Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
DOI 10.1007/s00267-007-9005-2
Stakeholder Perceptions of Scientists: Lake Tahoe Environmental
Policy from 1984 to 2001
Christopher M. Weible
Received: 6 July 2006 / Accepted: 21 June 2007 / Published online: 11 September 2007
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Abstract What factors explain stakeholders’ perceptions of scientists in environmental politics?
Questionnaire data are used to examine stakeholders’
views of scientific experts in the context of Lake Tahoe
environmental policy from 1984 to 2001. Stakeholders’
perceptions of scientists have remained the same over
time – despite a shift from adversarial to collaborative
policymaking and after decades of mounting scientific
evidence showing water quality declines. On average,
stakeholders perceive scientists with limited influence on
Lake Tahoe environmental policy and view them with
mixed levels of skepticism. Stakeholders’ evaluation of
scientists is best explained by their beliefs about development versus the environment. Stakeholders in favor of
more land development express distrust of scientists and
negatively evaluate university researchers and consultants. Stakeholders in favor of environmental protection
are more likely to trust scientists and positively evaluate
university researchers and consultants.
Keywords Watershed management Environmental policy Collaborative decision making Science Lake Tahoe Water policy
Introduction
How do stakeholders perceive scientists in environmental
politics? Existing research has found that the general public
C. M. Weible (&)
School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 685
Cherry Street, Atlanta, GA 30332-0345, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
is confident with the performance of scientists (NSB 2004)
but that some sectored pockets of society view scientists with
skepticism (Holton 1993; Ross 1996; Kendrick 1996; Bauer
and others 2000). Others question scientists’ influence in
policymaking, arguing that scientists wield either too much
influence (Fischer 2000) or not enough influence (Majone
and Quade 1980). One way to help clarify this discussion is to
analyze stakeholder perceptions of scientists over time. It is
likely, for example, that perceptions of scientists might
change as scientific evidence accumulates or as policymaking shifts from adversarial to collaborative processes. The
current article analyzes data from three questionnaires
administered to stakeholders involved in Lake Tahoe environmental policy over a 17-year period to explain their
perceptions of the performance and influence of scientists.
Few environmental issues embroil stakeholders in
heated and long-term disputes as much as water politics
(Sabatier and others 2005; Scholz and Stiftel 2005).
Because of its vital role in life support, economic development, and environmental conservation, water mobilizes
actors like few other issues. An exemplar of water politics
is the lasting debate over water quality in the Lake Tahoe
Basin. Lake Tahoe is an interesting case study for examining perceptions of scientists in environmental politics
because scientists have accumulated evidence of water
quality declines for more than 30 years with the resulting
information being used to shape policy (Sabatier and Pelkey 1990; Jassby and others 2001). Also, Lake Tahoe water
politics is interesting to study because collaborative-based
organizations have been present since the late 1980s
(Imperial and Kauneckis 2003; Nechodom and others
2000), which parallels trends in other environmental policy
domains (Butler and Koontz 2005; Lubell 2004; Imperial
1999; Weber 1998; NRC 1996; Sabatier and others 2005).
This article presents a rare analysis of stakeholder
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perceptions of scientists before and after the emergence of
collaborative organizations.
This article begins with a description of the theoretical
approach, the case study, and the dependent and explanatory variables. It uses both descriptive and explanatory
techniques to analyze the data. Despite the emergence of
collaborative organizations and the accumulation of scientific evidence, stakeholders remain divided in their
distrust of scientists and perceive scientists with limited
influence.
Materials and Methods
Theoretical Approach
This article investigates stakeholders’ perceptions of the
performance and influence of scientists. Stakeholders can
be defined as actors who influence directly or indirectly
the affairs of a policy subsystem. Stakeholders include
interest groups, businesses, elected government officials,
agency officials, scientists, and members of the media
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Stakeholders’ perceptions of the performance of scientists is defined as
their assessment of how scientists conduct research,
present their findings, and participate in the policy process. Similar definitions are found in the literature on the
perceived confidence of science and scientists (NSB
2004). Perceptions of the influence of scientists in policymaking is defined as the extent that stakeholders view
scientists affecting policy decisions, altering agendas, and
shaping community preferences (Bachrach and Baratz
1962; Gaventa 1980).
