they so desire, oftentimes they do not have the
social freedom to do so. The United States, just like Saudi Arabia
and France, limits the rights of Muslim women through its stance,
this time social rather than legal, on head coverings.
The discrepancy of women’s rights, which include the freedom of self-expression, between Muslim women, who are either
forced or forbidden to veil, and other women of the world who,
in contrast, are given or are helped in fighting for human rights,
can only be solved by allowing Muslim women to have the freedom
to choose whether they will wear the hijab or not, with neither
political nor social pressures. Various countries may stress their
differences in how they approach the veil, but in truth, the Saudi
mutawwa’un, French policies, and the American “social police” that
naturally arises among the population, are all one and the same:
they oppress women’s rights to veil or not veil. No country has the
right policy and enforces it justly, and each misunderstands the
other country’s point of view. Contrary to popular belief in the
Western world, the hijab is not necessarily the result of coercion
by males: one American Muslim convert reveals,
To me wearing a scarf was a symbol of being Muslim—the external
expression of my religious beliefs. When most people asked me why
Muslim women wore a scarf, I explained that I knew of four general
reasons. One was that Islam enjoins modesty on both genders, and
that some people think that keeping hair covered is an important
part of modesty…Another was that some people understood the
Qur’an to command women to cover their hair, the reason for which
was to show one’s willingness to obey God’s command…The Third
was a mystical Sufi explanation I had heard in my mosque, stating
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61
that there was a spiritual arsh, or opening, on the top of my head,
and that it benefited both men and women to keep it covered from
the world…The fourth reason I mentioned was to declare oneself
publicly as a Muslim, to show pride in one’s faith.58
Women choose to wear the hijab for diverse reasons, and should
accordingly not be herded together and labeled as “oppressed”
by the non-Muslims of the world:
Certainly, some Muslim women today are forced to cover themselves
against their will. However, it is incorrect to claim that every woman
that does so is necessarily coerced and oppressed. Muslim women
everywhere must refute this all-too-prevalent Western misconception.
For women who choose it, the headscarf is an indispensable part
of their personal identity, one that should not be compromised. If
Western feminists and other critics want to advance women’s rights,
they are better off honoring a woman’s right to choose rather than
trying to impose their prejudices on Muslims.59
The many Muslim women around the world who wear the hijab
have been the subject of debate by Westerners who, possibly inadvertently, insult these women, take away their human rights,
and challenge their religion. The message needs to be spread
throughout the West that “The scarf is far more than a symbol
of male supremacy alone.”60 Just as many Westerners believe that
the cultural and legal response to the hijab in the Middle East
is immoral, Middle Easterners do not support the Western view
on head coverings and the intolerance of women who choose to
wear the hijab. Reconciliation, followed by understanding is desperately needed for the wellbeing of Muslim women who choose
to wear or not wear the hijab; without it, these women will remain
misunderstood and persecuted, and a dilemma that plagues the
world—the persecution of all women, rather than solely attacks
on Muslim women’s various approaches to the hijab—will remain
ignored. “There are as many perspectives and approaches to resolving inequities in women’s status and other gender-based injustices as there are societies.”61 Progress in women’s human rights
demands the patience and willingness to understand different
cultures from both sides of the hijab debate, which is just one of
the many battles for women’s rights that are occurring now; only
after study, discussion, and the declaration of open-mindedness
62
Kristina Solvik
can the world’s citizens begin to collaborate on finding a desirable
resolution for all Muslim women who all have different perspectives of their own, thus taking a step towards the freedom of all
the women of the world.
Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf, “The Veil, My Body,” in Voices
of Resistance: Muslim Women on War, Faith and Sexuality ed.
Sarah Husain, 246 (Emeryville, California: Seal Press, 2006)
2
Jen’Nan Ghazal Read, et al., “To Veil or Not to Veil? A
Case Study of Identity Negotiation Among Muslim Women in
Austin, Texas,” Gender and Society 14 (2000) p. 396
3
According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, Fourth Edition (2009: Houghton Mifflin
Company), “hijab” is defined as “The headscarf worn by
Muslim women, sometimes including a veil that covers the face
except for the eyes.”
4
Bronwyn Winter, Hijab and the Republic: Uncovering
the French Headscarf Debate (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse
University Press, 2008) p. 1
5
According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, Fourth Edition (2009: Houghton Mifflin
Company), “human rights” is defined as “The basic rights
and freedoms to which all humans are entitled, often held
to include the right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and
expression, and equality before the law” (italicized by the author
of this paper).
6
Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance
(Oxford: Berg, 1999) p. 11
7
Qur’an 24:31
8
Ibid., 33:53
9
Ibid., 33:59
10
Ibid., 7:26
11
Syed Ali, “Why Here, Why Now? Young Muslim Women
Wearing the Hijab,” Muslim World 95 (2005) p. 515
12
Qur’an 2:256
13
Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, author of Hijab, the Muslim
Women’s Dress (Islamic or Cultural?) (Canada: Ja’fari Islamic
Centre)
14
El Guindi, p. 6
15
Ibid., pp. 6-7
16
Winter, p. 22
17
Ibid., p. 22
1
THE CONCORD REVIEW
18
“The central tropes of the Orientalist fantasy harem were
sex and idleness. In the imagery of the dominant Orientalist
discourse, the harem constantly figures as a polygamous space.
Apter describes how the polygamous harem continued to be
“exploited in Orientalist paintings and colonial fiction as a
means of evoking every possible venue of erotic fantasy.” Thus,
abduction, exhibitionism, voyeurism, bestiality, sapphism,
onanism, and masochism “constituted a mosaic of ‘aberrant’
sexual preferences to be grouped under the rubric ‘harem.’”
Quoted in Nadia Maria El Cheikh, “Revisiting the Abbasid
Harems,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 1 (2005) p. 3
19
El Guindi, p. 10
20
Ibid., p. 13
21
Ibid., p. 14
22
Winter, p. 27
23
El Guindi, pp. 14-15
24
Ibid., p. 13
25
Ibid., p. 17
26
Ibid., 20
27
Merve Kavakci, “Headscarf Heresy,” Foreign Policy 142
(2004) p. 67
28
Ramsay M. Harik and Elsa Marston, Women in the
Middle East: Tradition and Change (New York: Franklin Watts,
1996) p. 131
29
Winter, 30
30
Harik and Marston, p. 131
31
Kavakci, p. 67
32
This was written by several Frenchwomen, including
philosopher Elisabeth Badinter and writer Catherine Millet,
in an open letter to then-French President Jacques Chirac in
2003. Ibid., p. 67
33
Ibid., p. 67
34
Harik and Marston, p. 127
35
Nesta Ramazani, “Arab Women in the Gulf,” Middle East
Journal 39 (1985) p. 261
36
Ibid., p. 262
37
Ibid., p. 263
38
Ibid., p. 264
39
Ibid., pp. 264-265
40
Milton Viorst, “The Muslims of France,” Foreign Affairs
75 (1996) p. 78
41
AKA a “beur,” which is the pig latin—known as “verlan”
among French teenagers, which is an inversion of the word,
63
64
Kristina Solvik
“l’envers,” which translates to “the opposite”—version of “Arabe”
in French.
42
Ibid., p. 85
43
Secularism has been a national priority for France
since it originated in the Act of December 9, 1905 on the
separation of church and state, a law in the making since the
French Revolution of 1789-1799. Secularism in France is even
more strict than in the United States: the government cannot
recognize or fund any religion (this is why there is no census
on what religions the people of France follow, and thus why
there is no concrete number for Muslims living in France).
44
Winter, p. 131
45
Viorst, p. 86
46
Ibid., p. 86
47
Interesting side note: The mosque was paid for by Saudi
Arabia. Its imam described it as standing “midway between
two cultures—the marvels of the Koran and the wisdom of
Descartes” at its dedication. Ibid., p. 81
48
Ibid., p. 81
49
Katha Pollitt, “Muslim Women’s Rights, Continued,” The
Nation 289 (2009) p. 10
50
Donna Gehrke-White, The Face Behind the Veil: the
Extraordinary Lives of Muslim Women in America (New York:
Citadel Press, 2006) p. 3
51
Ibid., p. 3
52
See the “Muslim Demographics” video for an example
of how some Westerners are in panic over the rise of Islam
in Western countries: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63X5hIFXYU&feature=related
53
Gehrke-White, pp. 3-4
54
Ibid., p. 6
55
Ibid., p. 9
56
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “The post 9/11 hijab as icon,”
Sociology of Religion (2007) p. 5
57
A video of “Wear a Hijab or Turban Day” can be found at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCbOcBldETY
58
Z. Gabriel Arkles, “The Scarf,” in Voices of Resistance:
Muslim Women on War, Faith and Sexuality ed. Sarah Husain,
pp. 247-249 (Emeryville, California: Seal Press, 2006)
59
Kavakci, p. 67
60
Arkles, p. 249
61
Marian Lief Palley, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights:
An International Perspective,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 551 (1991) p. 164
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Bibliography
Ali, Syed, “Why Here, Why Now? Young Muslim Women
Wearing the Hijab,” Muslim World 95 (2005) 515
Arkles, Z. Gabriel, “The Scarf,” in Voices of Resistance:
Muslim Women on War, Faith and Sexuality ed. Sarah Husain,
pp. 247-249, Emeryville, California: Seal Press, 2006
El Cheikh, Nadia Maria, “Revisiting the Abbasid Harems,”
Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 1, Fall 2005 pp. 1-19,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40326869 (accessed May 13, 2010)
El Guindi, Fadwa, Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance
Oxford: Berg, 1999
Gehrke-White, Donna, The Face Behind the Veil: the
Extraordinary Lives of Muslim Women in America New York:
Citadel Press, 2006
Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, “The post 9/11 hijab as icon,”
Sociology of Religion (2007) p. 5, http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_m0SOR/is_3_68/ai_n28571705 (accessed May 13,
2010)
Harik, Ramsay M., and Elsa Marston, Women in the Middle
East: Tradition and Change New York: Franklin Watts, 1996
Kavakci, Merve, “Headscarf Heresy,” Foreign Policy 142
(2004) pp. 67-67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4147579
(accessed May 2, 2010)
Manaf, Nor Faridah Abdul, “The Veil, My Body,” in Voices of
Resistance: Muslim Women on War, Faith and Sexuality edited
by Sarah Husain, 246, Emeryville, California: Seal Press, 2006
65
66
Kristina Solvik
Palley, Marian Lief, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: An
International Perspective,” Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 551 (1991) pp. 163-178, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/1046936 (accessed May 2, 2010)
Pollitt, Katha, “Muslim Women’s Rights, Continued,” The
Nation 289 (2009) p. 10
Ramazani, Nesta, “Arab Women in the Gulf,” Middle East
Journal 39 (1985) pp. 258-276
Read, Jen’Nan Ghazal, and John P. Bartkowski, “To Veil
or Not to Veil? A Case Study of Identity Negotiation Among
Muslim Women in Austin, Texas,” Gender and Society 14
(2000) pp. 395-417, http://www.jstor.org/stable/190135
Viorst, Milton, “The Muslims of France,” Foreign Affairs
75 (1996) pp. 78-96, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20047745
(accessed May 2, 2010)
Winter, Bronwyn, Hijab and the Republic: Uncovering
the French Headscarf Debate Syracuse, New York: Syracuse
University Press, 2008
Copyright 2011,THE
The Concord
Review,
Inc., all rights reserved 67
CONCORD
REVIEW
PETER THE GREAT: PERSONA AND POLICY
Preeti Varathan
A
s the religious strife ravaging Europe finally came to
a close with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Eastern Europe remained backward looking and outdated. Three obsolete political
organizations dominated Eastern Europe—the Ottoman Turks,
the Holy Roman Empire, and the Republic of Poland. In all of
these decaying empires, central authority had become weak with a
chaotic number of princes, archbishops, and outlying dignitaries
taking control. The economic situation was deteriorating—serfdom plagued attempts at social mobility and autonomy established itself in the hands of the lord of the manor. Government,
if there was such a thing, lacked effective administration and had
become outmoded by the novel ways of rule now being practiced
in France. The predicament of the Tower of Babel resurfaced in
the conglomerate of ethnicities and cultural backgrounds present in these regions; people found greater relation among those
who shared their tongue rather than those who shared their state.
Thus when Voltaire concluded that the Holy Roman Empire was
“Neither holy, Roman, nor an empire” he, with wit, encompassed
the deteriorating situation of Eastern Europe as a whole.1
Preeti Varathan is a Senior at Singapore American School in Singapore,
where she wrote this paper for Mr. Rick Bisset’s AP European History
course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
68
Preeti Varathan
The stage was set for three countries: Russia, Austria, and
Prussia—to assert their autonomy over Eastern Europe. Austria
would come to dominate the Holy Roman Empire and Hungary
under Charles VI, and the security of its throne would be further sustained by his Pragmatic Sanction. Prussia, or Brandenburg-Prussia,
would prosper under the regime of the Great Elector, Frederick
William. He would use the strength of the Prussian military state
to intimidate surrounding nations and ease diplomatic relations
with other countries. The need to maintain a full- functioning
and effective military would become the goal of Prussian society,
determining the character of the people and acting as a source
of unity for the state.2
Russia, in particular, would see its great transformation
under the rule of Peter the Great. During the Middle Ages, much
of what later came to be Russia was dominated by the ruthless
Mongol Khan. Over time, however, several Muscovite Princes
amassed authority and succeeded in replacing Mongol power. Of
these Ivan I (1288-1340) and Ivan III were the most significant.
Ivan III (1440-1505), popularly known as Ivan the Great, sought
to nurture Moscovy into a “Third Rome” and attracted many
scholars and expert craftsmen to his city. His successor, Ivan IV
(1530-1584) later expanded and began the slow westernization of
Muscovy, which would be continued by successive rulers. He was
named “Ivan the Terrible” for his increased cruelty towards the
boyars and his emphasis on serfdom.3 His reign was followed by
the “Time of Troubles,” a period of rampant famine, successive
warfare, and severe disunity. Thus was the beginning of the Romanov dynasty. The Romanov dynasty would be one of the longest
imperial dynasties in the history of modern Europe, lasting from
1613 to the February Revolution in 1917. One of the Romanov
dynasty’s most notable rulers would be Peter I, leaving a mark on
Russia that still remains today.
Peter Romanov (1682-1725) would lead Russia out of this
age of disunity, obsolete institutions, and intellectual isolation and
into an era of rapid progress. In the late 17th century, Peter the
Great was forced to deal with, by far, the most opposition—namely
THE CONCORD REVIEW
69
Louis XIV and Prince William of Orange. His birth was an event
long awaited by the royal Russian house. On May 30, 1672, a son
was born to the tsar’s beautiful wife, Natalya, and all the astrologers
predicted a magnificent future for him. It was also on this day that
Louis XIV of France became militarily ready to cross the Rhine,
with the help of Condè and Turenne (French generals), a sign
that Peter might be a victorious military leader.5 Thus with simply
the event of his birth, Peter had already begun to raise hope in
the Russian royal house, and the tsar shared his merriment with
all the Russian people as kegs of beer flowed freely through the
city and a grand banquet feasted the eyes and taste with both
cymbal players and fried parrot. However, it was not a moment
of joy for all, as the rise of a male heir to the throne meant the
diminishing power for other contenders—namely Sofia, Peter’s
elder half-sister. Her age already gave her an ability to dominate;
she was 15 years older than Peter. Overall Peter’s relations were
strained with Sofia, his sister, as they contended for power. However this is by no means abnormal, as a race for the throne had
almost always brought strife.6
Nevertheless, Peter was most definitely born in a time of
unusual turmoil and chaos. Conservative factions were endlessly
battling the monarchy and Peter was forced to witness many uprisings by the Streltsi, the reactionary military force, as a young
child. In fact the Streltsi would revolt and attempt a coup three
times during his reign. As a 10-year old boy, he witnessed the terror
brought on by the Streltsi; they massacred many members of his
family and the royal house. Seven years later, the Streltsi, under
the command of his sister, Regent Sofia, once again brought horror to the Kremlin. Peter had left the city of Moscow to train with
foreigners in the outskirts of Russia; consequently, Sofia planned
on ways to become Russia’s first tsarina and quietly made the
imperial orb and scepter her own.7 In the late summer of 1689,
Sofia marched through the streets of Moscow in a show of power;
her intention was clear—Peter was unfit to be tsar of Russia.8 Yet
Peter’s once play-army of rag-tag rural boys proved an indomitable
force and Peter’s power was restored. It was a mixed victory, however, as Sofia made arrangements for Peter and his half-brother
70
Preeti Varathan
Ivan to share the throne. Sofia was so intent on manipulating her
younger brother Ivan and influencing Russian politics that she
had a special double throne created with a small window for her
to speak through. As diplomats and officials discussed matters
with the two boys, Sofia would whisper the appropriate response
in their ears. The final threat of the Streltsi came at a time when
Moscow was almost defenseless, during the Grand Embassy: Peter’s
foreign escapade into western Europe. Peter’s initial intention was
to convince the other European powers to support militarily his
claims to the Ottoman Empire’s ports along the Strait of Kerch.
However, his journey throughout Europe turned into a remarkable educational experience. Not only did Peter voraciously study
the engineering of ships in the Dutch and British shipyards, but
he analyzed dentistry and surgery as well. Every aspect of western
progress caught his attention and his paramount goal was to bring
back such advances to Russia. This outraged the Boyars (Russian
Nobles), the Old Believers (advocates of the traditional Russia),
and the Streltsi. Their final attempted coup was the closest they
ever came to success but Peter’s young master, General Gordon,
kept the reactionary army at bay. Peter arrived in time to crush the
rebellion.9 Such calamity only further shaped Peter’s uncompromising policies in the future. His reaction mirrors Louis XIV’s to
the Fronde (1648-1653) in France; they both aggressively limited
the influence of the nobility when they accepted power.10
Hence it would be Peter’s choices as a young man and his
tactful (or tactless) ways of dealing with resistance that would truly
define his future. Peter was a man of Eastern birth and heritage,
with an undeniable fascination for the West. Although considered
a callous man with a harsh personality, certain actions of his were
justifiable. He was undeniably conspired against—as attest the
Naryshkins’ crooked uprisings and the xenophobia of the Russian people. The events that preceded Peter’s exploration of the
West are yet another clear indication of the turmoil in Russian
society. Tsykler, a conspirator against Peter, emerged as the head
of the usurpers that plotted to assassinate Peter before he left.
Tsykler had originally abandoned Sofia, Peter’s sister, for favor
of the Tsar, but had returned unrewarded. After torture, Tsykler
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71
revealed his allies, Alexis Sokovnin and Feodor Pushkin. Their
objections were personal; Peter had required that their children
be sent to foreign schools. Finally, Peter uncovered assassination
plans seven years old drafted between Sofia and Tsykler, with an
effective strategy put forward by Ivan Miloslavsky. Then Peter
revealed his aggressive and barbaric side in a sudden outburst;
Miloslavsky’s body was exhumed and hauled into Red Square.
But the executions were an entirely new spectacle. A towering
stone pillar with six pegs had been erected at the center of Red
Square, as the grotesque remains of the limbs of Tsykler and the
other accused were hastily chopped. Their heads were guillotined
and left for display while the dripping blood from their bodies
drenched Ivan Miloslavsky’s corpse. Though nothing less than an
utter macabre event, it proved a clear sign to others—plots against
the Tsar were intolerable.11 Furthermore, it reveals the underlying
dissent to Peter’s westernizing policies. However, pure brute force
and unrelenting torture would keep his policies alive.
II. Peter the Great—His Persona
To say the least, Peter could be considered a notable
leader. Intimidation and domination were his forte; Peter towered
over his inferiors with an unusual height of 6’7”. His sea-colored
eyes were sharp and focused and a head of untamed brown curls
added to his rugged charm. Past his imposing looks, his ways were
unorthodox; his public image was that of a laborer clad in workingman’s attire with heavy boots. As compared to the culture of
his contemporaries, Louis XIV and William of Orange, Peter was
almost illiterate. Yet his keen and sharp mind transcended his lack
of education. An observer would put it thus, “He had no letters;
he could only read and write, but he had a great regard for learning and was at much pains to introduce it into the country.”12 As a
young man, Peter showed great dexterity in shipbuilding; again,
a talent more attune to the character of a laborer than that of a
tsar. Almost all his models were a result of his own hands; he even
constructed an immense fleet at Azoz built to defeat the Turkish
Empire.13
72
Preeti Varathan
It was with this attitude that Peter and an entourage of
Russian observers would, in the years from 1697-1698, tour the
Netherlands, Germany, England, and other Western European
nations to gain knowledge of administration and military technology. This open-mindedness was an attribute Peter solely possessed; other rulers at the time only occasionally saw value in the
experiences of others. Though the Russian regime and that of
France and England share far more differences than similarities,
a comparison between Peter the Great and his contemporaries,
namely Louis XIV, can further emphasize the boldness and unorthodoxy of his personality.14
France during the late 16th and early 17th centuries would
be at its pinnacle; the French language was the language of the
wealthy and influential; French culture and cuisine dominated
royal tastes. In many ways, Louis XIV was the greatest example of
an absolute ruler, as attest his many financially-draining wars and
architectural expeditions. Not one ruler had held such power
for so long. Louis XIV was crowned king in 1643 at age five, and
he reigned for 72 years until his death in 1715. Not only did he
carry himself with an air of superiority, reflected in his personal
portrait by Hyacincth Rigaud and his imposing titles like Grand
Monarque and the Sun King, but he also aimed to disrupt the
carefully crafted balance of power in Europe to bring about a
continent dominated by France.15
Spain under the impotent imbecile Charles II proved his
first victim. He sought to reap the benefits of being wedded to
Charles’ sister and though only claiming to desire the Spanish
Netherlands and the Franche-Comté region, he in actuality was
vying for the entire Spanish inheritance. Such a gain would lead
to the feared and dreaded universal monarchy, whereby France
would be in possession of a sizable portion of Western Europe
and much of Europe’s colonial holdings. Yet above his ambitions
and endless wars, the Versailles Palace truly reflected Louis XIV’s
glory and power. Versailles not only required the employment of
around 30,000 workers, but also proved to sincerely deplete the
French financial reserve. Nonetheless, the palace with its splendid
THE CONCORD REVIEW
73
Hall of Mirrors and extensive gardens displayed what Louis XIV
wished to convey; he was a wealthy and absolute ruler.16
Though Peter the Great would later build the city of St.
Petersburg in a move to westernize Russia’s image (increasing the
proximity of Russia’s capital to the west) and to augment his own,
it would be far more sensible and austere in nature than Louis
XIV’s palace at Versailles. Unlike Peter, the Sun King would never
have seen the possibility of seeking insight or advice from other
countries, as it would only debase France’s superior position.
Thus put in historical context, the personality and ventures of
Peter the Great were anything but conventional. This was further
exemplified in his journeys to Western Europe, where Peter left a
remarkable impression, through both his persona and his careless
and clumsy men. In particular an observer would once note,
His traveling companions often behaved crudely by western European
standards: they consumed beer, wine, and brandy in quantities that
astonished their hosts, and King William III sent Peter a bill for damages done by his entourage at the country house where they lodged
in England. (Among other things, Peter had ruined the gardens by
having his men march through them in military formation.)17
Moreover, analyzing Peter’s family life uncovers other
facets of his eccentric personality. There is no doubt that what
truly reflects his brutally ambitious and somewhat cold nature is
the treatment of his son, Alexis (1692-1718). Alexis’ childhood
was one graced by daily beatings, physical abuse, and thorough
castigation. In essence, historian M.S. Anderson would refer to
Alexis’ experience as a “wretched childhood.” Moreover, Alexis
embraced the very traditions Peter despised. The Kremlin and the
Orthodox Church were his home, and moreover, Alexis adored
his mother. Peter’s marriage had been arranged and while Peter
represented a modern, progressive force, his wife was a symbol
of orthodox Russia. When Alexis was eight, Peter took a drastic
measure and sent his wife to the life of a nun.18 Again, this casts
insight on Peter’s personality. He felt no love for his orthodox
wife and not once considered her maternal importance to Alexis.
Alexis would never forgive his father for his actions and would
always support the orthodox traditions in memory of his mother.
74
Preeti Varathan
We have also shown how Peter was a man of ambition, a man
who saw the enlightenment and improvement of his government
as an end in itself. In many ways, Alexis would be the antithesis of
Peter. As a young boy, he put aside much of the military games that
had intrigued his father, and preferred to while away his time in
activities irrelevant to government and politics. Peter was frustrated
by his son’s lack of interest and aptitude; he consequently swore
to withhold the throne until Alexis could prove worthy. Alexis
feared his father, and more importantly, he feared the position
he wanted him to aspire to. Peter actually dealt with Alexis with
unique generosity; he offered him, time after time, ways to redeem
himself. During Peter’s military campaign against the Swedes, he
asked Alexis to lead his army on the 400-mile march to Poltava.
The bitter Russian winter proved too much for the weak Alexis,
and he caught an acute fever. Peter was disappointed. Perhaps
a more personal approach would warm Alexis to western ideals
and modernization. Peter arranged for Charlotte, a Russian noble
with a bloodline that included both the Austrian and British royal
houses, to marry Alexis. This only distanced Peter and his son,
for Alexis abhorred his new wife and consequently entertained
himself with a rugged Finnish mistress: a common serf. Alexis,
however, did please his father in one respect; Charlotte bore a
son, Peter II. Yet this only jeopardized Alexis’ position as Peter’s
heir. Finally, Peter gave his son one final chance: a drafting test.
Alexis would have to create a plan for a technologically advanced
fortress. This proved such a great burden for the young man that
he attempted to commit suicide. It failed.19
Thus Alexis was no tsar and Peter the Great came to realize
that. Peter’s one option: force Alexis to abdicate to the Russian
Orthodox Church; in essence, commit to the austere existence
of holy orders. This proved a sacrifice too great, and Alexis refused. Peter eventually charged Alexis of treasonous behavior.
Consequently, in the year 1718, Peter’s torture killed his son.
Russians have had a history of cruelty and violence that seem radical by today’s standards; Peter’s actions are not unprecedented
or unique. Ivan Grozny, better known as “Ivan the Terrible,” also
murdered his son.20 The actual cause of his death is still contested.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
75
However, the general consensus is that the tsar committed the
crime in a rage.21 The memorable Russian artist, Ilya Repin, has
depicted this event in the painting, Ivan the Terrible killing his son
(1581). Thus, one cannot immediately presume that Peter the
Great was unusually pitiless for his time period. By Russian imperial standards, Peter merely followed the norm. Yet compared to
the more progressive contemporaries of his time (Louis XIV, for
example) he was harsh. Peter was an intelligent progressive who
allowed the modernization of Russia to consume his life. Familial
concerns were his lowest priority, if they were a priority at all.22
Thus Peter’s background was atypical, his mannerism crude,
his demeanor abnormal, and his personality eccentric. Though
it would cause his fellow sovereigns to scoff at and spurn him, it
molded him in ways that would allow him to ruthlessly eliminate
deep-seated tradition and import western ideas. Peter the Great
was nothing short of fearless.
III. Russia—An Era of Reform
Expanding, extending borders, toppling cities, and warring
for seaports was the lifestyle that all empires religiously followed—
and Russia was no exception. There is no single reason for Russia’s
desire to expand; most historians believe that the “testament of
Peter I” and the urge for a “third Rome” are spurious and not nearly
as consequential as other more prominent motivations. Generally,
Russia wished to expand for three basic reasons. Firstly, reaching
the Pacific seas would not only give Russia warm water ports, but
it would also help her establish a stronger Eurasian empire. This
would later prove important as Russia sought to expand in the Far
East—primarily Manchuria and Korea—during the 19th century.
Secondly, a larger empire would expand Russia’s trade routes.
The fall of Constantinople in 1453 dismantled one of the greatest
trading zones since the age of the Silk Road. Its strategic location
was the primary land route from Anatolia to Greece. Essentially,
the trade that traveled along the Silk Road, from China and India
76
Preeti Varathan
and into Europe, almost always passed through this great city.
Hence the fall of the Byzantium Empire had great repercussions.23
Russia took advantage of this and sought to expand its own trading empire. Thirdly and finally, Russia’s constant fear of foreign
invasion almost always led to unrestrained expansion.24 Russia’s
history had been one characterized by relentless invasion and
intervention. In the 13th century, the Mongols under the leadership of Genghis Khan, invaded Russia and ruled eastern Europe
under the Golden Horde.25 The Mongols were only ousted from
power when Muscovite princes challenged the tax system and the
Mongolian Diaspora had severely weakened. The Ottoman Empire
would also prove a threat to Russia and the rest of Europe. One of
the three gunpowder dynasties, the Ottoman Empire embraced
a line of sultans who possessed a passion for expansion. Mehmed
II (1432-1481), also known as “the Conqueror,” captured the
Byzantium Empire in 1453.26 Later, Suleiman the Magnificent
(1495-1566) conquered much of eastern Europe and laid siege to
Vienna.27 Only an alliance between the major European powers
at the time defeated the Turkish force. Though Peter did not live
during the times of Mongolian and Turkish invasions (although
he did fight the Turks in his own expansionist wars), he did witness the expansion of one military power: the Swedes.
Peter’s early years in many ways prepared him for the expansionist and defensive wars to come; his childhood was filled
with mock-battles and swords-play. Accordingly, the young Peter was
captivated by conquest. He played war games with other children,
adopting the role of military general while his fellow comrades
made up his lieutenants, officers, and army. His games were so
close to an accurate representation of warfare that many children
suffered casualties; others died. Peter was also a precocious woodcutter, deftly learning the trade from a young age.28 This would
later influence his decision-making policy, as he would choose to
concentrate a disproportionate amount of energy towards building a prodigious navy, an idea that was in accord with both his
expansionist tendencies and his inward passion for shipbuilding.
Thus, Peter aided Russia in its rise to supremacy by threatening
the autonomy of neighboring powers. In the Great Northern War
THE CONCORD REVIEW
77
(1700-1721), Peter undermined Swedish preeminence, while his
battle against the Ottoman Empire further engendered its slow
decline and the eventual fall of the Turkish empire—“the sick
man of Europe.”29 Though he would not succeed in acquiring the
Black Sea ports he so desired, a later Tsarina would—Catherine
the Great.
The Great Northern War was the highlight of Peter’s
military history—the war that eventually allowed him to secure
access to the Baltic. It can almost be said that the sea called out
to Peter, a summons that made his yearning for the Baltic all the
more potent. One historian would portray Peter’s fervor for the
sea as,
He was enchanted to be so near the water. The idea of his being able
to breathe sea air all year round, feel the salt spray in his face night
and day, and watch ships through a telescope was all so exciting that
he forgot the most elementary caution in working out his building
plans. Here he felt more at home than anywhere else in Russia, both on
land and on water: an amphibious czar in an amphibious landscape.30
Russia’s involvement was due, primarily, to Denmark and
Poland-Saxony’s wish to regain territory lost to Sweden in the previous century. In 1698 and 1699, Russia entered into an alliance
with these two countries; Peter saw an opportunity to retrieve the
Swedish Ingria, a region Sweden tookß from Russia in 1618. Ingria
was also valuable for a far greater reason; it gave Russia access to
the Baltic seaports. The first phase of the war was a victory for the
Swedish, as the Battle of Narva proved a humiliating defeat for
the Russian military at the hands of Charles XII, king of Sweden.31
However, Charles made a tactical blunder with his decision to head
towards southern Poland in an attempt to dethrone the current
ruler, August II, and replace him with a more compliant Swedish king, Stanislaw Leszczynski. This effectively removed Poland
from the Northern War. While Charles XII busily negotiated with
the Polish, Peter remodeled, replenished, and retained most of
his New Army in the Baltic region. Charles also blundered in his
attempt to persuade the Ukrainian Cossacks to join the Swedish
effort; most Russians soured at Charles’ leadership of Sweden and
its general dominance in eastern European affairs.
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Preeti Varathan
Charles XII was a brilliant military ruler and in the first 26
years of his life he had not once been defeated in battle. Yet the
Russians would put forth two obstacles that not even the militarily
excellent Swedes could overcome. As Charles marched farther
into Russia, he was forced to rely on the Russian land to sustain
his troops since access to his supply lines was impossible. Peter
implemented the “scorched earth” campaign to make this impossible as well. Soon all that Charles’ army encountered was miles
of useless, fallow land. As the troops starved, they were forced to
battle a new enemy: the brutal Russian winter. When the Swedish
army finally faced the Russians at Poltava they were sick, starved,
and bitter.32 Thus, the Battle of Poltava (October 9, 1708) changed
the course of the war. The Swedish army, marred by numerous
casualties, fled toward the Dnieper River. Yet, as they tried to escape, the Swedish found too few boats to cross the river. Charles
XII was forced to surrender. Peter occupied the Baltic provinces
in 1710.33 This is a good example of how Peter’s expansionist ambition fueled major reform. The Russian army was bordering on
medieval, until Peter actively reformed it by Western standards.
Acquisition of the Baltic region and access to the Baltic seas had
been a paramount goal for Peter since he first became Tsar. The
Baltic region would be Peter’s window to the west: an opportunity
for him to access the changes of the west with facility.34
As Peter returned from war, victorious, he took both a
momentous and consequential decision; he crowned himself
Emperor. Of course, he was already referred to as Tsar Peter by
the Russian people; however, the title “tsar” was a Russian title of
honor and nobility, not a European one. The origin of the term
Tsar comes from the Russian modification of the term Caesar.
It’s important to note that the term “tsar” is no meek title, as it is
comparable to the titles bestowed on Julius Caesar and Octavius
Caesar during the Roman Empire. However, France had never
acknowledged the Tsar as a leader; only in 1745, 20 years after his
death, did they recognize his title.35 Thus “emperorship” did add
to Russia’s prestige, as the title “Emperor” was the equivalent to
Monarch or King, a title Peter’s prominent contemporaries were
granted. It also set the stage for Peter to assume the responsibili-
THE CONCORD REVIEW
79
ties of an absolute monarch. Though Enlightenment ideas had
already begun to influence Western Europe, Russia would not
implement such ideas until the reign of Catherine the Great. Peter also modeled many of his political practices after Louis XIV,
undoubtedly an absolute monarch.36
With this title, Peter set out to reform Russia. Many historians have argued that every one of Peter’s reforms was directed
toward improving the military; yet the analysis of many of his
political reforms can lead to a different conclusion. Peter was
not alone in his desire to reform the government of Russia; European statesmen from every country began to see the value of
reorganizing the political structures in their respective countries.
Some believe that monarchs and politicians were adhering to
the new philosophies of the Enlightenment, and in the spirit of
Montesquieu were emphasizing distribution and balance as opposed to complete centralization. Others attribute the change to
the contemporary discoveries in science; Newton’s discovery of
innate laws in the universe lead rulers to believe that there were
inherent laws governing administration as well. Regardless, the
1600s and 1700s were a time of active reform in government, and
Russia was no exception.37 The traditional form of government
in Russia was not only obsolete, but also hopelessly inefficient.
It was a sprawling bureaucracy, without any real local authority;
every decision had to be approved by Moscow. Tsar Peter began
by decentralizing the government. Peter divided Russia into 50
provinces, granting authority to local governments while moderating the vast responsibilities of the central government in
Russia. Though this proved a failure, as the local governments
could not handle the responsibility Peter had required of them,
it still proved a step in advancing the administration of Russia.38
The parliamentary system of Russia was also in desperate need of
reform. The feudal Zemsky Sobor had been in place during the 16th
and 17th century and could be called into session by the tsar, the
patriarch, or the boyar duma. Ivan the Terrible had summoned
the council in 1549; the same council, including peasants, had appointed Mikhail Romanov tsar in 1613.39 However, Peter silenced
the dying institution and replaced it with a nine-man senate that
80
Preeti Varathan
oversaw the monetary and judicial affairs of the country. He later
relieved the senate of its administrative burden by creating a system
of colleges that assumed many of the responsibilities previously
granted to government bureaus.40
Although believing all of Peter’s reforms were targeted
towards improving the military is in many ways a too-hasty assumption, there were definitely many that were fueled by his military
ambitions. The senate he created in 1711 dealt largely with two
main issues: how to raise money for the military and how to raise
men for the military. In fact, the dividing of Russia into the gubernia and the smaller provintsia, was motivated by the need to
decentralize the government and facilitate administration while
Peter was absent (usually during military campaigns). In addition,
Peter eradicated the incompetent and corrupt method of drafting
peasants; instead, he sent government officials to the rural areas
in Russia and directly enlisted the peasants. Beginning in 1700,
Peter assigned Tikhon Streshnev to Moscow, Michael Golitsin to
Ukraine, Matthew Gagarin to Siberia, and others in an attempt
to raise money, men, and materials.41 Peter’s revenue system was
also strongly targeted toward military expenditure. Peter would
passionately declare, in a meeting to the Senate, that “money is
the arteries of war.”42 In fact, simply examining the total revenues
annually and the war expenditures of the same year lead to one
obvious conclusion: Peter raised revenue for his military. In 1701,
Russia raised 3 million rubles, and spent 2.27 million on warfare.
In 1710, the government raised 3.3 million rubles, and spent
3.158 rubles on military expenses. A similar pattern continued
throughout Peter’s reign. Peter also recklessly debased the ruble
in an attempt to fuel his military ambitions; hence the value of
the ruble depreciated rapidly while he was in power. In addition,
Peter revisited traditional mercantilist policies by enforcing the
Commercial Code of 1667, which forbade exporting precious
metals and hoped to attract a vast amount of bullion to Russia.
Thus, military campaigns fueled both Peter’s economic and political policies.43 This also reveals an important truth about Peter’s
reforms: though many attempted to modernize and ape the
policies of the West, not all were progressive. His adherence to
THE CONCORD REVIEW
81
mercantilist policies would later prove a mistake and other tsars
would be forced to rectify this. Though mercantilist-capitalism was
the major economic policy of most western nations at the time,
towards the end of the century it would be seen as inefficient
and counterproductive. Adam Smith, in Wealth of Nations would
put forth a new economic theory based on the principles of free
trade and open markets. Catherine the Great, Alexander I, and
the successive Russian monarchs would be forced to deal with
these economic changes and eventually rectify their own trading
policies.44
Peter’s reforms reached the civilian population as well.
In 1705, Peter brought the first newspaper to Russia, hoping the
Russian population would be more aware of affairs outside of
their country. He was also notoriously known for chopping off the
beards of the Boyars, much to the chagrin of the Old Believers
(Russian traditionalists). Not only was Peter demanding a more
western appearance, but he was also insulting a time-honored
belief. The Old Believers considered man as shaped by the form
of God, and therefore believed mutilating man’s form was mutilating God’s creation. Peter extended this outlook while reforming
the church as well. In fact, what had so blatantly failed during
the Babylonian Captivity and later in the Catholic Counter Reformation was forcefully implemented in Russia. With the death
of Patriarch Hadrian in 1700, Peter the Great chose to ignore his
responsibility and neglected to appoint a patriarch for the next
21 years. Then in 1721, he created an easy alternative, the Holy
Synod, a council of 10 clerics under the leadership of a layman.
They assumed the responsibilities of the patriarch, but the church
was now completely subservient to the power of the Tsar.45
Peter the Great changed the face of Russia. Reform reached
all spheres, sometimes to the irritation and disappointment of the
conventional classes. Russia’s modernization and reform helped
her enter an age of prosperity both economically and politically;
yet, many deep-rooted traditions were lost.
Above all, Peter the Great restructured the face of Russia.
More noteworthy leaders would follow; Catherine the Great would
82
Preeti Varathan
bring many of the Enlightenment ideals to Russia and Alexander
II, the “Great Liberator,” would free Russia from an institution that
had plagued her economy and restricted equality: serfdom. Yet what
is truly remarkable about the reign of Peter the Great is the extent
to which he transformed Russia’s position on the international
scene. Russia became a formidable power in the Eurasian basin.
Russia’s entry in European politics was firmly established; never
again did any major alliance exclude Russia. Under Catherine,
Russia would acquire the long-sought Black Sea ports from the
Ottoman Empire. Under Alexander I, Russia asserted her international authority through the Holy Alliance. After the Russian
Revolution, the Communist presence in Russia only seemed to
strengthen the nation; Stalin proved a skillful and manipulative
[killer and] politician.46 Decidedly, Peter initiated the succession
of these events and began a legacy that to date remains historic.