Stakeholders’ perceptions of scientists are explained
by four factors. First, the perception of scientists is
dependent on the context of decision making in the
policy subsystem. Over the past couple decades, collaborative-based organizations have become a common
institutional approach for environmental management
(Butler and Koontz 2005; Imperial 1999; Lubell 2004;
NRC 1996; Sabatier and others 2005; Weber 1998).
Collaborative organizations are iterative, transparent
processes with extensive face-to-face communications
aimed at developing shared meanings of problems and at
formulating and selecting win-win policy alternatives
under consensus-based decision rules (Sabatier et al.,
2005). The emergence of collaborative organizations is
largely a backlash to adversarial approaches to decision
making. Adversarial decision making can be defined as
top-down, opaque processes where a single government
agency dominates decisions with limited participation by
interested and affected stakeholders and where resulting
policies lead to clear winners and losers (Mansbridge
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Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
1983; NRC 1996). Examples of adversarial approaches
include courts, legislatures, and traditional top-down
strategies for rule-making. When policies are debated in
adversarial decision making, stakeholders use scientific
information as political salvo to mobilize supporters and
win the support of sovereigns, which can sterilize
learning, stall the development of policy, and generate a
‘‘dialogue of the deaf’’ (Sabatier 1987, p 678). In contrast, collaborative organizations are expected to provide
opportunities for scientific experts and other stakeholders
to work together via joint-fact finding, integration of
different forms of knowledge, and adaptive governance
(NRC 1996; McGinnis and others 1999; Woolley and
others 2002; Lubell 2004; Norton 2005; Scholz and
Stiftel 2005; Guston 1999). I hypothesize that stakeholders will evaluate scientists positively and view
scientists as more influential in policy subsystems where
collaborative approaches are accessible compared to
policy subsystems where collaborative venues are inaccessible. This first hypothesis builds on existing research
that shows how a decision-making context affects whether science is used for advocacy or for learning
(Sabatier, 1987; Jenkins-Smith, 1990).
The second factor is the level of disagreement or consensus among scientists in a policy subsystem (Schneider
and Ingram 1997). When a scientific community is divided
over the evidence about the seriousness, causes, or alternatives of a public policy issue, stakeholders are likely to
disagree over knowledge claims and will selectively use
science to bolster various political positions. If the scientific community remains divided for long periods of time,
the accumulation of scientific and technical information
will unlikely alter actors’ problem orientations but instead
reinforce preexisting beliefs and limit learning over time
(Weiss 1977). I hypothesize that when the scientific community provides a consistent message over time,
stakeholders will evaluate scientists positively and perceive
scientists as influential in making policy. This second
hypothesis is adapted from Schneider and Ingram’s argument about the effects of the social construction of
knowledge and the power of a unified policy community on
policymaking (1977).
The third factor is the risks or opportunities of scientific
information to the intrinsic or extrinsic wellbeing of
stakeholders (Schneider and Ingram 1997). Intrinsic wellbeing relates to stakeholders’ core normative beliefs, such
as the importance of environmental protection versus
economic development. Extrinsic wellbeing relates to
stakeholders’ material interests (Ostrom 2005), such as the
importance of protecting property from regulations. Scientific and technical information is often used in political
debates to bolster policy positions, which allows some
stakeholders to perceive such information as either
Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
threatening or supporting their intrinsic or extrinsic wellbeing. The argument builds on Schneider and Ingram
(1997) who argued that stakeholders’ social construction of
knowledge will reflect the resulting political opportunities
or risks. I hypothesize that actors who perceive more
opportunities than risks from scientific information on their
intrinsic or extrinsic wellbeing will evaluate scientists
positively and believe that scientists are not influential
enough. Alternately, actors who perceive more risks than
opportunities from scientific information on their intrinsic
or extrinsic wellbeing will evaluate scientists negatively
and believe that scientists are too influential.
Finally, stakeholders’ views of scientists will be shaped
by their knowledge of science (Ziman 1991; Laugksch
2000; NSB 2004). Scientific knowledge is defined as an
actors’ ability to understand the methods and content of
science (Wynne 1995). I expect that stakeholders, who are
very knowledgeable about science, will more likely evaluate scientists positively and perceive scientists as not
influential enough.
Study Area
Straddling the California and Nevada border, Lake Tahoe
is one of the world’s largest, deepest, and clearest lakes.
The Lake Tahoe economy shifted from resource extraction in the latter half of the 19th century to summer
tourism in the early 20th century (Nechodom and others
2000). After the 1960 Winter Olympics and the construction of a major interstate highway, the Basin’s
economy extended to year-round tourism. Soon after,
millions of people flocked annually to the Basin to ski,
hike, and gamble. Thousands more bought open lots,
commercial property, and second/residential homes
(Nechodom and others 2000).
With a rapid increase in visitors and residents in the
1960s, people began to worry about the potential adverse
effects from land use on Lake Tahoe’s water clarity. Scientists started monitoring water clarity and found that
people could see 30 m below Lake Tahoe’s surface (Jassby
and others 2001). Scientists argued that sewage, mainly
from leaky septic tanks, threatened the clarity of Lake
Tahoe and recommended exporting sewage out of the
Basin (McGauhey and others 1963). Governments
responded by pumping all sewage out of the Lake Tahoe
Basin by 1975 (Sabatier and Pelkey 1990). The sewage
system had the unintended effect of permitting additional
commercial development on steep lots, which eventually
traded one source of nutrient input (nitrogen from leaky
septic tanks) for another (phosphorous from housing,
commercial, and road development) (Sabatier and Pelkey
1990).
855
In the 1960s, comprehensive environmental management was hampered with authority being divided among
two states, five counties, and one incorporated city
(Elliot-Fisk and others 1996). In 1969, California and
Nevada state governments and the federal government
signed a bi-state compact that created the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (TRPA). The TRPA was
charged with developing and implementing land use
management plans while balancing economic development with environmental protection (Elliot-Fisk and
others 1996).
The TRPA immediately faced a contentious political
landscape. The TRPA’s 1971 general plan was criticized
by business and development groups for restricting too
much growth and by environmental groups for allowing too
much growth. Tahoe stakeholders were soon entangled in
litigation and political controversy (Sabatier and Pelkey
1990).
In 1980, the bistate compact was revised to prioritize
the environment over economic development. The 1980
bistate compact gave state representatives the majority
on the TRPA governing board, revised the voting rules
to make it easier to deny development permits, elevated
the importance for meeting new environmental thresholds, and required a new plan to meet these thresholds
(Sabatier and Pelkey 1990). The TRPA adopted a new
general plan in April, 1984. The next day, environmentalists filed two suits alleging that the plan would be
insufficient to control growth. A property rights group
also filed a suit, alleging numerous violations of property
rights. In June, 1984, a federal court stopped all construction in the Basin until an acceptable plan was
designed and adopted. The moratorium gave a temporary
victory to environmentalists until the Nevada state legislature threatened to withdraw from the bistate compact,
which would have jeopardized the effectiveness of landuse regulations in the Basin (Elliot-Fisk and others 1996;
Kauneckis and others 1999; Sabatier and Pelkey 1990).
A hurting stalemate resulted, where environmentalists
and developers considered the status quo as unacceptable
and perceived no alternate venues to achieve their
political objectives (Sabatier and Pelkey 1990; Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith 1993).
Concurrent to the policy and political events of the
1970s and early 1980s, scientists continued to measure
declines in Tahoe’s water clarity. Goldman (2000) documented a 21-year decline in water clarity from 30 meters in
1968 to 25 meters in 1984 with the major source of nutrient
input being erosion and runoff from housing, commercial,
and highway developments.
The hurting stalemate led to stakeholder negotiations
and a new era of collaborative policymaking. After
almost two years of negotiations, a new TRPA regional
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plan was approved in 1986/87 that is still used today.
The TRPA’s 1986/87 plan combined a new parcel
evaluation system, lot acquisition programs, a guarantee
for all property owners to build, a housing allocation
system, and several programs for transferable development rights (Sabatier and Pelkey 1990). Since 1986/87,
collaborative-based organizations have emerged in the
Basin and are now the primary mechanism for mitigating
conflict and for making policy decisions in the Basin
(Elliot-Fisk and others 1996; Kauneckis and others 1999;
Imperial and Kauneckis 2003). Nechodom and others
(2000) identified several collaborative organizations in
the Basin including the Transportation and Water Quality
Coalition (est. 1989), the Tahoe Coalition of Recreation
Providers (est. 1991), the Tahoe Truckee Economic
Coalition (est. 1992), and the Forest Health Consensus
Group (est. 1992).