Modern empires were finally beginning to rise from the ashes of
weak city-states and tyrannical absolutist regimes; Russia was no
exception.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
R.R. Palmer and Joel G. Colton, “The Transformation of
Eastern Europe, 1648-1740,” A History of the Modern World
9th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971) pp. 188-220
2
Ibid., p. 201
3
“Ivan the Terrible: Middle Ages,” Middle-Ages—Medieval
Resources GNU (16 May 2010) <http://www.themiddleages.
net/people/ivan_the_terrible.html.
4
Peter Schnall, Don Campbell, Mark Fason, and Molly
McKinley, “Icons of Power,” Icons of Power: Peter the Great
History Channel, Singapore, Singapore, television
5
Henri Troyat, Peter the Great (New York: Dutton, 1987)
p. 6
6
Lindsey Hughes, “Peter the Great | Recensiebank
Historisch Huis” (Yale University Press, 21 November 2009)
<http://historischhuis.nl/recensiebank/review/show/89>
7
Schnall
8
Hughes
9
Schnall
10
Don Campbell, Dir., “Peter the Great: The Tyrant
Reformer,” Russia: Land of the Tsars The History Channel
11
Douglas Liversidge, Peter the Great, the Reformer-tsar
(New York: F. Watts, 1968) p. 20
12
James H. Robinson, “Peter the Great and the Rise of
Russia, 1682-1725,” Modern History Sourcebook Web, 29
October 2009, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/
petergreat.html#Von%20Korb>
13
Ibid.
14
Jerry Bentley and Herbert Ziegler, Traditions &
Encounters, A Global Perspective on the Past (New York:
McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2007)
p. 645
15
Palmer, p. 173
16
Ibid., p. 167
17
Bentley and Ziegler, p. 60
18
Schnall
19
Ibid.
20
“Ivan the Terrible: Middle Ages”
21
Campbell
22
Ibid.
23
Bentley and Ziegler, p. 319
24
“Imperial Expansion, Russia,” Europe, 1450 to 1789: An
Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World Jonathan Dewald, ed.,
6 vols. (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004) reproduced in History
1
83
84
Preeti Varathan
Resource Center (Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale) <http://
galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/History/>
25
Bentley, p. 470
26
Ibid., p. 465
27
Ibid., p. 763
28
Campbell
29
“Peter the Great Issues Reforms, 1689-1725,” DISCovering
World History Online Edition, Gale 2003, reproduced in
History Resource Center (Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale)
29 October 2009 <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/
History/>
30
Troyat, p. 153
31
“Battle of Narva, November 20, 1700,” DISCovering
World History Online Edition, Gale 2003, reproduced in
History Resource Center
32
Schnall
33
“Great Northern War,” Encyclopedia of Russian History
James R. Millar, ed., 4 vols. (Macmillan Reference USA, 2004)
reproduced in History Resource Center (Farmington Hills,
Michigan: Gale) <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/
History/>
34
“Peter I,” Encyclopedia of World Biography 2nd ed., 17
vols. Gale Research, 1998, reproduced in Biography Resource
Center (Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale, 2009) 29 October
2009 <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/BioRC>
35
Robert Wallace and Time-Life Books, Rise of Russia (New
York: Time-Life Books, 1967) Print, p. 160
36
Troyat
37
Wallace and Time-Life Books, Print, p. 81
38
Ibid., p. 161
39
J.L. Keep, “The Decline of the Zemsky Sobor,” The
Slavonic and East European Review 36 (1957) pp. 100-122, Jstor
16 May 2010 <http://www.jstor.org/pss/4204909>
40
Wallace, p. 161
41
Lawrence J. Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969) Print, p. 81
42
Ibid., p. 81
43
Ibid., p. 91
44
Palmer
45
Wallace, p. 161
46
Geoffrey A. Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 15521917 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1977) Print
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Annotated Bibliography
“Battle of Narva, November 20, 1700,” DISCovering World
History Online Edition, Gale 2003, reproduced in History
Resource Center, Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, <http://galenet.
galegroup.com/servlet/History/>
This article offered a concise description of the Battle of
Narva, one of the most important battles in the Great Northern
War. I utilized the source in my description and analysis of the
Great Northern War.
Bentley, Jerry, and Herbert Ziegler, Traditions &
Encounters, A Global Perspective on the Past New York:
McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2007
Traditions & Encounters is a basic overview of the history
of the world at large. Though I only consulted it for a basic
summary of Peter’s major accomplishments, it helped to crossreference other more detailed and specialized sources. In
addition, this contained several primary sources.
Campbell, Don, Dir., “Peter the Great: The Tyrant
Reformer,” Russia: Land of the Tsars The History Channel
This documentary was an invaluable source because of its
extensive discussion of Peter’s early years. The oppression,
turmoil, and distress Peter was forced to face as a young child
helped to shape the first section of my paper.
Evans, Lawton B., “Heritage History Putting the ‘Story’ back
into History,” Heritage History 21 November 2009, http://www.
heritage-history.com/www/heritage.php?Dir=books&Menulte
m=display&author=evans&book=oldtime&story=peter>
There was an abundance of anecdotal evidence in this
resource. Lawton cited stories, tales, and anecdotes from the
time in order to describe the personality of Peter the Great. It
was also especially helpful in detailing Peter’s unique love for
the sea.
“Great Northern War,” Encyclopedia of Russian History
James R. Millar, ed., 4 vols., Macmillan Reference USA, 2004,
reproduced in History Resource Center, Farmington Hills,
Michigan: Gale, <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/
History/>
85
86
Preeti Varathan
This resource contributed to my description and analysis
of the Great Northern War. Not only does it illustrate the
influences of Russia’s military reforms on the course of the war,
but it also gives a balanced viewpoint of the war from both the
perspectives of Russia and Sweden.
Habberton, William, Russia: the Story of a Nation Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965
This is a comprehensive and extensive history of Russia.
Along with the other general histories of Russia, I used the text
to cross-reference more specific studies on Peter the Great.
Hosking, Geoffrey A., Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977
Yet another history of Russia, this text begins in the
years prior to Peter the Great and ends before the Russian
Revolution. This text was significant in that it gave an overview
of Peter’s reforms in context with the rest of modern Russian
history; hence, it helped me in my conclusion.
Hughes, Lindsey, “Peter the Great | Recensiebank Historisch
Huis” Yale University Press, 21 November 2009, <http://
historischhuis.nl/recensiebank/review/show/89>
Lindsey Hughes is a famous Russian historian; her specialty
is Peter the Great. I used this source to cross-reference the
evaluations and conclusions other historians have made on
Peter’s reforms as well as derived information about Peter’s
anti-religious policy.
“Illustrated History of St. Petersburg, Russia,” SaintPetersburg.com—travel and event guide for St. Petersburg,
Russia 21 November 2009, <http://www.saint-petersburg.com/
history/index.asp>
This website gives an extensive, chapter by chapter history
of St. Petersburg. I used this source to support the majority
of my descriptions and evaluations of Peter’s reforms (St.
Petersburg) and its influence on the rest of Russia.
“Imperial Expansion, Russia,” Europe, 1450 to 1789: An
Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World Jonathan Dewald, ed.,
6 vols., Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004, reproduced in History
Resource Center, Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale, <http://
galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/History/>
THE CONCORD REVIEW
This text analyzes the importance of expansion in Peter the
Great’s agenda. It significantly contributed to the introduction
of my section on reforms in Russia while offering a concise
explanation on the basic motivations for expansion.
“Ivan the Terrible: Middle Ages,” Middle-Ages—Medieval
Resources GNU, 16 May 2010, <http://www.themiddleages.
net/people/ivan_the_terrible.html.
“Ivan the Terrible: Middle Ages” focuses on Russia under
the rule of Ivan the Terrible, particularly his cruelty and
brutality. It gives a detailed description of the events that lead
to and followed the death of Ivan’s son.
Keep, J.L., “The Decline of the Zemsky Sobor,” The Slavonic
and East European Review 36, 1957, pp. 100-122, Jstor 16 May
2010, <http://www.jstor.org/pss/4204909>
“The Decline of Zemsky Sobor” discusses the end of the
medieval political institutions in Russia, particularly the Zemsky
Sobor. The resource proved useful in discussing Peter’s political
reforms in historical context.
Lamb, Harold, The City and the Tsar—Peter the Great
and the Move to the West 1648-1762 1st ed., Garden City: the
Country Life P, 1948
This text gives an overview of Peter’s westernization policy
and his reforms. I used it to cross-reference other texts and reenforce the general influence of Peter’s policy on the Russian
policy. I also used Lamb’s conclusions about St. Petersburg in
my description of the city.
Liversidge, Douglas, Peter the Great, the Reformer-tsar New
York: F. Watts, 1968
This was one of my most important resources. A novel and
a general overview of the life, military campaigns, and the
reforms of the tsar, the text offers a detailed look at all aspects
of Peter’s life. I used it particularly to discuss the brutal manner
in which Peter confronted any opposition.
Oliva, Lawrence J., Russia in the Era of Peter the Great
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969, Print
This was an invaluable source that extensively discussed
Peter’s reforms. I used it to distinguish the extent to which
Peter’s reforms were focused on military improvements as well
87
88
Preeti Varathan
as to confirm the complex and specific terms for the branches
of Peter’s bureaucracy. This text provided statistics on tax
revenues and finances directed toward military spending as
well.
Orthodox Russia: Belief and Practice Under the Tsars New
York: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003
The Orthodox Church is the focus of this text. Though I
never directly used it as a resource in my paper, it helped me
gauge a sense of the changing influences of the church due
to Peter the Great’s rule. It contributed to my research of the
Russian Orthodox Church as well.
Palmer, R.R., and Joel G. Colton, “The Transformation of
Eastern Europe, 1648-1740,” A History of the Modern World
9th ed., New York: Knopf, 1971, pp. 188-220
This text was one of my greatest resources on the decline of
the three empires in Eastern Europe prior to the era of Peter
the Great. The substance of my introduction (facts, analysis,
conclusions) comes from this text. Though this chapter is taken
from a complete textbook on the modern world, aside from the
decline of the three empires, information on Peter the Great
and Louis XIV was not valuable for this paper.
“Peter I,” Encyclopedia of World Biography 2nd ed., 17
vols., Gale Research, 1998, reproduced in Biography Resource
Center Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale, 2009, 29 October
2009, <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/BioRC>
Though this is a comprehensive summary of Peter the
Great’s life, I primarily used it to discuss and analyze the impact
of Peter’s military reforms on the course of the Great Northern
War.
Peter the Great,” Historic World Leaders Gale Research,
1994, reproduced in Biography Resource Center Farmington
Hills, MI: Gale, 2009, 29 October 2009, <http://galenet.
galegroup.com/servlet/BioRC>
This article offered a basic biography on Peter the Great
and helped in preliminary research. It was also used to crossreference other resources.
“Peter the Great,” NNDB: Tracking the Entire World
Web, 30 November 2009, <http://www.nndb.com/
people/599/000078365/>
THE CONCORD REVIEW
This article discussed Peter’s expansionist tendencies and
his later reform. Though I did not specifically use this as a
resource, it helped during my preliminary research and some
of the general reforms I allude to can be credited, in part, to
this article.
“Peter the Great Issues Reforms, 1689-1725,” DISCovering
World History Online Edition, Gale 2003, reproduced in
History Resource Center, Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale,
29 October 2009, <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/
History/>
This article outlined Peter’s basic reforms and gave a
general overview on Peter’s westernizing influences on Russia.
Again, this text was mostly used for cross-referencing the
information in other texts regarding Peter’s reform; it also
proved a useful text for preliminary research.
Riasanovsky, Nicholas V., A History of Russia New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984, Print
Though A History of Russia is not specifically about Russia
under Peter the Great, it, like the other full-length histories of
Russia, allowed me to cross-reference more specific sources.
Robinson, James H., “Peter the Great and the Rise of Russia,
1682-1725,” Modern History Sourcebook Web, 29 October
2009, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/petergreat.
html#Von%20Korb>
This was an invaluable source. Robinson has carefully
accumulated many primary sources from people of varying
classes that discussed Peter’s rule and detailed their
experiences under his reform program.
“Russia,” Europe, 1450 to 1789: An Encyclopedia of the
Early Modern World Jonathan Dewald, ed., 6 vols., Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 2004, reproduced in History Resource Center,
Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale, <http://galenet.galegroup.
com/servlet/History/>
This text only briefly discussed Peter’s rule of Russia;
however, it was useful for preliminary research.
Schnall, Peter, Don Campbell, Mark Fason, and Molly
McKinley, “Icons of Power,” Icons of Power: Peter the Great
History Channel, Singapore, Singapore, television
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Preeti Varathan
Icons of Power: Peter the Great was a valuable source
because of its extensive analysis of Peter and Alexis’
relationship as well as the specific details it offered about the
Great Northern War. Furthermore, it also discussed Peter’s
struggles with the Streltsi at great length.
Troyat, Henri, Peter the Great New York: Dutton, 1987
This is another book dedicated to analyzing the life
and reign of Peter the Great. It proved most valuable in its
description of Peter’s birth and his earlier years of facing
tremendous opposition.
Wallace, Robert, and Time-Life Books, Rise of Russia New
York: Time-Life Books, 1967
Though this source only focused on a chosen few of Peter’s
reforms, the detail to which these reforms were discussed was
valuable. This was also used to cross-reference other resources.
Copyright 2011, THE
The Concord
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Inc., all rights reserved 91
CONCORD
REVIEW
DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE HEADSCARF:
CONTROVERSIES IN TURKEY AND FRANCE
Fatima Hosain
T
he recent headscarf controversy within Turkey and
France has produced outbursts from people all over the world.
Some support the ban that the two nations have put in place which
forbids veiled girls and women, increasingly seen as symbols of
radical political Islamism, from entering public schools. Others
are angry and perceive that the rights of these women are being
restricted. Although Turkey and France are enforcing these bans
for different reasons, both countries are inadvertently exposing the contradictions within their particular interpretations of
secularism. France is upholding this ban in the name of laicité, a
deeply-rooted and fundamentally French idea that there should
be complete and utter separation of Church and State so that no
person is oppressed or pressured by religion.1 Turkey is in support
of this ban in order to maintain this same separation of religion
from the public sphere (laiklik), and also to show the rest of the
world, particularly the European Union, that it is willing to let go
of its Ottoman religious history in an effort to appear “modern.”
The headscarf controversy is, on a fundamental level, a
matter of identity politics. The issue lies in the conflicting alleFatima Hosain is a Senior at the Poughkeepsie Day School in Poughkeepsie,
New York, where she wrote this Junior Thesis for Ms. Karen Nichols in
the 2009/2010 academic year.
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Fatima Hosain
giances that veiled women must deal with. When they wear the
hijab their first allegiance is spiritual, that is, what they believe
their religion asks them to do. This is very much an individual
allegiance as it is primarily between the woman in question and
her personal relationship with God. Unfortunately, countries
like Turkey and France believe that everyone’s first allegiances
should be to the state as a form of national identity. The latter,
more modern view very clearly clashes with the former. The issue
then becomes a matter of choosing between religion and state,
two things that should instead work in tandem with each other.
In such a potentially contentious setup, it is no wonder that veiled
women have been inadvertently drawn into such a controversy.
These dual tendencies of maintaining spiritual foundation and
still keeping national pride have created numerous problems, not
only in regards to the headscarf controversy, but with religion in
general. If they ever hope to resolve this issue, nations must learn
to work hand in hand with religion rather than force their citizens
to choose between the two.
The ironic thing about both France and Turkey is that the
principle of secularism was put in place to protect people from
having certain beliefs imposed against their will. By forcing women
to take off their hijab in certain public contexts, thus prohibiting
Muslims from practicing their religion freely at all times, the idea
of freedom becomes lost. The governments are, in effect, pushing
their views of secularism onto people. Disregarding this point, the
veil by itself has come under scrutiny as a result of the ban. Feminists on both sides of the matter are laying out their arguments
for whether or not the headscarf has a place in today’s modern
society. Some say that the veil is an oppressive object while others
cite it as an important form of identity for Muslim women in the
Western world. Still others believe that the veil has specific political connotations that could be potentially dangerous for the host
nations. Clearly the issue is not black and white, as there are many
layers to the headscarf controversy: cultural, personal, political.
Because this topic of the veil is so very important to women all over
the world, the way that France and Turkey handle this controversy
will affect how many other nations view Muslims and Islam and
will have significant effects on subsequent generations.
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The recent veil controversy has drawn attention to the
inherent ironies within both France and Turkey’s secular positions. Both secular nations are misguided in their use of French
laicité and the Turkish laiklik to prohibit the headscarf in schools
and public institutions. Neither nation is living up to its secular
ideas in making sure that no person has religion unfairly pushed
upon them when they create laws prohibiting Muslim women from
practicing their religion freely at all times, which is necessary to
be a Muslim; this in essence pushes secularism onto veiled Muslim
women. The practice of banning expressions of faith in the public
sphere is problematic on many levels, as this paper will argue. A
discussion of the practice of veiling (hijab) followed by a review
of how the controversy is shaping up in both France and Turkey
will reveal specific problems with the ban, and will also suggest
that many unintended side-effects may result that ultimately undermine the professed secularism of the state as well as the rights
of the individual to fully practice her faith.
HIJAB: An Islamic Tradition
The veil that covers parts of the body of a Muslim woman,
or hijab by itself does not seem to be such a controversial thing.
Hijab at its most basic level consists of a scarf worn to cover the
head and neck.2 Some people include loose clothing or modest
dress as part of the hijab, but in its simplest form, it is just a piece
of square cloth. One may ask how something so plain could cause
so much argument and debate all over the world. Coinciding with
the rise of radical Islam in the 1970s, the hijab became imbued
with particular political connotations. Since the horrific events
of September 11, 2001, and the media coverage that occurred
afterwards, many people in the West, including political leaders
like Bill Clinton, George Bush Sr., and George W. Bush, began
to regard Islam in a new light. Women wearing headscarves and
men with religious beards are now viewed by some people with
contempt or distrust. The stories of jihadist terrorists and suicide
bombers appear in the news with some frequency. Some Muslims
living in the West have been ostracized, driven from their homes,
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or threatened by strangers; many don’t have the chance to defend
themselves or their religion. Some people are scared of Muslims
and consequently many do not try to learn about the true Islam;
instead they rely on the media for stories about Islamic life and
culture (many of which are biased or incomplete).3 The hijab has
become the main symbol of Islam, partly because it is such a visible and every day part of many Muslim women’s lives. The image
of the headscarf is one that draws up deeply-rooted suspicions of
misogyny in Islam. Many traditional Western feminists are explicit
about their views on the hijab: that it is demeaning to women and
naturally forces them to be seen as inferior to men.4 They also
believe that many veiled women cover themselves because they are
forced to by their families or husbands and that hijab oppresses
otherwise “liberated” women from living their lives with complete
physical and sexual freedom. These sorts of views about hijab are
common; many Westerners, and for that matter “modern” Muslims, simply cannot understand why a woman would want to cover
her hair in a time of plastic surgery, explicit music videos, and a
rapidly expanding and successful fashion industry.
Conversely, many other (mostly Muslim) feminists view
the hijab as a tool used to empower women in a male-dominated
society.5 Covered women want to be known and respected because
of their intellect and other capabilities, not simply because of their
physical beauty. The hijab diverts the (lustful) gaze of men and
allows women more freedom and control in professional environments.6 The hijab is also a symbol of identity for many women,
particularly those in countries with secular or Western influences.7
Veiling oneself is a reminder of one’s roots and culture perhaps
in defiance of a country’s call for “modernism” and “Westernism,”
two terms that are increasingly being linked together by governments all over the world as synonyms for progress.
Disregarding the views of other people about hijab, the most
important aspect of the veil for believing women is the religious
foundation for the practice. Contrary to popular opinion, the hijab
is not actually purely Islamic. Like many other Islamic practices,
for example, prohibition of swine, it has its roots in the ancient
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Judeo-Christian tradition,8 the remnants of which can be seen in
the coverings of nuns. The Quran does not explicitly command all
women to cover their heads and bodies, but there is one passage
in particular that many scholars raise in support of hijab: “And
tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and
to display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and
to draw their veils over their bosoms...”9 (24:31). Although some
people say that “that which is apparent” refers only to a woman’s
hands and face, for many others the interpretation of this passage
is very liberal. Instead, evidence for the importance and obligation of hijab is usually taken from various hadith, sayings of the
prophet Muhammad (SAW) as documented by his companions.
One of the most important is taken straight from the wife of the
Prophet, Ayesha:
Ayesha (rad.i-Allahu `anha) reported that Asma’ the daughter of Abu
Bakr (rad.i-Allahu `anhu) came to the Messenger of Allah while wearing thin clothing. He approached her and said: ‘O Asma’! When a
girl reaches the menstrual age, it is not proper that anything should
remain exposed except this and this. He pointed to the face and
hands. [Abu Dawud].10
Covering during the early Islamic period (around 650 CE)
was of different importance than it is today. Back then only women
of stature (i.e., not slaves or prostitutes) were allowed to cover. It
was a sign of good breeding, sufficient money, power, and familial
status for a woman to have the ability to veil herself. Pre-Islamic
Arabia was filled with widespread corruption and extreme oppression of women. In most places, they were treated merely as sexual
objects who could own no property, were not allowed to initiate
divorce, were the victims of female infanticide, and were forced to
obey all the wishes of their husbands and fathers, including those
regarding marriage and family life.11 Islam was seen by many as the
liberator of women; it demanded independent funds for married
women, rights in divorce, an end to female infanticide, explicit
permission from the woman before her marriage, considerably
more freedom in the household (particularly in the upbringing
of children), and honor and respect for all women, particularly
mothers.12 This honor and respect was further improved by the
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wearing of the veil, behind which women had the freedom to
move through social and professional circles of society without
being seen as sexually promiscuous.
Although many now chastise Islam for its seemingly oppressive and limiting attitudes towards women in the professional
setting, in truth, all women (and men) are encouraged to obtain a
proper education and be successful in all aspects of life. Khadija,
the Prophet’s own wife, was a very prosperous businesswoman who
proposed marriage to the Prophet although he was her inferior
in age and station. In short, although Islam strongly encourages
the wearing of the hijab, it is not at all meant as a means to restrict
women; it is quite the opposite, in fact. The topic of hijab is more
complex than many people realize.
Clearly there are many aspects to the headscarf controversy
present in France and Turkey: there are the political connotations
(whether correct or not) commonly associated with the veil, the
differing feminist views on the meaning and symbolism of the hijab,
the sense of personal identity hijab brings that appeals to many
women, and the religious perspective of Islam on the matter. This
all shows that the solution is not obvious; there is no clear right
and wrong answer.
On the political scale, it is perhaps understandable why
France and Turkey are so adamant about the ban of the headscarf
in public institutions. Both have deeply-rooted beliefs of secularism
in their nation’s histories—laicité in France and laiklik in Turkey.
The complete and utter separation of religion and government
is part of each one’s particular identity. The two cases are also
very different however; France, because of its immense power
and influence, is being watched very closely to see what it will do
next and the effect it will have on other nations. Tacit and overt
accusations of xenophobia and racism being launched against
the government are not exactly without ground; recently there
have been riots and unrest among the French people regarding
anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic sentiments. The headscarf ban
has been supported by the majority of the French (most of whom
are self-described as secular13), so it is not as much of an internal
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issue as it is an external one; there has been international concern
and media coverage of the issue that has called into question the
ethics of the ban in the modern day. Turkey, on the other hand, is
dealing with this ban primarily as an internal problem (although
it has implications for Turkey’s international standings). The
government is meeting constant resistance from Turkish women
trying to wear the headscarf in defiance of the ban. Turkey has the
added complication of being majority Muslim (99.8 percent14).
Although the government considers itself to be completely secular
(going further than France and extending the ban to even private
universities), the people, for the most part, consider themselves
practicing Muslims.15 As much as the government tries to “modernize” in an effort to join the European Union (not yet successfully)
many of the people continue to try to hold onto their culture and
religion. The situation in Turkey is fascinating because of this
intense power struggle between the government and some of the
people, as neither side can gain an advantage over the other. In
some ways hijab has become a political symbol here as well, not
as a reference to radical Islamism perhaps, but as a way of speaking out against the government as it puts in place new laws and
practices—much like the Iranian Revolution of 1979. This scares
officials very much; if Turkey is faced with an Islamic revolution like
that in Iran, it will never be seen as a modern state and will most
definitely not be accepted into the European Union. If, however,
Turkey’s government, using secular practices such as banning the
headscarf, manages to keep the Islamist radicals in check, there is
hope for Turkey to one day, in the near future, join with the likes
of France and Germany as part of the E.U. The push for secularism in many of the European nations, most notably France, could
very well be something Turkish secular political parties are eager
to emulate.
SECULARISM: Passive vs. Aggressive
There are two types of secularism present in today’s society: passive and aggressive. The United States, for instance, is
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known as passively secular in that it does not play an active role in
completely separating religion from the public sphere. Instead of
banning all types of religious expression, it instead allows equal
representation of all faiths. The reason that France and Turkey
are going through this headscarf controversy is that they have
adopted a system based on aggressive secularism. This means that
the governments play a key role in making sure that all forms of
religious expression are kept solely in the private sector and do
not translate to the public sphere. Because passive and aggressive secularism are opposing philosophies, it is difficult for many
Americans and other Westerners to understand the motives nations like France and Turkey have for eliminating “ostentatious”
religious symbols, like the headscarf, from the public realm. To
truly get to the root of the schism between these opposing schools
of thought, it is necessary to examine the history and influence
of the nations involved: America, France, and Turkey. However,
before launching into their respective cases, it is first necessary to
understand the ways in which the idea of “modernism,” in many
ways so closely related to secularism, has helped mold each of
these countries into the states they are today.
As the West begins to expand its influence across the globe,
secular laws and practices, which are very modern Western ideals,
have started to become almost universal symbols for progress.
There is an increasing amount of anti-traditionalist tendencies
in many nations that hope to become more Westernized and,
subsequently, successful both economically and politically. With
these anti-traditionalist sentiments comes a push for science-based,
secular societies free of “backwards” religious thought.16 In Europe,
this phenomenon began as early as the 16th century when radical
thinkers began to appreciate the importance of humanism/individualism when faced with oppressive religious laws and figures.
As more and more people started to think independently of the
Church in Europe they began to view the world in an entirely
new light. The revival of secular humanism from Ancient Greece
during the Renaissance carried over to the influential Enlightenment period. No longer being told what to think, scientists and
philosophers discovered and created new theories markedly dif-
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ferent from those explicitly given in Biblical text. This led to an
onslaught of new ideas and inventions that transformed life in
Europe (for better or worse) as it moved into the 19th and 20th
centuries. This ongoing promotion of ideas is deemed “progress”
and almost all countries wish to take part in it.
The Truman Doctrine in the post World War II era initiated this idea of modernism and democracy in the developing
world. After the imperial era and the two World Wars, the U.S. was
clearly viewed as one of the two new superpowers—the other being
the Soviet Union. Truman’s promotion of capitalism and democracy was carried out through economic development programs,
which proliferated through agents such as USAID and multiple
United Nations agencies.17 Their success was at times impeded
by the seeming “backwardness” of many of the less developed
societies, including those that were religious and that appeared
intent to preserve religious customs that did not work well with
liberal capitalism, thus emerged seemingly dual worlds—one
a “traditional religious” sphere and the other a sophisticated,
secular, and increasingly modern U.S. and Europe. This is one of
the reasons why many “modern,” Westernized nations are either
secular or wish to be thought so. France and Turkey, of course,
have deeper secular roots based on the conditions of the births
of these republics, but they reassert themselves as secular in this
climate of dualities. These two countries are very proud of their
historically secular views and wholeheartedly defend their policy
on banning religious expression (hijab) in public schools.
An interesting irony regarding the seemingly relentless
importance placed on modernism is the method by which the
West hopes to combat the classic traditionally backwards society:
education. Reminiscent of colonial Africa, Western countries hope
to “civilize” their developing neighbors by promoting education
and modernism in schools. With this headscarf controversy that
bans veiled women from attending public schools, thus limiting access to education, France is, in essence, going against this
“modernizing” objective.18 Raja El Habti also points out that if
France wants to fight off the threat of radical Islamism, forcing
veiled girls to drop out of school and become easy targets for these
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types of groups is certainly a paradox within itself.19 France (and
the rest of Europe) is perhaps unaware of the more complicated
consequences that its strict, aggressive interpretation of secularism
creates.
For many nations, such as the United States, which is used
to pluralism, also known as “passive secularism,” where the government is completely “passive” or neutral towards religion,20 the
idea that the government would ban religious expression seems
absurd. Pluralism is the concept of allowing multiple religions to
coexist in the same spheres so that no one ideology dominates.
Yet all peoples are able to practice their own faith without fear of
persecution.
Ideally, (from an inter-faith global perspective) pluralism implies
that all religions can exist in a tolerant, harmonious way. But practically, it means that all religions must conform to a planned universal
standard, so that any one set of doctrines or values no longer offends
those who follow other gods.21
France and Turkey, however, do not promote this passive secularism;
rather, they support a more rigid form called assertive. or aggressive, secularism, in which “the state favors a secular worldview and
aims to exclude religion from the public sphere. The state plays
an assertive role as the agent of a social engineering project that
confines religion to the private domain.”22 In other words, the selfprofessed secular government has the right to interfere if it feels
that religion is becoming too influential in the public realm. The
term “self-professed” is key; both Turkey and France explicitly state
within their constitutions that their states are “secular”: “France
shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic”23
and “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social
State.”24 Neither clause specifies just how much the State is able
to interfere regarding religious expression, but the writers’ intentions are markedly different than say, those of the United States
Constitution, which states in the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...”25 Nowhere
does it mention state secularity and, if anything, this amendment
clearly appears to restrict the State’s power in matters regarding
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religion by declaring religious expression to be an unalienable
right of the people as stated in the Bill of Rights.
Conversely, France and Turkey’s constitutions seem to
expand their governments’ influence upon their own peoples by
not indentifying religious expression as a right. By wielding the
aforementioned clauses the two nations can crack down on all
forms of religion in the public spheres by declaring them to be
not secular and, thus, unconstitutional. Legally, they may be justified, but not everyone agrees that the laws are in fact just. Many
other countries including, for obvious reasons, the United States,
believe that religion is a right that should be granted to all people
as part of international law, and that the term “secular” should
be more loosely applied depending on the context.26 President
Barack Obama gave a speech at Cairo in 2009 in which he stated:
[T]he U.S. government has gone to court to protect the right of
women and girls to wear the hijab, and to punish those who would
deny it. […] [I]t is important for Western countries to avoid impeding
Muslim citizens from practicing religion as they see fit—for instance,
by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear. We cannot
disguise hostility towards any religion behind the pretence of liberalism. […] I reject the view of some in the West that a woman who
chooses to cover her hair is somehow less equal.27
Although obviously not speaking for all Americans, President
Obama’s thoughts on the subject of hijab certainly carry weight
both in international and federal affairs. In this case, he was referring to mostly France, not Turkey, which as of 2010 was considered
by many to be neither “Eastern” nor “Western,” but rather somewhat of a crossroads between Europe and Asia. Obama may also
have been questioning the right of assertive secularist countries
to “impede Muslim citizens from practicing religion as they see
fit...”28 in comparison to the U.S.’s passive secularism.
There does seem to be a certain hypocrisy within aggressive
secularism that is highly unsettling for some people. According
to Ahmet Kuru, France and Turkey consider “secularism itself as
an established doctrine to be promoted.”29 If secularism can be
considered an ideology, then it is perhaps hypocritical of France
and Turkey to promote it so vehemently; neither nation is living up
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to their secular ideals in making sure that no person has religion
unfairly pushed upon them when they create laws prohibiting
Muslim women from practicing their religion freely—in essence
pushing their views of secularism onto them. Although in theory
assertive secularism is meant to protect minorities so that no one
religion may dominate in the public realm, the real issue is that
nowadays the idealistic principles of laicité have been distorted and
exceptions to the rule have been made regarding other religious
expressions (such as the Jewish yarmulke and the Christian cross)
that suggest an underlying bias against Muslims. Pluralistic nations would not have these sorts of problems because of the more
liberal nature of their philosophy, but assertive secularism is very
overprotective in its mindset: no one ideology may dominate in the
public realm. Paradoxical? Perhaps, but the reasons for Turkey’s
and France’s strict interpretations lie in their individual histories.
TURKEY: A Nation Divided
Turkey has a rich history from which its particular views
on secularism arise. For many centuries prior to the early 1900s,
the region now known as Turkey was at the heart of the Ottoman Empire, which spread Islam across the region. After being
thoroughly crushed in World War I, the Ottoman Empire was
forced to give up Anatolia to the victorious Allied Powers, who
were eager to divide it up in accordance with the 1920 Treaty of
Sevres. Naturally, the Turkish people were quite unhappy with
this arrangement, and the Turkish War of Independence began
under the leadership of former military general Mustafa Kemal.
Kemal, also known as Ataturk, father of Turkey, led the Turkish
people to victory against the Greeks, who were the “occupiers”
they found the most offensive, and on November 1, 1922, the new
parliament formally replaced the Sultanate after more than 600
years of Ottoman rule.
Kemal became the Republic of Turkey’s first president,
and set about creating radical changes in government and politics.
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After growing up learning about the West and its many accomplishments, Kemal had begun to associate modernism (progress) with
Western secularist ideals. His own philosophy, Kemalism, was based
around six key “arrows”: republicanism, nationalism, populism,
reformism, statism, and secularism, all of which were fundamentally influenced by Western thought.30 Over the next few decades
Ataturk’s reforms pushed Turkey towards a more Westernized
mindset with the closure of Islamic courts, replacement of Sharia
(Islamic) law with secular civil code, the granting of full political
rights to women, and the general secularization of the Turkish
government. On April 10, 1928, the state was officially declared
secular and the clause in the Turkish Constitution that cited Islam
as the official state religion was eliminated. Ataturk was very eager
to appeal to his Western counterparts and encouraged his people
to act, dress, and talk like them by instituting laws that prohibited
the wearing of the fez (traditional Turkish hat) and creating a
whole new Turkish language based on the Latin alphabet rather
than the Arabic.31 “The Turkish style of secularism called laiklik,
is based on the French laicité. Laiklik demands the exclusion of
religious symbols from the public sphere.32 Secularism became
an essential part of many people’s notions of Turkey, particularly
those holding government positions.
The Turkish headscarf controversy first began in the 1980s
when there was a significant increase in the number of women
wearing the headscarf in Turkish universities. A headscarf ban
was put in place but not properly enforced, so many women were
able to wear it and still graduate. Turkish law maintained that
women could not wear the headscarf in public institutions as
well as some private universities. The problem escalated over the
years until it exploded in May 1999, when Merve Kavakci, newly
elected MP for the pro-Islamist Victory Party, was not allowed
to take her oath because she refused to remove her headscarf.
Many politicians spoke out in outrage and women from across the
world (including, notably, many from Iran, which had recently
undergone its radical Islamic Revolution) rushed to her aid. The
Turkish government held fast to its original decision, and began
to tighten its policies regarding the veil in universities. Students
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were completely denied access to universities unless they took
off their veils. This resulted in a number of protests, as well as a
large number of female drop-outs who simply gave up on their
education rather than compromise their faith.
In 2002, a few years after the big incident, the majority
Muslim conservative Justice and Development party (AKP) party
won its first major election causing a shift in political power. At
that point the AKP held the prime ministry and the Parliament
or Turkey, while the main opposition within the government,
the Republican’s Peoples party (CHP), held only the presidency.
In 2007, the secular CHP grew anxious about the traditionalist
AKP’s hold over the Turkish population. Party leaders knew that if
AKP party member Abdulla Gül won the elections for presidency,
the AKP would be in full control of Turkey. The other issue with
the election of Gül was related to his wife, Hayrünnisa Gül, who
prominently wore the veil in public. After boycotting votes and
staging demonstrations, the government finally intervened with the
military in an effort to stop the doomed elections.33 The Turkish
people angrily responded to these act by setting a record number
of votes in favor of the AKP.34 Gül won by a landslide and assumed
the presidency, greatly strengthening the influence of the AKP.
In February 2008, an amendment to the Turkish Constitution allowing women to wear the headscarf in universities successfully
passed through Parliament. The AKP championed the amendment, arguing that the ban was preventing women from getting a
proper education. However, it was met with vehement opposition
not only from the CHP but also from hundreds of protestors who
rioted outside Parliament in favor of the ban. The amendment
was annulled only a few months later with government officials
saying that it went against Ataturk’s vision for Turkey as laid out
in the Constitution.35 And just like that, Turkey was right back to
where it started.
The main supporters of the ban today are modern-day
Kemalists who are adamant about the state’s right to uphold the
headscarf ban in the name of secularism and the Turkish Constitution. Most government officials support the ban, probably
because many are upper class, mostly non-Muslim, and “western-
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ized.” Interestingly, although many of the political leaders are in
support of the separation of religion and state, “statistics show
that most people in Turkey don’t see the headscarf as a threat to
secularism and are in favor of removing the ban.”36 A 2008 field
study titled “The Headscarf Controversy in Turkey” conducted
by Metin Toprak and Nasuh Uslu showed that 70.3 percent of
Turkish people say that if university students who want to cover
their heads are allowed to do so, it is not contrary to secularism,
and 64 percent of people think that civil servants can cover their
heads without any contradiction to secularism.37 In another poll
titled “Religion, Secularism and Headscarf in Daily Life” carried
out by KONDA in 2007, when asked whether there should be a
ban on the headscarf in universities, 78 percent of Turks said it
should be allowed, a 2.5 percent rise compared to results of the
2003 poll, while only 24.5 percent said donning a headscarf should
be banned.38 Obviously these statistics elucidate a big problem
regarding the handling of the headscarf issue when the government, in theory, is supposed to be representing the people of
Turkey when creating and implementing laws. So why exactly has
the government put into place this ban if it doesn’t seem to be
approved by the people it represents? The answers are less selfless
than one may have hoped for.
Clearly Turkey has had both secular (Ataturk and preByzantium) and religious (Ottoman Empire) influences. The
religious influence of Islam is prevalent among the common
people, while Ataturk’s secular influence can be seen more readily
in the politicians and government officials. Besides the influence
the secularism has within the Turkish Constitution (where Ataturk
himself did not explicitly ban the headscarf) through Ataturk’s
reforms Turkey began to admire and mimic the West. Simultaneously, the West’s push for modernism and liberal capitalism had
won a following, thus cementing its position and economic power.
Turkey, in close proximity to many of these successful nations
would seem a natural fit to join the European Union ranks, but
its fight to enter the Union has been long and tedious. Members
of the E.U. are very reluctant to let in a predominately Muslim
state, and worry that after the events of September 11 and the war
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on terror, Turkey will end up becoming too much of a danger.39
Turkey itself is divided on the issue; some believe that economically and politically, Turkey would benefit tremendously from the
E.U.’s resources and power. Others say that the AKP (currently a
major Turkish party) does not, in fact, harbor any inclination to
join the European Union and is, instead, trying to ally with the
Arab/Muslim world.
But behind these more concrete issues might there not also
lie an inherent and pervasive trend of prejudice? There are, after
all, no predominately Muslim states in the European Union, nor
are there any that are not majority Caucasian. Turkey’s booming
tourism industry and relatively stable economy40 make it a better
candidate than some of the other nations the E.U. has absorbed
(like some of the poorer Eastern European nations), and yet it
is forced to wait and mold itself to fit Western standards. Many
nations in the European Union, such as France, Germany, and
Belgium, have banned the headscarf in public institutions. It is
perhaps no surprise then that Turkey is eager to follow their lead
and show the other nations that it is willing to crack down on its
Islam-influenced culture and primarily Muslim population. Turkey
seems to be discriminating against its majority population; nowhere
in the law does it state that Jewish yarmulkes or Christian crosses
are not allowed. In the name of secularism, it has banned only
the Islamic headscarf.
The other big issue that Turkey wants to address with the
headscarf ban is the use of the veil as a political tool. After the 1979
Islamic Revolution in Iran, many Muslim nations reevaluated their
own societies. Iran had gone from a secular, Westernized country
into a religious Islamic state within a few decades. The Iranian
people had seen the Shah as a puppet of the Western nations, particularly the U.S., and wanted to return to their religious culture.