During the 1990s, scientists continued to document
evidence of declines in Tahoe’s water clarity. Jassby and
others (2001) found that Lake Tahoe water clarity dropped
ten meters over the past 30 years. Scientists identified
several causes of nutrient input, such as atmospheric
deposition and erosion from housing, commercial, and high
way developments (Jassby and others 1994; Jassby and
others 2001).
Data Collection
Three mail-in questionnaires were administered by Paul
Sabatier and his colleagues in 1984, 1990, and 2001 to
active stakeholders involved in Lake Tahoe environmental
policy (Sabatier and others 2003). They used a modified
snowball sampling technique to generate the sample of
stakeholders. They first collected names of stakeholders in
leadership positions (boards and high staff) in agencies and
interest groups. A stakeholder advisory committee, which
consisted of leaders of all the major interests, was then
established to help complete the sample in a traditional
snowball approach.
The first mail-in questionnaire was administered in the
summer of 1984, which was the most politically contentious period in Tahoe’s history with a moratorium on
commercial and residential development (n = 334, total
responses = 202, rate = 60%). The second mail-in
questionnaire was administered in the winter of 1990/91,
just a few years after stakeholders reached consensus and
the emergence of collaborative venues in the Basin (n =
534, total responses = 316, response rate = 59%). The
third mail-in questionnaire was administered in the
winter of 2001/02, roughly 14 years after the 1986/87
agreement (n = 657, total responses = 365, response rate
= 56%).
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Measures
The perceived performance of scientists is measured by a
distrust variable and an evaluation variable. The distrust
variable is a two-unit scale. Respondents were asked on the
1984, 1990, and 2001 questionnaires to agree or disagree to
the following questions: (i) ‘‘Scientists always release data
that supports their own theories;’’ and (ii) ‘‘Too many
issues are now decided by experts without consultation
with those affected.’’ The Cronbach’s alphas equal 0.76,
0.68., and 0.70 for the scales in the respective 1984, 1990,
and 2001 questionnaires, which indicate that the scales
have adequate internal consistency and reliability. An
alpha of 0.68 is somewhat lower than the conventionally
accepted alpha of 0.70. I also analyzed the data using each
distrust variable separately and found similar results
(Appendix Section 6). The second measure of stakeholders’ evaluation of scientists is an evaluation variable from
only the 2001 questionnaire (Appendix Section 3).
Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of
researchers in universities and consulting firms compared
to 16 other organizational affiliations on a 100-point scale
(0 = extremely low rating, 100 = extremely high rating). To
compare how respondents rated researchers in universities
and consulting firms in relation to the other 16 affiliations
and to control for the possibility that respondents evaluated
affiliations differently on the 100-point scale, a relative
evaluation variable of university researchers and consultants was calculated. The relative evaluation variable was
calculated by taking a stakeholder’s evaluation of university researchers and consultants minus the aggregated mean
value of the remaining 16 organizational affiliations. For
instance, if a stakeholder gave university researchers and
consulting firms a +70 and the mean responses for the
remaining 16 organizational affiliations was +60, this
stakeholder would receive a +10 indicating that he or she
evaluates this group of scientists positively compared to the
other organizational affiliations in the Basin. The range for
the relative evaluation variable can range from +100 to
–100, but the actual means in the data range from –49 to
+68.
The influence of scientists in the Lake Tahoe Basin was
measured using a question from the 2001 questionnaire.
Stakeholders were asked to rate the influence of university
researchers and consultants and 16 other organizational
affiliations in policymaking on a 100-point scale (0 = not
influential at all, 100 = extremely influential). The influence of university researchers and consultants was part of
the same question used to measure the evaluation variable
previously discussed (Appendix Section 3). The relative
influence of university researchers and consultants compared to the other 16 organizational affiliations was
calculated. Similar to the relative evaluation variable, the
Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
Results
Figure 1 presents a line graph of the mean values for the
distrust variable by six organizational affiliations in 1984,
7
6
Mean Distrust of Scientists
perceived influence of university researchers and consultants was subtracted from the average influence of the other
16 organizational affiliations. The range of the relative
influence variable can range from +100 to –100, but the
actual means in the data range from –71 to +56.