The revolution was massively popular as Islamic fundamentalism
returned to Iran and women wore the hijab in spite of the ban and
in support of the movement. The hijab became a sort of symbol for
Islamic fundamentalism as media coverage showed photographs
and clips from riots where women wearing the headscarf marched
and protested against the secular Shah government. Obviously
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107
the West was not in favor of the revolution, which eventually put
Ayatollah Khomeini in power, and secular Turkey was not exactly
a fan of Islamic fundamentalism, so it is understandable that
it would not support the wearing of headscarves in the public
sphere. Unfortunately for Turkey, because of the ban it has put
in place, women have been using the veil as a political tool, not
necessarily for Islamic fundamentalism, but as a rejection of the
ban and Turkey’s increasingly Western ideals. The headscarf has
become a way in which many women can passively act out against
the Turkish government as in Iran without directly confronting
it with riots. Of course, many other women are wearing it simply
because they feel that their religion asks them to cover their hair,
and not for political expression, but how can the government be
sure which is which? This same issue of political expression using
the veil will also come up when discussing France’s reasons behind
its ban.
Turkey’s assertive secularism has not seemed to work to
its advantage. By alienating its majority Muslim population, it has
gained nothing in regards to membership with the European
Union. The ridiculous irony of banning a headscarf in a country
where 99.8 percent41 of the population is Muslim does nothing for
Turkey’s image either. Although trying to promote neutrality and
secularism, “the headscarf ban in Turkey only targets the Islamic
headscarf worn by practicing Muslim women, violating religious
neutrality. Ironically, the religious practice Turkey is targeting
through the headscarf ban is that of the majority and not of the
minority as in the French case.”42 The headscarf controversy has
only managed to cause divisions and unrest among the people
and a markedly lower number of female graduates than male.43
Besides this, many women who wear the headscarf will undoubtedly seek education outside of Turkey so the country will lose
these talented, driven, and well-educated women as well (thus
cementing the nation’s already male-dominated society).44 In
short, Turkey would have done better to follow the United States’
model of passive secularism to create choice for its female population. Now it seems that whichever way the government chooses to
go with the ban, political parties will bicker and complain or the
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E.U. will finally be able to reject once and for all Turkey’s much
anticipated entrance to their club. And who will pay the price for
these endless petty politics? Primarily women it seems.
FRANCE: Secular or Xenophobic?
In France, too, it is primarily women who are the victims
of this aggressive secularism. France, however, is in many ways different from Turkey. Although it has imposed a similar headscarf
ban, the French government’s reasons for doing so reach back
to France’s age-old secular values. The country and many of its
people (already a difference from the religious Turkish population) harbor a suspicious distaste for religion because of France’s
early history. Prior to 1789, the French people lived under the rule
of oppressive rulers like monarchs and religious officials (particularly the Pope) who used the Church (and religion in general) as
a way to keep the masses from gaining power or rebelling. The
citizens of France were poor, hungry, and destitute from the numerous taxes imposed upon them. They were not allowed proper
representation in Parliament, could not speak freely in regards
to their pitiful situation, and were unable to receive the simple
human rights they deserved. Naturally, after such a long period
of oppression by the Church and monarchy, the people rose up
against their rulers and demanded change. “One of the demands
of many supporters of the French Revolution in 1789 was to curb
the power and influence of the Catholic Church and this began a
gradual move towards a secular society.”45 The Church managed to
resist and the tension between the two parties grew stronger. The
arrival of Napoleon Bonaparte marked a stalemate between the
Church and the French people as he attempted to retain peace by
limiting (but not eliminating) the Church’s influence in France.
For nearly a century there was relative quiet, until 1905
when a new French law declared France to be a secular nation and
marked the separation between Church and State. This secularism, or laicité, meant that the government and all state institutions
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could not be affiliated or associated with any religion. Schools,
where future generations were being taught and influenced were
particularly important to keep neutral.
The headscarf controversy started with the creation of the
Stasi Commission in July 2003. Prior to this, during the 1970s to
the 1990s, in response to new waves of immigrants from countries
like Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, French authorities expelled a
few girls who had refused to remove their headscarves. The Stasi
Commission basically recommended that a proper law be put in
place that explicitly banned the wearing of “ostentation religious
symbols” in public institutions. As recommended, these symbols
would include the Muslim hijab, the Jewish yarmulke, and the Sikh
turban. In March 2004 a law banning these conspicuous symbols
passed through the lower house with a massive majority vote (494
in favor vs. 36 against with 31abstentions).46 In September of that
same year the law became active. “Although the numbers of students
affected were relatively small, official figures from 2003 counted
1,256 young women who wore the headscarf, 20 of whom were
considered difficult cases and four of whom had been expelled.”47
The expulsion of the four girls caused waves of protest around the
world. The issue of the headscarf suddenly became important, as
the media honed in on France’s concept of laicite. Many individuals
responded through internet blog, either expressing anger about
the ban or praising it. Internationally, many human rights groups
and state governments expressed their disapproval of the law. The
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
stated in its 2004 report:
In February 2004, the Commission issued a public statement expressing concern over the proposed new law. The Commission expressed
particular concern that the proposed restrictions may violate France’s
international human rights commitments. The Commission also
stated that though increased immigration in France in recent years
has created new challenges for the French government, including
integration of these immigrants into French society as well as problems of public order, these challenges should be addressed directly,
and not by inappropriately limiting the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, religion, and belief. The French government’s promotion of its understanding of the principle of secularism should not
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result in violations of the internationally recognized individual right
to freedom of religion or belief.48
This report’s views on the issue mirrored that of many other opponents of the ban. France was unmoved by such criticism and
continued to defend its stance on laicité.
“The insistence on schools as religion-free zones goes to
the heart of the French idea of citizenship. The Republic has always recognized individuals, rather than groups: a French citizen
owes allegiance to the nation, and has no officially sanctioned
ethnic or religious identity.”49 This French nationalism is part of
the reason why France does not look favorably upon the headscarf
controversy. The French do not believe that they can be classified
as Muslim, Christian, Jewish, etc. but that they are all French and
thus equal. This trend can be seen in statistics regarding French
religion. Although studies vary widely, a 2006 report on religion
by the Financial Times declared only that 27 percent of French
people believe that there is a God or supreme being, the lowest
percentage in comparison to the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Germany.50 Other studies indicate similar trends; most
French people simply do not consider themselves “religious” (a
huge difference in comparison to Turkey, which has a 99.6 percent
self-described Muslim population). These statistics may give insight
into the reasons behind the headscarf ban. By allowing certain
people to wear their headscarves, a prominent symbol of their
particular religion, the sense of French unity is lost. But, some
critics may ask, why must it be lost? Does unity imply sameness
between peoples? Does it not leave room for individual expression, or perhaps more importantly, ethnic and cultural diversity?
Along with many others, the United States of America, also known
as the “great melting pot” of races and cultures from all over the
world, would have to disagree.
France’s views on this topic of secularism seem to dangerously border issues of prejudice and xenophobia. There have been
many accounts of hostility against “Muslim sounding” names in
the workplace and even local mosques have been targeted with
graffiti and defacement. France has recently experienced numer-
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111
ous riots and unrest among its people regarding anti-immigrant
and anti-Islamic sentiments. One of the most famous riots, also
known as the 2005 civil unrest in France, was triggered by the
death of three teenage immigrant boys from North Africa who
had been chased by the police after being accused of burglary.
The event set off protests in the streets of Paris, unleashing some
of the pent-up tensions already in place against immigrants and
Muslims. “[The 2005] riots were a stark reminder of how poorly
France has done in integrating its diversity, remaining locked
in an officially “color-blind” national ideology that often simply
avoids confronting the problems of racial inequality. France counts
no blacks or Arabs as members of Parliament, and its corporate
boardrooms don’t fare much better.”51 The racism so prevalent
in the country is not adequately recognized by the government
and so the issue will continue to persist. Many people say that the
headscarf ban itself is a mark of “racism” by the French authorities
because it restricts the huge minority Muslim population (many
of whom support the wearing of hijab) far more than the much
smaller minority Jewish population (with even fewer people who
wear the traditional yarmulke).52
To get to the root of the anti-Islamic racism that has taken
over so much of France it is necessary to go back to the issues that
caused it in the first place. Why exactly has the French government
imposed this strict ban on the headscarf? Besides defending the
notions of laicite and secularism, there is also the issue (as previously discussed with regard to Turkey) of radical Islamism. After
the July 1995 metro bombings led by Algeria-based Islamist terrorists that killed eight people and wounded more than 100, the
French government began to seriously regard the massive waves
of incoming Muslim immigrants as potential threats to the French
people. The September 11, 2001 bombings in the United States
only heightened concern all over the Western world. French people
began to cast a new eye on the immigrants that were coming in,
living in French homes, and taking over French jobs. France holds
an anti-immigration policy that restricts people from coming into
the country (particularly from African nations) and is actually very
popular among the French people.53 The fits of racism and anti-
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Islamic feeling that ensued after 9/11 also led people to further
scrutinize the religion of Islam which seemed (to many) to have
been at the forefront of the media’s coverage of terrorist attacks
and bombings. The traditionally Islamic veil, already associated
with accusations of misogyny and sexism, was now being seen as a
weapon used by such Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist groups
as a way to keep women from achieving equal status with men.
Many people, particularly Westerners, began to look down upon
these “poor souls” who did not have the strength to throw off
their headscarves and become “liberated.”54 France claims that
the forced donning of the veil is another reason to impose the
ban; now Muslim women will be able to stand up to the families
that apparently have made them cover their bodies. The French
government did not seem to think that perhaps some of the
women made the choice to wear the veil by themselves. According
to sources, when deciding on the law the government called up
only one woman to give her opinion on the matter of the ban,
and even then she was not listened to:
When France passed the ban on the headscarf, the women who actually wore headscarves and would be impacted by the ban were not
consulted. Only one covering woman testified in front of the Commission Stasi, and she was not taken seriously. In order to help these
women “attain freedom,” no one even listened to what they wanted
or why they wore the headscarf.55
How ironic that the very group of people France is so eager
to “protect” and “liberate” is not even allowed an opinion on the
matter! The government is, in effect, practicing the same misogyny
that it is trying to eradicate. Besides this, France has overlooked
a key point; if the families are forcing their daughters and wives
to veil themselves, then how would a law banning hijab liberate
them? Instead isn’t it possible that any unintended consequence
of such as law is that many such women cold be imprisoned within
their own houses because they are not able to freely wear their
headscarves in public?
Aside from trying to “liberate” Muslim women, France is
also trying to take away influence from the previously mentioned
Islamist groups that have threatened the safety of French citizens.
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And so the real question becomes, will banning the headscarf
in public institutions limit the influence of the Islamist militant
groups?
The general perception of Islam is not a positive one at present,
especially through recent media attention with terms like “Islamophobia” being rampant throughout the front pages. Any form of openly
displayed Islam must be “fundamental” or “extremist.” Maybe the
people who fear these terms—mainly the governments—are hoping
that if they suppress Islam, then the “fanatics” will die away. If this
is the strategy then it’s not very well thought out to say the least, oppression in any form only leads to a reaction—generally a rash one.56
The French government is, indeed, trying to suppress Islamist
groups by, in a sense, alienating the religion of Islam through this
heavily debated headscarf ban. Clearly, there is potential danger
for backlash from these groups. Besides the direct effect the ban
would have on the influence of radical Islamists, there is also an
indirect effect that would come from the veiling women themselves.
It seems that if the women wearing the headscarves are
not allowed to go to school then they will eventually find some
other means of education or diversion. It can be easily deduced
that Islamist groups looking to expand their influence will target
these unanchored women as potential supporters. If this is so,
then once again France will be harboring an unfortunate irony
in their reasoning behind the ban; by removing the veiled women
from public schools (where they may learn the importance of
democracy and other such western ideals), the government will
drive them straight into the arms of the fanatical groups they are
trying so hard to suppress. It stands to reason, therefore, that the
French government would do better to keep the women in school
where they can at least keep an eye on them.57
Unfortunately, it is not just veiled women who are at risk
with such extremist groups. With the increase of terrorist acts across
Europe and beyond, French Muslims have had to deal with rising
amounts of prejudice, hatred, and xenophobia.58 Unemployment,
particularly among Muslim youth, is very high. Because of new
anti-Islamic legislation, including the headscarf ban, France is, in
many ways, pushing away and alienating its Muslim population.
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Because many Muslims, particularly young people, do not feel like
an integral part of their country (diminished national identity),
they have the potential to turn to extremist politics to feel as if they
belong to something. By increasing the distance between itself and
its Muslim population, France is unwittingly pushing thousands
of its citizens towards dangerous Islamist political groups. 59
In many places overrun with Islamist rule, women are
forced to wear the headscarf.60 To fuel the government’s clear
desire to separate itself from the fundamentalists, France has
been using the headscarf ban as a way to show its criticism of the
apparently demeaning uses by these Islamist groups in regards
to women’s bodies. An interesting example related to the idea of
using women’s bodies for political purposes is an early attempt by
France to physically unveil Algerian women in colonial Algeria. On
May 16, 1958, French officials removed many Algerian women’s
veils in a public event. The idea was to show the world what these
previously oppressed women had become under the great influence of the French empire. Soon afterward, however, many of
these women reclaimed the headscarf as a revolutionary tool to
speak out against their colonizers. Marnia Lazreg, an Algerian
sociologist, states that this incident “did lasting harm to Algerian
women. It brought into limelight the politicization of women’s
bodies and their symbolic appropriation by colonial authorities.”
This is a very interesting parallel to many Islamist groups’ widespread use of women’s bodies for ideological purposes and calls
into question the motives behind the ban.61
France’s headscarf ban has uncovered some alarming facts
about the nation’s own insecurities. “The debate about laicité has
pushed aside the real alarming social and economic problems,
the increasing gap made of inequalities, poverty, discrimination,
and racism all exacerbated by international political tensions.”62
It is not just about secularism and basic human rights anymore,
but about the issues within France that are not being properly addressed. Although supporters of the ban claim that it will reduce
the influence of radical Islamist groups and liberate oppressed
Muslim women, it is clear that it will do neither. Although in some
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ways more forgivable than the starkly more religious Turkey, many
critics wonder if it is truly proper for the state of France to meddle
with religious affairs. Although the country is trying to stay true
to its secular ideals by viewing religion as a personal right, is it acceptable for it to dictate the way in which a person practices his or
her own religion in the public realm? As the French government
faces growing criticism over this ban, it only seems to defend itself
with more and more vehemence. Are the age-old values of laicite
truly fitting for this day and age, or are they quixotic ideals behind
which the government can conceal its xenophobic tendencies?
Most importantly, are the women most affected by this ban being treated with the respect and equality that they deserve? It is
unfortunate that the answers to these questions may not be ones
the French government is prepared to admit. It may be valuable
for French officials to take a step back and properly reevaluate
the potentially detrimental consequences of this headscarf ban.
THE HEADSCARF BAN: An Issue of Identity Politics
The headscarf ban currently in place in Turkey and France
has not only failed in protecting the basic human rights of Muslim
women, but also in maintaining fundamental, individual religious
freedoms that, because of their very nature, assertively secular
states find hard to afford. The problem with aggressive secularism is that instead of allowing for freedom for all religions, the
government allows none. The irony of aggressively secular states is
that secularism is treated almost like a religion in the way that it is
pushed onto the citizens, particularly when it directs such minute
details of their lives as clothing they may or may not wear. This
oxymoronic nature of Turkey and France’s assertive secularism
also seems to infringe on the right to practice religion without
state interference. The headscarf debate is a prime example of
how the practice of one’s personal religion can suddenly be turned
into a contentious state matter. Norm Geras, an internet blogger,
maintains that assertive secularism itself if not the problem; rather
it is the way it has been interpreted by Turkey and France that is
unjust:
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The public space in a secular democracy is not an atheist public
space. Secularism means that no religion is favored or specially catered for; but it leaves people free to wear the religious insignia they
choose to or not to wear any. To insist on a notion of secularism that
would forbid the wearing of these items is the equivalent of insisting
that secularism prohibits religious belief and its expression, which
it patently does not...63
So is it really fair of the government to ban the wearing of the
veil in public institutions? Can the mere act of donning a piece
of cloth really be this controversial? Some would say that the infringements on human rights that occur in presence of the ban
greatly outweigh the relatively passive and more personal effect that
result from a few women wearing hijab. Certainly the governments
have not taken into account the emotions of these women. How
can those feminists and liberals who have denounced the hijab as
a tool for oppression really know what goes on in the mind of a
Muslim woman? As mentioned earlier, there is a huge irony with
the governments’ implementation of this ban in hopes of protecting the helpless without first consulting those directly involved.
“In this process the principal concerned party, Muslim women,
is forced to be voiceless and passive. Once again, they are denied
the right to choose for themselves and this time in the name of
women’s human rights.”64 Contrary to popular belief, there are
many valid reasons why a woman would want to don the veil (as
discussed earlier), and not all of them are the products of misogynistic, “brainwashed” thought.
Not allowing women to wear the headscarf is just as undemocratic as forcing women to wear it. In both cases, the woman
herself is not allowed the actual personal choice, but the decision
is made for her. The dignity of her actions is nullified when there
stands a man higher up in power and status who is ordering her
to remove a piece of her identity. Where is the freedom in that?
In this light, France and Turkey are just as “oppressive” to women
by banning the veil as Saudi Arabia is in enforcing it; something
neither side would be happy to hear. “The headscarf ban is not
freeing women but rather limiting them from the freedom to
choose, to gain an education, to work in a career of their choice
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and the ability to control their own lives and bodies.”65 All of
these choices are made for the woman in question by the maledominated governments she is subject to.
Although the French and Turkish governments try hard
to maintain that they are looking out for the best interest of all
women, there is another type of oppression that is occurring right
under their noses. While the headscarf controversy has to do with
women covering up parts of their bodies, this oppression has to do
with the unclothing of women’s bodies. Western society “norms”
forcing women to take off their clothes can be just as oppressive as
forcing them back on. Modern-day media and culture phenomena
have given rise to widespread eating disorders, dwindling numbers
of women in scientific/professional settings, abnormally high rates
of sexually transmitted diseases and teen pregnancy, and dangerous
(cosmetic) plastic surgery, among other trends. Are these figures
not more alarming than those of a few women with strong faith who
adhere to their religion’s relatively simple recommendations? If it
is so concerned with the safety and pride of women, then why has
the government not also passed a ban on inappropriate dressing
or promiscuous advertisements? Women in the West face a great
pressure to look beautiful and exposed wherever they go. Proof of
this lies in the massive cosmetics industry that sells makeup, skin
creams, hair removers, and numerous other beauty products. All
their lives, women have been taught that these products can make
them physically attractive and consequently, successful in life. So
many television shows and movies highlight the female actress’s
beauty and the male actor’s strength or ingenuity; it is not hard
to find such actresses sprawled across billboards in provocative
dress selling perfume or alcohol. Exactly what kind of message
is this sending to girls out there? That if they are pretty enough,
they too can become leggy supermodels?
Liberal feminists may look at the West and remark on how
“free” and “liberated” the women there are in comparison to the
Muslim world, but they have not stopped to think about the increasingly repressive nature of the very culture they so wholeheartedly
support. What exactly is so wrong with a woman who wants to cover
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her hair? “For many Muslim women wearing the hijab marks a
rejection of a world where women have to endure objectification
as sex objects. It helps them to enjoy a sense of their own (special)
privacy and personhod.”66 The veil may mark a sense of power
and dignity in a climate overrun with sexual promiscuity. Is it
hurting anyone to see a strong, educated woman dressed in hijab?
The ban set in place by Turkey and France is simply infringing on
the basic human necessities for religious expression by not allowing practicing Muslim women to freely cover their hair in public.
Instead of eliminating fundamental social and cultural issues of
patriarchy and sexism, the ban only manages feebly to cover up
the underlying problems of “racism” and Islamapobia. By not allowing women who wear the headscarf to enter the public realm,
the government is only exacerbating the problems and causing
tension in the world. Why must this topic continue to be so hotly
debated when there are so many other problems that need our
attention more urgently? The world should allow women their
rights as citizens of France and Turkey, and focus instead on more
pressing issues that need to be resolved.
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1
CNRTLS, Portal Lexicography (2009) http://www.cnrtl.
fr/definition/laicit%C3%A9 (accessed November 2009)
2
Princeton University, WordNet Search 3.0 http://
wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=hijab (accessed
2009)
3
al-Maktabi, Islamophobia: an Irrational Fear or Prejudice
Towards Islam and Muslims (2005) http://www.islamophobia.
org/readarticle.php?article_id=1 (accessed 2009)
4
Al, “Al’s Articles,” The Hijab: Liberation or Oppression?
(October 2005) http://alyasarticles.blogspot.com/2005/10/
hijab-liberation-or-oppression.html
5
Including but not limited to [Salma Yaquoob, Hijab: A
Woman’s Right to Choose (October 16, 2004) http://www.
whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/Latest/Hijab.pdf (accessed
2009)], [turkophile, The Turko Phile (July 16, 2008) http://
turkfile.wordpress.com/2008/07/16/france-and-turkeydenying-muslims-women-their-rights-since-no-one-canremember-when (accessed 2009)], [Raja El Habti, Laicité,
Women’s Rights, and the Headscarf Issue in France (April 19,
2004) http://www.karamah.org/docs/Veil_Paper.pdf (accessed
2009)]
6
Lorenz, anthropologi.info (June 2009) http://
anthropologi.info/blog/anthropology/2009/thesis-hijabempowers-women (accessed 2009)
7
Saied R. Ameli and Arzu Merali, Islamic Human Rights
Commission (January 31, 2006) http://www.irhc.org.uk/show.
php?id=1708 (accessed 2009)
8
Kim Parker, Emory University (1996) http://www.english.
emory.edu/Bahri/Veil.html (accessed 2009)
9
Quran (24:31)
10
Niqaab: Our Religion, Our Right, Our Choice http://
niqaabis.com/do-not-assume-to-teach-us-our-own-religion.html
(accessed 2009)
11
Muslim Women’s League, Women in Pre-Islamic Arabia
(September 1995) http://www.mwlusa.org/topics/history/
herstory.html (accessed 2009)
12
Islamic.org, Ideals and role models for women in Qur’an,
Hadith and Sirah http://www.themodernreligion.com/
women/w_roles_ideals.htm (accessed 2009)
13
Ahmet Kuru, Politics and Religion in Secular States: The
United States, France, and Turkey (2005)
120
Fatima Hosain
14
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Turkey
(January 2010) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/tu.html (accessed 2010)
15
Kuru, Politics and Religion in Secular States
16
Karen Nichols as interviewed by Fatima Hosain (2009)
17
Spartacus, Marshall Plan http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.
co.uk/USAmarshallP.htm (accessed 2010)
18
Ibid.
19
Habti
20
Ahmet Kuru, “Secularism in the United States, France,
and Turkey: An Historical Perspective” Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association
(2005) 4 (no publisher)
21
UNESCO, Pluralism in the Church http://www.
crossroad.to/Quotes/spirituality/Pluralism.html (accessed
2009)
22
Kuru, “Secularism”
23
French Constitution, “French Constitution,” in French
Constitution Article 1
24
Turkish Constitution, “Turkish Constitution” in Turkish
Constitution Article 2
25
United States Constitution, “United States Constitution,”
in United States Constitution First Amendment
26
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “2003
Executive Summary,” International Religious Freedoms Report
2003, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/27185.htm
(accessed 2009)
27
Blake Hounshell, “Foreign Policy,” Obama Flubs Name
of Host University; Defends Hijab (June 4, 2009) http://blog.
foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/04/obama_flubs_name_of_
host_university_defends_hijab (accessed 2009)
28
Ibid.
29
Kuru, Politics and Religion in Secular States
30
Burak Sansal, Ataturk’s Reforms http://www.
allaboutturkey.com/reform.htm (accessed 2010)
31
Rit Nosotro, “Hyperhistory.net; Hyperlinked World
History with Biblical Perspective,” Ataturk, Kemal (2003)
http:www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/bios/b2ataturkkemal.htm
(accessed 2010)
32
turkophile
33
Carol Migdalovitz, “Turkey’s 2007 Elections: Crisis of
Identity and Power,” CRS Report for Congress (2007)
34
Metin Toprak and Nasuh Uslu, “The Headscarf
Controversy in Turkey,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive (2008)
THE CONCORD REVIEW
121
35
BBC, “BBC NEWS,” Court Annuls Turkish Scarf Reform
(June 5, 2008) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7438348.
stm (accessed 2010)
36
Hera Hashmi, Take off my what? Headscarves, hats
and history (December 2009) http://www.alarabiya.net/
views/2009/12/22/94963.pdf (accessed 2010)
37
Toprak and Uslu
38
Turkish Daily News, “Worldwide Religious News,” Poll
finds Turks oppose headscarf ban in universities (December
2007) http://wwrn.org/articles/27169/?&place=turkey&sectio
n=miscellaneous (accessed 2010)
39
ParaPundit, Should Turkey Join the European
Union? (December 14, 2002) http://www.parapundit.com/
archives/000790.html (accessed June 2010)
40
Burak Sansal, Turkish Economy http://www.
allaboutturkey.com/economy.htm (accessed 2010)
41
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Turkey
(January 2010) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/tu.html (accessed 2010)
42
Hashmi
43
UNICEF, Turkey: Statistics (2004) http://www.unicef.
org/infobycountry/Turkey_statistics.html (accessed 2010)
44
Hashmi
45
Michael Streeter, France is a secular state, but what does
that mean? (2009) http://www.frenchentree.com/societefrancaise/DisplayArticle.asp?ID=20486 (accessed 2010)
46
BBC, “BBC NEWS,” French Secularism-Laicite (October
2004) http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663 (accessed
2010)
47
Ibid.
48
United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom, “RefWorld: the Leader in Refugee Decision Support,”
USCIRF Annual Report 2004—France (2004) http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4855696fc.html (accessed 2010)
49
Henri Astier, “BBC NEWS,” The Deep Roots of French
Secularism (September 2004) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/3325285.stm (accessed 2010)
50
Angus Reid Global Monitor, “Polls and Research,”
Religion Important for Americans, Italians (December 2006)
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/14255 (accessed 2010)
51
Jean Ayissi, “Time Magazine,” Racism Unfiltered
in France (2007) http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,1574817,00.html (accessed 2010)
122
Fatima Hosain
El Habti
Sarah Verbosky, Immigration in France: The Economics
and Politics of a Sensitive Issue http://www.lehigh.
edu/~incntr/publications/perspectives/v15/verbosky.pdf
(accessed 2010)
54
turkophile
55
Hashmi
56
Al
57
El Habti
58
PBS Wide Angle, Young, Muslim, and French (August 23,
2004) http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/france/
(accessed April 2010)
59
Ibid.
60
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan,
Restrictions Placed on Women By the Taliban (1999) http://
www.islamfortoday.com/afghanistanwomen4.htm (accessed
June 2010)
61
Ibid.
62
El Habti
63
Norman Geras, “normblog,” An Illiberal Measure (July
2009) http://normblog.typepad.com/normblog/2009/07/anilliberal-measure.html (accessed 2010)
64
El Habti
65
Hashmi
66
turkophile
52
53
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October 2005 http://alyasarticles.blogspot.com/2005/10/
hijab-liberation-or-oppression.html
Al-Maktabi, Islamophobia: an Irrational Fear or Prejudice
Towards Islam and Muslims 2005 http://www.islamophobia.
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Ameli, Saied R., and Arzu Merali, Islamic Human Rights
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Angus Reid Global Monitor, “Polls and Research,” Religion
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THE CONCORD REVIEW
123
Astier, Henri, “BBC NEWS,” The Deep Roots of French
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views/2009/12/22/94963.pdf (accessed 2010)
Hounshell, Blake, “Foreign Policy,” Obama Flubs Name
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foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/04/obama_flubs_name_of_
host_university_defends_hijab (accessed 2009)
Islamic.org, Ideals and role models for women in Qur’an,
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(accessed 2009)
Nosotro, Rit, “Hyperhistory.net; Hyperlinked World History
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THE CONCORD REVIEW
125
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CONCORD
REVIEW
Copyright 2011, THE
The Concord
Review,
Inc., all rights reserved 127
THE INFLUENCE OF ROMANS ON BRITISH CULTURE
Molly Pickel
T
he modern view of the Celts of Britain is of a warring,
barbaric people, while Romans are seen as highly civilized and
cultured. One must wonder how these two peoples lived on the
same island and how they interacted. Roman Britain, from AD 43
to around AD 450, is a story of British exposure to new customs
and traditions. In some instances, what Romans brought replaced
what had previously existed, but at other times, the two ethnicities
melted together. Celtic Britons slowly blended with their occupiers and a mixture of the two built an entirely new culture, which
borrowed partly from the Celtic heritage and partly from Roman
influence. Mainly due to the creation of towns and cities in Britain
during this period, Romans had a vast effect on the art, economy,
religion, and language of Britain.
The single most significant change that the Romans brought
was the transformation of the center of the community from a
hillfort to a town or city because many other cultural changes
resulted from this move. First, it is important to be aware of how
pre-Roman Britain was organized. Tribes were settled in hillforts,
which were villages surrounded by ramparts. These were the centers of religion and industry for tribes and the streets seemed to
be organized in districts by occupation.1
Molly Pickel is a Senior at Horace Greeley High School in Chappaqua,
New York, where she wrote this paper for Steven Houser’s AP European
History course in the Spring of 2009.
128
Molly Pickel
Within the tribe, extended families sharing a common great
grandfather most likely lived together. This organization would
determine succession and the family would own land together.2
There were also social classes present in pre-Roman Britain,
which the Romans called druides, equites, and plebes, respectively
the educated men, warriors or nobles, and the common man.
These social divisions were similar to Roman organization, so the
fact that it continued as such during Roman times does not act
as evidence to show any change that Roman occupation made to
British society. Lloyd Laing, author of Celtic Britain, also states that,
“on the very lowest level of society were the slaves. Possibly but not
certainly these unfortunates owed their existence to contacts with
and ideological influences from the Romans.”3 It is interesting
to note that most likely there were slaves in pre-Roman Britain
because one might assume that when Britons were used as slaves
during Roman occupation it was a new source of oppression, but
that does not appear to have been the case. Also similar to Roman
society, Celtic families were patriarchal.4
In regards to political organization, Celts had local, lesser
chiefs and kings or head chiefs, who had greater power.5 However,
since the Celts were illiterate, this information is taken from Roman
accounts, and so one must consider that they may have described
Celtic society by relating it to what they experienced in their own
society, rather than by observing the true situation.
In 55 BC, Julius Caesar attacked southeast Britain, which
was the most easily identified beginning of Romano-British interactions.6 Although the Romans mainly allowed Britain to function
on its own, trade and political interactions increased. Cunobelin,
leader of the Catuvellauni tribe, having triumphed over the Trinovantes, had a vast kingdom under his control and is spoken of
in several classical works. Suetonius, the Roman writer, called him
“King of Britain” and during his reign, he assumed the title rex, the
Latin word for King. His court included Roman luxuries, and it
is likely that some of his followers could read and write in Latin.7
Although this all occurred before the Claudian invasion of AD 43,
Roman thought had already penetrated into British culture and
Britons, such as Cunobelin, had begun to emulate Roman life.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
129
Other pro-Roman rulers and tribes existed at this time
and even later, into the time of Roman occupation. Commius,
the leader of the Atrebates (a British tribe) spoke with Caesar’s
legates and exchanged hostages as a sign of cooperation.8 His
sons, Tincommius, Eppilus and Verica, also employed the title
rex, showing the early influences of Latin on the Celtic language.9
Augustus, made Emperor in AD 4,10 encouraged RomanoBritish trade and pro-Roman feelings in an attempt to annex
Britain. Caligula, who succeeded him, failed in this attempt, and
it wasn’t until Claudius’ invasion that Britannia became a Roman
province.11
The Claudian invasion occurred in AD 43, and at this time,
Britain officially became a Roman province, which increased Roman impact on the every-day life of Britons. Many hillforts were
destroyed, particularly in a campaign led by Vespasian in the 60s
AD.12 People were moved to towns, which was an entirely new environment. However, tribal structure was allowed to remain with
towns acting as tribal capitals.13 Since people from the same tribe
were permitted to live together, some of their traditions survived.
Client kingdoms sprung up in Britain around this time,
which was part of the Roman plan to make use of existing tribal
structures to enforce their laws. They would allow a native ruler
to control his kingdom as long as he remained loyal to the Roman Empire. When people were relocated from hillforts to newly
established towns on lower ground, they were citizens of their own
tribe, not of the city.14 In this way, they were not truly Romanized.
Their own backgrounds were what defined them, which was an
important tradition remaining in Roman Britain.
One ruler of a client kingdom in south Britain was Cogidibinus (c. AD 45-80), who encouraged Romanization and even
built a temple at Chichester to Neptune and Minerva. In addition,
some pre-existing settlements were allowed to remain, such as two
Belgic areas at Colchester. However, a Roman legionary fortress
was placed near these.15 By allowing the previous organization to
continue, Romans were not entirely imposing their ideas on the
Britons, but one can already see their influence in religion by
130
Molly Pickel
Cogidibinus’ shrine and in everyday life by establishing Roman
military camps near the settlements that existed before.
In one notable case, however, the change that Romans
wished to make was forcefully opposed. This occurred when
Prasutagus, leader of the Iceni, died in c. AD 60 and left his property to the Roman Empire and his two daughters. The Romans
disregarded his wishes, and denied his wife, Boudicca, rights as
queen. When Boudicca contested this, she was whipped and her
daughters raped. The Iceni, and the neighboring Trinovantes destroyed Colchester and London.16 This shows that there was fierce
opposition to the way that Romans sought to control the island,
disregarding the wishes of some tribal leaders. This is one example
where tribes were suppressed, which marked a great change to the
social structure of Britain. Around this time, Romans generally
abandoned client kingdoms in favor of an imperial bureaucracy
with limited participation by native Britons.17
Britain, as a province of the Roman Empire, had little
influence in the workings of government. However, there was an
annual provincial council in Colchester at the temple of Claudius.
Delegates, consisting of the aristocracy from British towns, met
to speak informally and choose a representative in Rome.18 This
was a change from local governments led by chiefs, and though in
many instances these rulers were allowed to remain, the Roman
Empire controlled the laws that affected all the provinces.
The physical development of British cities progressed to
resemble Roman cities. From AD 80 to 130, Britain underwent
rapid urbanization. With the help of Roman architects and engineers, they built fora, basilica (court houses), baths, shops, and
private houses in most towns.19 The baths, as in Rome, consisted
of a courtyard, an undressing room, a cold water room, a warm
water room, a hot water room, and a sauna. This required water
pipes, which were constructed to bring water across towns.20 They
arranged the cities with a grid-like plan and built walls for protection.21 The virtual replication of a Roman town is one of the most
telling ways in which Romans affected British culture. By bringing
their own building plans, they also brought the customs associ-
THE CONCORD REVIEW
131
ated with those places and the British learned from the Roman
example.
Romans built roads throughout Britain, connecting major
cities, and many of these radiated out of London.22 This changed
the landscape of Britain physically and allowed for greater trade
between cities and tribes. The roads were durable and used for a
long time for transportation of goods and people.
Health and medicine, based on the teachings of Hippocrates, came to Britain through the Romans. They created
sewers and brought the best medicine of the time. Also, baths
were thought to have health benefits.23 This influx of knowledge
brought the British away from their more spiritual ways of fighting
disease.
The introduction of the forum created a major change in
British economics. It became a huge trade center and usually had
a market hall in which stalls were set up.24 This was an important
change because it provided a place in which agricultural workers
could sell their goods, which increased the farmers’ wealth and
allowed people to move to cities where they did not have to grow
their own food. In addition, with increased trade with the Continent, the forum allowed for more exposure to different cultures,
through the goods Britons purchased.
London became a major trading city because of its easy
accessibility from the water. This shows a truly lasting impact of
the Romans because London remains today one of the world’s
capitals for trade. Colchester had previously been the main trade
center, but Romans built roads and buildings in London and even
constructed a bridge over the Thames. They rebuilt it after it was
destroyed by Boudicca and the city prospered, with as many as
30,000 people within three miles of strong stone walls.25 The governor later moved his headquarters from Colchester to London.
From AD 60-70, the “proto-forum,” an administrative structure
with a central courtyard, was built in London and included offices for the treasury and imperial procurator. Later it became
a forum-basilica complex, which covered about seven and a half
acres.26 This again shows the Roman influence on the situation
132
Molly Pickel
today because London continues to be the political center of
England.
In addition to the establishment of cities, Romans brought
about a change in rural life. Previously, Britons had owned scattered farms in the countryside. But from AD 150-200, villas, or
Roman-style country-houses with farms, appeared as a result of
Roman influence and technology. In part, it came simply from
coming in contact with Romans, who employed the villa system in
their own lands. In addition, fora established in cities at that time
allowed for farmers to sell their goods and make enough money
for elaborate villas.27 Romans also brought superior farming tools
such as axes, two-handed scythes, and iron-shod spades, which
made planting and harvesting easier.28 It can be deduced from
artifacts found that Britons furnished their rooms in the Roman
style with products from the Continent and wore togas,29 though
they had previously worn mainly tunics and cloaks, fastened by
brooches.30 By making changes to town life, Romans indirectly
altered the culture of the country.
Another new type of building brought to Britain was the
theater. These were constructed similarly to those in Rome, with
a rectangular stage and semicircular seating. They hosted plays,
pantomimes, singing, and recitations, another new tradition
brought from classical culture.31 In addition to theater, gladiator
combats and beast fights were entertainment, performed in large
amphitheaters. Though these were on a smaller scale than in the
richer provinces, remains of amphitheaters have been found in
Caerwent, Silchester, Dorchester, Chichester, and Carmarthen.
These would also have been used for military training.32
Romans also influenced the visual arts in Britain, though
less directly than the theater, since it happened when Celtic artists
began to emulate classical art, rather than when Roman engineers
and architects designed theaters for performances. Celtic art often included elongated dogs, hares, spirals, scrolls and tendrils33
while Roman art usually showed the human figure. Britons would
have been exposed to Roman art on coins and imports. The two
styles were blended in Britain, as shown by numerous pieces of
art found from that time.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
133
One example of Romano-British art is a relief of the goddess
Sulis-Minerva in Bath, because she holds a large circular shield
similar to the Romans’, but Celtic motifs decorate the piece. A
stone head on Hadrian’s Wall of the god Antenociticus shows classical facial shapes, but Celtic, wild hair. A statue of Juno Regina
in Chester shows a Roman figure with Celtic drapery. Two bronze
lions found in Britain are mostly representational in the classical
style, but have stylized tails and manes in the Celtic manner.34 This
blending of art is an extremely important part of Roman influence
because they actually changed a style. Building Roman-style towns
replaced hillfort organization, but some Celtic traditions remained
in art, although the Britons adapted to integrate classical styles.
Prior to Caesar’s invasions in 55 and 54 BC, Britain was not
completely isolated. It can be deuced from artifacts found on the
island that they were trading with most of Europe during the first
and second centuries BC. They imported coins and pottery from
Greece, Spanish figurines, and wine from Italy.35 After 15 BC, trade
between Celtic Britain and the Roman Empire increased greatly;
Britons imported bronze vessels, wine, Spanish fish sauce, pottery,
jugs, flagons, and silver cups.36 This is significant because even
before it was an official province, Britain was bringing in much of
Roman culture. All of these things would have shown the Britons
different technology because of the materials and structures used,
unfamiliar art because of decorations, and new customs because
of the role each item played in Roman life.
As far as industrial production, it seems that the Romans
continued what had been taking place since the Iron Age. The
industry of Kimmeridge shale, which had been produced in quantity since the first century BC remained throughout the Roman
period,37 as did mines, though some fell under military administration.38 While this evidence may appear to suggest that Romans
did not affect production, one must recognize that Britons were
exporting more because of their close ties to the Continent and
also had a better market for selling goods because of the towns,
most of which had a forum for trade. In addition, it was necessary
for agricultural production to increase in order to provide for
the Roman troops staying in Britain. With a greater demand for
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crops, farmers had an incentive to produce a surplus for money,
and with the advanced technology of the Romans, they had the
means to do so.39
The last part of the economy which remains to be discussed
is currency. Long before Caesar sailed to Britain, Celts were using
ingots, long sword-shaped blocks, of iron with the value depending on weight.40 Some time before 50 BC Belgae invaders brought
coins and used them for money and later, Roman coins came to
the island though they were mostly used as ornaments. British
coins often showed Romanized Celtic designs, and Augustus is
on many of the coins produced by Britons.41 All this happened
slowly and in a disorganized manner, but in the 2nd century AD,
Roman coins were brought to Britain and replaced all native coins.
A mint was subsequently established in London and coins were
produced, most of which showed British events that glorified the
Romans as great conquerors.
Another important aspect of Roman and Celtic culture
that blended was religion. One of the main reasons for this is that
Romans, being polytheistic, were willing to accept other polytheistic
religions because they could simply add to their pantheon of gods.
Romans only rejected monotheistic religions and religion with
inhumane practices. Druidism, the religion of Iron Age Celts, was
judged by Romans to violate the latter requirement, and so some
suppression of druidism did occur. In addition, it was strategic
to impose Roman deities as a unifying element to make Britons
more Romanized and less likely to revolt.42
It is difficult to get a clear picture of pre-Roman religion in
Britain because the only accounts of it are from Roman sources.
As conquerors, it is likely that they would have exaggerated the
horrors of druidism in order to put themselves in a good light,
bringing Roman, civilized religion to the barbarians, and so one
should not take everything they say as truth. However, human
sacrifice has appeared in so many writers’ accounts of Celtic druidism that it seems very likely that this practice did occur. There is
also archaeological evidence for sacrifice, though animal sacrifice
seems to have been more common. Pits for sacrifices, dating to
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135
the Bronze Age and Iron Age have been found with items such as
spears, swords, iron, knives, pots, acorns, canine skeletons, hares’
and cocks’ bones, and raven skulls. This would not have upset the
Romans, but human skeletons were also found.43
More evidence suggests the probability of human sacrifice,
with an emphasis on severed heads. Celtic myths often mention
headhunting and in several stories, severed heads make prophesies
or give orders. In addition, several heads have been found without
bodies and it seems that Celtic warriors kept their enemies’ heads
displayed on the gates of hillforts.44 This tradition seems only to
have survived in Celtic tales, probably due to the Romans’ revulsion and suppression of this practice.
Very little is known about the Celts’ gods mainly because
they were localized, without mythologies around them.45 Again, the
illiteracy of Celts causes a problem because one is forced to look
at their gods through the perspective of a Roman. Romans often
equated their gods with Celtic gods, though the similarities were
not great. There are 374 Celtic gods that have been mentioned
in Roman writings, though only four or five of them appear more
than 20 times. At least 69 of these gods have been compared to
Mars, the god of war.46 Some other Romano-Celtic gods were
Apollo Maponius, Lenus Mars, and Sulis Minerva,47 and it is only
though this Roman comparison that we can observe the purpose
of the Celtic deities.
One strange change that took place was that Celtic gods
actually took a more definite shape during Roman occupation.
Dedications were made to specific Celtic gods and certain names
were used throughout Britain when they had been local before.48
This most likely happened because of urbanization, which brought
different tribes together to share their beliefs, and because of
exposure to the Roman pantheon, in which each god had very
specific purposes. Probably unintentionally, the Romans actually
strengthened Celtic beliefs to make them more universal.
Although Celtic beliefs remained and may have actually
been strengthened, Roman religion made a great impact on Britain
around this time. Mainly this happened because of the Roman
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Molly Pickel
citizens and soldiers staying in camps and imperial settlements.
There are statues of Roman deities and dedications to Jupiter, Juno,
Minerva, Mars, Neptune, Apollo, Vulcan, Ceres, and Mercury.49
With these displays of worship, it is not surprising that the Roman
religion spread to Britons. This is shown by the aforementioned
Romano-Celtic deities and also by temples.
The emergence of Roman-style temples in British towns
shows the beginning of worship of Roman gods. In one instance,
a Romano-Celtic temple was built on top of a Celtic Shrine, which
can be identified by its circular shape.50 Other Romano-Celtic
temples, used for sacrifices, were built, usually with an inner square
chamber, which rose like a tower above an outer rectangular
veranda and a sloped roof held up by columns. These often followed an Italian architectural style.51 These are another example
of something new that was brought to replace an old tradition.
Although some Celtic gods survived by being equated to Roman
gods, the temples were completely different from before Roman
occupation.
Another type of worship, imperial cults, which wasn’t
even very developed in Rome, came to Britain and faced much
opposition. The most famous example of imperial worship is in
Colchester, with the Claudian temple. According to H.H. Scullard, many Britons despised this worship of a mortal, but as they
became more tied with the Roman Empire, they accepted it and
made dedications to him and his household. Also, many busts and
heads of Emperors have been found in Britain.52 This is significant in both religion and politics because the Celts were willing
to place a Roman mortal among their gods and recognized the
Roman Empire as their supreme leader and protector.
So far it has been shown that Roman influence in religion
was mainly peaceful, even allowing a blending to occur. However,
in AD 59, Suetonius Paulinus made an aggressive attack on druidism in Anglesey. Though Anglesey is in Wales, it is relevant to
changes in England because of the incident that occurred and
its far-reaching consequences. Tacitus writes that Paulinus and
his troops “destroyed the groves devoted to Mona’s barbarous
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137
supersition.”53 He also ended the “priesthood” of druids,54 which
was extremely devastating because Druids led the worship of gods,
sacrifices, and judged on not only religious, but also legal matters.55
They went through extensive training because all information was
passed orally, and so it was necessary to memorize everything. They
would have learned how to lead sessions of worship and interpret
the movements of sacrificial victims in order to make prophecies.56
Since druidism was so heavily based in oral tradition, destroying
their “priesthood” meant that many traditions were lost. Through
violence, Romans demolished a great deal of Celtic religion.
The effects of Roman occupation of Britain can also be
seen in language. It has already been discussed that the Celts were
illiterate, and so Latin opened many doors for them. Wealthy
families sent their sons to schools, where they would be trained in
language, literature, and rhetoric and those who pursued politics
would often learn Greek as well.57 While this had a remarkable
impact, because Celts were then able to record their own history,
it did not wipe out the languages that existed before.
The languages that remained were significantly altered.
Celtic, which became modern Irish Gaelic, Scottish Gaelic, Manx,
Welsh, Cornish, Breton, Gaulish, and Celtiberian, 58 was affected
by Roman/Latin influence. This can be seen clearly in Welsh,
which created new words very similar to the Latin equivalents in
areas of agriculture, sea, building, cooking, washing, education,
public life, and military. Some examples of these are:
Latin
Welsh
English
Praesepe
Preseb
Prefect (Manager)
MareMorMarine (Sea)
PonsPontPontoon (Bridge)
Taberna
Tafarn
Tavern (Inn)
Medicus
Meddyg
Medic (Doctor)
CivitasCiwdodCitizen (Tribe)
Castellum
Castell
Castle59
One can see why Celts may have adapted Latin to describe these
things. Doctors, inns, and castles did not exist in pre-Roman Brit-
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Molly Pickel
ain. While tribes existed before the Romans came, when they were
placed in cities, the Celts probably made a word to mean tribes
living together in a city rather than in their traditional hillfort.
In order to assess the impact that the Romans had on
British culture, it is necessary to look at the period following Roman occupation. After more than 400 years of experiencing the
customs and institutions of the Roman Empire, one could not
expect this to disappear on the island with the removal of troops
and the beginning of autonomy.
First one must understand the reasons for which Rome
ended its rule over Britain. It was not voluntary, but out of desperation; they needed to withdraw troops from this distant province
in order to protect themselves from warring peoples on the continent. At the same time, Picts and Scots from north of Hadrian’s
Wall (current Scotland) were pressing south and invading British
towns along with the Saxons. In AD 410, some Britons returned
to Iron Age hillforts because they already had fortifications. This
migration back to traditional tribal centers renewed an interest
in Celtic heritage and culture, even though Roman culture still
remained a dominant force. At Maiden Castle, a new Celtic temple
was built around this time, showing that their ancient religion had
not been lost completely.60
In the late 300s AD, archaeological evidence suggests
strongly that people moved out of towns and villas. The forum in
Wroxeter was not used after the third century AD and it seems that
Chichester was abandoned before 300 AD. Most villas are assumed
to have been left around this time because a great number of them
do not have coins from later dates.61 Just as the consolidation into
towns after the Claudian invasion played a large part in Romanizing Britain, the dispersal and abandonment of towns brought
Britons closer to their roots. Some places, however, remained
inhabited. It seems that at Verulamium, large town houses with
mosaics were built up through the 300s AD, and a new water main
was laid, using Roman engineering.62
An interesting combination of archaeology and linguistics
also shows a return to Celtic heritage. A.L.F. Rivet observes in an
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139
article named, “Celtic Names and Roman Places,” that many names
of towns in Britain describe Roman settlements. During Roman
occupation, forts would most likely have been called by the name
of the military unit stationed there. However, once the Roman
troops withdrew, it seems that Celts began using their own words
for these places, and it is also likely that some of the soldiers from
Gaul, being Celts themselves, may have used these names before
leaving the island.63 An example of this is the town Durobrivae,
which is a combination of Celtic words meaning walls and bridge.
There were no walls or bridges there until Roman times, which
indicates that the Celtic name did not survive through that time,
but was rather created during or afterward.64 London itself, not
a significant place before the Romans made it a trade center is
named from the Celtic word lond, meaning wild, or bold.65
All this evidence for a rebirth of Celtic culture is not meant
to deemphasize the remaining influence of Romans. Britain definitely lost much of its heritage during the time of the Romans either
through destruction of the past or through a blending, which erased
older beliefs. Every aspect of British culture was altered; hillforts,
the tribal centers, were destroyed and replaced with Roman-style
cities; artistic style changed to incorporate classical elements and
theater was introduced as a new form of entertainment and art;
trade increased, bringing wealth to the countryside and new goods
to the island; Celtic religion was merged with Roman polytheism
and greatly oppressed; language was changed forever to reflect
Latin words and Roman ideas. All of these things remained and
became part of the British identity. But, the story does not end
here. The next chapter of Britain’s history includes Saxon invaders, bringing other cultural ideas and opposition to the Celtic
culture, language, and religion.
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Molly Pickel
Lloyd Laing , Celtic Britain (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1979) pp. 52-57
2
Ibid., p. 20
3
Ibid., p. 19
4
H.H. Scullard, Roman Britain: Outposts of the Empire
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1979) p. 16
5
Laing, p. 19
6
Scullard, p. 179
7
Laing, pp. 94, 99
8
Julius Caesar, Cornelius Mashal Lowe, John Thomas
Ewing, De Bello Gallico Libri VII (Chicago: Albert, Scott and
Co., 1895) p. 367
9
Laing, p. 99
10
Thomas Rice Holmes, Ancient Britain and the Invasions
of Julius Caesar (Harvard University: Clarendon Press, 1907)
p. 722
11
Laing, p. 95
12
Ibid., p. 106
13
Ibid., p. 102
14
Scullard, pp. 49-50
15
Ibid., pp. 50-52
16
Christopher Hibbert, The Story of England (London:
Phaidon Press Limited, 1998) p. 21
17
Peter Salway, The Oxford Illustrated History of Roman
Britain (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 365
18
Ibid., pp. 90-91
19
Ibid., p. 94
20
Ibid., pp. 102-103
21
Hibbert, p. 22
22
Ibid., p. 22
23
Marjorie and CHB Quennell, Everyday Life in Roman
and Anglo-Saxon Times (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1959)
p. 25
24
Scullard, p. 100
25
Hibbert, p. 21
26
Ibid., p. 55
27
Ibid., p. 115
28
Laing, pp. 36-37
29
Hibbard, pp. 23-24
30
Scullard, p. 14
31
Ibid., pp. 104-106
32
Ibid., pp. 104-109
33
Ibid., pp.153-154
1
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141
Ibid., p. 153
Laing, p. 50
36
Ibid., p. 95
37
Ibid., pp. 47-48
38
Scullard, pp. 55-56
39
Salway, pp. 434-435
40
Laing, p. 45
41
Ibid., pp. 97-98
42
Scullard, p. 154
43
Laing, pp. 85-86
44
Ibid., pp. 81-83
45
Jane Webster, “‘Interpretario’: Roman Power and the
Celtic Gods,” Britannia 26, available from JSTOR, <http://www.
jstor.org/stable/526874> p. 155
46
Laing, p. 81
47
Webster, p. 154
48
Scullard, pp. 158-159
49
Ibid., p. 156
50
Laing, p. 87
51
Scullard, p. 100
52
Ibid., p. 154
53
Laing, p. 106
54
Scullard, p. 154
55
Laing, p. 80
56
Scullard, p. 20
57
Ibid., p. 147
58
Lyle Campbell, Historical Linguistics: an Introduction
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004) pp. 190-191
59
Scullard, pp. 148-149
60
Laing, pp. 111-112
61
Richard Reece, “Town and Country: The End of Roman
Britain,” World Archeology 12:1, available from JSTOR,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/124452> pp. 78-80
62
Salway, p. 318
63
A.L.F. Rivet, “Celtic Names and Roman Places,”
Britannia 11, available from JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/
stable/526874> pp. 13-15
64
Ibid., p. 1
65
Campbell, pp. 190-191
34
35
142
Molly Pickel
Bibliography
Caesar, Julius, Cornelius Mashal Lowe, John Thomas Ewing,
De Bello Gallico Libri VII Chicago: Albert, Scott and Co., 1895
Campbell, Lyle, Historical Linguistics: an Introduction
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004
Hibbert, Christopher, The Story of England London:
Phaidon Press Limited, 1998
Holmes, Thomas Rice, Ancient Britain and the Invasions of
Julius Caesar Harvard University: Clarendon Press, 1907
Laing, Lloyd, Celtic Britain New York: Thames and Hudson,
Inc., 1979
Quennell, Marjorie, and CHB Quennell, Everyday Life in
Roman and Anglo-Saxon Times New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
1959
Reece, Richard, “Town and Country: The End of Roman
Britain,” World Archeology 12:1, available from JSTOR,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/124452>
Rivet, A.L.F., “Celtic Names and Roman Places,”
Britannia 11, available from JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/
stable/525666>
Salway, Peter, The Oxford Illustrated History of Roman
Britain New York: Oxford University Press, 1993
Scullard, H.H., Roman Britain: Outposts of the Empire New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1979
Webster, Jane, “‘Interpretario’: Roman Power and the Celtic
Gods,” Britannia 26, available from JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.
org/stable/526874> p. 155
THE CONCORD REVIEW
143
Copyright 2011, The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
SLAVES IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Caroline Carson Mullins
D
uring the American Revolution, Britain’s American
colonies rebelled and fought for their independence from the
crown and the mother country and were recognized as an independent nation through the Treaty of Paris of 1783. However,
neither the colonists nor the British seemed to feel that they had
sufficient troops during the war; they wanted more men, and one
way to achieve this goal was to recruit slaves; Patriot forces recruited
slaves pretending to be free blacks, while the Loyalists recruited
black men known to be the slaves of Patriots. The relationship
between slaves and the Revolutionary War, which began in 1775,
was one that affected both sides. Slaves made an impact on the war
through the factor of their existence in white decisions, wartime
jobs assigned to them, and how the manumission promises made
to them affected the final treaty ending the war. On the other
hand, the war affected the slaves through opportunities for freedom, the alteration of some white opinions and prejudices, and
the setting of precedents for future wars and for the aftermath of
those future wars.
During the war, slaves affected whites on both sides of the
conflict. According to historian Benjamin Quarles, in the early
Caroline Carson Mullins is a Junior at St. Mary’s Episcopal School in
Memphis, Tennessee, where she wrote this paper for Sheila Patrick’s AP
United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
144
Caroline Carson Mullins
stages of the war, both sides avoided including slaves in any military
role, although technically, the American rebels had used slaves at
the very outbreak of war, and only later had discovered that the
issue was meeting opposition and so changed their stance on it.1
One reason why neither the Patriots nor the British were very eager to invite slaves into the war effort was that many feared black
revolts.2 A second reason is that most whites had doubts about a
black man’s courage under fire.3 Finally, other whites simply did
not want to fight alongside blacks for reasons based on the social
ladder. As one soldier observing his regiment commented, “there
were a number of negroes, which to persons unaccustomed to
such associations, had a disagreeable, degrading effect.” General
Philip Schuyler complained that “Negroes disgrace [the Patriot]
arms.”4 However, when all belligerent forces found that they
needed more men, they were forced to, for a time, put aside
some prejudices and fight side by side with the blacks. The first
to turn to slaves were the British, led by John Murray, the Earl
of Dunmore and Royal Governor of Virginia. On November 7,
1775, Lord Dunmore issued a proclamation from Norfolk that
requested that the slaves of Patriot masters join the British cause.5
This proclamation declared that “indentured Servants, Negroes,
or others, (appertaining to Rebels) free that are able and willing
to bear Arms, they joining His Majesty’s Troops as soon as may
be, for the more speedily reducing this Colony to a proper Sense
of their Duty, to His Majesty’s Crown and Dignity.”6 Although he
originally stated that he only wanted free blacks, in reality he accepted for enlistment the slaves of Patriot masters, although he
returned the slaves of Tories.7
According to historian Benjamin Quarles, the Royal
Governor’s motives were plain and easily comprehended. First,
the slaveholders with anti-English sentiments would be forced to
remain at home if their workers were fleeing, creating an even
worse depletion of armed men in the Continental Army.8 Second, the blacks could fill the holes in the military labor forces.9
Lastly, such promises of freedom could cause slave rebellions in
the colonies, which could destroy parts of the South.10 Dunmore
most likely understood that emancipating the slaves of American
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145
rebels would not hurt Britain, while it could severely weaken the
Patriots, since the resulting loss of labor force could devastate the
Southern economy. The methods seemed to work on the rebellious
colonists, since the slave desertions and propaganda led many
Patriot planters to feel that they needed to stay at home to watch
over and protect their slaves and property.11 Most slaveholders preferred to keep their workers laboring in the fields rather than on
the battlefield, and this fear of slave revolts made the shortage of
soldiers even worse, especially in the Continental Army.12 However,
if a master decided to stay home, it was not unusual for a master to
send a black man as his substitute in the ranks.13 Substitution was
not the only reason for whites to send slaves off to war, though;
New York, for example, passed a law in 1781 which stated that
any master who sent a servant or slave to the Patriot forces would
receive 500 acres of land.14 Others wanted money, and in South
Carolina slaveholders often turned over slaves for sums sometimes
near £170 given by the state government.15 Although the British
were the first to overcome their scruples about blacks, especially
slaves, in the war effort, the American rebels soon followed their
lead as they discovered how severe a shortage of soldiers they had
in the Continental Army, and in response to Lord Dunmore’s
proclamation.16
In the American military forces, slaves and free blacks
originally served the war cause in both the army and navy, but in
July 1775, George Washington, who was the master of a Virginia
plantation that used slaves, took command of the Continental
Army of the Patriot forces, and it was he who was adamantly
against blacks, whether free or not, serving in the force.17 In
October 1775, the Continental Congress issues a directive that
stated that no “negroes, Boys unable to bear Arms nor Old men
unfit to endure the Fatigues of the Campaign” were allowed to
serve in the Continental Army.18 However, after Lord Dunmore’s
proclamation, more and more planters decided to stay home, and
the Continental Army suffered. Because of this situation, George
Washington decided that he had to change his mind, and on January 17, 1776, the Continental Congress issued a new proclamation;
this one stated that “The free Negroes who have served faithfully
146
Caroline Carson Mullins
in the army…may be re-enlisted, but no others,” and, according
to historian Gail Buckley, from then on, until the end of the war,
free blacks and slaves who were at least thought to be substituting for their masters fought for the American forces in the war.19
Technically, slaves were not allowed in the American forces, but
those in command, who had quotas to fill, were willing to pretend
that the run-away slaves coming to enlist were freedmen; blacks
especially helped to fill the quota requiring a certain number of
men from each state created by Congress in 1777.20 Patriot forces
even went a step further than enlistment in order to counteract
Dunmore’s offer to slaves: they granted freedom as payment for
service.21
While the British used the colonists’ distrust of slaves to
create fear and discord among the Rebels, the Southern Patriots
used that distrust to create anger towards the British.22 Propaganda
was used to set ideas in the heads of colonists, as well as in slaves.
For example, the Virginia Gazette published letters that warned
slaves against joining the British forces. They warned slaves that
the British were the real enemy, since they did not stop the slave
trade; that if the British won the war the slaves would actually
be sold in the West Indies; that Dunmore was only going to free
the men who served under him, so that the women, children,
sick, and elderly would all be left in slavery; and that conditions
would be much better for slaves in the Patriot forces because the
Rebels would, in the words of one of the letter-writers, “not only
prevent any more negroes from losing their freedom, but restore
it to such as [had] already unhappily lost it.”23 Measures taken in
certain states at the start of the war fed the almost paranoid fear
of potential uprisings and the idea of slaves becoming masters.
One illustration of this fear put into action was in Maryland,
where the Governor Robert Eden was approached in April 1775
by a delegation requesting the arms to smother any slave revolts.24
Another example was in South Carolina in June 1775, when the
Council of Safety warned against “instigated insurrections by…
negroes.”25 Last, according to Quarles, in North Carolina some
whites believed that the British had promised that any slaves who
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147
killed their masters would be given the plantations belonging to
the late white men.26
Once in the war, the slaves had a wide variety of jobs on both
sides of the conflict. Under both flags, the blacks were extremely
important out of combat, in support roles. Blacks were the core
of the hard labor support, and they were often skilled workers.27
They foraged, acted as spies, carried messages, built pathways and
breastworks, worked as servants for officers, as grooms, gravediggers, and provisioners.28 Specifically, the British used slaves as
guides, since the British were unfamiliar with the territory, and in
germ warfare.29 Blacks were particularly vulnerable to smallpox,
so the sick and dying were placed in Patriot camps, for example
in Yorktown.30 The Patriots especially used slaves for repair work
in docks and harbors.31 They were rope makers, ship carpenters,
and sawyers.32 They were also used as waiters and valets.33 However,
slaves were also used in combat.
In both forces, the blacks were placed in the military, but
whether they were in segregated or integrated units depended
on which side they were fighting for.34 For the most part, slaves
were placed in integrated units in the Continental Army; however,
there were a few all-black regiments.35 One black regiment fought
to the end of the war, beginning in early 1778.36 With no proper
training, this extraordinary regiment managed to hold the front
line in the Battle of Rhode Island for four hours, only suffering
22 casualties.37 A second example is Massachusetts’ Black Regiment, which was similar to the First Rhode Island Regiment.38 A
major integrated Patriot force was the army of the Spanish governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Galvez.39 Galvez used the army,
which was made up of between 10 and 50 percent black soldiers
in every rank, to successfully get the British out of the Mississippi
River Valley, and during that time six black officers were cited for
bravery, leading the King of Spain to award them medals.40
In the British military forces, blacks were mainly segregated,
used in fatigue duty to relieve white troops.41 One integrated unit
was the Ethiopian Regiment created by Lord Dunmore in December 1775, which consisted of nearly 300 slaves in uniforms which
148
Caroline Carson Mullins
read “Liberty to Slaves” on their chests.42 The Ethiopian Regiment
was actually a part of the “Lexington of the South,” which was a
section of the British force routed by American militiamen in
December 1775 at Great Bridge.43 Other Loyalist black regiments
were found to be very useful in small raids against Patriot militia
forces.44 Irregular black forces, also known as the “followers of
the flag,” fought against the Patriots in the New Jersey counties
of Monmouth and Bergen, as well as outside of Charleston, South
Carolina.45 These irregular forces robbed and kidnapped Patriots,
controlling the border posts.46 They were not official regiments,
though. They were raiders, but they were quite effective and did
their jobs very well, however questionable those jobs may have
been.47
However, the navies of both sides desperately needed
men, and so were not at all selective about where the blacks were
placed, or who they were.48 Slaves made up a large force in the
navies because they would put up with the horrible conditions on
board the ships.49
In the Patriot navy, blacks had three choices between fleets.
The Continental Navy was the worst choice of the three, and the
state navies and the privateers easily outstripped its good points.
Compared to the Continental Navy, the state navies had superior
pay, greater opportunity for promotion, a shorter enlistment period,
a wider variety of jobs for blacks, and the bonus that rebels were
only expected to function in the territorial waters of the state, or
close by.50 The privateers were even better for blacks than the state
navies, though; on board privateers, the crew got to share among
themselves any prize money from handing over a captured enemy
vessel, there was an egalitarian system on board, so no questions
were asked, and there were extra pay and privileges according to
the service and performance of each individual.51
At the end of the war, the question came up of whether or
not the British would keep the promises of manumission made to
the slaves who had joined their forces. The British felt the need
to keep up their end of the bargain, but the Americans were
adamantly against any such proposition. The colonists wanted
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149
slaves who had run to the British to be immediately returned to
their Patriot owners.52 The final result of all of the negotiation
was Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris of 1783, which stated that “…
All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty, and his Britannic Majesty shall with all convenient speed, and without causing
any destruction, or carrying away any Negroes or other property
of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons,
and fleets from the United States…”53 However, most of the British refused to agree that the terms of the peace treaty included
former Patriot slaves who had gone under the umbrella of British protection before the preliminary articles of peace had been
signed.54 So, when the British evacuated American ports, many
former slaves left with them. The British relocated former slaves
to Jamaica, East Florida, the Bahamas, Canada, Nova Scotia, and
England.55 As many as 20,000 Negroes may have left the country
because of the war, but many others were enslaved yet again.56
Throughout the war, enslaved Negroes, in the words of
historian Andrew K. Frank, “used the chaos of the era to find freedom.”57 Somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 slaves obtained
their freedom one way or another during and directly following
the Revolutionary War.58 Slaves tried to gain their freedom by
taking up the offers and promises of freedom given by Lord Dunmore. They took asylum behind British lines, enlisted in Loyalist
forces, and tried to pass as free blacks.59 Other slaves simply ran
away while the country was preoccupied with matters of war. It is
estimated that in the South alone approximately 100,000 slaves
were lost.60 Still more slaves went to the Patriot forces as substitutes
for masters who did not feel that it would be expedient to leave
home. These slaves were often promised freedom, although it is
unknown how many actually received what they were promised.
As the blacks fought along with whites, both British and
Patriot, they disproved many prejudices against the character of
blacks, and, in fact, many slaveholders began to see slavery as an
evil institution that had been falsely justified over the centuries in
North America and the rest of the world.61 New Jersey Governor
William Livingston proposed a manumission law to the assembly
150
Caroline Carson Mullins
of 1778 on the basis that slavery was “utterly inconsistent with the
principles of Christianity and humanity; and in Americans who
have almost idolized liberty, peculiarly odious and disgraceful.”62
Some Americans, through the fight for their independence, recognized the total hypocrisy of fighting for their independence
while they enslaved so very many men, women, and children. In
fact, the original version of the Declaration of Independence included
a clause opposing the slave trade:
[The King of England] has waged cruel war against human nature
itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons
of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying
them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death
in their transportation thither…this warfare…is the warfare of this
Christian king of Great Britain determined to keep open a market
where men should be bought and sold.63
South Carolina, Georgia, and New England wanted this passage
deleted in order to protect their interests in the slave trade, so it
was cut out.64 On the other hand, some states, such as Vermont
in 1777 and Massachusetts and New Hampshire in 1783, created
constitutions that outlawed slavery within their borders.65 Other
states, such as Pennsylvania and Connecticut, planned for gradual
emancipation.66
Many whites changed their opinions about blacks through
the war, and some positive precedents were set for blacks between
1775 and 1783, but there were also negative precedents set. One
positive precedent was that blacks could rise in status and gain
new opportunities during wartime.67 Negroes had chances to
prove themselves through hard labor outside of the plantation,
valor during battle, as shown through the six men of Galvez’s army
decorated by the King of Spain, and in the opportunities to gain
higher rank on board ships, although they were usually only privates
and infantryman in either army. Second, whites looked to blacks
only in times of great military need.68 In the words of historian
Allan D. Austin, “the labors and loyalties of blacks were crucial
to the comfort, security, and military success of several colonies;
they had to be officially recognized.”69 As soon as peace had once
again resumed, whites would once again ignore Negroes, treating
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151
them as subhuman, without dreams, ambitions, or talent.70 Whites
were merely bad-weather friends to the blacks, supporting their
freedom or rights only when it best served white interests.
The relationship between slaves and the American Revolution was also beneficial to slaves and masters of both the British
and the Patriots, though. While some slaves gained freedom and
status, both the colonies and Britain gained a core workforce
and some valuable soldiers, both on the battlefield and off. Also,
to certain men and women, blacks had proved their bravery and
worth, and so had become more human and less like animals. That
degraded view of African Americans was also damaged with the
post-war creation of a large, independent American social class of
free blacks, because it illustrated the falsity and hypocrisy of the
old argument that blacks needed to be cared for by whites in order
to survive. To quote Benjamin Quarles, “Ultimately, the colored
people of America benefited from the irreversible commitment
of the new nation to the principles of liberty and equality.”71 All of
these revelations and ideals later spurred a wave of abolitionism,
which had already begun to build in the North by the end of the
war, and as this wave came crashing down on America, it left in
its wake the factors leading to the American Civil War.
152
Caroline Carson Mullins
Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961) p. 197
2
Rolando Avila, “American Revolution,” in Encyclopedia
of Emancipation and Abolition in the Transatlantic World
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007) p. 35
3
Ibid., p. 35
4
Gerald Astor, “The Struggle Begins,” in The Right to
Fight: A History of African Americans in the Military (New
York: Random House, 2001) p. 15
5
Gail Buckley, American Patriots: The Story of Blacks in
the Military from the Revolution to Desert Storm (New York:
Random House, 2001) p. 15
6
David Waldstreicher, “The African-American Revolution,”
in The Struggle Against Slavery: A History in Documents
(Oxford University Press, 2001) http://elibrary.bigchalk.com
7
Buckley, p. 15
8
Quarles, p. 21
9
Ibid., p. 21
10
Ibid., p. 21
11
Avila, p. 35
12
Lt. Col. (Ret.) Michael Lee Lanning, “Colonial Days and
the Revolutionary War,” in The African-American Solider: From
Crispus Attucks to Colin Powell (Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol
Publishing Group, 1997) p. 10
13
Astor, p. 9
14
Quarles, p. 70
15
Ibid., p. 71
16
Buckley, p. 16
17
Ibid., p. 14
18
Ibid., p. 14
19
Ibid., p. 16
20
Astor, p. 8
21
Quarles, p. 198
22
Ibid., p. 14
23
Ibid., p. 24
24
Ibid., p. 14
25
Ibid., p. 14
26
Ibid., p. 14
27
Astor, p. 10
28
Ibid., p. 12; Quarles, p. 94; Astor, p. 11; Kai Wright,
“Choosing Sides: The Revolutionary War Era,” Soldiers of
Freedom: An Illustrated History of African Americans in the
1
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153
Armed Forces (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal, 2002) p. 6;
Quarles, p. 77
29
Quarles, p. 94; Allan D. Austin, “American Revolution,” in
Encyclopedia of African-American Culture and History edited
by Jack Salzman, David Lionel Smith, and Cornel West, Vol. 1
(New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996) p. 123
30
Austin, p. 123
31
Jonathan D. Sutherland, “American Revolution,” in
African Americans at War: An Encyclopedia Vol. 1 (Santa
Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004) p. 46
32
Quarles, p. 90
33
Astor, p. 12
34
Ibid., p. 11
35
Wright, p. 26
36
Ibid., p. 26
37
Lanning, p. 13
38
Wright, p. 25
39
Ibid., p. 25
40
Lanning, p. 14
41
Daniel Curtis Littlefield, “Antebellum African American
Culture,” Encyclopedia of American Social History 3 vols.
(Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993) http://galenet.galegroup.
com/servlet/HistRC
42
Philip S. Foner, Blacks in the American Revolution
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976) p. 45
43
Buckley, p. 15
44
Graham Russell Hodges, “Loyalists in the American
Revolution,” Encyclopedia of African-American Culture and
History 5 vols. (Macmillan, 1996) http://galenet.galegroup.
com/servlet/HistRC
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Astor, p. 10
49
Ibid., p. 10
50
Sutherland, p. 46
51
Ibid., p. 46
52
Astor, p. 13
53
“Transcript of the Treaty of Paris (1783),” Our
Documents: A National Initiative on American History, Civics,
and Service http://www.ourdocuments.gov/
54
Quarles, pp. 199-200
55
Astor, p. 13
154
Caroline Carson Mullins
Ibid., p. 13
Andrew K. Frank, “The Revolutionary War and African
Americans, in History in Dispute edited by Keith Krawczynski,
Vol. 12 The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (St. James Press,
2003) http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/HistRC/
58
Avila, p. 35
59
Frank
60
Buckley, p. 35
61
Austin, p. 122
62
Quarles, p. 49
63
Buckley, p. 16
64
Ibid., p. 16
65
Avila, p. 36
66
Ibid., p. 36
67
Lanning, p. 17
68
Ibid., p. 17
69
Austin, p. 120
70
Lanning, p. 17
71
Quarles, p. 200
56
57
Bibliography
Astor, Gerald, “The Struggle Begins,” in The Right to
Fight: A History of African Americans in the Military Novato,
California: Presidio Press, 1998, pp. 6-15
This source was helpful in finding information on the many
different occupations of blacks during the war, as well as on the
Treaty of Paris slave clause.
Austin, Allan D, “American Revolution,” in Encyclopedia of
African-American Culture and History edited by Jack Salzman,
David Lionel Smith, and Cornel West, Vol. 1, New York: Simon
& Schuster Macmillan, 1996, pp. 120-123
This source provided information regarding the fates of
many of the newly freed blacks after the war, and it explained
certain precedents set by the war.
Avila, Rolando, “American Revolution,” in Encyclopedia of
Emancipation and Abolition in the Transatlantic World edited
by Junius Rodriguez, Vol. 1, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
2007, pp. 35-37
THE CONCORD REVIEW
155
This source was an excellent place to get background
information, as it very concisely, yet with specifics, gives an
overview of blacks in the Revolution.
Buckley, Gail, American Patriots: The Story of Blacks in
the Military from the Revolution to Desert Storm New York:
Random House, 2001
This source has extensive information on every aspect of
blacks in the American Revolution, from recruitment to the
aftermath.
Foner, Philip S., Blacks in the American Revolution
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976
This source gives details regarding the Ethiopian Regiment
of the Earl of Dunmore.
Frank, Andrew K., “The Revolutionary War and African
Americans,” in History in Dispute edited by Keith Krawczynski,
Vol. 12, The American Revolution, 1763-1789 St. James Press,
2004 http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/HistRC/ (accessed
September 28, 2009)
This article was beneficial to this paper in that it shed light
on how the slaves used the chaos of the Revolutionary times to
their advantage in their struggle for freedom.
Hodges, Graham Russell, “Loyalists in the American
Revolution,” in Encyclopedia of African-American Culture and
History 5 vols., Macmillan, 1996, http://galenet.galegroup.
com/servlet/HistRC/ (accessed September 28, 2009)
This article was especially helpful in providing facts about
the different kinds of regiments in which the blacks served in
both American forces and British troops.
Lanning, Lt. Col. (Ret.) Michael Lee, “Colonial Days and
the Revolutionary War,” in The African-American Soldier: From
Crispus Attucks to Colin Powell Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol
Publishing Group, 1997, pp. 1-17
First, this source explained black reasoning during the
Revolution, and second, it described precedents for blacks set
by the American Revolution.
156
Caroline Carson Mullins
Littlefield, Daniel Curtis, “Antebellum African American
Culture,” in Encyclopedia of American Social History 3 vols.,
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, http://galenet.galegroup.com/
servlet/HistRC/ (accessed September 28, 2009)
This source was helpful in providing facts concerning the
maltreatment of blacks, especially on the British side.
Quarles, Benjamin, The Negro in the American Revolution
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961
This source delves deeper into each of the topics that my
other articles and books merely touch on, and it gives specific
examples and individuals to go along with large events of the
war.
Sutherland, Jonathan D., “American Revolution,” in African
Americans at War: An Encyclopedia Vol. 1, Santa Barbara: ABCCLIO, 2004, pp. 41-48
This article gives information on blacks on both sides in the
navies, both on the ships and in the harbors.
“Transcript of Treaty of Paris (1783),” Our Documents:
A National Initiative on American History, Civics,
and Service http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.
php?doc=6&page=transcript (accessed January 19, 2010)
Regarding the actual treaty helps me to understand exactly
what the agreement between Britain and the colonies was
regarding prisoners of war and slaves.
Waldstreicher, David, “The African-American Revolution,”
in The Struggle Against Slavery: A History in Documents
Oxford University Press, 2001, http://elibrary.bigchalk.com/
(accessed November 29, 2009)
This source was my only source that actually provides the
transcript of the Earl of Dunmore’s proclamation.
Wright, Kai, “Choosing Sides: The Revolutionary War
Era,” in Soldiers of Freedom: An Illustrated History of African
Americans in the Armed Forces New York: Black Dog &
Leventhal, 2002, pp. 2-29
This source provides a lot of information on American black
regiments, the few that there were.
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157
Copyright 2011, The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
LINCOLN AND ROOSEVELT: NATIONAL SECURITY
AT THE EXPENSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
Jiweon Kim
When the Founding Fathers of the United States signed
the Constitution in 1787, they purposefully left vague phrases in
the document to give it flexibility and elasticity. The United States
Constitution is a living document that adjusts to changing times
and a changing society. Since 1787, several Presidents have defined
their executive powers differently, often setting precedents and
altering their roles. During Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s presidencies, a wartime nation forced the Presidents
to act as commanders-in-chief and order actions that overstepped
civil liberties. President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas
corpus (the right of an arrested person to a speedy trial) on April
27, 1861, following the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, while
President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on February 19,
1942, which authorized the relocation and internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II. Both actions were justified on
the grounds that some sacrifice was necessary in ensuring national
security. Though Lincoln’s and Roosevelt’s use of executive power
has been criticized as despotic and even tyrannical, the Presidents
illustrate that the Constitution was designed to be flexible, and
Jiweon Kim is a Senior at the Hotchkiss School in Lakeville, Connecticut,
where she wrote this paper for James Marshall’s AP United States History
course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
158
Jiweon Kim
that there are circumstances when forceful measures are essential
in keeping the nation united and safe.
Although the Constitution, as revised in 1871, delineated
citizens’ rights and created a fluctuating balance between federal
and state governments, it failed to address the issue of slavery explicitly. This led to almost a century of sectional tensions between
the North and the South, and eventually erupted in a Civil War.
Upon his acceptance of the Illinois Republican Party’s nomination
as the United States Senator on June 16, 1858, Abraham Lincoln
delivered a speech that clearly stated his stance on slavery and the
Union as a whole: “A house divided against itself cannot stand. I
believe this government cannot endure, permanently half-slave
and half-free.”1 Lincoln acknowledged the heightening tension
between the North and the South, and prophetically implied
that a series of compromises was not going to make the conflict
vanish. Until then, because the North and the South were so fundamentally different, Congress had avoided developing a solution
regarding slavery that would satisfy both sides; instead, it worked
on compromises­—the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the Great
Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, to
alleviate sectional tensions. Lincoln’s prophecy was proved true
when the Confederacy attacked Fort Sumter on April 14, 1861,
marking the beginning of a deadly Civil War. Following the attack
on Fort Sumter, President Lincoln made a proclamation calling the
militia and convening Congress, and explicitly stated his reason
for entering war:
I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate and aid this effort to
maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National
Union, and the perpetuity of popular government.2
From Lincoln’s point of view, the Civil War was initially fought for
the chief purpose of preserving the Union. As the war carried on,
Lincoln did everything he could to ensure that the Union would
be saved, even if it meant violating citizens’ rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.
After the attack on Fort Sumter on April 14, 1861, Lincoln
was concerned with defending Washington, D.C., the capital of
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159
the Union. Surrounded by Maryland and Virginia, both of which
were slave states, Washington D.C. was in danger of falling into
the hands of the Confederates. The slaves states tried to cut off
Washington, D.C. by destroying bridges and cutting telegraph lines,
and attempted to isolate the capital from the rest of the Union.
Though Union soldiers arrived in time to defend the capital,
Lincoln was still alarmed by the possibility of Maryland seceding
from the Union to join the Confederacy. On April 25, 1861, Lincoln sent an order to General Winfield Scott, Commander of the
Union Army:
I therefore conclude that it is only left to the commanding General to
watch, and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their people
against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt, and efficient means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the bombardment
of their cities—and in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.3
Lincoln never intended on suspending the writ of habeas corpus,
as he advised General Scott to do so “in the extremest necessity.”
However, the situation in Maryland became increasingly violent,
and drove Lincoln to issue an order on April 27, 1861 to “suspend
the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety.”4 The Suspension
Clause, located in Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution, prohibits the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus unless “when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it.”5 Lincoln justified the
suspension on the grounds that “the Civil War was a clear case of
rebellion, and the public safety required the detention of those
who were aiding and abetting that rebellion.”6 The Founding Fathers purposefully chose not to define explicitly what qualified as
a rebellion or an invasion. They set down the core framework of
how the government should be run, but left it up to the leaders
to make the right decisions.