A pro-development belief variable is used as a measure
of intrinsic values (Appendix Section 2).The pro-development belief variable is a three-unit scale that measures
stakeholders’ preferences for environmental protection
versus economic development in the Lake Tahoe Basin.
Commercial property ownership and private property
ownership serve as measures of extrinsic values (Appendix
Section 7). I expect that pro-development beliefs and
property ownership will be associated with skepticism
toward scientists’ performance and influence.
Two variables measure knowledge about science: (i) a
five-point education variable that ranges from no high
school diploma to an advanced degree; and (ii) a dichotomous variable that indicates a stakeholder’s occupation as a
scientist or an engineer (Appendix Sections 4 and 5). I
expect the education and science occupation variables will
be associated with a positive evaluation of scientists and
perceptions that scientists are not influential enough in the
Basin.
To measure changes in the emergence of collaborative
organizations and the effects of the accumulation of scientific information over time, this article compares
stakeholder perceptions of scientists in 1984 compared to
1991 and 2001. The year 1984 is used as the baseline and
1990 and 2001 are dichotomous variables. On the one
hand, this is a good way to measure the effects of collaborative organizations on stakeholders’ perceptions of
scientists because collaborative organizations emerged
after the 1987/88 consensus. This is also a good way to
measure the effects of the accumulation of science on
stakeholders’ perceptions of scientists because the questionnaires span 17 years and start almost 20 years after
scientists started monitoring water quality in the Basin. On
the other hand, this approach poses several threats to
internal validity. For example, there might be other changes over time in the Basin that shape stakeholder
perceptions of scientists. As a result, the results of the year
variable should be interpreted cautiously. Given the
imperfect research design, it is important to note that the
three questionnaires used in the current analysis present a
rare opportunity to focus on elite opinions of scientists over
time in an environmental policy subsystem.
857
5
4
3
2
Bus
Reg Gov
Sci
Env
Loc Gov
State/Fed Gov
1
1984
1990
2001
Fig. 1 Mean distrust of scientists by organizational affiliations in
1984, 1990, and 2001
1990, and 2001 (see Appendix Section 1 for organizational
affiliation coding). The dotted or solid lines connect the
means for the distrust variable over the three time periods
by local government officials (Loc Gov), regional government officials (Reg Gov), state and federal government
officials (State/Fed Gov), environmental groups (Env),
scientists (Sci), and business groups (Bus).
Figure 1 shows two clusters of organizational affiliations. Near the top of Figure 1 with solid lines, business
groups and local governments expressed strong distrust of
scientists. Business groups’ and local governments’ distrust
of scientists makes sense assuming that they perceived
more risks than opportunities from science being converted
into stricter land use regulations in the Basin. Displaying
moderate levels of distrust of scientists with dotted lines in
the middle of Figure 1 are regional governments, state and
federal governments, environmental groups, and scientists
(means ‡3.5 and £0.41, standard deviations £1.8). The
moderate levels of distrust among these four organizational
affiliations also makes sense assuming that they perceived
more opportunities than risks from science being converted
into stricter land use regulations.
The mean distrust of scientists has decreased slightly
over time but without major substantive change. The total
means have decreased slightly for the distrust variable from
4.9 in 1984 (standard deviation = 1.8), to 4.5 in 1990
(standard deviation = 1.6), and to 4.3 in 2001 (standard
deviation = 1.6), which is significant using a Welch test for
unequal variance (p \ 0.003). Local government officials
(from 5.7 to 5.0) and business groups (from 6.1 to 5.5)
changed the most from 1984 to 2001, and both changes are
statistically significant using a Welch Test for unequal
variance (p \ 0.05 and p \ 0.003, respectively). The
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Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
statistically significant results for local governments and
business groups should be interpreted tepidly because their
means remain on the distrust end of the seven-point scale.
Scientists, regional governments, state and federal governments, and environmental groups changed very little
with belief shifts of no more than plus or minus 0.3 on the
seven point scale (p [0.72).