Inevitably, there were dissenters who challenged Lincoln’s
constitutional right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. John Merryman, a landowner in Maryland and lieutenant in a secessionist
cavalry company, was arrested on May 25, 1861 at Fort McHenry
for treason. His counsel petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, stat-
160
Jiweon Kim
ing that Merryman was being illegally held. The case came before
the United States Circuit Court (the Supreme Court was not in
session), and Chief Justice Roger B. Taney ruled in Ex parte Merryman in May 1861 that Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus was unconstitutional. As a Democrat and an opponent of
Lincoln, Taney justified his ruling by emphasizing that Merryman’s
civil rights had been denied to him. Though Taney was legally correct, he failed to put the case into context. The Union was torn
into two, and the fate of the nation was in jeopardy. Taney was
missing what Lincoln had pointed out in his speech to Congress
on July 4, 1861: “…are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted,
and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”7
The writ of habeas corpus was suspended for the greater good; a
civil right was temporarily denied to save the Union.
Taney argued that the Suspension Clause was located in
Article 1 of the Constitution, indicating that the right to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus was given to Congress, not the Executive. However, Congress would not be in session until July, and
immediate action had to be taken to protect Washington, D.C.
Lincoln may not have had the explicit power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus, but he “averred a higher constitutional duty to
do whatever was necessary to preserve, protect, and defend the
nation—including its capital.”8 Though it is impossible to predict
how the war might have turned out differently had Lincoln not
overstepped civil liberties, Civil War historian James McPherson
commented in an interview:
It is possible that Maryland might have seceded, in which case the
capital would have been isolated, which could have made a significant
difference. And there might have been more guerilla activity in the
border states, and even in copperhead parts of the North, which
could have handicapped the Union war effort.9
In a letter to Albert G. Hodges, written on April 4, 1864,
Lincoln used an analogy of a surgeon amputating a limb to save a
life, asserting once again that the provisional suspension of habeas
corpus was a step taken to ensure national security:
Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution?
By general law life and limb must be protected: yet often a limb must
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161
be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a
limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become
lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the nation.10
Though Lincoln has been criticized for setting an inauspicious
precedent, historians have begun to shed a more positive light on
Lincoln’s actions during the U.S. Civil War. Historian Herman Belz,
for example, concluded that “Lincoln was neither a revolutionary
nor a dictator, but a constitutionalist who used the executive power
to preserve and extend the liberty of the American founding.”11
Scholar Daniel Farber also defended Lincoln’s actions, claiming,
“many of the acts denounced as dictatorial…seem in retrospect to
have reasonably good constitutional justifications under the war
power.”12 Just as Lincoln prevented the Union from dissolving by
temporarily suspending the writ of habeas corpus, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the relocation and internment of 110,000
Japanese Americans to protect the nation from possible future
threats, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy bombed the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii. After enduring World War I and the severe economic
depression that followed, the United States had no intention of
entering another European war; however, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was troubled by the expansion of totalitarianism in the
world. John Yoo, a former official in the United States Department
of Justice, noted, “By 1941, with Hitler in control of Europe, and
Japan occupying large parts of China, FDR wanted to find a way
for the United States to enter the war on the side of Britain.”13 At
the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, Roosevelt told Winston
Churchill that “he would become more and more provocative” and
promised that “everything would be done to force an incident”
that would “justify him in opening hostiles.”14 Through the “cash
and carry” system with the Allied nations and the Lend-Lease
Act of 1941, the United States was able to provide aid to the Allies while simultaneously managing to stay out of direct military
confrontation. There is no evidence that Roosevelt was aware of
the imminent attack on Pearl Harbor beforehand; he had merely
162
Jiweon Kim
maneuvered the Axis Powers into firing the first shot. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 allowed the United States
to declare war on the Axis Powers, and rallied public support for
war, just as the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter had done eight
decades before.
The anti-Japanese sentiments in the United States that
eventually prompted Executive Order 9066 had been deeply
rooted in American culture, dating back to the gold-rush period
in 19th century. Though some of the Forty-Niners who traveled to
California to seek gold during the California Gold Rush in 1848
were Chinese, the Chinese and Japanese were often grouped
together due to their similar appearances. Because of the confusion, the yellow-peril stereotype, originally associated with Chinese
immigrants, was inevitably applied to the Japanese. Furthermore,
the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War that broke out on
February 8, 1904, intensified anti-Japanese sentiments, “inspiring
rumors in the United States that resident Japanese were spies
and soldiers in disguise, representing the first wave of a ‘peaceful
invasion’ which threatened to overrun the country.”15 Following
the Russo-Japanese War, events such as the Japanese invasion of
China in 1931, the Nanking Massacre of 1937, and the Second
Sino-Japanese War that broke out in 1937, heightened anti-Japanese
feeling in the United States. The attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941
became the catalyst for turning deep-seated antagonism of the
Japanese by whites on the West Coast into “new measures of legally
sanctioned discrimination.”16 Though anti-Japanese sentiments
did not arise in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the rumors from
Pearl Harbor “gave new sustenance to racist belief in the yellow
peril…to undefined feelings of hostility and distrust compounded
of the xenophobia of superpatriots…”17 In the midst of widespread
fear, suspicions of Japanese spies and fifth-column activity at Pearl
Harbor accumulated. A frightened, wary atmosphere fostered
exaggerated rumors about the Japanese Americans, ranging from
Japanese gardeners with short-wave transmitters hidden in their
garden hose to Japanese farmers with poisoned vegetables; every
Japanese, no matter the origin of birth, was blamed and accused
of prior knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
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163
On December 8, 1941, the day after the attack on Pearl
Harbor, President Roosevelt delivered a speech to a Joint Session
of Congress:
Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the
United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by
naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan…the facts of yesterday
speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already
formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the
very safety and life of their nation…I believe I interpret the will of the
Congress and the people when I assert that we will not only defend
ourselves to the uttermost, but will make very certain that this form
of treachery shall never endanger us again.18
Roosevelt’s message was clear: the United States would soon officially enter World War II, and take whatever measure necessary
to triumph in the end. Roosevelt’s speech blamed the Japanese
outright, worsening the existing anti-Japanese sentiments in the
United States. On February 19, 1942, Roosevelt signed Executive
Order 9066, authorizing the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson,
and his military subordinates to “prescribe military areas…from
which any or all persons may be excluded” and to place such
further restrictions as they deemed necessary upon “the right of
any person to enter, remain in, or leave” these areas.19 Although
the order did not specifically mention Japanese Americans, it was
clear given the circumstances that it was sanctioning the evacuation of all people of Japanese descent.
Though the ultimate decision to authorize Japanese internment camps was made by Roosevelt, he was not the sole mind
behind the order. Within three days of the Pearl Harbor attack,
General John L. DeWitt, commander of the Fourth Army on the
West Coast, provided the first proposal for mass evacuation of the
Japanese, justifying it with the possibility of a looming Japanese
American revolt.20 Though nothing can, in retrospect, justify the
internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans, the situation at the
time must be taken into consideration. In the weeks following the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was in a state of shock
and at war.
164
Jiweon Kim
Americans had spent a century learning to hate and fear the Japanese,
and after the catastrophe of Pearl Harbor they lashed out—half in
habit, and half in frustration—at the only available enemy.21
Executive Order 9066 was substantiated when the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of internment camps in Korematsu vs.
United States on December 18, 1944. Justice Hugo Black asserted,
We are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large
group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is
an aggregation of hardships…compulsory exclusion of large groups
of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental
institutions. But when under conditions of modern warfare our
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must
be commensurate with the threatened danger.22
The Court stressed that the Constitution was flexible in times of
war, it would be unconstitutional for the government to detain its
citizens based solely on their race, but that did not apply to this
case because “we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because
the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion
of our West Coast,” and “the military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
from the West Coast temporarily.”23 Justice Black concluded the
ruling by stating, “we cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm
perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions
were unjustified.”24
The internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans [and that
of Japanese Canadians at the same time] can never be morally
justified; however, given the outrage that was brought on by the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt’s justification that “the
successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection
against espionage and…sabotage” seems valid.25 Roosevelt correctly
concluded that the spread of totalitarianism posed a threat to the
nation’s existence, and led the United States into World War II.
Though the Japanese Americans were severely traumatized by
their internment experiences during World War II, the world may
have turned out to be a drastically different place had it not been
for Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066. Given that a more humane
THE CONCORD REVIEW
165
action could have been taken in place of a forced internment,
Roosevelt thoroughly understood the scope and magnitude of
his executive power, and acted swiftly in a time of war.
The last word of the United States Constitution will never
be written, for the United States began as an experiment, and
continues to exist as an experiment. Though there are strict
constitutionalists who believe in the literal interpretation of the
Constitution as the Founding Fathers wrote it, the Constitution
is a living document that was intentionally left vague to give it life
and adaptability. A system of checks and balances was put in place
so that no branch of the government would overstep the powers of another. However, because both times and circumstances
continuously change, it is nearly impossible to solve every arising
problem by turning to examples from the past. In times of war,
preserving national security comes first, and the practice of following every legal rule may become secondary for a time. Though
both President Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt took
actions that violated civil liberties during the Civil War and World
War II, respectively, they were measures taken to ensure that the
nation would return to its original state of unity and stability. It is
because of leaders such as Lincoln and Roosevelt, who challenged
the Constitution by setting courageous and bold precedents, that
the United States has been able to keep her Constitution alive.
166
Jiweon Kim
Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the
Civil War: Selected Writings and Speeches ed. Michael P.
Johnson (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001) p. 63
2
Ibid., p. 123
3
Sherrill Halbert, “The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus by President Lincoln,” The American Journal of Legal
History 2, no. 2 (April 1958) p. 97
4
Ibid., p. 98
5
“Lincoln’s Suspension of Habeas Corpus,” in Landmark
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court IV ed. Maureen
Harrison and Steve Gilbert (La Jolla, California: Excellent
Books, 1994) p. 57
6
James M. McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as
Commander in Chief (New York: Penguin Press, 2009) p. 27
7
Lincoln, p. 131
8
McPherson, Tried by War, p.29
9
McPherson, email interview by Jiweon Kim, May 26, 2010
10
Lincoln, p. 285
11
Benjamin A. Kleinerman, “Lincoln’s Example: Executive
Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism,” Perspectives on
Politics 3, no. 4 (December 2005) p. 803
12
Ibid., p. 803
13
John Yoo, Crisis and Command: The History of Executive
Power from George Washington to George W. Bush (New York,
New York: Kaplan Publishing, 2009) p. 296
14
Ibid., p. 296
15
Jacobus TenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W.
Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Causes and
Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in
World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954) p.
26
16
Jill Norgren and Serena Nanda, American Cultural
Pluralism and Law (New York: Praeger 1988) p. 76
17
TenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, p. 68
18
Cabell Philips, The 1940s: Decade of Triumph and
Trouble (New York: Macmillan, 1975) p. 64
19
Kenneth Sydney Davis, FDR, the War President, 19401943: A History (New York: Random House, 2000) pp. 418-419
20
Last Witnesses: Reflections on the Wartime Internment
of Japanese Americans ed. Erica Harth (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2001) p. 256
1
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Maisie Conrat and Richard Conrat, Executive Order
9066: The Internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans (San
Francisco: Serimshaw Press, 1972) p. 21
22
“Korematsu vs. United States,” in Landmark Decisions of
the United States Supreme Court II ed. Maureen Harrison and
Steve Gilbert (Beverly Hills, California: Excellent Books, 1992)
p. 54
23
Ibid., p. 58
24
Ibid., p. 58
25
Norgren and Nanda, p. 76
21
Bibliography
Conrat, Maisie, and Richard Conrat, Executive Order 9066:
The Internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans San Francisco:
Scrimshaw Press, 1972
Davis, Kenneth Sydney, FDR, the War President, 1940-1943:
A History New York: Random House, 2000
Halbert, Sherrill, “The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus by President Lincoln,” The American Journal of Legal
History 2, no. 2, April 1958, pp. 95-116
Kleinerman, Benjamin A., “Lincoln’s Example: Executive
Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism,” Perspectives on
Politics 3, no. 4, December 2005, pp. 801-816
“Korematsu vs. United States,” in Landmark Decisions
of the United States Supreme Court II, edited by Maureen
Harrison and Steve Gilbert, Beverly Hills, California: Excellent
Books, 1992, pp. 51-65
Last Witnesses: Reflections on the Wartime Internment
of Japanese Americans edited by Erica Harth, New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2001
Lincoln, Abraham, Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the Civil
War: Selected Writings and Speeches edited by Michael P.
Johnson, Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001
167
168
Jiweon Kim
“Lincoln’s Suspension of Habeas Corpus,” in Landmark
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court IV edited by
Maureen Harrison and Steve Gilbert, La Jolla, California:
Excellent Books, 1994, pp. 57-74
McPherson, James M., Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as
Commander in Chief New York: Penguin Press, 2008
Norgren, Jill, and Serena Nanda, American Cultural
Pluralism and Law New York: Praeger, 1988
Phillips, Cabell, The 1940s: Decade of Triumph and Trouble
New York: Macmillan, 1975
TenBroek, Jacobus, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W.
Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Causes and
Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in
World War II Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954
Yoo, John, Crisis and Command: The History of Executive
Power from George Washington to George W. Bush New York,
New York: Kaplan Publishing, 2009
Copyright 2011, THE
The Concord
Review,
Inc., all rights reserved 169
CONCORD
REVIEW
DIVISION WITHIN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY
DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Rachel Harrus
E
ach year on Passover, Jews around the world gather
together to commemorate their escape from slavery in Egypt.
The holiday is rich with important symbolism about the Jewish
experience with slavery, from the bitter herbs that represent the
bitterness of slavery to the saltwater that represents the tears of
the slaves. At one point during the traditional holiday ritual, one
family member recognizes the unique significance of Passover
within the year by asking: “Why is this night different from all
other nights?”1 The answer is that on Passover, Jews from vastly
different countries and cultures come together with a common
bond, united by their shared history of oppression symbolized by
eating matzo, the bread of affliction, made in haste while crossing
the Sinai desert.
The question of slavery divided America in two during the
Civil War. These divisions affected Americans in many ways and
on different levels. The violent divide between the Union States
of the North and the Confederate States of the South gave way
to division within towns and even within families. The immensely
divisive nature of the war affected all Americans and American
groups during the period, including religious groups.
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Rachel Harrus
The Civil War tore the entire country apart, and “…nowhere was this truer than in the largest denominations of American Christianity. Unable to reconcile political disagreements, one
church after another split.”2 Secessionist Presbyterians split formally from their Northern counterpart in 1862, and similar splits
also divided the Baptist and Methodists churches along regional
lines.3 The Catholic Church, with its clear hierarchy leading to
the Vatican and the Pope, remained officially neutral throughout
the conflict. In 1861, the third Council of Catholic bishops issued
a letter, saying: “Thus, while many of the sects have divided into
hostile parties on an exciting political issue, the Catholic Church
has carefully preserved her unity of spirit in the bond of peace,
literally knowing no North, no South, no East, no West.”4
The Jewish American experience during the Civil War both
mimicked and differed from the Christian American experience.
Although Jews had immigrated to the United States from vastly
different cultures all around the world during the years leading
up to the Civil War, their minority religion united the otherwise
diverse Jewish community.5 When the national battle between
slavery proponents and abolitionists heated up prior to and during the Civil War, however, the formerly united American Jewish
community split in half.
At first glance, the Jewish division over the question of
slavery seems uniquely surprising. After all, Jews have historically
been united by a history of oppression and were themselves held
as slaves in Egypt. However, close inspection of Jewish religious
texts reveals some of the same ambiguity that tore Civil War Jewish communities apart. The different books of the Torah suggest
vastly different messages about the role of slaves and leave a wide
margin for different interpretations. Exodus mentions “slave[s]6 for
life,” and says: “When a man strikes his slave…with a rod, and he
dies there and then, he must be avenged. But if he survives a day
or two, he is not to be avenged, since he is the other’s property”
(Exodus 21:2-11, 20-21). In Exodus, at least, the Torah presents a
more brutal version of slavery.
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171
Deuteronomy, however, presents a version that seems more
like indentured servitude than life-long slavery:
If a fellow Hebrew, man or woman, is sold to you, he shall serve you
six years, and in the seventh year you shall set him free. When you set
him free, do not let him go empty-handed: Furnish him in the flock,
threshing floor, and vat, with which the Lord your God has blessed
you. Bear in mind that you were slaves in the land of Egypt and the
Lord your God redeemed you; therefore I enjoin this commandment
upon you today (Deuteronomy 15:12-18).
This textual ambiguity set the stage for later disunity between
Jewish leaders and rabbis during the Civil War. These different
Biblical interpretations also provoked debate within Christian
communities. Some Protestant churches “denounced [slavery]
as a sin and called for immediate emancipation or abolition,”
while others “argued that the Bible treated slavery as a morally
legitimate institution.”7
The debate about the Torah’s position on slavery was further
exacerbated by the fact that there is no ultimate religious authority
within the Jewish faith to determine a unified expression of Jewish
opinion on a subject.8 The rabbinate is not built on a hierarchical structure, so there is no precedent for a rabbi or other Jewish
leader to preach his political beliefs from the pulpit. This lack
of religious hierarchy “precluded any official Jewish pronouncements on the most important single religion-cultural question of
the day.”9 Without an ultimate religious authority to direct Jewish
political perspective, rabbis and other Jewish leaders were free to
lend their voices and support to both sides of the debate.
As American communities violently fractured during the
Civil War, so too did the Jewish community. Religious unity took
a backseat to regional political alliances as Jewish leaders joined
either the Union or Confederate causes. But as surprising as this
disunity might seem, this political controversy within the community was inevitably established by three things: the lack of a
hierarchy within the Jewish rabbinical structure, years of political
precedent dating back to the American Revolution, and ambiguity
within the Torah itself.
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Rachel Harrus
Although Jews were a minority group in Colonial America
of only approximately 2,000 people, they influenced politics from
very early on.10 David Emanuel, a Jew, was the sixth governor of
Georgia and many other Jews served in the early American military.11
Yet even from the earliest years of the Revolution, the community
in the United States was divided between Jewish Loyalists and
Jewish revolutionaries. While it is not known precisely how many
Jews fought with the British during the war, some Jews chose to
stay behind when the British occupied New York and others later
refused to take an oath of allegiance to Rhode Island.12 Other
Jews fought in the revolutionary army and several even reached
highly ranked positions within their units.13
Haym Salomon14 was an especially influential Jewish American during the colonial period. He played an important role in
financing the Revolution and may have even been a member of
the New York branch of the Sons of Liberty.15 In 1784, he described
his role as both an American revolutionary and a Jew by saying: “I
am a Jew; it is my own nation; I do not despair that we shall obtain
every other privilege that we aspire to enjoy along with our fellow
citizens.”16 His commitment to the revolution was absolute. One
Yom Kippur, when he heard that Washington’s soldiers were on
the verge of munity because they had not been paid, he managed
to raise $400,000 from the Jewish community in one day, including $240,000 of his own money.17 Salomon was not the only Jew
to financially support the Revolution, however. Several others
donated their own money, raised money, or purchased provisions
for soldiers.18
The end of the Revolutionary War and the creation of the
American Constitution paved the road for Jews to assume even
more influential positions in the United States. While Jews had
previously been banned from holding public office and from
practicing law, there were some improvements in the post-Bill of
Rights period.19 President George Washington even wrote a letter
to the Sephardic Jewish congregation in Newport, Rhode Island,
on August 17, 1790, to assure them of their equal status in the
new United States:
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173
May the children of the stock of Abraham who dwell in the land
continue to merit and enjoy the goodwill of the other inhabitants.
Everyone shall sit safely under his own vine and fig tree and there
shall be none to make him afraid.20
Although the United States was not immune to the anti-Semitism
that plagued most of the world, many early Jewish immigrants
found a home in the United States and quickly began to share
the same nationalism that their fellow citizens did.
By the time the Civil War broke out in 1861, there were
approximately 150,000 Jews in America.21 Jewish soldiers served in
the militaries of both sides of the conflict, with 7,000 Jews fighting
for the Union Army and 3,000 Jews fighting for the Confederate
Army.22 As they had during the Revolutionary War, many Jewish
soldiers reached high-level positions in the Union and Confederate armies, with 21 Jewish colonels and even nine Jewish generals
serving in the field.23
The Jewish community joined the debate over slavery in
non-military ways as well. On the front lines of the Jewish contribution to the slavery debate were Jewish-American newspaper-owners
such as Mordecai Noah, who argued a strong pro-slavery position,
and Morris Pinner, who argued for abolition. Jewish-American
politicians also voiced strong opinions. Senators Judah Benjamin
and David Yulee both argued in favor of the slave system, while
Isidor Bush and Philip J. Joachimsen championed abolition.
The most vocal Jewish proponent of the pro-slavery position was Dr. Morris J. Raphall of New York City. On January 4,
1861, President Buchanan proclaimed a National Fast Day to
encourage prayer and mobilize national sentiment against the
impending break-up of the United States.24 As Jews around the
country gathered to observe the day of prayer, Raphall took advantage of the occasion and delivered a speech on “The Bible View
of Slavery,” which placed Judaism in opposition to abolitionism.
He proclaimed that there was no place in the Bible that prohibited
slavery, and, in fact, insisted that biblical law guaranteed the right
to own slaves.25 He argued:
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Rachel Harrus
How dare you…denounce slaveholding as a sin? When you remember
that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Job—the men with whom the Almighty
conversed, with whose names he emphatically connects his own most
holy name…—that these men were slaveholders, does it not strike
you that you are guilty of something very little short of blasphemy?26
He then challenged the abolitionist orators to produce evidence
that the Bible forbade slavery.
In an attempt to seem objective, Raphall did contrast the
biblical portrayal of slavery with the brutal slavery practiced in
the South at the time. He suggested that the South should adopt
a more human version of slavery that would be, he argued, more
consistent with the biblical version of slavery.27 But abolitionists
received the majority of his criticism for their “misrepresentation
of the Bible and for their agitation against the legitimate rights of
Southerners.”28 While Raphall claimed that he himself did not
support slavery, his overall argument was that the Bible could not
legitimately be used to support abolition.
Raphall’s sermon was the most influential ever delivered
by an American Rabbi. His interpretation of the Bible was particularly useful to the anti-abolitionists, whose rhetoric depended
substantially on the Bible’s translation.29 A pamphlet, also called
“The Bible View of Slavery,” which reprinted this and similarly
sermons, received widespread circulation. The Richmond Daily
Dispatch said that the sermon was “the most powerful argument
delivered” in the entire religious controversy about slavery. This
speech was also used throughout the South as evidence that Jewish
leaders supported the cause of secession. In a speech before the
Virginia House of Delegates, ex-Governor Wyndham Robertson
referenced Raphall’s speech when he said.
Nor perhaps is it inappropriate to remember here a late powerful
and eloquent voice that has been raised by a learned Israelite in New
York in vindication of that social institution [i.e., slavery] in which
our peace and welfare are vitally involved…30
In Memphis, Tennessee, Rev. Simon Tuska also referenced
Raphall’s speech in a letter to the Memphis Daily Appeal in which
he wrote glowingly of a rabbi who had delivered “the most forceful arguments and justification of the slavery of the African race,
THE CONCORD REVIEW
175
and the most thorough refutation of…rabid abolitionist views.”
The Charleston Mercury also praised Raphall for “defend[ing] us in
one of the most powerful arguments put forth north or south.”31
But it was not long before Jewish abolitionists responded
forcefully to Raphall’s speech. Michael Heilprin, a Polish-Jewish
intellectual, gave the first response to Raphall’s presentation published in the New York Tribune.32 Shocked that a Jew would argue
in support of slavery, he wrote:
…being a Jew myself, I felt exceedingly humbled; I may say outraged,
by the sacrilegious words of the Rabbi. Have we not had enough of
the ‘reproach of Egypt?’ Must the stigma of Egyptian principles be
fastened on the people of Israel by Israelitish lips themselves?33
Heilprin went on to refute and attack each of Raphall’s contentions
and interpretations. He was appalled at the rabbi’s interpretation
of Judaism, and said that it was “nonsense to pretend that everything preserved in the Bible retained a divine sanction.”34 Raphall’s
speech, and the variety of emphatic responses, placed the Jewish
pro-slavery element firmly into the debate.
Raphall’s anti-slavery counterpart was Rabbi David Einhorn
of Baltimore, a leading Jewish abolitionist. He wrote four separate
articles in response to Raphall’s sermon in his monthly publication,
Sinai. Einhorn argued that the question must be reformulated: it
is not whether the Bible mentions slavery, he argued, but whether
the Bible “merely tolerates [slavery]…or whether it favors, approves of
and justifies and sanctions it in its moral aspect.”35 Einhorn argued
that the scriptures had an abolitionist spirit, regardless of what
the Bible concretely said on the subject, and said that the religious
principles of freedom and righteousness must ultimately triumph
over “ancient prejudies.”36
Einhorn believed that there was a basic relationship between Jewish Americans and Black Americans. Each group was
a minority whose liberty was dependent upon an atmosphere of
freedom and not enslavement. He believed that to ensure freedom
for one minority group, freedom must be secured for all minority
groups:
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Rachel Harrus
…Is it anything else but a deed of Amalek, rebellion against God, to
enslave human beings created in His image, and to degrade them
to a state of beasts having no will of their own? Is it anything else but
an act of ruthless and wicked violence, to reduce defenseless human
beings to a condition of merchandise…?37
Einhorn was adamant in his belief that “any Jew who lifts his hand
against the Union is a Jew to be considered equal to a parricide.”38
Many Jewish leaders, however, were adamantly opposed
to Einhorn’s view and his propensity to use his pulpit to espouse
them. The editor of the Jewish Messenger, Samuel Isaac, condemned
Einhorn when he wrote: “it seems that he has been mistaking his
vocation, and making the pulpit the vehicle for political invective.”39 These Jewish leaders, unlike Einhorn and Raphall, were
opposed to the use of their religious influence to write in support
of their political beliefs for national magazines and newspapers.
The tension erupted on April 19, 1861, when riots broke
out between Union and Confederate sympathizers in Baltimore.
A number of abolitionists (and people merely suspected of being abolitionists) were killed and the printing press of Einhorn’s
Sinai was set on fire.40 Friends urged Einhorn to flee north, but
he refused repeatedly. A number of young men from his congregation established an armed guard around his house to protect
him, and finally, on the fourth day of rioting, Einhorn agreed to
flee north. Although he intended to return when the violence
subsided, he never did return to Baltimore. The congregation was
itself so divided between political perspectives that they asked him
to stop commenting on the issue of slavery, writing: “it would be
very desirable…if in the future there would be no comment in the
pulpit on the excitable issues of the time.”41 This condition was
unacceptable to Einhorn, and he settled into life in Philadelphia.
Despite Einhorn’s self-imposed exile to Philadelphia, other
Jewish leaders vocally continued the debate that Einhorn and
Raphall had started. Another Jewish abolitionist, Rabbi Bernhard
Felsenthal of Sinai Temple in Chicago, delivered a number of antislavery sermons and even refused to apply for a rabbinical position
at an Alabama congregation because he felt that he could not live
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177
in a pro-slavery environment.42 But although Felsenthal shared
many of Einhorn’s beliefs, he did not join Einhorn in condemning
Confederate Jews who approved of slavery. He argued that these
Jews were the minority, and that for the most part American Jews
were “heart and soul, dedicated to the anti-slavery movement.”43
Another especially dynamic rabbi who supported the Union
was Sabato Morais of Philadelphia. Unlike Einhorn and Felsenthal, however, Morais did not support the Union for abolitionist
reasons. Instead, he was a devout supporter of President Lincoln
and of Republicanism. He argued that it was critical for the United
States to preserve the Constitution for the sake of republicanism
worldwide.44 As an immigrant, Morais came from a world of political strife, and knew firsthand how easily freedom can be lost and
how difficult it is to regain. He was therefore passionate about the
preservation of the Constitution and of democracy. The future of
democracy hung in the balance, he argued, so it was crucial that
America come together for a speedy recovery. He could not speak
in favor of abolitionists, who he condemned for their willingness
to throw away the nation rather than live with slavery. Equally
abhorrent to Morais was the notion that the Southerners would
“cast away as worthless the precious legacy of their father” to defend slavery.45 When war became a reality, however, Morais gave
his support to the Union in the belief that survival of the nation
was of the utmost importance and preached pro-Union sermons
whenever he got the chance. These discourses gradually attracted
a following, and more of his sermons were printed in the press
than those of any other rabbi.46
While Morais supported the Union at all costs, Isaac Meyer
Wise believed that peace was paramount. He felt that it was impossible to side with either the North or the South. The notion that
one would pick up arms against their fellow man was abhorrent
to him, and so he maintained a stance of neutrality even as war
broke out. Wise continued to be sensitive to the idea that Jews in
the Southern states had every right to support the Confederacy.
He argued that it would be normal and natural, after all, for Jews
to assimilate to the culture in which they live. He argued that
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Rachel Harrus
Northern Jews could not “expect the Jews [in the South] to stand
in opposition to the masses of people,” he recognized their right
to secede.47
Like Einhorn, Wise expressed many of his opinions in
his Jewish newsletter, Israelite, and lost large numbers of Southern subscribers when the war broke out.48 Israelite was not the
only Jewish newspaper to take a financial hit during the time.
On April 26, 1861, Rabbi Samuel M. Isaacs wrote an editorial in
support of the Union, entitled “Stand By the Flag!” in the Jewish
Messenger newspaper. He argued that everyone should support the
Union’s cause, writing: “Whether native or foreign born, Gentile
or Israelite, stand by it, and you are doing your duty, and acting
well your part on the side of liberty and justice!” In response, the
Hebrew Congregation of Shreveport, Louisiana, cancelled their
subscription to the Jewish Messenger in protest.49
Although Rabbis conducted most of the debate about
slavery and secession in Jewish newspapers and newsletters of the
time, Jewish political leaders also joined the conversation. Judah
Benjamin and David Yulee, the two prominent Confederate Jewish senators, shared much in common. They were both born in
the West Indies, raised in the South, and were U.S. Senators in
the years before the Civil War.50 They both also played prominent
roles in secession.
Benjamin climbed the political ladder in Louisiana quickly
and eventually became the first openly Jewish member of the U.S.
Senate; Yulee had been previously elected, but he denied his Jewish ancestry.51 Benjamin’s Judaism did cause some problems for
him during his career—at one point, a justice of the peace listed
his name as “Judas” rather than “Judah” on an affidavit—but for
the most part, he was respected as an influential Senator.52 But
although Benjamin acknowledged his Judaism, he was not actively
involved in the faith. He, like Yulee, married a Christian woman
and remained largely detached from religion.53
Yulee and Benjamin were both slave-owners, but Benjamin’s support for slavery seems to have been less ardent, and in
later years he was even among those who proposed a Confederate
THE CONCORD REVIEW
179
emancipation plan towards the end of the Civil War.54 In earlier
years, however, his arguments for slavery prompted fellow Senator
Benjamin Wade of Ohio, a passionate abolitionist, to call him an
“Israelite with Egyptian principles.”55
Yulee also was the subject of scorn for his vocal support of
secession and slavery. Some of the scorn even came from within
the Jewish community; the Northern Jewish press responded to
a description of him as Jewish in the New York Times by disowning
him and saying that he “had been an Israelite long, long ago” but
was no longer a member of the community.56 But the ridicule that
Yulee endured from both the Jewish and non-Jewish communities
did not change his politics, and Yulee was one of the first Southern
senators to announce the secession of a Southern state—his home
state of Florida—on the Senate floor.57
Benjamin’s home state of Louisiana seceded 16 days later,
and Benjamin left the Senate almost immediately thereafter. He
quickly moved to Montgomery, Alabama, where the new Confederate Congress was in session and on February 25, 1861, he was
confirmed as the first attorney general of the Confederate States
of America.58 Benjamin’s powerful role in the secession did not go
unnoticed by the Northern press; one Boston newspaper, referring
to Benjamin, wrote scathingly: “We ask whether the Jews, having
no country of their own, desire to put other nations in the same
unhappy condition.”59
But as the Civil War ranged on and it gradually became
clear that the Confederacy was losing, Benjamin and his close
friend Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederate States,
struggled to find ways to turn the tide of the war. Eventually,
Benjamin proposed that the South offer slaves their freedom if
they agreed to fight in the war, but that proposal was quickly rejected.60 When the Confederacy eventually fell and General Lee
surrendered, Benjamin fled to England and Yulee worked in the
railroad industry until his death shortly thereafter.61
The end of the Civil War left the Southern Jewish community in much the same state as the rest of the South: impoverished,
disheartened, and scattered. The major impact of the post-war
180
Rachel Harrus
period was that many Southern Jews moved north to New York or
Philadelphia, and the population of Jews in the South dwindled as
a result.62 New Jewish immigrants to the United States also avoided
the Southern states during the post-war period, since the longtime
use of slave labor had left wages much lower than in the North.63
Given the centuries-old Jewish history of oppression and
slavery, it would seem that Jewish Americans during the Civil War
would have united behind the cause of abolition. Instead, various
important factors led the Jewish community to politically divide:
ambiguity within the Torah, the lack of rabbinical hierarchy, and a
precedent of political disunity within the community. Even from
the earliest years of colonial America, Jews disagreed about political issues and were willing and able to offer up their financial
support or even their lives to support those causes.
Ultimately, the Jewish Americans during the Civil War chose
allegiance to their country (whether that was the United States of
America or the Confederate States of America) over allegiance
to their faith. This Jewish nationalistic pride was provoked by the
history of multiple diaspora the Jewish community had endured.
Jews had lived for generations without a permanent homeland,
forced to live as global nomads, so when Jewish immigrants moved
to the United States—a somewhat more welcoming environment
than some European countries at the time—those immigrants
firmly committed to their new home as quickly and as ardently as
possible. Jewish Americans during the Civil War chose to be loyal
to what they had always lacked: a home.
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181
1
Susan R. Friedland, The Passover Table (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1994) print, p. 11
2
Kathleen Trainor, “But the Choir Did Not Sing: How the
Civil War Split the First Unitarian Church,” Washington History
7.2 (1995) pp. 55, JSTOR Web, 27 May 2010, <http://www.jstor.
org/stable/40073163>
3
Ibid., p. 55
4
John Francis Maguire, The Irish in America (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1868) print, p. 1
5
Bertram Wallace Korn, American Jewry and the Civil War
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2001) print, p. 3
6
The original Hebrew word is “ebed,” which has been
translated to English as both “slave” and “servant.”
7
James Howell Moorhead, “Religion in the Civil War:
The Northern Side,” National Humanities Center (Princeton
Theological Seminary, Oct. 2000) Web, 15 May 2010 <http://
nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nineteen/nkeyinfo/
cwnorth.htm>
8
Korn, p. 20
9
Ibid., p. 18
10
Henry L. Feingold, Zion in America: The Jewish
Experience from Colonial Times to the Present (New York:
Hippocrene Books, 1981) print, p. 174
11
Oscar Reiss, The Jews in Colonial America (Jefferson,
North Carolina: McFarland & Co., 2004) print, p. 140
12
Ibid., p. 141
13
Ibid., p. 143
14
“Haym” is sometimes spelled as “Chaim” and “Salomon”
is sometimes spelled as “Solomon.”
15
Reiss, p. 149
16
Lauren R. Schwartz, Jews and the American Revolution:
Haym Solomon and Others (Jefferson, North Carolina:
McFarland & Co., 1987) print, p. 24
17
Reiss, p. 151
18
Ibid., p. 153
19
Ibid., p. 173
20
Zalman Schachter-Shalomi, “Denominationalism and
Jewish Renewal,” American Voices 71.2 (2007) p. 26, Google
Scholar Web, 26 February 2010 <http://www.therra.org/
Reconstructionist/Spring2007.pdf>
21
Bertram Wallace Korn, “Lincoln and the Jews,” Journal of
the Illinois State Historical Society 48.2 (1955) p. 183
182
Rachel Harrus
22
Stephen David Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler,
Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and
Military History (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2000)
print, p. 1070
23
Seymour Brody, Jewish Heroes and Heroines of America
(Hollywood: Lifetime Books, Inc., 1996) print, p. 221
24
Korn, p. 20
25
Ibid., p. 20
26
Ibid., p. 21
27
Ibid., p. 21
28
Ibid., p. 21
29
Ibid., p. 21
30
Ibid., p. 22
31
Ibid., p. 22
32
Ibid., p. 22
33
Ibid., p. 23
34
Ibid., p. 23
35
Ibid., p. 24
36
Ibid., p. 25
37
Ibid., pp. 24-25
38
Ibid., p. 28
39
Ibid., p. 28
40
Ibid., p. 26
41
Ibid., p. 26
42
Ibid., p. 27
43
Ibid., p. 28
44
Ibid., p. 42
45
Ibid., p. 42
46
Ibid., p. 44
47
Ibid., p. 48
48
Ibid., p. 49
49
Ibid., p. 53
50
Robert N. Rosen, The Jewish Confederates (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2000) print, p. 50
51
Ibid., p. 59
52
Ibid., p. 59
53
Ibid., p. 59
54
Ibid., p. 63
55
Ibid., p. 64
56
Ibid., p. 68
57
Ibid., p. 67
58
Ibid., p. 70
59
Ibid., p. 70
THE CONCORD REVIEW
183
Ibid., p. 84
Ibid., p. 87
62
Theodore Rosengarten and Dale Rosengarten, A Portion
of the People: Three Hundred Years of Southern Jewish Life
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002) print,
pp. 140-141
63
Ibid., p. 143
60
61
Bibliography
Brody, Seymour Jewish Heroes and Heroines of America
Hollywood: Lifetime Books, Inc., 1996, print
Faber, Eli, Jews, Slaves, and the Slave Trade New York: New
York University Press, 1998
Feingold, Henry L., Zion in America: The Jewish
Experience from Colonial Times to the Present New York:
Hippocrene Books, 1981, print
Ferris, Marcie Cohen, and Mark I. Greenberg, Jewish Roots
in Southern Soil: A History Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis
University Press, 2006, print
Friedland, Susan R., The Passover Table New York: Harper
Collins Publishers, Inc., 1994 print
Friedman, Saul S., Jews and the American Slave Trade New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998, print
Heidler, Stephen David, and Jeanne T. Heidler,
Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and
Military History Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2000,
print
Korn, Bertram Wallace, American Jewry and the Civil War
Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2001, print
Korn, Bertram Wallace, “Lincoln and the Jews,” Journal of
the Illinois State Historical Society 48.2, 1955
Maguire, John Francis, The Irish in America London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1868, print
Moorhead, James Howell, “Religion in the Civil War:
The Northern Side,” National Humanities Center Princeton
Theological Seminary, October 2000, Web, 15 May 2010
<http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nineteen/
nkeyinfo/cwnorth.htm>
O’Connor, Thomas H., and Anthony B. Lalli, “Roman Views
on the American Civil War,” The Catholic Historical Review
57.1, 1971, pp. 21-41, print
184
Rachel Harrus
Reiss, Oscar, The Jews in Colonial America Jefferson, North
Carolina: McFarland & Co., 2004, print
Rosen, Robert N., The Jewish Confederates Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2000, print
Rosengarten, Theodore, and Dale Rosengarten, A Portion
of the People: Three Hundred Years of Southern Jewish Life
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002, print
Schachter-Shalomi, Zalman, “Denominationalism and
Jewish Renewal,” American Voices 71.2, 2007, pp. 26-33, Google
Scholar Web, 26 February 2010 <http://www.therra.org/
Reconstructionist/Spring2007.pdf>
Schwartz, Lauren R., Jews and the American Revolution:
Haym Solomon and Others Jefferson, North Carolina:
McFarland & Co., 1987, print
Trainor, Kathleen, “But the Choir Did Not Sing: How the
Civil War Split the First Unitarian Church,” Washington History
7.2, 1995, pp. 54-71, JSTOR Web, 27 May 2010, <http://www.
jstor.org/stable/40073163>
Copyright 2011, THE
The Concord
Review,
Inc., all rights reserved 185
CONCORD
REVIEW
YOUNG HICKORY:
THE LIFE AND PRESIDENCY OF JAMES KNOX POLK
Rachel Waltman
I
n May 1844, Democratic Party leaders met in Baltimore
to nominate their candidate for the presidential election to be
held later that year. They passed over leading contenders, including Martin Van Buren, Lewis Cass, John C. Calhoun, and Thomas
Hart Benton, and instead nominated James Knox Polk, a relatively
unknown former Congressman from Tennessee.1 Many people
thought Polk’s political career was over following his second failed
bid to win reelection as Governor of Tennessee just nine months
before.2 The nomination of this “dark horse” candidate—which
surprised no one more than Polk himself—was met with ridicule and
derision by the opposing Whig Party.3 “Who is James K. Polk?” they
jeered.4 The Whigs considered Polk no match for their candidate,
Henry Clay, a popular and influential politician from Kentucky.
Even Clay, in a moment of “arrogant candor,” expressed regret
that the Democrats had not selected a candidate “more worthy
of a contest.”5 The Whigs should not have been so smug. Buoyed
by the popularity of the Democrats’ expansionist platform, Polk
won the election by a narrow margin.6 At age 49, he became the
Rachel Waltman is a Senior at Tenafly High School in Tenafly, New Jersey,
where she wrote this paper for Mr. Richard Luther’s AP United States
History course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
186
Rachel Waltman
11th President of the United States, the youngest man up to that
time to be elected to the position.7
For the next four years, Polk tirelessly devoted himself to
achieving each and every one of the goals he set during his presidency. Yet, despite his many accomplishments, Polk did not escape
his four years in office with his reputation unscathed. Despite
America’s victory in the Mexican War, the Whigs, led by Abraham
Lincoln, harshly criticized Polk for his role in the outbreak of the
war, which led to his censure by the House of Representatives in
1848.8 Several years later, Ulysses S. Grant concurred with Lincoln’s
assessment of Polk in his memoirs, referring to the Mexican War
as “the most unjust war ever waged by a stronger against a weaker
nation.”9 These attacks on Polk negatively affected history’s view
of him. However, attitudes about him began to change in the 20th
century, as presidential historians took a fresh look at Polk’s accomplishments, and consistently included him in their rankings
of America’s “great” or “near great” presidents.10 As a result, many
Americans were again asking, “Who is James K. Polk?”
I. Polk’s Background and How it Influenced him as President
James K. Polk was born on November 2, 1795 in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, a place “where men lived simply on
the fruits of their own labor without expectations of easy wealth
and dealt honestly with each other on a basis of rough equality
and mutual respect.”11 Polk was the first of 10 children. His father,
Samuel Polk, was of Scots-Irish descent, and was a slaveholder, a
successful farmer, and a surveyor. His mother, Jane Knox Polk, was
the great-grandniece of Scottish Reformation leader John Knox.12
Polk’s childhood was marked by several distinct influences
that would later affect him as President. Significantly, Polk’s grandfather, Ezekial, and his father Samuel, were staunch supporters of
Jefferson’s Republican philosophy, which undoubtedly influenced
Polk’s later political views. As one historian notes, “As Polk grew
into adulthood, everything he had grasped about the conflict
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187
between Federalist and Republican values seemed to reinforce a
basic and logical argument that the country would be better served
if national government was the declared servant of all the people
(or all those who were not slaves) and was barred from acting
chiefly as the agent of the rich and powerful constituencies.”13
While the Polk family may have agreed on politics, they
did not agree on religion. Polk’s mother, Jane, was a devout Presbyterian. Raised under the influence of her strict Presbyterianism,
Polk derived a rigid self-discipline that would govern his actions
throughout his life.14 His father, however, was not deeply religious.
During Polk’s baptism ceremony, Samuel Polk refused to affirm
his belief in Christianity. As a result, the Reverend James Wallis
refused to baptize the infant Polk.15 Perhaps due to this religious
tension within his family, Polk was not known to “speak on his religious commitment” during his presidency, nor is there anything
in his presidential diary to suggest “that he prayed for guidance
or heavenly intervention in his life—not even during the war with
Mexico.”16
When Polk was 11, he and his family moved to the Duck
River region of Middle Tennessee. There, the family grew rich,
with Samuel Polk turning to land speculation and becoming a
county judge and respected civic leader.17 His family’s desire for
land and the success they encountered after moving west no doubt
influenced Polk’s later commitment to the large-scale expansion
of the nation’s borders during his presidency.
During his childhood, Polk suffered from extremely poor
health. As a result, his early education was delayed “in consequence
of having been very much afflicted.”18 When he was 17, his illness
was diagnosed as urinary stones, which required major surgery.19
His father sent Polk to Philadelphia in the back of a covered wagon
to be operated on by Dr. Philip Syng Physick, who was known as
“the father of American surgery.”20 However, Polk’s pain became
so severe during the journey that his father instead turned to Dr.
Ephraim McDowell of Danville, Kentucky to perform the surgery.
Polk was awake during the incredibly painful surgery, in which a
sharp instrument called a “gorget” was forced through his pros-
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tate and into his bladder to remove the urinary stones.21 Despite
excruciating pain, the surgery was a success, although it may have
left Polk sterile, as he never had children.22 One historian concludes that surviving this encounter gave Polk the characteristics
of “courage, grit, and unyielding iron will” that he later displayed
in dealing with his opponents as President.23
After he was cured of his bad health, Polk was determined
to get a proper education. Following his recovery from the surgery,
he enrolled at a Presbyterian school near his home. A year later,
his father agreed to send him to the more distinguished Bradley
Academy, located in Murfreesboro, a small town near Nashville.
Polk excelled at his new school, where he was adjudged “the most
promising boy in the school.”24
In 1816, Polk was admitted to the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. He majored in mathematics and the
classics, “subjects he felt would best discipline his mind.”25 At the
University of North Carolina, Polk joined the Dialectic Society, one
of the school’s debate clubs, where he honed both his debate and
leadership skills. Polk held a succession of offices in the Dialectic
Society, and twice was elected as its president.26 Polk’s participation
in the Dialectic Society led to an interest in a career in law and
politics. According to historian Walter R. Borneman, “it was here
that he learned to speak, write, and formulate an argument.”27
II. Polk’s Character and Personality
With respect to his character and personality, Polk was a
man who was true to his beliefs, and who never seemed in doubt.
As one historian notes, “On the first day when he strode onto the
floor of the Tennessee House of Representatives, there was about
him a moral certitude and self-righteousness that he carried to the
White House.”28 Others have been less charitable of Polk’s character and personality, referring to him as “colorless, methodical,
plodding [and] narrow”29 and a “stern task-master.”30
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Polk’s adversaries often poked fun at his stiff and humorless
demeanor. For example, John Quincy Adams once wrote in his
diary that Polk “has no wit, no literature, no point of argument, no
gracefulness of delivery, no elegance of language, no philosophy,
no pathos, no felicitous impromptus; nothing that constitutes an
orator, but confidence, fluency, and labor.”31
Nonetheless, even Polk’s detractors would surely agree
that he was extremely disciplined and hard-working. He routinely
worked 12-hour days, and rarely delegated responsibilities to others.
“I have never in my life labored more constantly or intensely,” he
once said of his presidency. “I am the hardest working man in the
country.”32 Polk’s strong work ethic, self-discipline, and confidence
would allow him to accomplish much during his presidency. In A
Country of Vast Designs, author Robert W. Merry sums it up best:
Small of stature and drab of temperament, James Polk was often
underestimated by Whig opponents and sometimes by his own Democratic allies, despite his early political accomplishments in Congress.
He struck many as a smaller-than-life figure with larger-than-life
ambitions. But he harbored an absolute conviction that he was a
man of destiny, and his unremitting tenacity ultimately produced a
successful presidency.33
III. Polk’s Non-Government Career
After graduating from the University of North Carolina
with honors in 1818, Polk returned to Tennessee to study law. Polk
never envisioned the law as a permanent career choice, but rather
as a means to an end. His participation in the Dialectic Society
had spurred an interest in politics, and for Polk, the law provided
the most obvious path into the political arena.34
To gain admission to the bar in Polk’s day, it was necessary
to study cases under the guidance of a licensed practitioner. Polk
was accepted to study under Felix Grundy, a prominent Nashville
trial lawyer and experienced politician. Grundy had moved to
Tennessee from Kentucky, where he had served both as a representative to the United States House of Representatives and as
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chief justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court.35 Grundy quickly
became Polk’s first mentor, and the two men would remain close
friends and political allies in the years to come.36
After completing his law studies with Grundy, Polk was
admitted to the Tennessee bar in June 1820.37 He established a law
practice in Columbia, Tennessee. His first case involved defending
his father against a public fighting charge. He was able to secure
a dismissal of the charge for a fine of $1 plus costs.38 Polk’s law
practice was successful, since there were many cases regarding the
settlement of debts following the Panic of 1819. In the courtroom,
Polk was described as “wary and skillful, but frank and honorable
[and] in addressing a jury he was always animated and impressive
in manner.”39
Despite his busy law practice, Polk still found time for socializing. During this time, he met Sarah Childress, the daughter
of a wealthy and respectable family from Murfreesboro. While
the details of their courtship are largely unknown, a favorite
story among historians is that Andrew Jackson encouraged their
romance:
Supposedly, Polk asked his mentor, Jackson, what he should do to
advance his political career. Jackson advised him to find a wife and
settle down. Asked if he had anyone in particular in mind, Old Hickory
replied, “The one who will never give you trouble. Her wealthy family, education, health and appearance are all superior. You know her
well.” It took Polk only a moment to suggest what should have been
the obvious. “Do you mean Sarah Childress?” he asked. “I shall go
at once and ask her.”40
Polk and Sarah Childress were married on New Year’s Day
1824. Polk was 28 years old; Sarah was 20. They remained married
until Polk’s death in 1849.41 By all accounts, their marriage was a
true love match, and Sarah was an “ideal mate” for Polk.42 As John
Seigenthaler notes in his biography of Polk, “Sarah’s personality—outgoing, vivacious, and witty—was a natural complement to
her husband’s formal reserve. She brought out the best in him.”43
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191
IV. Polk’s Government Career
In 1819, during the time Polk was studying law under Felix
Grundy in Nashville, Grundy was elected to the Tennessee state
legislature. He suggested that Polk accompany him to Murfreesboro, where the legislature was to meet, and seek election as clerk
of the state senate. In September 1819, Polk was elected clerk of
the Tennessee state senate. He was paid the sum of $6 per day to
manage the paperwork of the senate, which was viewed as a very
generous wage, since legislators received only $4 per day.44 Polk
quickly established a reputation as “a diligent and effective senate
clerk.”45 He was reelected in 1821, and remained in the post until
1822.46
In 1822, Polk resigned his position as clerk of the state
senate to run for the Tennessee state legislature. He won the
election, defeating the incumbent, William Yancey, and became
the new representative of Maury County, Tennessee.47 In 1825,
Polk ran for the United States House of Representatives for Tennessee’s sixth congressional district. He campaigned vigorously,
traveling throughout the district to court voters. Polk’s opponents
said that at 29 years old, he was too young to serve in the House
of Representatives.48 However, Polk proved them wrong and won
the election.
Polk’s congressional career lasted 14 years. Elected to the
House of Representatives seven times, Polk learned campaigning
techniques and strategies that would serve him well with the voters.49 He was a loyal supporter of the policies of his mentor and
fellow Tennessee Democrat, Andrew Jackson, who was elected
the seventh President of the United States in 1828. Jackson was
known as “Old Hickory”—as in “tough as hickory”—a nickname
earned during the early days of the War of 1812.50 Polk’s support
for Jackson’s policies was so strong that he was nicknamed “Young
Hickory” after his mentor.51
In 1833, after being elected to his fifth term in Congress,
Polk became chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.52 In this position, Polk was at the center of the major domestic
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policy debate over the nation’s banking system. Throughout the
crisis, Polk remained loyal to the position of his mentor and nowPresident Andrew Jackson, and was an outspoken critic of the
Second Bank. After the Ways and Means Committee undertook
an investigation of the bank at Jackson’s request, the majority of
committee members found no evidence of wrongdoing. Polk, however, issued a minority report that contained a stinging criticism
of the bank, and recited a long list of justifications for removing
federal deposits from it.53 Polk would later deliver a speech on
the floor of the House, in which he railed against the Bank and
its head, Nicholas Biddle, calling them “despotic.”54
In June 1834, Speaker of the House Andrew Stevenson
resigned to become minister to Great Britain, leaving the position
open. Polk ran against John Bell of Tennessee for the post. After
10 ballots, Bell won, handing Polk the first defeat of his political
career.55 However, in 1835, Polk ran against Bell for Speaker, and
this time Polk won. A master of rules and procedures, Polk was
an effective Speaker of the House.56 He was the first Speaker to
“promote openly a president’s agenda,” first endorsing the policies of Andrew Jackson, and then those of his successor, Martin
Van Buren.57
The two major issues during Polk’s term as Speaker were
slavery and the economy, following the Panic of 1837.58 As discussed
in more detail herein, both of these issues, particularly slavery,
would continue to plague Polk throughout his political career.
In 1839, concerned that the rival Whig party was becoming increasingly popular in his home state of Tennessee, Polk left
Congress to return home and run for the governorship.59 He defeated the incumbent Whig, Newt Cannon, yet after serving only
one two-year term, Polk twice failed to be reelected.60 Although
his rivals assumed Polk’s political influence had peaked, he continued to look for opportunities to revive his political career, and
remained close to Andrew Jackson.61
In 1844, delegates to the Democratic Convention—who
had not forgotten Polk’s dedication to the Democratic Party over
the years—viewed Polk as a potential vice presidential candidate.62
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However, when the party’s leading presidential contenders, Martin
Van Buren and Lewis Cass, failed to gain sufficient support to win
the nomination, the deadlocked convention needed a compromise candidate. Polk was put forth as a “dark horse” candidate,
and after nine ballots, the Democratic Convention unanimously
nominated Polk as its presidential candidate for the election to
be held later that year.63
Challenging the well-known Whig candidate Henry Clay in
the 1844 election, Polk promised to actively encourage America’s
westward expansion. He favored the annexation of Texas and the
acquisition of the Oregon territory.64 Although critics expressed
concern that aggressive expansionism might lead to war with Great
Britain or Mexico, a majority of American voters accepted Polk’s
vision, and in 1844, they elected him the 11th President of the
United States by a slim margin. He was 49 years old, the youngest
person up to that time to be elected president.65
After receiving his party’s Democratic nomination in 1844,
Polk announced that if he were elected President, he would not
seek a second term.66 Aware that the Democratic Party had been
splintered into bitter factions, Polk hoped that by promising to
serve only one term if elected, his disappointed Democratic rivals
would unite behind him, believing they had another chance at
the nomination in four years.67
True to his campaign pledge, at the end of his first term,
Polk left office and returned to Tennessee in March 1849. However, he did not have much time to pursue a career after leaving
the presidency—either in the public or private sector—since he
died of cholera on June 15, 1849 in Nashville, Tennessee, only
three months after leaving office.68
V. Polk’s Literary and Other Achievements
Many people find Polk’s election as President somewhat
baffling, since he lacked the charisma of many of his fellow presidents. In addition, while Polk garnered praise for his oratorical
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skills—earning him the nickname “Napoleon of the Stump”69—he
had no literary or other achievements during his lifetime. As one
historian points out in his tongue-in-cheek essay on Polk, his most
notable achievement was likely his utter lack of achievement:
The trouble with Polk was that he never did anything to catch the
people’s eye; he never gave them anything to remember him by; nothing happened to him. He never cut down a cherry tree, he didn’t tell
funny stories, he was not impeached, he was not shot, he didn’t drink
heavily, he didn’t gamble, he wasn’t involved in scandal.70
Similarly, in accounting for the fact that so few Americans are
familiar with Polk, another historian remarked that “men are
remembered for their unique qualities, and Polk had none.”71
Nonetheless, while Polk never wrote his memoirs and had
no literary or other achievements during his lifetime, he did keep a
detailed diary during his presidency. It was discovered—along with
a collection of his other personal correspondence and papers—in
the attic of his widow, Sarah, after her death in 1896.72 The diary
was first published in four volumes in 1910, and reprinted and
abridged in later editions. Today, it is recognized as “one of the
most valuable documents for the study of the American presidency,” since it provides a “rare behind-the-scenes glimpse of the
decision-making process in the White House, and offers insight
into the day-to-day administration of the government during one
of the most critical and exciting periods in American history.”73
VI. Polk’s Philosophy of Life
While Polk may not be well known among modern Americans or easily remembered for any significant literary or other
achievements, in truth, he was a man of action who accomplished
a great deal. His philosophy of life consisted of the belief that individuals should fix their sights clearly on their goals, and pursue
them “with undeviating resolution.”74
In keeping with this philosophy, early in his administration,
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195
Polk articulated four specific goals that he believed would make
his presidency meaningful, and would “address the immediate
and long-term economic and expansionist needs of the nation.”75
First, he would lower the tariff. This action would “set the tone
of his administration, and send the message to the nation’s working agrarian middle class that this was their administration, not
subservient to the powerful eastern industrialists.”76 Second, he
would establish an independent treasury, which would bring an
end to the financial control of the nation’s funds in private banks.
Third, he would acquire Oregon from the British; in Polk’s view,
the “time had come” and “western expansion demanded it.”77
Finally, he would acquire California from Mexico. Polk believed
that America should be “a continental nation, stretching from
ocean to ocean.”78 It was—to borrow a phrase coined by journalist
John L. O’Sullivan in the summer of 1845 to describe the national
goal—our “Manifest Destiny.”79
For the next four years, Polk worked hard to achieve each
and every one of his goals. During his presidency, he rarely left
Washington. He insisted that presidents who took their duties
seriously could never take vacations. He once observed that “No
President who performs his duty faithfully and conscientiously can
have any leisure.”80 He also spent as little time as possible engaged
in socializing, preferring to delegate the responsibility of fulfilling the social and ceremonial obligations of his office to his First
Lady, Sarah.81 To Polk, attending White House social functions
was “time unprofitably spent,” and he avoided them whenever
possible.82
VII. Polk’s Philosophy of Government
Polk’s philosophy of government was shaped by the programs and policies of his mentor, Andrew Jackson. Like “Old
Hickory,” Polk or “Young Hickory,” as he was known, championed
states’ rights and a strict interpretation of the Constitution, and
maintained that the federal government did not have the authority
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to interfere in the nation’s economic affairs or in the practices of
the individual states.83 In his Inaugural Address, Polk confirmed
his view that “the Government of the United States is one of delegated and limited powers,” and that he intended to refrain from
the “exercise of doubtful or unauthorized implied powers.”84 Polk
stood behind this position in 1846, when he vetoed legislation that
would have provided federal financing for canals and other means
of transportation, based on his belief that the federal government
did not have the authority to fund state infrastructure.85
Like Jackson, Polk also believed that the President was
“the only officer of the government elected by all the people;
that he should be President of all the people, and that it was his
responsibility to heed the voice of the people and carry out the
popular will.”86 Polk viewed himself as “a humble servant of the
people,”87 working on behalf of the national interest. He felt it was
his responsibility to introduce legislation and veto congressional
actions that favored only singular or sectional interests. In his
Inaugural Address, Polk stated that he would oppose “any policy
which shall tend to favor monopolies or the peculiar interests of
sections of classes [that] operates to the prejudice of their fellow
citizens.”88
Polk’s governmental philosophy of putting the nation’s
interests ahead of special interest groups extended to his views
on tariffs. Like the Jacksonian Democrats before him, Polk opposed protective tariffs, and supported non-protective tariffs
“sufficient only to fund government obligations.”89 As he stated
in his Inaugural Address, the federal government had no “right
to tax one section of the country, or one class of citizens, or one
occupation, for the mere profit of another.”90 He further claimed
that to protect one group, such as manufacturers or industrialists,
at the expense of another, like the working and agrarian classes,
“would be unjust.”91
Finally, Polk endorsed a philosophy of government that
supported western expansion. He favored the protection of
Americans in distant territories, especially farmers.92 He further
believed that Texas should be brought into the Union, as well as
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197
the Oregon territory.93 Given his expansionist views, Polk was also
determined to acquire California from Mexico.94
VIII. How Polk Handled the Major Crises of his Presidency
The most significant crises of Polk’s tenure as President
arose in the area of foreign policy. One such crisis was the dispute
between the United States and Great Britain over the Oregon
boundary. Since 1818, both countries had jointly controlled the
territory.95 Previous administrations had offered to divide the region
along with the 49th parallel, which is approximately the present
day border between Washington State and British Columbia.96
However, the British refused, and instead wanted the demarcation
line to be along the Columbia River, which would have moved the
United States’ interests southward, to about the present border between Washington and Oregon.97 The Democrats’ platform called
for all of Oregon to come within the jurisdiction of the United
States, and demanded that the British abandon their claims to
this territory all the way north to the 54th parallel. They shouted
the slogan “54° 40’ or Fight,” a battle cry for the entire Oregon
territory.98
Although the Democratic platform asserted a claim to the
entire region, Polk offered to compromise by dividing the territory
at the 49th parallel, the same proposal that had been offered by
his predecessors.99 When the British rejected this proposal, Polk
abruptly broke off negotiations, and reasserted America’s claim
to the entire region.100 James Buchanan, Polk’s Secretary of State,
warned that, “If the president’s views were carried out—demanding land north of the forty-ninth parallel—we would have a war”
with Britain.101 Buchanan warned Polk that the American people
would not support him in a war over the Oregon territory, but
Polk disagreed.102
In his first annual message to Congress in 1845, Polk
continued to take a strong stance on Oregon. He asserted that
America’s claim to the Oregon territory “cannot be abandoned
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without a sacrifice of both national honor and interest.”103 He
then went a step further, invoking the principles of the Monroe
Doctrine: “Alluding to past British and French influences in Texas
and warning those governments away from any similar intrigues
in Oregon, California, or anywhere else in North America, Polk
became the first American President to reaffirm the Monroe
Doctrine as a basic tenet of American foreign policy.”104
As months wore on with no resolution, Polk decided that
the time had come to prepare the nation for the possibility of war.
As he explained to one congressman: “The only way to treat John
Bull is to look him in the eye…if Congress faltered or hesitated
in their course, John Bull would immediately become arrogant
and more grasping in his demands.”105 Then suddenly, the British backed down, and inquired whether the United States would
consider a proposal to set the border line at the 49th parallel, the
same resolution initially offered by Polk. While some members
of Polk’s cabinet continued to advocate a position of “54° 40’ or
Fight,” others took a more dove-like approach. In the end, Polk
was not prepared to wage war with the British and agreed to compromise.106 The territory acquired by the United States would later
form the states of Washington and Oregon and parts of Idaho and
Wyoming.107
War could not be avoided, however, when it came to the
acquisition of California. The war with Mexico over this territory
was the most severe crisis of Polk’s term, and would become the
defining event of his administration.
After Polk’s election, Congress passed a joint resolution
admitting Texas into the Union, which the Republic of Texas accepted later that year, after Polk took office.108 This move angered
Mexico, which had offered Texas its independence on the condition that it not attach itself to any other nation.109
Following the Texas annexation, Polk turned his sights on
acquiring California. In 1845, Polk sent diplomat John Slidell to
Mexico to attempt to purchase New Mexico and California for $30
million.110 However, the Mexican government, still angry over the
annexation of Texas, refused to receive Slidell, citing a problem
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199
with his credentials. In 1846, Slidell returned to Washington. Polk
regarded the dismissal of his diplomat as an insult, which left
America no choice but “to take the remedy for the injuries and
wrongs suffered.”111
In the interim, shortly after becoming President, Polk
had promised to support the Texas Republic’s claim to the Rio
Grande as its boundary with Mexico, even though such claim was
somewhat suspect.112 Following Texas’ annexation in June 1845,
Polk demonstrated his intent to uphold this pledge by ordering General Zachary Taylor to move troops from Louisiana into
Texas, and directing additional naval troops to the area. Taylor
and his men settled on the south bank of the Rio Grande, near
present-day Brownsville, Texas. The Mexican army asked Taylor
and his troops to retreat across the river, but Taylor refused, and
instead ordered the American naval ships to blockade the mouth
of the Rio Grande.113 In response, the Mexicans attacked Taylor’s
men, killing 16 American soldiers. The next day, Taylor reported
the incident to Washington, stating that “hostilities may now be
considered commenced.”114
On May 11, 1846, Polk called for a declaration of war, stating that “Mexico had passed the boundary of the United States,
has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon American soil.”115 While some in Congress challenged Polk’s assertions
in light of the dubious nature of the boundary claim, Congress
overwhelmingly approved the declaration of war, despite opposition from anti-slavery Whigs, led by John Quincy Adams.116
After two years of costly and deadly fighting, the war ended
in 1848 with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Under this Treaty,
the United States added 1.2 million square miles of territory to its
borders, including the land that would form the states of California,
New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Colorado and
Wyoming.117 When all was said and done, Mexico’s size was cut
in half, while that of the United States increased by more than a
third. The Treaty also recognized the annexation of Texas, and
acknowledged the United States’ control over the disputed Rio
Grande territory. Mexico, in turn, received $15 million for the
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territory it ceded to the United States.118
Not everyone agreed with Polk’s handling of the war. While
the war had begun with a “flourish of national patriotic fervor” and
a series of military victories, enthusiasm for the war quickly waned
as it “dragged on for almost two years, casualties mounting, costs
accelerating until Whig opposition in Congress, once a murmur,
ultimately became an orchestrated concert.”119 Abraham Lincoln,
then a young congressman from Illinois, argued that blood was
spilled on “disputed” territory, and challenged Polk to tell Congress
exactly “the spot” where blood had been spilled.120 Following its
conclusion, the Whigs denounced the war as an immoral act of
aggression, and in 1848, the House of Representatives voted to
censure Polk for starting the war.121
It is easy for critics to argue with the benefit of hindsight
that the war was unjust and should never have been fought. Yet,
given the history of animosity that existed between the United
States and Mexico, it is doubtful that the United States would
have succeeded in its quest to acquire California and the rest of
the southwest territory through negotiation alone.
IX. Polk and the Slavery Issue
If Polk failed anywhere in his desire to fulfill his expansionist
goals, it was not in seeking a declaration of war from Congress, but
rather, in failing to confront the slavery issue that his expansionist impulses brought to the fore. Western expansion reopened a
furious debate in America over the issue of allowing slavery into
the new territories. Yet, Polk failed to anticipate the catastrophic
consequences that the slavery issue would have for the nation.
Instead, he viewed it as an aggravating “side issue” that detracted
from more “important political objectives—such as preventing
concentrations of power in government and commerce, keeping
tariff rates just high enough to sustain a prudent national government, [and] finding some means of maintaining currency stability
without resorting to a nefarious national bank.”122 As one historian
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notes:
Polk failed to understand the deadly combination of the slavery and
expansion issues until the explosive results were beyond his control…
Before he became President, he shared the convictions of many
southerners about slavery—that it was a practical necessity, though in
many respects deplorable, and that it was a local matter and so should
have no connection to national politics or international diplomacy.
The ominous interjection of slavery into the Texas question during
1843 and 1844 seems to have made little impression on him.123
Although Polk was a slaveholder, he never had been an
aggressive defender of the institution. On the one hand, since his
father and grandfather both owned slaves, he had grown up with
slavery and accepted it as a fact of life. On the other, he understood
the injustice of the institution. In his first speech on the floor of
Congress, Polk referred to slavery as a “common evil” and “an
unfortunate subject,” and acknowledged that slaves were “human
beings.”124 Yet he never made any effort during his political career
to seek a cure for this “common evil.”125 Instead, he declined to
become embroiled in the slavery controversy, and insisted that the
abolitionists who attacked the institution of slavery were motivated
primarily by political and anti-Southern considerations.126 He
opposed the Wilmot Proviso, which was intended to bar slavery
from the new territories, and his own idea to extend the Missouri
Compromise line west and prohibit slavery below the 36th parallel
was largely ignored.127 As a result of Polk’s failure to understand
the depth of popular emotion over the expansion of the South’s
“peculiar institution,” the slavery issue was unresolved at the end
of Polk’s term in office, and instead, would ultimately be settled
on the battlefields of the Civil War.
X. Polk’s Relationship with the American People and Congress
Polk was not particularly popular with either the American people or Congress. While Polk viewed himself as a “humble
servant” of the people,128 the American people did not feel any
particular affection towards Polk. Prior to his presidential nomination, he was virtually unknown to the general public. Moreover,
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“lovable, or even likable, he was not.”129 Instead, Polk was “formal,
stiff and humorless,”130 and was both a workaholic and something
of a loner, and becoming President did nothing to change these
traits or enhance his popularity with the American people. He
much preferred the solitude of his office to ceremonial events,
and relied on his wife, Sarah, to deal with visiting dignitaries, as
well as the public.131
Polk was even less popular with Congress. In his dealings
with Congress, Polk “exercised a degree of control unique in
the period between Jackson and Lincoln, when Congress usually
dominated the executive.”132 He was a micromanager, who was
determined to direct and monitor the affairs of government.133
He employed several strategies to accomplish this task and impose
his will on Congress. Among these, he frequently dispatched
cabinet members to lobby support for his administrative measures
among their friends in Congress, and denied patronage to those
congressmen who failed to vote for bills he wanted enacted. He
also drafted editorials and articles that appeared in the party
newspaper, the Union, which were designed “to exert the pressure
of public opinion” on his fellow Democrats in Congess.134
As with many other Presidents, Polk’s influence over
Congress was most effective early in his term. In 1846, he enjoyed
several major congressional victories, including approval of a treaty
resolving the Oregon boundary dispute, overwhelming support
of his request for a declaration of war against Mexico, and as discussed more fully below, a lowered tariff, and the establishment
of an independent Treasury Department.135
During the second half of Polk’s term, several factors,
including “the increasing unpopularity of the Mexican War, the
Democratic loss of the House, and the incubus of the slavery question” often frustrated his efforts with Congress.136 For example, in
August 1846, when he requested an appropriation from Congress
of $2 million, to be held in reserve for negotiations with Mexico
to end the war, the House amended the bill to add the Wilmot
Proviso, which required that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist” in the territory acquired from Mexico.137
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The Senate rejected this proposal, and Polk dubbed the proviso
“mischievous and foolish,” but it continued to plague him for
the rest of his administration, “poisoning the atmosphere and
obstructing much useful legislation.”138
XI. Polk’s Imprint on U.S. and World History
Despite his shortcomings, Polk left behind a great record of
accomplishments during his one term in office. In fact, historians
have consistently ranked Polk among the “great” and “near-great”
Presidents in their polls of the greatest American Presidents, for
his ability to outline his goals and achieve each and every one.139
Domestically, he lowered the high tariffs that had been imposed in
1842 under the Tyler administration. Polk believed that low tariffs
were crucial for the success of the agricultural sector. In 1846, he
secured passage of the Walker Tariff Act (named after Treasury
Secretary Robert Walker) by a narrow margin, which provided for
one of the lowest tariffs in United States history.140 The Act was
a success, in that it stimulated trade and brought much-needed
revenue into the Treasury.
A second major accomplishment of Polk’s domestic economic policy was the establishment of an independent or constitutional Treasury for the United States, under which government
funds were held in the Treasury rather than in banks or other
financial institutions.141 All payments by and to the government
were to be made in specie. The independent Treasury restricted
the use of funds as a basis for reckless speculation, which had been
a hallmark of the state banks. This independent Treasury system
remained the dominant element of American banking until 1913,
when it was replaced by the Federal Reserve Act.142
The most significant achievements of Polk’s administration
occurred in the area of foreign policy. His administration not only
completed the annexation of Texas, but also settled the Oregon
boundary dispute with Great Britain, and fought a victorious war
with Mexico. Under Polk, the United States expanded its territory
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by more than 1.2 million square miles, whose value was immediately established following the discovery of gold in California.143
The continental expansion was a remarkable achievement
that forever altered the geography of the country. In less than
four years, Polk had added more territory to the Union than any
other president except Thomas Jefferson, thereby fulfilling the
nation’s “Manifest Destiny” to expand across North America to
the Pacific Ocean.144 Yet this was not the only long-term impact
of Polk foreign policy successes. As historian David M. Pletcher
concludes in his appraisal of Polk:
The victories of the Mexican War also won the grudging but genuine
respect of Europe. Britain withdrew most of its political influence from
Mexico and a few years later, in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, agreed
to share influence in Central America. The broad frontage on the
western coast eventually made the United States a force in Pacific
affairs. In effect, the United States was promoted to a second-rank
power whose views must be consulted in all international questions
relating to the northern half of the New World.145
Not bad for a relatively young nation and its even younger president.
XI. How Polk Changed the Power of the Presidency
During his term, Polk greatly expanded the executive
powers of the presidency, particularly its war powers and its role
as commander-in-chief. As President, Polk was determined to be
his own man, who made his own decisions. As he told his friend,
Cave Johnson, before his inauguration: “I intend to be myself the
President of the United States.”146 Even his mentor Andrew Jackson
was annoyed to discover that he could not exert influence over
the course of Polk’s administration.147
Polk was not afraid to exercise the powers of the presidency,
such as the veto power, as demonstrated by his veto in 1846 of
legislation that would have provided federal financing of canals
and other means of transportation, based on his belief that the
federal government did not have the authority to fund state infra-
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structure.148 When it came to exercising war powers, Polk did not
hesitate to act aggressively, and he never wavered about whether to
approach Congress to seek a declaration of war against Mexico.149
Polk was also “the first President to define and implement the full
powers of his office as commander-in-chief.”150 He was a “hands
on” leader, who made many of the tactical decisions involving the
Mexican War himself, despite having no formal military training.151
For all these reasons, Polk is widely considered to be the most assertive chief executive prior to the Civil War.152
Polk left behind an impressive legacy of leadership. As
former President Harry Truman aptly stated, Polk “exercised the
powers of the Presidency…as they should be exercised…[He
knew] exactly what he wanted to do in a specified period of time
and he did it, and when he got through with it, he went home.”153
Yet, Polk’s tireless pursuit of his ambitious goals took its toll
on his health. He left the presidency in a state of exhaustion, and
became ill on his journey home, dying of cholera three months
after leaving office.154
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1
John Seigenthaler, James K. Polk (New York: Henry Holt
& Co., 2003) p. 84
2
Walter R. Borneman, Polk: The Man Who Transformed
the Presidency and America (New York: Random House, 2009)
p. xvii
3
Seigenthaler, p. 3; Robert W. Johannsen, “Who Is James
K. Polk? The Enigma of our Eleventh President,” Rutherford
B. Hayes Presidential Center 14 February 1999, http://www.
rbhayes.org/hayes/scholarsworks/display.asp?id=502 (accessed
December 7, 2009)
4
Seigenthaler, p. 92
5
Terry D. Bilhartz and Alan C. Elliott, Currents in
American History: A Brief History of the United States vol. 1
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007) p. 80
6
Robert W. Merry, A Country of Vast Designs: James K.
Polk, the Mexican War and the Conquest of the American
Continent (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009) p. 110
7
David M. Pletcher, “James K. Polk,” in The Presidents: A
Reference History 3rd ed., edited by Henry F. Graff (New York:
Thomson Gale, 2002) p. 155
8
Seigenthaler, p. 146
9
Merry, p. 474
10
Ibid., p. 473; Borneman, p. 352; Seigenthaler, p. 154
11
Paul H. Bergeron, The Presidency of James K. Polk
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987) (Hereafter cited
as Bergeron, “The Presidency”) p. 10
12
Borneman, p. 6
13
Seigenthaler, p. 11
14
Johannsen, p. 3
15
Ann Graham Gaines, James K. Polk: Our Eleventh
President (Mankato, Minnesota: Child’s World, 2009) p. 7
16
Seigenthaler, p. 14
17
Borneman, p. 7
18
Seigenthaler, p. 19
19
Ibid., p. 19
20
Borneman, p. 7
21
Ibid., p. 8
22
Seigenthaler, p. 19
23
Ibid., p. 20
24
Borneman, p. 8
25
Johannsen, p. 3
26
Borneman, pp. 9-10
27
Ibid., p. 8
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Seigenthaler, p. 1
Allan K. Nevins, ed., Polk: The Diary of a President:
1845-1849 (New York: Longman’s Green, 1952) p. xi
30
Thomas M. Leonard, James K. Polk: A Clear and
Unquestionable Destiny (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly
Resources, 2001) p. 43
31
Seigenthaler, p. 53
32
Johannsen, p. 5
33
Merry, p. 242
34
Borneman, pp. 9-10
35
Seigenthaler, pp. 22-23
36
Borneman, p. 10; Seigenthaler, p. 23
37
Bergeron, “The Presidency,” p. 10
38
Borneman, p. 11
39
Seigenthaler, p. 24
40
Borneman, p. 13
41
Bergeron, “The Presidency,” p. 11
42
Seigenthaler, p. 117
43
Ibid., p. 26
44
Borneman, p. 11
45
Bergeron, “The Presidency,” p. 11
46
Seigenthaler, p. 25
47
Ibid., p. 25
48
Borneman, pp. 23-24
49
Bergeron,” The Presidency,” p. 12
50
Borneman, p. 10
51
Seigenthaler, p. 4
52
Borneman, p. 34
53
Leonard, pp. 21-22
54
Seigenthaler, pp. 52-53
55
Borneman, p. 34
56
Ibid., p. 35
57
Seigenthaler, p. 57
58
Ibid., p. 57
59
Leonard, pp. 30-31
60
Bergeron, “The Presidency,” pp. 13-15
61
Leonard, p. 34; Borneman, p. 84
62
Seigenthaler, p. 68
63
Ibid., p. 84
64
Borneman, p. 125
65
Johannsen, p. 1
66
Seigenthaler, p. 92
67
Borneman, pp. 112-115; Leonard, p. 39
28
29
207
208
Rachel Waltman
Borneman, p. 344
They Might Be Giants, “James K. Polk,” Audio CD, A
User’s Guide to They Might Be Giants (Elecktra/Wea, 2005)
70
James Thurber, “Something about Polk,” Wisconsin
Magazine of History 50, vol. 2 (Winter 1967) p. 146
71
Johannsen, p. 4
72
Ibid., p. 2
73
Ibid., p. 2
74
Ibid., pp.4-5
75
Seigenthaler, p. 102
76
Ibid., p. 102
77
Ibid., p. 102
78
Ibid., p. 102
79
Ibid., p. 102
80
Borneman, p. 164
81
Leonard, p. 44
82
Johannsen, p. 5
83
Leonard, p. 45
84
Ibid., p. 45
85
Ibid., p. 49
86
Johannsen, p. 5
87
Leonard, p. 44
88
Ibid., p. 44
89
Ibid., p. 45
90
Ibid., pp. 45-46
91
Seigenthaler, p. 113
92
Leonard, p. 50
93
Seigenthaler, p. 122
94
Ibid., p. 103
95
Borneman, pp. 154-155
96
Seigenthaler, p. 123
97
Borneman, p. 161
98
Seigenthaler, p. 123
99
Borneman, p. 162
100
Ibid, pp. 163-164
101
Seigenthaler, 124
102
Ibid., p. 124
103
Borneman, p. 169
104
Ibid., p. 168
105
Ibid., p. 169
106
Seigenthaler, p. 127
107
Ibid., p. 128
108
Borneman, p. 148
68
69
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Leonard, p. 80
Bergeron, “The Presidency,” p. 71
111
Ibid., p. 71
112
Leonard, p. 148
113
Ibid., p. 157
114
Ibid., p. 157
115
Ibid., p. 147
116
Ibid., p. 160
117
Pletcher, p. 165; Borneman, p. 308
118
Leonard, p. 178
119
Seigenthaler, p. 132
120
Ibid., pp. 144-146
121
Ibid., p. 146
122
Merry, p. 130
123
Pletcher, p. 167
124
Seigenthaler, p. 86
125
Ibid., p. 86
126
Johannsen, p. 4
127
Seigenthaler, pp. 148-149; Merry, p. 453
128
Leonard, p. 44
129
Seigenthaler, p. 155
130
Johannsen, p. 4
131
Leonard, p. 44
132
Pletcher, p. 156
133
Borneman, p. 352
134
Paul H. Bergeron, “Polk and Economic Legislation,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 15, vol. 4 (Fall 1985) (Hereafter
cited as Bergeron, “Economic Legislation”) p. 782
135
Pletcher, p. 156
136
Ibid., p. 156
137
Seigenthaler, p. 148
138
Pletcher, p. 157
139
Seigenthaler, p. 154; Borneman, pp. 352-352; Merry,
p. 473
140
Bergeron, “The Presidency,” p. 186
141
Pletcher, p. 153
142
Seigenthaler, p. 122
143
Pletcher, p. 166
144
Ibid., p. 166; Merry, p. 477
145
Pletcher, p. 166
146
Borneman, p. 151
147
Seigenthaler, p. 112
148
Leonard, p. 49
109
110
209
210
Rachel Waltman
149
150
151
152
153
154
Borneman, p. 354
Johannsen, p. 6
Bergeron, “The Presidency,” p. xii
Borneman, pp. 353-354
Johannsen, p. 7
Leonard, p. 196
Bibliography
Bergeron, Paul H., “Polk and Economic Legislation,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 15, vol. 4, Fall 1985, pp. 782-795
The author examines Polk’s domestic economic policies,
a topic that typically receives little attention in comparison
to Polk’s foreign policy achievements. Domestically, Polk was
strongly committed to tariff reform and the establishment of
a constitutional or independent Treasury. Bergeron’s essay
examines how Polk worked to achieve both measures. This
essay appears in a professional publication that targets readers
interested in the presidency. I incorporated information from
this essay into my discussion of Polk’s domestic economic policy
successes.