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations (in
parentheses) for the relative influence and evaluation
variables in 2001 by organizational affiliations. The organizational affiliation categories are the same as in Figure 1.
The relative evaluation variable divides the organizational affiliations into the same two clusters as found in
Figure 1. A Welch test indicates statistically significant
differences among organizational affiliations for the
relative evaluation variable (p \ 0.00). Business representatives and local government officials evaluated
university research and consultants (means £ 1.2) with
more skepticism compared to the views of scientists,
regional governments, federal state governments and
environmental groups (means ‡ 12.5). The negative evaluation of university researchers and consultants by business
groups and local governments parallels the findings from
Figure 1 and supports the argument that these two organizational affiliations perceived more risks than
opportunities from science in the Basin.
The relative influence variable indicates that all organizational affiliations perceived university researchers and
consultants as not influential (means £ –7.8). A Welch test
indicates no significant difference among the organizational affiliations (p [ 0.75). The lack of difference among
organizational affiliations is surprising. The expectation is
that actors who perceived risks from science would view
scientists as too influential and actors who perceived
opportunities from science would view scientists as not
influential enough. The uniform response across organizational affiliations does not support such an argument.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the
explanatory variables. The means are categorized by the
same organizational affiliations as in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Using a Welch test, there is a significant difference (p \
0.00) among organizational affiliations for all variables.
Looking at the total means in the right most column,
stakeholders’ pro-development beliefs decreased slightly
from 1984 to 2001 with a leaning toward environmental
protection (3.3. to 3.1 on a seven-point scale). Owning
commercial and private property decreased over time by at
least 12%. The biggest change is the number of occupied
scientists or engineers in the sample, which increased from
9% in 1984 to 38% in 2001. Formal education, on the other
hand, remained the same during the time period with most
respondents holding a college degree.
The clusters of organizational affiliations in Table 2
parallel the findings in Figure 1 and Table 1. On one side
are businesses and local government officials, who favored
development over environmental protection (means ‡ 3.8),
owned commercial property (means ‡ 23%) or private
property (means ‡ 61%), and were less likely to be scientists or engineers (means £ 32%). On the other side are
environmentalists, scientists, and regional, state, and federal government officials. These four organizational
affiliations tended to disagree with the pro-development
belief scale (means £ 3.0), rarely owned commercial
property (means £ 14%), and frequently owned private
property (means ‡ 19%). Compared to business representatives and local government officials, a higher proportion
of environmentalists, scientists, and regional, state, and
federal government officials held graduate degrees.
The explanatory variables are tested head-to-head to see
which explain the most variance in the dependent variables
using ordinary least square regression (Table 3). The
dependent variables are distrust of scientists and relative
evaluation of university researchers and consultants. The
explanatory variables are listed on the left column.
Reported betas are standardized regression coefficients. I
control for the 17 individuals who completed more than
one of the 1984, 1990, or 2001 surveys with a dichotomous
panel variable.
The regression models show good fit to the data and
adequately explain variance in two of the dependent
Table 1 2001 Means (standard deviations) for the evaluation and influence of university researchers and consultants by organizational
affiliations
Organizational affiliations
Bus
Loc Gov
Total
Sci
Reg Gov
State/Fed Gov
Env
Relative evaluation of university
researchers and consultants
–4.4 (24.8)
1.2 (19.5)
18.1 (19.0)
14.6 (22.9)
12.5 (21.1)
14.7 (23.5)
8.5 (23.3)
Relative influence of university
researchers and consultants
–14 (24.2)
–7.8 (22.8)
–8.7 (20.7)
–11.4 (21.5)
–10.3 (22.0)
–9.4 (21.8)
–10.7 (22.3)
Note: A Welch test assuming unequal variance indicates significant difference among organizational affiliations (p \ 0.00) for evaluation of
scientists and no significant difference among organizational affiliations (p \ 0.75) for influence of scientists.