Bergeron, Paul H., The Presidency of James K. Polk
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987
Bergeron demonstrates how Polk was one of the strongest
chief executives to occupy the White House. He details Polk’s
accomplishments, and also explains how, despite his many
achievements, Polk failed to attract the kind of popular support
or recognition accorded to other Presidents. Drawing upon
the vast literature written about Polk, as well as entries from
Polk’s personal diary and papers, Bergeron provides a balanced
assessment of Polk’s presidency. This book is targeted to adult
readers looking for an unbiased account of Polk, and I relied
upon it for many of the details of Polk’s life.
Bilhartz, Terry D., and Alan C. Elliott, Currents in American
History: A Brief History of the United States vol. 1, New York:
M.E. Sharpe, 2007
This book provided background information for my
research paper. The source material I used came from the
chapter entitled, “In the Name of Manifest Destiny: The War
with Mexico and the Acquisition of the American West.”
THE CONCORD REVIEW
211
This book is a historical text that is intended to be used as an
educational guide for high school students.
Borneman, Walter R., Polk: The Man Who Transformed the
Presidency and America New York: Random House, 2009
In his biography of Polk, Borneman provides a detailed
and thoroughly researched account of our eleventh President.
He describes Polk’s extensive political career, and refutes the
popular notion that Polk was a “dark horse” candidate. This
book is targeted to an adult audience, and is a “must read” for
anyone interested in American history in general and Polk’s
presidency in particular. This was one of the main sources
for my research paper, because of its well-documented and
thorough portrayal of Polk’s life and his presidency.
Gaines, Ann Graham, James K. Polk: Our Eleventh
President Mankato, Minnesota: Child’s World, 2009
This biography of Polk is targeted towards young readers,
and is part of the “Our Presidents” series. It provides a concise
and easy to understand review of how Polk was able to achieve
much during his one-term presidency. I incorporated some of
the basic factual information on Polk from this book into my
research paper.
Johannsen, Robert W., “Who Is James K. Polk? The Enigma
of our Eleventh President,” Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential
Center 14 February 1999, http://www.rbhayes.org/hayes/
scholarsworks/display.asp?id=502 (accessed December 7, 2009)
These comments about Polk, delivered during the 10th
annual Hayes Lecture on the Presidency, provide a well-crafted
summary of Polk and his presidency. I was able to incorporate
many of Johannsen’s teachings into my research paper.
Leonard, Thomas M., James K. Polk: A Clear and
Unquestionable Destiny Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly
Resources, 2001
This book is a well-researched biography that analyzes
Polk’s political career, with a specific focus on his role in
western expansion. Leonard provides a critical assessment of
Polk’s aggressive foreign policy measures, and theorizes that
Polk’s handling of the Oregon boundary dispute with Great
Britain and the Mexican War were motivated by forces far
more complex than “Manifest Destiny.” His narrative of Polk
212
Rachel Waltman
is accessible to both high school students and adults who are
interested in learning more about United States history, foreign
policy, and the American territorial expansion of the 1840s.
This is one of the main sources I relied upon in my research,
particularly Leonard’s extensive use of quotes from Polk’s
Inaugural Address and his First Message to Congress in 1845.
Merry, Robert W., A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk,
the Mexican War and the Conquest of the American Continent
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009
Merry, a journalist and editor-in-chief of the Congressional
Quarterly, offers a thoughtful and detailed analysis of Polk’s
presidency. Relying on a broad range of sources to support
his arguments, Merry depicts Polk as a controversial figure
and a visionary, who steadfastly clung to his expansionist
view and extended America’s influence across the continent.
Merry concludes that given his many accomplishments, Polk’s
presidency has been underrated. I used Merry’s book primarily
to corroborate much of my other research on Polk.
Nevins, Allan K., ed., Polk: The Diary of a President: 18451849 New York: Longman’s Green, 1952
Nevins offers an edited version of Polk’s diary, which
provides valuable insight into our 11th President. At the
beginning of the book, Nevins provides a general overview
of Polk and his administration that is both informative and
unbiased. This book was useful in my research because it
provided me with a better understanding of Polk’s character
and personality, as well as a first person account of his
presidency.
Pletcher, David M., “James K. Polk,” in The Presidents: A
Reference History 3rd ed., edited by Henry F. Graff, New York:
Thomson Gale, 2002
This profile of Polk is an entry from a historical reference
guide about the Presidents by historian David M. Pletcher.
It is both informative and well-researched, and includes an
appraisal of Polk’s presidency, as well as information about
his leadership skills in handling the Mexican War. This article
proved very useful during my research in connection with
analyzing the successes and failures of Polk’s presidency.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Seigenthaler, John, James K. Polk New York: Henry Holt &
Co., 2003
Seigenthaler’s biography of Polk is concise and informative,
and proved invaluable during my research process. It is part
of “The President’s Series,” edited by historian Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., and does an excellent job of explaining the
issues confronting Polk during his presidency. However, the
book does have a somewhat liberal bias that becomes readily
apparent to the reader. This is one of the sources that I
referred to frequently in writing my research paper.
They Might Be Giants, “James K. Polk,” Audio CD, A User’s
Guide to They Might Be Giants Elecktra/Wea, 2005
The song “James K. Polk,” featured on this collection of
songs by the musical group, They Might Be Giants, has become
something of a cult classic. There is no editorializing in the
song; instead, the composers take a bunch of historical facts
about Polk and set them to music. With catchy lyrics such as
“Austere, severe, he held few people dear/His oratory filled
his foes with fear/The factions soon agreed/He’s just the
man we need/To bring about victory/Fulfill our Manifest
destiny,” this hit tune provides a memorable summary of Polk’s
accomplishments that is suitable for musical fans of all ages.
I relied on this song’s lyrics to support the fact that Polk was
known as “Napoleon of the Stump” for his oratory skills.
Thurber, James, “Something about Polk,” Wisconsin
Magazine of History 50, vol. 2, Winter 1967, pp. 145-146
Thurber’s humorous essay about Polk claims he was a man
who was not known for any significant accomplishments. I
incorporated information from this essay into my research on
Polk’s literary and other achievements.
213
214
Brooklyn, New York
Rachel Waltman
15 January 2011
Dear Will,
I applaud you for your dedication to improving education, lifting genuine
standards of accomplishment, and maintaining your high ideals for our
youth. Almost alone, you have fought to improve the teaching of history,
while encouraging young people to write thoughtfully and clearly about
the meaning of the past. Your devotion to history, to good writing, to
serious reading, and to the potential of young people should be an
inspiration to us all. I wish you the best as you continue to promote
sound ideas about education.
Diane Ravitch
Research Professor
New York University
[Professor Ravitch is the author of, among others, The Great School
Wars, Left Back, The Language Police, and The Life and Death of the Great
American School System]
----------------17 January 2011
Aspen, Colorado
Dear Will,
I wholeheartedly agree with Diane’s thoughts about the critical role you
play in holding us all to a higher standard in researching and interpreting
history. This special process of discovery in research prompts students
to thoughtfully reflect and develop mindful observations about the
past. Writing history papers does more than produce strong scholarship
however; I believe your inspired leadership for excellent historical
research helps us preserve our shared humanity in the midst of uncertain
times. With gratitude,
Karen Green
IB History
Aspen High School
Copyright 2011, THE
The Concord
Review,
Inc., all rights reserved 215
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REVIEW
AN ANALYSIS OF TITO’S YUGOSLAVIA:
A UNIQUE FORM OF TOTALITARIANISM
Samuel Ramani
Y
ugoslavia was a state that emerged from the remnants
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I in
1918. From the start of its history, Yugoslavia’s long-term sustainability as a state was seriously imperiled by ethnic and religious
divisions. Yugoslavia consisted of Serbians, Croatians, Bosnians,
Macedonians, Slovenians, Montenegrins, and Albanians, divided
religiously among Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism, and Islam.
The fact that Yugoslavia was effectively a composite state of various
ethnic groups that were all vying for autonomy prevented it from
developing a clear sense of national identity. The fledgling multinational state faced the prospect of disintegration and becoming
a failed state because of the ethnic and religious hostilities within
its borders. In the years between World War I and World War II,
Yugoslavia was governed by a constitutional monarchy, but Tito’s
role as leader of the Partisans in liberating Yugoslavia from Nazi
rule ensured that he gained the upper hand over the monarchy
after 1945. Tito’s take-over came at a perilous time for a newly- created Yugoslavian union. The prospect of a complete implosion of
Yugoslavia led to Tito’s creation of a totalitarian regime, but one
that he governed in a unique way compared to the Soviet model
Samuel Ramani is a high school Senior homescholar in Toronto, Ontario,
where he wrote this paper as an independent study in the 2010/2011
academic year.
216
Samuel Ramani
of Communism, which was the archetypical foundation of the
other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
Totalitarianism is a form of dictatorship that became a
major force in European politics during the interwar era, and it
was a phenomenon without parallel in political history because
of the sheer power these kinds of regimes were able to gain over
the peoples and regions they controlled. Totalitarian regimes
created states with a near-complete centralization of state power.
In the Soviet Union, this extreme consolidation of power was
often accompanied by immobile bureaucracies, inefficiency and
impaired communication between different levels of government.
Totalitarian regimes are typically characterized by a radical ideology that is the unifying factor for the regime and for its citizens,
an emphasis on the complete devotion of the people to the state
rather than to a religion or monarch, an attempt to establish
complete power over all areas of life by a process of organized
indoctrination, the establishment of a sophisticated secret police
system as an instrument of state power and repression, and a belligerent foreign policy.
While Yugoslavia maintained many attributes of the totalitarian state, Tito’s totalitarian regime had three unique and defining
strategies to counter the fragility of a Yugoslavian state under stress
from ethnic and religious divisions. These were Yugoslavia’s use of
a modified form of communism called self-governing socialism, a
non-aligned foreign policy and a pragmatic results-driven approach
to policymaking. The first unique characteristic of Tito’s regime was
self-governing socialism, a form of Communism which hearkened
back to the ideas of pre-Soviet Marxism.1 Self-governing socialism
had the objective of being a unifying force for Yugoslavians who
historically viewed themselves along divisive ethnic and religious
lines. The objective of this form of socialism was to forge a closer
link between the Yugoslavian government and the working class.
This key tenet of Marxism was perceived by many Communists in
areas as diverse as Yugoslavia and Maoist China as something that
was undermined by the Soviet Communist System. The second
unique characteristic was a nonaligned foreign policy which was a
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217
product of Tito’s split with Stalin, a move that was unprecedented
in the polarized environment of European politics at the time.
The result of his participation in the nonaligned movement was
that Tito was able to increase Yugoslavia’s geopolitical importance
and have relatively free reign regarding its foreign policy decisions
without the aggressive belligerence that characterized totalitarian
regimes in larger nations like Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and
the Soviet Union. The third unique characteristic of Yugoslavian
totalitarianism was pragmatism and relative ideological flexibility
that stood in direct contrast to the Soviet ideological rigidity. Communism’s radical economic and social policies like collectivization
in the Soviet Union were often forcefully instituted without regard
for the human suffering and destruction they caused. It was this
form of pragmatism and adaptability that allowed Tito to prevent
the breakdown of Yugoslavia during his life-time in spite of the
centrifugal forces of ethnic and religious division.
Notwithstanding these differences, Tito used the totalitarian instruments of repression, like a secret police system, political
prison camps for dissidents, and he employed Alexander Rankovic,
a henchman, to maintain political order in a state lacking a national identity. Rankovic’s repression can be compared to Stalin’s
use of Lavrentiy Beria to a limited extent, as both purged officials
who they believed to be rivals of the regime. Rankovic differed
from the nationality of the leader, as he was Serbian, while Tito
was Croatian and Slovenian, but Beria was Georgian, like Stalin.
Even though Stalin was a leader from a minority group who
presided over a vast multiethnic state, the fact that he did not
choose a Russian as his henchman demonstrates that he had a far
greater degree of power over the group of ethnicities in the Soviet
Union compared to Tito’s hold on Yugoslavia. Tito, however, was
definitely an iron-fisted leader, who held Yugoslavia together by
balancing tolerance of minorities and the maintenance of tight
central authority. The ultimate disintegration, after his death, of
the Yugoslavian state containing many hostile ethnicities can be
described as a microcosm of the collapse of the Soviet Union into
its constituent nation-states. The legacies of the breakdown of
both multinational and multiethnic states are still political issues,
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Samuel Ramani
and these issues are exemplified by the nationalist movements in
Kosovo and Chechnya.
The first major characteristic that made Tito’s Yugoslavia
unique was the regime’s use of self-governing socialism to cultivate
a closer connection between the government and working class
Yugoslavians. One notable intellectual who supported this kind
of socialist government was Svetozar Stojanovic, a prominent philosophy professor at the University of Belgrade. He praised Marxist
socialism and attacked the Stalinist form of Communism, which
violated human rights and created a façade of a disciplined legal
system to cover up the gross injustices perpetrated by the Soviet
government.2 However, the problem of class, which was at the
heart of Communist ideology, was by no means the most important
issue facing Tito’s regime. Rather, the danger of ethnic hostilities spiraling out of control was Yugoslavia’s most pressing issue.
These ethnic hostilities ensured that Tito was forced to deviate
from his professed ideology to make his government sustainable.
As a result, many intellectual protests against Tito’s government
occurred in the more liberal political climate of the 1970s, and
Stojanovic and several of his colleagues were expelled from the
University of Belgrade in 1975 as dissidents.
In order for Tito to sustain his ideological vision for
Yugoslavia, he needed to ensure that the Yugoslavian composite
state continued to be stable and viable as a government. In spite
of its long history of ethnic hostility, the concept of a Yugoslavian
composite state was not a new one because it had initially been
proposed by the 19th century Illyrian movement. The Illyrian
movement accompanied a Croatian national revival within AustriaHungary and attempted to create a form of South Slavic union
that foreshadowed the state of Yugoslavia. This attempt at a union
failed because its chief purpose was liberation from Austrian rule
rather than an attempt to achieve lasting solidarity among the
South Slavic ethnic groups. Also, the Illyrian movement was Croatian and Slovenian in origin and was detached from the political
situation in the region as it failed to deal with the major obstacle
presented by an independent Serbia.3
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219
Yugoslavia’s self-governing socialism differentiated the
country from other post-war states in Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia
was a nation-less state, a collection of ethnic groups with no real
desire for solidarity, held together under the banner of a country
that they did not identify with. Historically, there have been two
major reasons why nation-less states have fragmented: social division caused by ethnic and religious groups and political divisions
that develop as a result of a particular issue or ideological difference. These differences have divided countries as diverse as the
United States during the Civil War, post-World War II Germany,
and Yemen during the 1960s. While the existence of a nation-less
state is not without historical precedent, the circumstances and
issues Yugoslavia faced in its quest to be sustainable were different
from any of the aforementioned situations. The identity crisis that
afflicted Yugoslavia created many unique challenges that needed
to be met in innovative ways.
While innovations may have been required to adjust for
the uniqueness of Yugoslavia’s situation as a composite state, totalitarianism was still at the root of its form of government. One
common trend in countries where totalitarianism emerged during the 20th century, was the fact that they had no history of successful representative governments. Italy and Germany had only
been unified for several decades before they adopted totalitarian
political structures, while Russia, China, and Japan had historically
been dominated by authoritarian governments. Yugoslavia’s history followed this trend when the void left by the demise of Ottoman Turkey was replaced by a monarchy. Totalitarianism, which
by definition undermined all forms of division and dissent, was
deemed to be an effective system of government in the regions
where it emerged in spite of its draconian nature.
Tito’s response to the distinct issues Yugoslavia faced made
a system different from Stalinism an absolute necessity. This was
not because of a genuine desire to right injustices or idealist
notions of halting government-orchestrated violence. Instead,
dealing with Yugoslavia’s multidimensional diversity, in which
religion was an important threat to the sustainability of the state,
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Samuel Ramani
was of paramount importance to Yugoslavia’s efforts at survival.
This was in contrast to the Soviet Union, which did not have
large-scale internal religious tensions to deal with. These tensions
meant Yugoslavia could not impose atheism on the people to the
same extent as the Soviet Union could, so traditional hostilities
between Christians and Muslims remained below the surface
during the entire period of the union of the Balkan states. Tito’s
application of a different kind of Communism in Yugoslavia also
stemmed from his vehement opposition to the extension of Soviet
imperialism into the borders of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s autonomy
from Soviet influence demonstrated Tito’s success in avoiding the
fate of becoming a satellite like the rest of Eastern Europe, as he
wanted to increase the importance of Yugoslavia in international
affairs.
Tito’s self-governing socialism and success in maintaining Yugoslavian independence from the Soviet sphere came with
considerable risk, as this form of Marxism had not been applied
in any other country before Tito did it. In theory, self-governing
socialism emphasized the independence of the local unit and the
fact that the commune was a self-sufficient identity governed by the
working class.4 The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
which was at the heart of Marxist ideology, resembles the calls
for the workers to control the communes in the self-governing
socialist model. Self-governing socialism still maintained some of
the repressive institutions of the Stalinist Soviet Union but it was
much less brutal and more pragmatic than the Soviet regime.5
The concept of self-governing socialism was not derived from a
past application in a particular country. Instead, it was a unique
form of Communism that was only briefly alluded to by Lenin as
a source of connection between Bolsheviks and Soviets and by
Marx in his analysis of the Paris Commune.6 Lenin praised Marx
for his foresight in his analysis of the Paris Commune and he saw
a parallel between the French attempt at revolution and the 1905
and 1917 revolutions in Russia.7 Therefore, it could be argued that
Tito’s use of a system different from the Stalinist system was not a
condemnation of the principles outlined by Marx or described by
Lenin in the era before the revolution. Instead, his use of an idea
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221
inspired by the Paris Commune demonstrates that he was merely
rebuking and departing from Stalinism, a system that was viewed
by many as a betrayal of Marxist values. Tito was trying to display
Yugoslavian Communism as superior to Soviet Communism in
order to bolster Yugoslavia’s status in the international community.
Tito’s attempts to create an image of ideological superiority ensured that his form of government, which was often called
national Communism, was supported as a lesser evil compared to
the pro-Soviet regimes which dominated the rest of the region.
Tito’s policies were more moderate than those of the Soviet
Union, as he attempted to gain acceptance in the West without
subscribing to the capitalist system that formed the foundation
of the economies of Western Europe and the United States.8 His
support for decentralization of Yugoslavia took root during the
1970s with constitutional reforms but Tito always ensured that
the Communist party would retain its grip on power during any
attempts to make reforms in Yugoslavia.9 Tito’s application of the
relatively more decentralized national Communist model bears a
clear resemblance to the reforms Gorbachev made in the Soviet
Union during the 1980s. Gorbachev called for glasnost, which
increased openness in a government that was stagnating due to
its inefficient bureaucracy and perestroika to restructure and make
fundamental reforms in the USSR. Gorbachev’s reforms in the
Soviet Union were based on a model with many similarities to the
Yugoslavian model that they had crusaded against for decades.
While Yugoslavia’s reforms led to clear economic improvements,
Gorbachev’s reforms failed to make any major improvements in
the standard of living of the Soviet people. This demonstrates
that Tito’s reforms could be viewed as more of an adaptation to a
unique situation rather than a panacea for the economic problems
of all countries.
The fact that Tito was comparatively well-received among
Western nations demonstrates that his suppression of civil liberties was placed on a back-burner to the Cold War politics which
made him a useful ally in the Third World. The association of
Communism with violence like the Stalinist Great Purges of the
1930s came with the large and significant risk of tainting the im-
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Samuel Ramani
age of Communism internationally and preventing its growth
and expansion in the Third World. This concern ensured that
Communist leaders needed to emphasize the importance of the
working classes in creating a revolutionary spirit of Communism
and an egalitarian society in order to kindle the original spirit that
made Communism inspirational to many people. The development of councils under the Leninist model of revolution extended
beyond the working classes to the peasantry as Lenin’s calls for
the creation of an agrarian proletariat demonstrate; however, the
focal point of world revolution under the model of traditional
Marxism stemmed from greater representation for the urban
working class.10
Tito’s attempt to create a system of direct socialism based on
worker’s councils is reminiscent of the zemstvos that characterized
19th century Russia in the period leading up to the Communist
takeover.11 Imperial Russia for centuries was dominated by Tsars who
faced the issue of appeasing the noble boyars in order to maintain
power. The Romanov Tsars’ fears of objections from the boyars
stymied meaningful reform in Russia and explain how serfdom, a
bygone institution in most of the rest of Europe, existed in Russia
until the late 19th century. Reforms came at a huge political cost
and the emergence of a vast array of opposition movements led
to political violence, such as the assassination of Tsar Alexander
II, who abolished serfdom. Many opposition movements fought
against the ineptitude of the Tsarist management of the economy,
and this fueled a desire for decentralization, which is displayed
by the creation of new sources of regional authority like zemstvos.
Zemstvos did manage to bring some tangible successes in addressing
local issues, and while the nobility and large landowners exerted
a disproportionate share of representation, smaller landowners
gained increased political influence. The objectives of the zemstvos
were similar to those of Tito’s Yugoslavia, which was characterized
by the Four D’s of Democratization, Decentralization, Debureaucratization, and Destalinization.12 It can be argued that the presence of some common objectives between the zemstvos and Tito’s
government shows that Tito’s criticism of the Soviet Union under
Stalin was merely a rebuke of Stalinism and not of the ideology
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that sparked the Russian Revolution. Tito’s approach was based
on displaying Yugoslavia as a progressive and an ideological
role-model superior to the Soviet model that dominated Eastern
Europe. However, his repressive policies suggest that the actual
foundation and motives of Tito’s approach were questionable
and that his mantle of progressivism was just a façade to benefit
Yugoslavia’s foreign policy.
On the surface, Tito’s illusion of creating a dictatorship of
the proletariat was embedded in his unique system of totalitarianism. Tito’s system also seemed to be the embodiment of the ideals
of traditional Marxism, which emphasized the importance and
supremacy of the working class in creating the egalitarian and
classless society that Marx desired. In the Manifesto of the Communist
Party, Marx draws a clear distinction between the outlooks of the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat by stating, “In bourgeoisie society,
therefore; the past dominates the present; in Communist society,
the present dominates the past.”13 Tito’s innovative form of Communism definitely seems to illustrate the spirit of progressivism
that was the intent of Karl Marx’s writings. The application of Communism in the Soviet Union destroyed all traces of progressivism
with a kind of ideological rigidity and support for violence that
was a betrayal of the original spirit of Communism. The creation
of worker’s councils by Tito and the emphasis on the importance
of the commune in the system of self-governing socialism created
the illusion of the dictatorship of the proletariat that Communist
idealists and Marxists had hoped to create.
A parallel can also be drawn between the philosophy of
the Yugoslavian Communist system, no matter how illusory its
ideals actually were, and the writings of the Russian poet Yevgeny
Yevtushenko, who sympathized with the ideals of classical Marxism.
Like Tito, Yevtushenko opposed the Stalinist regime and its form
of Communism. His poem on the massacre of Ukrainian Jews at
Babi Yar clearly demonstrates his opposition to Stalin, and the
effects of the Stalinist purges on his family made him an avowed
opponent of the evils of Soviet Communism. Yevtushenko praised
Tito for Yugoslavia’s heroic resistance to the Stalinist regime,
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Samuel Ramani
and he claimed that the Yugoslavian separation from the Soviet
sphere did not engender hatred of Russians among the people.14
In Russia, the anti-Tito propaganda was not effective in demonizing Yugoslavia’s image in the eyes of the Soviet people.15 Thus,
Tito was largely successful in reducing support for Stalinism by
displaying the Yugoslavian form of Communism as both progressive
and true to Marxist ideology. In addition to the idealist writings
of Yevtushenko, the revolutionary spirit of Communism that was
emerging in Latin America and Africa during this time period
seemed to place the ideology of Tito’s Communist Yugoslavia as a
harbinger of future reform. Tito was not an idealist and definitely
did not exemplify a manifestation of the views of revolutionaries
and writers of his era like Yevtushenko; his chief concern was
holding the ethnically-divided Yugoslavian state together against
the pressures tending to its dissolution.
Tito’s creation of a form of self-governing socialism was
not a return to the values of classical Marxism, as the Yugoslavian
system was only a distinct form of totalitarianism which precluded
democracy or political liberalization. This distinct form of totalitarianism could be described as a workable middle ground between
the brutality of Stalinism and the ideals of Marxist revolutionary
thought. This middle ground demonstrates the pragmatism and
flexibility of the Yugoslavian model of Communism. It enacted
fewer policies with total disregard for the consequences on the lives
of the people than the Soviets did. This pragmatic approach also
allowed citizen-related government organizations to be strengthened and given a prominent role in the Yugoslavian government
alongside quasi-military instruments like the army and secret police.16 Dictatorships frequently link civilian and military institutions
into one and the undue influence of the military on politics has
contributed to the struggles of governments to achieve meaningful
reform in many African and Latin American countries. Totalitarian regimes kept the military and civilian institutions clearly subordinate to the wishes of the ideological party and the apparatus
that was the chief policymaker. This demonstrates the twin role
of such governments, which are to enact policies and to maintain
ideological homogeneity by using quasi-military institutions as
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instruments of repression. In summary, Tito displayed Yugoslavia
as a progressive Communist state and his system of self-governing
socialism and national Communism emphasized his integration
of worker’s interests into his government, but repressive politics
demonstrated the flaws of Tito’s system.
The second major characteristic that made Yugoslavian
totalitarianism unique in Eastern Europe was the fact that Yugoslavia was a Communist state that never aligned itself with the
Soviet Union. This foreign policy stance amplified the geopolitical importance of Tito’s government. Tito’s nonaligned status
gave him and his government a form of legitimacy and a higher
profile in the international community because Yugoslavia was a
Communist state independent of the Soviet Bloc. This profile was
something that a relatively small country like Yugoslavia would
have been hard-pressed to attain if it stayed in the Soviet sphere.
His independence from the Soviets coupled with his unique form
of Communism displays how Tito emphasized alternative characteristics to the traditional ethnic and religious distinctions which
were all too often the cause of hostility. Communism’s ideological
opposition to the social force of nationalism was exemplified by
these alternate characteristics.
Tito’s personal profile and the geopolitical prominence
that came from his opposition to Stalin benefited the regime’s
international image but also helped keep the regime together.
The Americans gave financial support to Tito’s regime because
Yugoslavia was a buffer zone between the Soviet Eastern European
countries and the NATO-allied countries. This aid assisted Yugoslavia’s economic development and Tito’s continued opposition
to Stalin made it advantageous for Western nations to give aid to
his regime. It is important to realize that an international profile
needs to be matched with domestic economic improvements for
stability to be maintained. This lesson was learned in a harsh way
by other nonaligned leaders like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah whose
profile, gained by his crusade for African unity, actually weakened
his grip on power at home as economic decline had emboldened
the military in that country. If Tito had any real peer in the non-
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Samuel Ramani
aligned community, it would be his ally Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser
promoted an agenda distinct from other Arab nations by calling
for Pan-Arab unity and assumed a prominent role in international
affairs while at the same time contributing to the modernization
of Egypt’s economy. Thus, the international profile, while vital at
least in the early stages following the war due to the Western aid
that it attracted, was not what kept Yugoslavia together. Instead,
it was Tito’s ability to improve Yugoslavia’s economy in conjunction with its role in international affairs that ensured that he
remained in power. It comes as little surprise that the first cracks
in Tito’s union emerged during the 1970s, when the Yugoslavian
government, shorn of the oppressive Rankovic, faced economic
difficulties due to the burden of decades of accumulation of debt
to Western countries.
Tito’s attempts to gain an international profile, while
at the same time not jeopardizing the economy, meant that he
had to split from the Soviet Bloc. In order to orchestrate a split
from Stalin, Tito needed to ensure he was viewed as a legitimate
leader among the many nationalities of the composite state. Tito
was able to justify his authority at home as people respected his
record of leadership in times of crisis and his role in the liberation of Yugoslavia, almost entirely without Soviet assistance. Tito
led the partisans who played a major role in gaining Yugoslavian
independence from Nazi Germany and on the surface was a
perfect leader to hold the diverse array of Yugoslavian ethnicities
together. The fact that Tito was of mixed Croatian and Slovenian
ancestry legitimized the Yugoslavian union during his lifetime to
some extent, as he was a member of the minority groups the state
was seeking to appease. While he was not well-educated, he managed to rise up in the ranks of the Yugoslavian Communist party,
which placed him in trouble with the law on numerous occasions,
much like Mussolini, Hitler, Lenin, and Stalin. Tito had experience
with the fragile ethnic situation in Yugoslavia as a Communist in
Croatia when an extremist Croatian Ustase murdered the Serbian
King Alexander I.17 During the war with Nazi Germany, Tito’s partisans also faced a civil war in Yugoslavia with the nationalist Draza
Mihailovic who made his clash with Tito his priority. Mihailovic
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foreshadowed Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic with his calls
for Serbian ethnic cleansing against groups like Bosnians and
Croatians. Mihailovic collaborated with the Axis powers, while
Tito gained the support of the Soviet Union against Mihailovic’s
army of Chetniks. The policies of Mihailovic were divisive to the
Yugoslavian state and he was executed in 1946 and had Tito not
won, the Yugoslavian state likely would have faced disintegration
in the manner of the 1990s genocide. The success of Tito’s partisans in liberating Yugoslavia from Nazi Germany and in defeating
the Chetniks gained him legitimacy as a war hero and the savior
of the nation in a united Yugoslavia. Tito’s history as a war hero
and the pragmatism he used in government were essential to his
efforts at keeping Yugoslavia together.
Tito’s background before becoming leader of Yugoslavia
also demonstrated his assertive character and his willingness to
use any means to achieve his ends of keeping Yugoslavia united,
a force in world politics and subordinate to no other nation. This
assertive character that distinguished Tito as a partisan leader
was proven by his demonstration that he could balance a civil
war and a war of liberation at the same time without significant
external backing. Thus, he could avoid the violations of the right
of national self-determination that were occurring in the satellite
states following the failure of the USSR to abide by the results of
the Yalta Conference. Tito claimed that a non-aligned Yugoslavia
would be a sovereign and much more powerful state than under
the leadership of the USSR. His negative attitude towards an
alignment with the Soviet Union was an aberration in the history
of the region. Serbia had a long history of being allied with Russians and the strength of this alliance was displayed in the Russian
involvement in World War I. Tito enacted many anti-Serbian policies under his government and his use of Alexander Rankovic, a
Serbian nationalist, as his henchman, was intended to appease the
Serbians. When Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist leader
of Yugoslavia, was embroiled in the international condemnation
and NATO invasion as a response to his handling of the Kosovo
situation, Russia opposed NATO’s involvement and stood by
Milosevic in spite of his flagrant abuses of human rights in the
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Samuel Ramani
Balkans.18 While the Russians eventually backed out of their alliance and their support for Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, it became clear
that only the threat of a NATO ground invasion would cause the
Serbians to back out of Kosovo.19 Tito’s anti-Soviet stance could
have stemmed from the fact that an alliance with the Soviet Union
would run the risk of kindling Serbian nationalism, as it did in the
years prior to World War I, and this renewed nationalism would
have jeopardized Yugoslavia’s fragile ethnic union.
Tito’s implementation of a unique system from that of the
Stalinist Soviet Union placed him at odds with the Soviet ambition of ruling the entirety of Eastern Europe. In a 1945 meeting
between Stalin and Tito on the philosophy of modern conflict,
Stalin claimed that he believed the social order of the conquering nation should be imparted to the conquered nation.20 Stalin’s
emphasis on placing the social order of the conquering nation as
supreme is not unparalleled in Russian history. The Russification
policies of the Russian Empire under Tsarist rule controlled the
social policies of Poland and other Slavic nations in Eastern Europe.
Russification was merely a predecessor to the Soviet exceptionalism that characterized the leadership of Stalin. It demonstrated
the Tsarist belief in the superiority of Russian culture much like
the Soviets promoted the “ethical superiority” of Communism
over degenerate capitalism. This statement by Stalin manifested
the problem faced by the satellite states of Eastern Europe and
the coercive expansionism that was an integral part of his foreign
policy. Promises of national self-determination and free elections
were ignored in favor of forcing the Communist Party’s supremacy
on the people of Eastern Europe. However, Yugoslavia was already
more autonomous than any of the satellite states because Soviet
involvement in the liberation of Yugoslavia from German rule
was not significant. During World War I, the Russians supported
Serbia as protectors of a fellow Slavic people, and this created an
obligation for Serbia to side with the Russians. On the contrary,
Yugoslavia was not indebted to the Russians during World War II
and did not wish to see their own culture and institutions superseded by Soviet ones.
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229
Tito’s influential role as a Communist independent of the
Soviet bloc inevitably led to clashes between him and Stalin. Tito
justified the schism on the grounds that it would help turn Yugoslavia into a more powerful and sovereign state if it was independent
from the Soviet Union. Stalin’s desire for complete hegemony in
Eastern Europe clashed with the notion that a former Russian
ally and a Communist state in the region would exist outside the
Soviet sphere of influence. Stalin responded to Tito’s actions by
attempting to assassinate him, but the failure of these plots led to
Tito pressuring Stalin to desist from attempted assassinations in
the future and if he did not, Tito threatened to assassinate Stalin.21
However, Stalin was able to succeed in preventing the proposed
unification of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria due to his fear that such
a move would cater too much to Tito’s ambitions and bolster his
power.22 Stalin’s opposition prevented Tito from gaining complete
control over the Balkans and the Black Sea region which was historically a strategic region for both Turkey and Russia, but Tito had
stemmed the advance of Soviet influence into Yugoslavia. Tito’s
defiance of Stalin came with a huge risk to both his and Yugoslavia’s well-being. In the Gulag Archipelago, Russian writer Alexander
Solzhenitsyn claimed that Tito only narrowly avoided being tried
for espionage by Stalin’s government as a foreign Communist on
Soviet soil.23 Also, the ruthlessness and power of the force Tito
confronted was exemplified by the manner in which Stalin imposed
Communism on the people of Czechoslovakia, just a few months
before the Tito-Stalin schism. In the 1948 Communist takeover in
Czechoslovakia, the pro-Stalin Czech Communists staged a coup
on the existing government and established a one-party government.24 The Czech anti-Communists adopted a foreign policy that
was conciliatory towards the United States and they were crushed
by the Soviet intervention in the country’s politics.25
Tito’s ability to justify Yugoslavian autonomy due to the
lack of Soviet intervention there during World War II coupled
with his network of allies, allowed him to maintain his non-aligned
foreign policy. Tito, unlike many Czech anti-Communists, did not
show support for the United States and would also be a critic of
Stalinist foreign policy, claiming that the Soviet Union’s inflexible
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policies were responsible for it ceding ground in international affairs to the United States.26 Thus, in spite of the threat of a Soviet
invasion of Yugoslavia in 1948 and assassination attempts on his
life, Tito refused to back down in his clash against Stalinist hegemony. He ultimately succeeded in gaining legitimacy as a leader
independent of the Soviet sphere. Tito’s challenge to the power
of the Soviet Union was by no means over, and it has been noted
that Tito’s agents found the Soviet Union, after Stalin’s death, an
even more frightening adversary than the Soviet regime with him
in power.27
Tito’s desire for Yugoslavian sovereignty was one major
reason for his participation in the non-aligned movement, which
included notable world leaders like Nasser in Egypt and Nehru in
India among its members. Tito even led the Non-Aligned Movement from 1961-1964. His position as a Communist free from
the Soviet Union ensured that he was an influential figure in the
politics of Eastern Europe, in the midst of the political forces
that divided the world into two spheres of influence. In a sense,
the clashes between the divergent ideologies of Communism and
democracy during the Cold War could be compared to concentric
circles because the ideology of the superpower (the large outer
circle) contained the satellite states (the small inner circles) within
their sphere of influence. The concentric circle model of empirebuilding has long been applied over the course of political history
and the manner in which the Roman Empire imparted its Latin
language, culture and other institutions to the provinces within
exemplifies this model. However, the transition in empire-building
from direct colonial conquest for the purpose of extraction to
ideological imperialism for the purpose of increasing geopolitical
influence increased the importance of keeping control of satellite
states. In both the traditional form of empire and the new form of
imperialism that was the product of the Cold War, nonconformist
states existed to prevent the absolute hegemony of a particular
imperial power or ideology. These outlier states acted as buffer
zones between rival empires as they maintained their sovereignty
and their unique system of government in spite of imperialistic
pressure. Examples of outlier states in territorial-based imperial
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231
partitions include Thailand and Ethiopia during the 19th century,
which remained independent of European influence. The case of
democratic Athens demonstrates that in spite of the military power
of autocratic regimes like Sparta and the Persian Empire, outlier
states can attain a kind of influence disproportionate to their size
because of their nonalignment to imperial rule. Yugoslavia was,
in many ways, the quintessential example of an outlier state and
Tito’s continued refusal to align with the U.S. or the USSR was his
way of keeping his own sovereignty. Yugoslavia was a microcosm
of an empire as it contained many of the ethnic and religious issues that have so often plagued and led to the demise of powers
throughout history. It was also a state that never managed to view
itself as the sum of its parts and its over-reliance on ephemeral
attributes of the regime, like Tito’s personal leadership, ensured
that the balance of power was not maintained following his death.
This represented the ultimate failure of the Yugoslavian miniature
empire to hold itself together through many leadership changes,
unlike concentric circle empires which imparted many social and
cultural attributes to their satellites to enforce their legitimacy
among diverse peoples. Thus, Tito’s mastery of political policy in
the international community by being a member of the nonaligned
movement, allowed him to exert a kind of influence in world affairs
that would have been impossible for a small nation like Yugoslavia
to attain. This, in practice, also led to Yugoslavian opportunism
and a lack of commitment to the causes of any superpower.
Tito’s opportunistic foreign policy ensured that Yugoslavian decisions to back other countries became unpredictable,
and this allowed him to be targeted by both the U.S. and the
USSR in their attempts to build ideological alliances in the Third
World. Despite the fact that Tito maintained his leftist stance, he
displayed his independent foreign policy and pragmatism in his
support for right-wing causes in Paraguay and Guatemala. Tito’s
foreign policy also did not force him to support nations merely on
ideological grounds. This was because his non-aligned status gave
him a relatively large amount of freedom to support politicians
with varying political affiliations and ideologies, something very
unusual in the polarized atmosphere of Cold War politics. This
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Samuel Ramani
independent and pragmatic foreign policy allowed Yugoslavia to
improve relations with the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, and
at the same time Tito was adept at maintaining favorable relations
with the West. While he sometimes backed American foreign policy,
one notable example of a situation in which Tito went contrary
to U.S. foreign policy occurred in the 1970s following Pinochet’s
ascension to power in Chile. Pinochet was a right-wing Chilean
dictator supported by the U.S. because of his opposition to Marxist political leader, Salvador Allende. The American support for
Pinochet was a form of interventionism that involved the direct
support of a dictator, even when the authoritarian nature of his
rule and his perpetration of human rights abuses were in conflict
with American democratic ideals. A form of intervention based
on containment, which could be called “reverse interventionism,”
was employed in Cold War politics.
Reverse interventionism was a distinct phenomenon that
was a product of the bipolar worldview that emerged as a result
of the ideological clash between American democracy and Soviet
Communism during the Cold War. Historically, interventionism
involved the support of a particular group either with an altruistic or opportunistic motive. This could be called traditional
interventionism and an example of this kind of foreign policy
was the French participation in the American Revolution against
the British. Reverse interventionism is a kind of foreign policy
intervention not based on ideological support. Instead, it stems
from the containment of the greater evil of an opposing ideology,
by supporting a political leader or government without regard
for whether it is authoritarian or a perpetrator of human rights
abuses. Another example of reverse interventionism was the Soviet
support for the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War.
Tito’s opportunism ensured that Yugoslavian foreign policy was
liberated from the constraints of reverse interventionism that was
foundational to Cold War politics.
Tito’s nonaligned status allowed him to support other
governments and gave him remarkable freedom of choice in
perhaps the most polarized period in the history of international
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233
relations. The philosophy of Tito’s government regarding the situation in Chile was based on his insistence on the leadership role
of the Yugoslavian League of Communists in the region, because
if the League did not assert itself, it would be displaced by another
force.28 Chile broke relations with other left-wing governments
like North Vietnam, and Cambodia was accused of spreading
political propaganda into Chile.29 The Chilean government went
against Yugoslavia when it was under the leadership of Slobodan
Milosevic, as Chile supplied arms to Croatia in 1991 under the
pretense of giving humanitarian aid.30 Thus, the example of Chile
demonstrates that Yugoslavian opportunism had the serious risk
of creating enmity between Yugoslavia and other nations due to
their betrayal of trust in foreign governments in order to push
their own objectives. This negative aspect of Yugoslavian foreign
policy became a serious issue during the civil wars of the 1990s,
a time when Yugoslavia needed international support because it
became effectively a pariah state as a result of Milosevic’s genocide.
Tito’s policies towards the Soviet Union in the post-Stalinist
period mirrored his tendency to vacillate in his involvement in Latin
American politics, with little regard for the political affiliations of
leaders he chose to support or oppose. His handling of the revolutions against Soviet interference in Hungary and Czechoslovakia
demonstrated how he often used strategic positioning to elevate
Yugoslavia’s international influence. At the same time, he made
it clear that he would not commit himself to either superpower
with the consistency that both superpowers wanted from him.
Under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, there was a thaw in
relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in contrast to
the threats of war that were common under Stalin’s leadership.
Yugoslavia did not join the Warsaw Pact of Communist states, and
maintained its nonaligned status, but Tito agreed that if the Cold
War escalated into a military conflict, Yugoslavia would support
the Soviet Union.31 Tito agreed to normalize relations with the
Soviet Union in 1955 on the condition that Yugoslavia was viewed
as a political equal to the USSR.32 Khrushchev’s decision to agree
to complete equality and Tito’s continuation of positive relations
with the West for much of the 1950s just demonstrates how promi-
234
Samuel Ramani
nent Yugoslavia, a nation with approximately 20 million people,
was becoming on the international stage. Tito was the ultimate
nonconformist, who made it clear that he was subordinate to no
other foreign leader in spite of the small size of the nation that
he led. Tito’s importance to Soviet politics was confirmed in 1956
during the Hungarian Revolution when Khrushchev consulted Tito
on how to handle the insurrection. Tito agreed with Khrushchev
that the Hungarian protesters’ hanging of secret policemen from
lampposts was a dramatic event in a counter-revolution that was
occurring in Hungary against the Soviet Union.33 When Brezhnev
took over as Soviet leader, relations chilled once again between
Yugoslavia and the USSR. This renewed chill in diplomatic relations
was displayed by the wave of anti-Soviet feelings that permeated
Yugoslavia in 1968 over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and
300,000 people joined the protest against the Soviets in MarxEngels square.34 Tito’s speeches during the 1968 Prague Spring
reforms of Dubcek condemned the Soviet Union’s putting troops
into Czechoslovakia by stating, “The sovereignty of a socialist
country has been violated and trampled upon and a serious blow
inflicted on socialist and progressive forces around the world.”35
Tito’s continual displays of autonomy and frequent criticisms of
Soviet foreign policy extended to attacks on Soviet culture, and
Nobel Prize winning writer Mikhail Sholokhov’s condemnation
of Soviet literary policy gained widespread attention in Yugoslavia.36 This form of criticism of the Soviet Union demonstrates that
Tito’s desire for autonomy transcended politics, and he wanted
to firmly engrain Yugoslavian independence from the USSR into
the framework of society.
Tito’s foreign policy was at times opportunistic in its motives,
and he tended to make decisions with regard to the future course
of Yugoslavian participation in world politics on a case-by-case basis.
Decisions were often not based on any kind of committed support
for a leader or ideology. This use of a case-by-case basis to evaluate
foreign policy ensured that the feud between Brezhnev and Tito
over Czechoslovakia did not continue for the duration of Tito’s
tenure as leader. This was displayed by his response to the 1973
Yom Kippur War which again pitted the Arabs, allies of the Soviet
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235
Union, against the Israelis, allies of the United States. Tito was
a staunch supporter of the Soviet Union and the Arabs, but the
conclusion that can be drawn from his approach to Middle Eastern
politics was that it was not necessarily based on firm convictions.
Instead, opportunism and circumstances held ultimate sway in his
decisions. Tito’s decision to recognize Israel as an independent
and progressive state at the UN resolution, which created the
Jewish state in 1948, was due in part to the fact that Israelis had
served in his Yugoslavian partisan army.37 Among the nonaligned
leaders, Tito had favorable relations with Jawaharlal Nehru, the
Soviet-leaning leader of India, but his closest relationship was
with Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Arab nationalist Egyptian leader,
who often consulted Tito on matters of policy.38 Tito’s support for
the Palestinians and the PLO leader Yasser Arafat symbolized his
attempts to make Yugoslavia a leader of a nonaligned movement
which had an anti-Western slant. This rose from his tendency to
blame the problems facing newly independent states on the destructive legacy of Western imperialism.39 Thus, the handling of
the Middle East conflict demonstrated that Tito’s foreign policy
was opportunistic and lacking in core principles; his decisions
were decided by the geopolitics of the time. Yugoslavia exploited
its nonaligned status to amplify its international prominence by
frequently contradicting past foreign policy decisions.
An analysis of the foreign policy of Tito’s Yugoslavia would
not be complete without a discussion of the American and British
perception of the regime and its leader. During the early stages
of the Cold War, the nonaligned position of Yugoslavia ensured
that President Harry Truman gave Tito’s government sizable
amounts of economic and military aid to prepare Yugoslavia in
the case of a Soviet invasion.40 The focus of American intervention
in Yugoslavia after 1951 shifted from providing aid to protect the
state from Soviet invasion, to attempting to establish Yugoslavia
as a model for other nonaligned states.41 The American support
for Tito’s government was part of their larger objective of resisting the Soviet desire for hegemony and the abrogation of human
rights that accompanied Soviet rule. While Yugoslavia was by no
means a standard-bearer for nations on the issue of human rights
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Samuel Ramani
because of the totalitarian nature of Tito’s regime, it provided a
case for how firm leadership can overcome divisive forces within
a nation-less state. This ensured that Yugoslavia under Tito did
not face the conflict and chaos that occurred following the end
of colonialism in Africa.
Britain, like the other Allies during World War II, was supportive of Tito. When British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
met with Tito, then the leader of the partisans in Naples in 1944,
Churchill promised to give Tito support on the condition that
he did not use arms for a Yugoslavian civil war and established a
democracy in Yugoslavia at the war’s conclusion.42 Tito demonstrated his opportunism, ironically, in a manner similar to Stalin,
the man he was trying to distance himself from. Stalin violated
the Yalta Conference because of his desire for Soviet hegemony
in Eastern Europe. Similarly, Tito accepted Churchill’s proposal,
only to establish a Communist state after the War and to execute
Draza Mihailovic, the leader of his Chetnik rivals, at the end of
World War II. In spite of his failure to abide by his promise to
Churchill, Tito became the first Communist leader to make a
state visit to Britain in 1953. The British were open to maintaining diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia primarily because they
perceived Tito’s Yugoslavia as a buffer state between the British
and Russian spheres of influence, but they also recognized that
this was not as significant as maintaining economic and political ties with Italy and Grece.43 Thus, Tito was a figure who was
trusted and supported by many Western nations in spite of his
refusal to commit to NATO and his continuation of Communist
rule. However, the West supported Tito’s regime as a lesser evil
in spite of the human rights abuses and anti-democratic nature
of his government. In summary, Tito’s nonaligned foreign policy
was successful in maintaining Yugoslavian national sovereignty and
his split from Stalin ensured that he could ally with whomever he
believed would increase Yugoslavian influence without a binding
commitment to a particular superpower.
The third major characteristic that made Yugoslavian totalitarianism unique in Eastern Europe was Tito’s pragmatic and
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237
comparatively flexible application of Communist ideology in his
attempts to solve the domestic problems facing Yugoslavia. This
pragmatic approach to tackling domestic problems ensured that
like other totalitarian regimes, he used repression when necessary
in order to hold the multiethnic state together during his lifetime.
Another result of this pragmatism was the evaluation of policies
based on their effectiveness rather than their conformity to an
ideology. The economic policies of Tito were unique in Eastern
Europe because they were results-driven and not bound by the
ideological rigidities that characterized Soviet collectivization.
Collectivization of agriculture and the establishment of peasant
communes led to catastrophic losses of human life as a result of
famine in the Soviet Union. Tito’s original economic policy was
based on the Stalinist model of central planning which had led to
rapid economic growth in the Soviet Union and greatly increased
their competitive position as the Great Depression ravaged Western
Europe and North America. Despite the frequent clashes that occurred between Tito and Stalin, he initially retained many Sovietstyle Communist institutions like collectivized agriculture and five
year industrialization plans.44 The failures of collectivization to
improve the situation of the common people of Yugoslavia led to
a revival of private farming, and Tito’s decision to end collectivization demonstrates some ideological flexibility at the policy level.45
Yugoslavia’s declaration that the era of primitive revolution and
state intervention in agriculture was over, marked a profound shift
from the collectivization policies that had characterized Stalin’s
era.46 The influence of pragmatism and flexibility at the policy
level demonstrated Tito’s willingness to judge policies on their
success rather than on their exact conformity to a Soviet ideology
that the Yugoslavian government had become estranged from; in
this respect, Tito’s approach could be viewed as a forerunner of
the policies of Deng Xiaoping’s China.
Tito’s opposition to Soviet totalitarian domestic policies
was not the product of idealism or a concern for human rights
and the conditions of the poor. Instead, it demonstrated an
emphasis on pragmatism in a mold that was strikingly similar to
the totalitarianism adopted by Deng Xiaoping’s China. The Chi-
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Samuel Ramani
nese system, based on authoritarian capitalism and a substantial
liberalization of the Maoist economy, has fueled significant economic growth in the modern era. Deng Xiaoping loosened the
strict path of collectivization set up by Mao in favor of a greater
degree of entrepreneurship and increased foreign investment.
Deng Xiaoping resembled Tito in his judgment of policies based
on their effectiveness rather than on a dogmatic application of
Communist ideology. While Tito was in his last years of rule when
Deng took over, Tito had previously stood up for the inclusion
of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations.47 Deng
Xiaoping was also like Tito because his opportunism took precedence over support for a particular leader or country. In a speech
in 1956, he praised Stalin and his form of Communism, while at
the same time he denounced Nikita Khrushchev and Josip Broz
Tito as revisionists.48 When Deng actually took power, his policies
resembled those of Tito much more than those of Stalin in their
balance between totalitarian control over the Chinese people and
pragmatic policies. The viewpoints on policymaking expressed by
both Tito and Deng Xiaoping were successful in increasing the
prosperity of their countries. Yugoslavia was much more prosperous
than its neighbors, Romania and Bulgaria, during the 1960s and
many Yugoslavians took jobs in Western Europe with a particular
concentration of workers being in West Germany.49 The Chinese
economy also has grown rapidly in the decades following Deng
Xiaoping’s economic liberalization, and the pragmatic approach
to economic policy advocated by Deng has lifted China out of the
stagnation and decline that was predominant during the Maoist
era.
The pressures of maintaining a united Yugoslavian state
and the totalitarian nature of Tito’s regime led to organized
repression by Tito and Alexander Rankovic, his second in command. This repression severely impacted the lives of the people.
While the degree of repression in Yugoslavia was not comparable
to the violence of the Stalinist purges, the Yugoslavian government
continued its commitment to Marxism and used fear and intimidation to assert Tito’s power. Much like Stalin used Beria to run his
political prison camps, Tito had his own ruthless hard-line leader
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239
in Alexander Rankovic, who led the secret police forces and for a
time, was considered Tito’s likely successor. Rankovic was a Serbian
nationalist, who aided Tito in keeping the Yugoslavian ethnic groups
together by force and he also set up facilities for Soviet-style “reeducation” in the Goli Otok Camp. This resembled the system of
indoctrination employed by other Communist leaders who used
political prison camps to re-educate dissidents. Venko Markovski,
a Bulgarian poet laureate, was one notable political prisoner of
Tito’s regime who was incarcerated at Goli Otok. He described Goli
Otok as a small desolate island because its name was derived from
the Croatian word for barren island.50 The prison camp deprived
prisoners of all their civil rights; Markovski recounts a meeting
he had at the prison in which he stated that he had no right to
have opinions as a prisoner, but if he could have opinions, they
would differ from those of the person he was meeting.51 Venko
Markovski’s writings on the Tito regime and his incarceration at
the Goli Otok prison were directed to an international audience,
and one characteristic of Tito’s regime that he alludes to was its
hypocrisy in turning patriots and Yugoslavian heroes into political
prisoners.52 Markovski’s description of the political prison camp
of Goli Otok displays the nature of the persecutions enacted by
Tito’s government to destroy the identities of the people they incarcerated. The psychological manipulation that Tito practiced in
the prison camps demonstrates Yugoslavia’s totalitarian nature by
displaying how intimidation and control over people’s viewpoints
were actively practiced by his regime as a means of aligning the
citizens of the state behind the government and discouraging
dissent.
The form of indoctrination that Tito’s regime employed
in political prison camps like Goli Otok was also integrated into
the Yugoslavian education system. Tito employed a policy of Yugoslavization to downplay nationalist sentiments among the disparate
ethnic groups and the Serbians were the most actively targeted.53
The history of tensions between the Croatians and Serbians was
displayed by the manner in which the Ustase subscribed to the Nazi
Aryan racial hierarchy which placed Serbians as inferior peoples.
In spite of instances of Tito promoting anti-Serbian propaganda,
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Samuel Ramani
non-Serbians resented Rankovic’s Serbian nationalism, and Belgrade was viewed as a Serbian capital rather than as the capital of
Yugoslavia.54 This led to fears in Tito’s government that Rankovic’s
continuing heavy-handedness on non-Serbians was alienating them
from the Yugoslavian identity. These political circumstances could
have contributed to the manner in which Rankovic was removed
from his position of power in Yugoslavia.
The political persecutions perpetrated by Tito’s regime also
demonstrated Yugoslavia’s use of double standards in its policy
towards political executions. In spite of the executions and violence
towards dissidents in Yugoslavia, Tito criticized the Khrushchev
government and the Soviet Union regarding the execution of
Imre Nagy, the liberal Communist leader whose reforms instigated
the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Relations between Khrushchev
and Tito hit a nadir reminiscent of the Tito-Stalin split of 1948
and the threats that accompanied it. The Albanian Communist
Party refused to call Tito a comrade, and they claimed that Tito’s
support for Nagy demonstrated a deep-rooted desire to fuel the
causes of imperialists against the Soviet Union.55 Albania’s decision to not view Tito as a comrade was a clear repudiation of his
foreign policy as the term comrade reflected a sense of political
belonging among Communists similar to the way the term citizen
did during the French Revolution. Ironically, Albania would later
follow Tito’s path of alienation from the Soviet Union as it became
the sole bastion of Maoism in Eastern Europe.
The criticism of the Nagy execution demonstrates the duplicity that was present in Yugoslavian foreign policy. Tito criticized
other nations for participating in acts of political violence when
at the same time Rankovic was overseeing persecutions of Tito’s
opponents in Yugoslavia. Tito’s use of double standards mirrored
the foreign policy of Joseph Stalin and the Soviet regime, which
often condemned the West for actively spreading capitalism,
while they violated national self-determination rights among the
nations of Eastern Europe to spread Communism. Thus, Tito’s
handling of Hungary demonstrates his opportunism in criticizing
other nations not because of his firm principles but because of the
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241
potential for gaining political capital among Third World nations.
While he was denounced by communists as an imperialist, Tito
definitely did not condone imperialism, as Yugoslavia’s sovereignty
in the post-World War II era was the result of his confrontation
of Nazi and Soviet imperialism. Imperialism was the nemesis of
Yugoslavian influence in the Third World, and his subsequent
collaboration with leaders like Nasser was aimed at containing
the neo-colonialism of Western nations.
In addition to his political repression, Tito established
a cult of leadership in a similar way to Stalin, and the fact that
he adopted this key aspect of totalitarianism demonstrates the
hypocrisy that was at the heart of some of Tito’s policies towards
the Soviet Union. The creation of a cult of leadership around
Tito was not universally supported, and was a major reason for
the alienation of the writer Milovan Djilas, who had previously
been a Tito ally.56 The tradition of naming cities as a symbol of
authoritarian leadership was employed often in Russian history as
the names of Petrograd, Leningrad, and Stalingrad demonstrate.
Tito was no exception to this authoritarian tradition by symbolizing his leadership in the Balkans with the creation of the city of
Titograd in his honor. Djilas’s opposition to his continuation of
totalitarian policies like those of the Soviet Union led to his arrest
as a political prisoner.
Tito’s image as a repressive leader, while shrouded abroad
to some extent by his criticism of human rights abuses in other
nations, as in the case of Hungary, was cemented among many
nationalists at home. One area where the policies of Tito and
Rankovic gained particular relevance in the course of future Balkan conflicts was Kosovo where the Albanians equated Rankovic
with Serbian repression.57 Tito’s hopes of uniting Albania with
Yugoslavia ended with Albanian leader Enver Hoxha’s decision to
side with the Soviet Union in 1948, and Kosovo, which contained
an Albanian majority, was kept under tight centralized control to
prevent it from seceding.58 The importance of preventing Kosovo
from seceding particularly affected the Serbs, as the land has a
historical significance dating back to the 1389 defeat of Serbia at
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Samuel Ramani
the hands of Ottoman Turkey.59 The fall of Rankovic led to fears
among many Serbian nationalists that the Serbian people would
no longer be protected, and Tito’s purges of Rankovic’s former
allies led to large-scale Serbian emigration from Kosovo.60 The
post-Tito and Rankovic era would eventually lead to chaos as ethnic
hatreds that had previously been suppressed fueled the genocide
and atrocities of Slobodan Milosevic’s rule in Yugoslavia. The
chaos that accompanied the dissolution of the ethnic system and
Milosevic’s inflammatory calls for Serbian ultra-nationalism were
strikingly different from Tito’s controlled approach and severe
restriction of any form of nationalism that was destructive to the
Yugoslavian state. Rankovic was removed from the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia during the late 1960s and this move weakened
the degree of totalitarianism in Yugoslavia to some extent.
Rankovic’s demise paved the way for more constitutional
reforms during the 1970s as Tito faced clashes over national
sovereignty in his home country of Croatia. One reason for the
Croatian desire for constitutional reform was societal as Croatia
moved from a rural to an increasingly urban nation, and educational opportunities for the people had improved substantially.61
The Croatian desire for reform exemplifies a trend of education
and urbanization leading to calls for political liberalization that has
occurred in many countries over the course of history. However,
the constitutional reforms that the Croatian people desired did
not occur before the Tito regime’s incarceration of many Croatian
political activists. One notable activist was Franjo Tudman, the
first President of Croatia, who had previously been an academic
known for his Milosevic-style ultra-nationalism and his denial of
the Holocaust. The decision by Tito to make reforms to appease
internal nationalism in Croatia once again demonstrates his application of a form of pragmatic totalitarianism. While Tito’s death
accelerated the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, the demise
of the iron-fisted Rankovic actually was the event that sowed the
seeds for the genocidal violence that occurred under Slobodan
Milosevic, something that could be considered inevitable since
the state of Yugoslavia was created.
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243
The constitutional compromises that Tito was forced
into during the 1970s demonstrate the pragmatic totalitarianism
employed by the Yugoslavian government as well as the necessity
to appease ethnic groups and prevent anarchy. Ethnic hostilities were particularly prominent in Tito’s native state of Croatia.
Since Tito was of mixed Croatian and Slovenian nationality, he
did not fuel Serbian nationalism as Slobodan Milosevic did, to the
detriment of the Yugoslavian state. During World War II, Croatia
broke away from Yugoslavia and it was placed under the control
of the pro-Nazi Ustase. The Ustase was the de facto Nazi Party of
Croatia, as it supported exaggerated nationalism and corporatism
and attacked liberal Croats, Jews, and Serbs who were all perceived
to be enemies of the Croatian state.62 The events that occurred
in Croatia under the Ustase make it apparent that strong state
power can give rise to two distinct types of leadership. The first
is the Hitler type of leadership where national leaders incited
violence against undesirable ethnic groups like the Ustase and
Milosevic. The second is Stalin’s type of leadership, which kept
states together by brutal repression and the suffocation of dissent.
Tito’s rule, while less brutal than Stalin’s, could be considered an
example of the second type of leadership.
Since Croatian politics played a role in shaping Tito’s
form of Communism, it would be important to analyze the social
conditions that helped form his political opinions. Croatia was
divided between Catholic Croatians and the Orthodox Serbians,
and enmity between them existed even in small impoverished
towns like Lika, which writer Milovan Djilas uses to illustrate the
society of Tito’s Yugoslavia.63 Djilas’s descriptions of Montenegro
were different from Croatia because he states that by examining
the Montenegrin ethnicity, language and history, there are clear
parallels that place Montenegrins as part of the Serbian race.64
Croatia’s history of religious division and traditional ethnic hatreds
undoubtedly shaped the psyche of Josip Broz Tito, who was an
ethnic Croatian leading a multiethnic state where the plurality of
people were Serbian. The shadow of Croatian secession loomed
over Tito as he attempted to hold Yugoslavia together. The existence
of a nation within a nation came with the risk of destabilization in
244
Samuel Ramani
a manner similar to Basque and Catalan separatist movements in
Spain and the Irish crisis in Britain. Yugoslavia was a patchwork
quilt of nationalities who varied in terms of their feelings of affinity
to the Serbians who made up the plurality of the state. At the same
time, the fact that the Serbians were not in the majority meant
that leaders like Rankovic could not stamp their authority on the
minority ethnic groups to the extent that the Russians managed
to accomplish in the Soviet Union or the Castilian Spanish did in
Franco’s Spain.
The fragility of the ethnic union would have turned
Yugoslavia into a failed state beset by anarchy like Somalia and
post-occupation Iraq had it not been for Yugoslavia’s iron-fisted
post-war leadership. However, Tito’s achievement of peace during his time as leader would prove to be short-lived as the tensions that emerged following the fall of Rankovic foreshadowed
the ethnic violence that would occur in Yugoslavia. Tito’s death
meant that strong centralized authority was no longer present to
prevent the ethnic tensions from destroying the apparatus of the
Communist state. This coupled with the inflammatory and racist
rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic antagonized the constituent states
to the point of secession from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, under Milosevic, was viewed as a Serbian state that intended to destroy the
other states by ethnic cleansing rather than encompassing them
as political equals to Serbia. In Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, Bosnian
Muslims were viewed as undesirables in a manner that resembles
Max Weber’s description of Jews as pariahs in the decades leading
up to the genocide of European Jews by the Nazis. The civil war
and the violent response of Milosevic led to placement of serious
sanctions on Yugoslavia. The rump state of Serbia, Montenegro
and Kosovo that emerged from the wars became a pariah in the
international community as a result of the genocide perpetrated
by Milosevic. The subsequent separation of Montenegro from the
union as an independent state in 2006 led to the disintegration of
this makeshift rump state, which was renamed Serbia and Montenegro from Yugoslavia. Kosovo’s declaration of independence in
2008 and the tensions that ensued demonstrate that the effects of
Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo still linger in Balkan politics today.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
245
Thus, Milosevic’s radical racist agenda was the ultimate betrayal of
the more tempered pragmatism that characterized Tito’s views on
ethnic issues. This demonstrates that in multiethnic states, when
radicalism and hatred overcome pragmatism and cooperation,
the apparatus of government is doomed to inevitable implosion.
In order to place the issues regarding national sovereignty
that Yugoslavia faced under Tito and Milosevic in the context of
global politics, it is important to realize that nations can face two
distinct situations regarding statehood and nationality. The first
situation creates a nation-less state much like Yugoslavia and the
second situation is a state-less nation, a group of people with a
distinct identity but lacking a state, much like the Kurds in the
Middle East. Three parallels can also be drawn between the Yugoslavian case and post-colonial Nigeria. The first parallel is that
both Yugoslavia and Nigeria were synthetically created states that
were formerly under the administration of the colonial powers of
Austria-Hungary and Britain respectively. This led to the creation
of a state with boundaries that suited the geopolitics of their era
more than the actual desires or identity of the citizens residing
in the state. The second parallel between them is that both states
were ethnically and religiously diverse. Both nations struggled
with clashes between Christians and Muslims and also over the
dominance of one group over another. The people in the Christian
South of Nigeria were generally wealthier, with more educational
and employment opportunities because of large-scale British
investment in the region.65 This disparity of wealth and opportunities led to resentment among the people in Northern Nigeria
who were mostly Muslim. The conflict between the Serbians, who
dominated the government, and the Muslim Bosnians would later
be a principal cause of the Yugoslavian genocide of the 1990s.
Also, the lack of ethnic solidarity in both nations contributed to
their struggles with issues of national identity. The third parallel
is that both countries suffered from the horrors of genocide. The
Igbo genocide in Biafra from 1967-1970 led to the temporary
creation of Biafra as an independent state, in a similar manner
to the creation of republics from the former Yugoslavia after the
Bosnian genocide. While a common set of circumstances faced
246
Samuel Ramani
by nationless states can be outlined, the responses to them and
the effects of national insurrection differ from nation to nation.
Nigeria has struggled with political instability since independence
was attained in 1960, as the military has exerted undue authority
over the government. However, optimism has increased regarding the sustainability of a stable government in Nigeria because
there has not been any major military insurrection since the 1999
election of Olusegun Obasanjo as President. Yugoslavia’s struggles
did not lead to frequent changes in government before the fall of
Milosevic due to the fact that the Communist government wielded
much more extensive central authority under Tito, preventing
changes of power.
In conclusion, Tito’s strategy for Yugoslavia was unique
from all other totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe. Firstly, it
was derived from self-governing socialism, a form of socialism that
was rooted in pre-Soviet ideology and had never been put into
practice in any other country before Tito’s regime. Secondly, it
engendered the creation of a Communist state that was independent from the Soviet sphere of influence. Thirdly, Yugoslavian
policy decisions were pragmatic as they placed effectiveness over
ideological conformity when policies were being made. These three
unique characteristics together with his repressive policies ensured
Tito’s Yugoslavia stayed united over the course of his leadership
and that Yugoslavia exerted a disproportionately influential role
in regional and international politics considering its relatively
small size. The use of the politics of repression, which included a
secret police system and political prison camps to enforce Tito’s
authority, ensured that the multiethnic state did not disintegrate
during Tito’s lifetime. However, the demise of Rankovic hastened
the inevitable breakdown of central authority that occurred just over
a decade after Tito’s death. Tito’s regime could only be totalitarian
to a limited extent as the multiethnic nature of the state that he
controlled prevented him from being as autocratic as Stalin. His
form of totalitarianism resembled the regimes of Mussolini and
Hitler to a limited extent, because all three regimes courted the
support of the populace in order to legitimize their governments in
the eyes of the people and the international community. Slobodan
THE CONCORD REVIEW
247
Milosevic’s rhetoric was based on Serbian nationalism, and he opposed the transition towards a form of democracy that prevented
the breakdown of other multiethnic states like Nigeria. The inevitable breakdown of authority mirrored the collapse of the Soviet
Union under Gorbachev and the USSR’s subsequent breakdown
into constituent states. The composite state of Yugoslavia could be
described as a microcosm of an empire, and its implosion was the
most recent instance of the disintegration of a multi-ethnic state
held together by repression. This disintegration represented the
demise of the last vestige of Cold War Communism. It came at a
time when international politics was shifting towards a balance
of power based on economic and ideological influence, rather
than direct imperialistic control of territories. Tito’s Yugoslavia
demonstrates that multiethnic states and multinational empires
held together by repression are doomed to fail at some point, and
the transient nature of these kinds of states shows that there is
only a thin line between a sustainable state and the anarchy that
accompanies a failed one.
248
Samuel Ramani
Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (New York:
Palgrave Publishers, 2001) p. 97
2
Sharon Zukin, Beyond Marx and Tito (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975) p. 194
3
John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a
Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 41
4
Zukin, p. 50
5
Benson, p. 97
6
Ibid., p. 97
7
Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Nikita Federovski, The Civil
War in France: The Paris Commune (New York: International
Publishers, 1993) p. 123
8
Joel Krieger, Margaret E. Crahan, The Oxford
Companion to Politics of the World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001) p. 838
9
Ibid., p. 838
10
Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, The Proletarian
Revolution in Russia trans. Jacob Hartman and Andre Tridon
(Moscow: The Communist Press, 1918) p. 75
11
Benson, p. 97
12
Joel M. Halpern and David A. Kideckel, Neighbors
at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University,
2000) p. 61
13
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the
Communist Party ed. Friedrich Engels (Radford, Virginia:
Wilder Publications, 2007) p. 24
14
James Headley, Russia and the Balkans (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008) p. 26
15
Ibid., p. 26
16
Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, Authoritarian
Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established OneParty Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970) p. 505
17
Alex N. Dragnich, First Yugoslavia (Stanford California:
Hoover Institution Press, 1983) p. 99
18
Robert Service, Russia: Experiment with a People
(Cambridge, Masschusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002)
p. 173
19
Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in
the Modern World, 1700-2000 (New York: Basic Books, 2001)
p. 416
20
Richard Pipes, Soviet Strategy in Europe (New York:
Cranel Russack Publishers, 1976) p. 67
1
THE CONCORD REVIEW
249
21
Zhores Medvedev and Roy Medvedev and Ellen
Dahrendorf, The Unknown Stalin trans. Ellen Dahrendorf
(London: Tauris Publishers, 2003) pp. 61-62
22
Venko Markovski, Goli Otok: The Island of Death (New
York: Social Science Monographs, 1984) p. xiv
23
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 19181956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1998) p. 247
24
Richard Pipes, Europe since 1815 (New York: American
Heritage Publishing Corporation) p. 528
25
Ibid., p. 528
26
Josip Broz Tito, Selected Speeches and Articles: 19411961 (Zagreb: Naprijed Publishers, 1963) p. 217
27
Markovski, p. 22
28
Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Stane Dolanc, Ideological
and Political Offensive of the League of Yugoslavia (Belgrade:
The Secretariat for Information on the Federal Executive
Council, 1972) p. 28
29
Julio Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, Military
Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions (Baltimore,
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) p. 317
30
Daniel Bethlehem and Marc Weller, The Yugoslav Crisis
in International Law: General Issues (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997) p. xxxii
31
Sergei Khrushchev and Shirley Benson, Nikita
Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000)
p. 148
32
Misha Glenny, The Balkans (New York: Penguin
Publishers, 1999) p. 570
33
Neil Barnett, Tito (London: Haus Publishing, 2006)
p. 126
34
Ibid., p. 127
35
Ibid., p. 127
36
Robert F. Price, Mixail Soloxov in Yugoslavia (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1973) p. 36
37
Barnett, p. 113
38
Ibid., p. 112
39
Ibid., p. 112
40
Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat (University Park,
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) p. xiv
41
Ibid., p. xiv
42
Chris Wrigley, Winston Churchill: A Biographical
Companion (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO Publishers, 2002)
p. 325
250
Samuel Ramani
Richard Aldrich and Michael Hopkins, Intelligence,
Defense and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-war World
(Newbury Park: Frank Cass Publishers, 1994) p. 16
44
Vidosav Stevanovic and Zlata Filipovich, Milosevic: The
People’s Tyrant (London: Tauris Publishers, 2004) p. 15
45
Ibid., p. 15
46
Benson, p. 97
47
Tito, p. 186
48
Ming Ruan, Nancy Liu, Peter Rand, and Lawrence R.
Sullivan, Deng Xiaoping: Chronicles of an Empire (Boulder
Colorado: Westview Press, 1994) p. 4
49
Misha Glenny, The Balkans (New York: Penguin
Publishers, 1999) p. 570
50
Markovski, p. ix
51
Ibid., p. 54
52
Harold B. Segel, The Columbia Literary History of
Eastern Europe since 1945 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2008) p. 161
53
Danielle S. Sremac, War of Words: Washington tackles
the Yugoslav Conflict (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Publishing Group, 1999) p. 40
54
James F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe
after Communism (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University
Press, 1994) p. 236
55
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967)
p. 233
56
Robert Service, Comrades: A History of World
Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007)
p. 256
57
Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto
Press, 20) p. 12
58
Joseph Held, The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in
the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press,
1992) p. 339
59
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster
Publishers, 1998) p. 260
60
Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto
Press, 2000) p. 12
61
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Politics, Power and
the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 74
43
THE CONCORD REVIEW
251
Klaus Ziemer, Jerzy W. Borejsza and Magdalene Hulas,
Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies
and Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2006) p. 231
63
Milovan Djilas, Tito: The Story from Inside trans.
Vasilije Kojic and Richard Hayes (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1980) p. 150
64
Milovan Djilas, Montenegro trans. Kenneth Johnstone
(San Diego: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963) p. xi
65
Gabriel A. Almond, et al., Comparative Politics Today: a
World View (New York: Pearson Longman, 2010) p. 659
62
Bibliography
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Newbury Park: Frank Cass Publishers, 1994
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View New York: Pearson Longman, 2010
Barnett, Neil, Tito London: Haus Publishing, 2006
Benson, Leslie, Yugoslavia: A Concise History New York:
Palgrave Publishers, 2001
Bethlehem, Daniel, and Marc Weller, The Yugoslav Crisis
in International Law: General Issues Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997
Brown, James F., Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe after
Communism Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press,
1994
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967
Clark, Howard, Civil Resistance in Kosovo London: Pluto
Press, 2000
Dawisha, Karen, and Bruce Parrott, Politics, Power and
the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997
Djilas, Milovan, Montenegro trans. Kenneth Johnstone, San
Diego: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963
Djilas, Milovan, Tito: The Story from Inside trans. Vasilije
Kojic and Richard Hayes, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1980
Dragnich, Alex N., First Yugoslavia Stanford California:
Hoover Institution Press, 1983
Ferguson, Niall, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the
Modern World, 1700-2000 New York: Basic Books, 2001
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Glenny, Misha, The Balkans New York: Penguin Publishers,
1999
Halpern, Joel M., and David A. Kideckel, Neighbors at War:
Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 2000
Headley, James, Russia and the Balkans New York: Columbia
University Press, 2008
Held, Joseph, The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in
the Twentieth Century New York: Columbia University Press,
1992
Huntington, Samuel, and Clement Moore, Authoritarian
Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established OneParty Systems New York: Basic Books, 1970
Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order New York: Simon and Schuster
Publishers, 1998
Khrushchev, Sergei, and Shirley Benson, Nikita Khrushchev
and the Creation of a Superpower University Park,
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000
Krieger, Joel, Margaret E. Crahan, The Oxford Companion
to Politics of the World New York: Oxford University Press,
2001
Lampe, John R., Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a
Country Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press, 2000
Lees, Lorraine M., Keeping Tito Afloat University Park,
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997
Lenin, Vladimir, and Leon Trotsky, The Proletarian
Revolution in Russia trans. Jacob Hartman and Andre Tridon
Moscow: The Communist Press, 1918
Markovski, Venko, Goli Otok: The Island of Death: A Diary
in Letters New York: Social Science Monographs, 1984
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the
Communist Party edited by Friedrich Engels, Radford, Virginia:
Wilder Publications, 2007
Marx, Karl, Vladimir Lenin, Nikita Federovski, The Civil
War in France: The Paris Commune New York: International
Publishers, 1993
Medvedev, Zhores, Roy A. Medvedev, and Ellen Dahrendorf,
The Unknown Stalin translated by Ellen Dahrendorf, London:
Tauris Publishers, 2003
Palmer, R. R., Joel Colton, and Lloyd Kramer, A History of
the Modern World New York: McGraw Hill Companies, 2007
THE CONCORD REVIEW
253
Price, Robert F., Mixail Soloxov in Yugoslavia New York:
Columbia University Press, 1973
Pipes, Richard, Europe since 1815 New York: American
Heritage Publishing Corporation
Pipes, Richard, Soviet Strategy in Europe New York: Cranel
Russack Publishers, 1976
Ruan, Ming, Nancy Liu, Peter Rand, and Lawrence R.
Sullivan, Deng Xiaoping: Chronicles of an Empire Boulder
Colorado: Westview Press, 1994
Segel, Harold B., The Columbia Literary History of Eastern
Europe Since 1945 New York: Columbia University Press, 2008
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Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002
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An Experiment in Literary Investigation Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1998
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Yugoslav Conflict Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group,
1999
Stevanovic, Vidosav, and Zlata Filipovich, Milosevic: The
People’s Tyrant London: Tauris Publishers, 2004
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Ideological and Political Offensive of the League of Yugoslavia
Belgrade: The Secretariat for Information on the Federal
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Companion Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO Publishers,
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Notes on Contributors
Caitlin Lu (Matteo Ricci) is a Junior at Chinese International
School in Hong Kong, where she plays varsity squash and runs
varsity cross country. She spent her Freshman year at Geelong
Grammar School in Australia, working on a farm while taking a
full academic load. She is fluent in Mandarin and English.
Andrew Crumrine (Reforms of Gaius Marius) is in his first
year at the Georgia Institute of Technology. At Richard Montgomery
High School he was an AP Scholar of Distinction and earned the
IB Diploma. He was also president of the Archaeology Club.
Kristina Solvik (Rights of Muslim Women) is a Senior at
the Athenian School in Danville, California. She plans to study
French and Women’s Studies in college and hopes to become a
foreign correspondent for a newspaper. She will be at Pomona in
the Fall.
Preeti Varathan (Peter the Great) is a Senior at Singapore
American School in Singapore, where she received awards in AP
European History, History of China, Western Civilization and
Physics. She is in the National Honor Society and plays both western
and carnatic (Indian) violin. She earned an 800 on the U.S. History
test, and has been active in Model Congress and debates.
Fatima Hosain (Headscarf Ban) is a Senior at Poughkeepsie
Day School in Poughkeepsie, New York, where she wrote this paper
for her Junior Thesis with Karen Nichols. She is very interested in
interfaith outreach and religious awareness.
Molly Pickel (Roman Britain) is a Senior at Horace Greeley
High School in Chappaqua, New York, where she earned summa
cum laude three years on the National Latin Exam. She plays the
violin and is interested in Swedish weaving. She shared the 2009
Chairman’s Youth Award for environmental work.
Caroline Carson Mullins (Slaves in the Revolution) is a
Junior at St. Mary’s Episcopal School in Memphis, Tennessee,
where she received the Madge Clark Art Award. She is a member
of the National Beta Club and the Spanish Honor Society. She
sings and plays the piano and likes English, Spanish, and history.
She enjoys the youth activities at her church.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
255
Jiweon Kim (Lincoln and Roosevelt) is a Senior at the
Hotchkiss School in Lakeville, Connecticut, where she shared a
prize for Non-Western History, and earned the Round Square’s
King Constantine Medal for service work. As editor of the school
paper, The Record, she won a Gold Medal from Columbia Scholastic
Associate Press. She is captain of both the golf and swimming
teams, and plays the violin in the orchestra.
Rachel Harrus (Jewish Community) is a Senior at Palo Alto
High School in Palo Alto, California. Next fall she will be a student
at Barnard College.
Rachel Waltman (James Knox Polk) is a Senior at Tenafly
High School in Tenafly, New Jersey, where she is treasurer of
the Model United Nations Club. She has received a number of
awards for her community service work, and is active in the Peer
Leadership Program, the Principal’s Cabinet, and the Impact
Ambassadors Program. Last summer she was in a Rotary Youth
Exchange Program in Belgium. She is taking classes in Spanish,
French, Italian, and Portugese, and will be at Stanford in the Fall.
Samuel Ramani (Tito’s Yugoslavia) is a Senior homescholar
from Toronto, Ontario. He earned a 5 in AP Chemistry, World
History, Biology, European History, and Comparative Government
and Politics. On SAT Subject Tests, he earned an 800 in Chemistry,
World History and Math Level 2. He is an AP Scholar with Distinction
and a National Biology Scholar and National AP Scholar in Canada.
In piano he is at the Grade 8 Level of the Royal Conservatory of
Music.
ccccc
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