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859
Table 2 Mean responses by stakeholder affiliations
Year
Organizational affiliations
Bus
Pro-development Beliefs (1 = disagree, 7 = agree)
Commercial property Owner (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Private property Owner (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Science or engineering Occupation (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Education (1 = HS diploma 5=Adv Degree)
Loc Gov
Sci
Total
Reg Gov
State/Fed Gov
Env
1984
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.4
2.0
1.6
3.3
1990
4.8
3.8
2.5
2.1
2.2
1.6
3.1
2001
4.3
3.8
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.0
3.0
1984
53%
36%
0%
11%
14%
3%
27%
1990
43%
39%
9%
7%
3%
14%
23%
2001
41%
23%
6%
8%
1%
4%
15%
1984
1990
90%
85%
80%
81%
57%
45%
67%
69%
43%
24%
65%
69%
72%
64%
2001
82%
61%
19%
76%
22%
79%
56%
1984
2%
4%
86%
22%
4%
7%
9%
1990
9%
10%
73%
36%
44%
3%
23%
2001
5%
32%
84%
35%
57%
11%
37%
1984
3.8
4.1
4.7
4.4
4.4
4.6
4.2
1990
4.1
4.1
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.6
4.3
2001
4.1
4.3
4.8
4.3
4.5
4.6
4.4
Note: All numbers are means. A Welch test for unequal variance indicates significant difference among organizational affiliations (p \ 0.00). A
Welch test was not conducted for female in 1984 because of the lack of variance in one of the affiliation categories.
Table 3 Multivariate analysis
Dependent variables
Distrust of scientists
Positive evaluation of university
researchers and consultants
1984, 1991, & 2001
2001
Betas
Betas
p-values
p-values
Pro-development beliefs
0.51
0.00
-0.41
0.00
Commercial property owner
0.06
0.04
0.06
0.31
Private property owner
Science/engineering occupation
0.07
–0.03
0.02
0.30
0.00
0.16
0.94
0.00
Formal education
–0.17
0.00
0.08
0.74
Panel
0.001
0.85
-0.02
0.75
Year 1990
–0.02
0.56
-
-
Year 2001
–0.06
0.12
-
-
Constant
-
0.00
-
0.06
R2
0.41
0.20
F-Stat/p-value
73/0.000
14/0.000
N
824
303
variables (R2 = 0.42 for the distrust of scientists variable
and R2 = 0.20 for relative evaluation of university
researchers and consultants). None of the explanatory
variables can explain the relative influence of university
researchers and consultants. One explanation for the lack of
explanatory power for perceived influence of university
researchers and consultants is the lack of variance across
respondents (Table 1) and the lack of significant
correlations with variables in the current study (Appendix
Section 8).
For the distrust of scientists and positive evaluation of
university researchers and consultants, the best predictor is
pro-development beliefs. A one standard deviation increase
in pro-development beliefs gives a 0.51 standard deviation
increase in distrust of scientists and a 0.41 standard deviation decrease in positive evaluations of university
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860
researchers and consultants. Controlling for the other
variables, stakeholders with extreme pro-development
beliefs (i.e., business representatives and local government
officials) are more likely to show skepticism of scientists
than stakeholders with pro-environmental beliefs. This
result lends support for the expectation that stakeholders,
who see scientific information as a political risk, will more
likely think skeptically about scientists.
There is significant support for the material welfare
hypothesis with commercial and private property variables
showing statistical significance for the distrust variable.
The standardized coefficients are small (std. coef. \ 0.07),
indicating that while owning property matters in respondents’ trust of scientists, the effect is weak compared to
pro-development beliefs. Property ownership has no effect
on evaluating university researchers and consultants in the
Basin. This result suggests that property owners have different perceptions of university researchers and consultants
compared to a general category of scientists.
For the scientific knowledge hypothesis, the variables
split in their significance. Education statistically explains
some of the variance in the distrust variable. The significance of education supports Bak (2001), among others,
who argued that formal education contributes to the division in opinions regarding the distrust of scientists.
Stakeholders, who work as scientists or engineers, are also
more likely to evaluate university researchers and consultants positively compared to other stakeholders.
Table 3 provides little support for the claim that collaborative policymaking or that the accumulation of
science in the Basin has altered stakeholders’ perceptions
of scientists. The lack of significance of year90 and year01
for the distrust dependent variable indicates that the distrust
of scientists has remained the same over time while controlling for the other variables.
Conclusions
The emergence of collaborative organizations is well
recognized and studied in the literature (Butler and Koontz 2005; McGinnis and others 1999; Lubell 2004;
Imperial 1999; Weber 1998; Sabatier and others 2005).
Rarely analyzed, however, are collaborative-based
approaches compared to other decision-making approaches (Schneider and others 2003; Coglianese 1997;
Weible and others 2004). This article uses longitudinal
data of stakeholders’ perceptions of scientists before and
after the emergence of collaborative organizations. In
addition, stakeholders’ perceptions of scientists are
dependent on whether the scientific community is unified
or divided (Schneider and Ingram 1997). This article
analyzes a policy subsystem where a unified scientific
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Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
community has given policymakers mounting evidence
spanning more than three decades about the seriousness
and causes of a public policy problem. With greater
access to collaborative organizations and with mounting
scientific evidence from a unified scientific community,
stakeholders were expected to increase their level of trust
of scientists and increase their beliefs about the influence
of scientists. However, the findings suggest that stakeholders’ views of scientists have changed very little from
1984 to 2001 and scientists were not viewed as influential
compared to other organizational affiliations in the Lake
Tahoe Basin in 2001.
One explanation for this article’s null result is that Lake
Tahoe’s collaborative organizations were never designed to
integrate science into policy. Collaborative organizations
in the Lake Tahoe Basin emerged out of the political
conflict in the 1980s to cool political tension and not
explicitly designed to bring science into policy. Such an
explanation follows a growing recognition that collaborative organizations vary greatly in their membership,
procedural rules, goals, authority, and legitimacy (Moore
and Koontz 2003). While the current analysis does not
offer a full delineation of collaborative-based groups, it
proposes that some collaborative organizations serve more
as political institutions than as forums for integrating science into decision making.
Stakeholders’ perceptions of scientists are best
explained by their beliefs about development and environmental protection in the Lake Tahoe Basin. Prodevelopment stakeholders distrust scientists and negatively evaluate university researchers and consultants.
Pro-environment stakeholders trust scientists and positively evaluate university researchers and consultants. The
result supports Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) assertion
that stakeholders’ perceptions of scientists will reflect
their perceived political risks and opportunities from
science. The implication from such a polarized view is
that scientific and technical information is serving proenvironment stakeholders more than pro-development
stakeholders, thereby limiting the usefulness of analytical
discussions, reducing the opportunities for learning across
all organizational affiliations in the Lake Tahoe Basin,
and limiting the range of plausible policy alternatives
(Sabatier 1987).
On average, stakeholders agree that university
researchers and consultants are not influential in the Lake
Tahoe Basin compared to other organizational affiliations,
which is surprising because some university researchers
have strongly advocated for more science-based decisions
in the Basin. One interpretation is that university scientists are not influential in policymaking but are influential
in shaping problem definitions. Previous analysis has
found that stakeholder beliefs about water quality
Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
problems reflect discoveries made by Basin scientists. For
example, stakeholders now recognize atmospheric deposition as a significant source of nutrient input after
supporting scientific evidence (Weible and Sabatier 2006).
Another interpretation is to accept that university
researchers and consultants are not influential in policymaking but to investigate the influence of other types of
scientists, such as scientists working for the TRPA or
other government agencies. It is quite possible that scientists associated with a government agency might be
more influential than university scientists and consultants
in shaping policy processes. Finally, it is quite possible
that the influence of university researchers and consultants
has increased over time because the influence variable
used was only asked on a 2001 questionnaire. Additional
research is needed to understand the ways in which science and scientists are influencing the policy process in
the Lake Tahoe Basin and how the role of science and
scientists in the Lake Tahoe Basin compare to other
environmental policy domains.
The results support the hypothesis that stakeholders’
knowledge of science affects their support of science (Ziman 1991; Bak 2001). The explanatory power of formal
education on stakeholders’ perceptions of scientists is
probably less important for stakeholders active in politics
because they tend to have higher levels of formal education
compared to the general public (e.g., Schlozman and
Tierney 1986). In addition, stakeholders tend to devote
more effort compared to the general public in formulating
coherent and stable belief systems, which are then used to
guide behavior (e.g., Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). In such
situations, the influence of beliefs is probably magnified,
placing education in a secondary role.
The current analysis is not without limitations. First, it
uses a distrust dependent variable that refers to scientists in
general and an evaluation and influence variable that specifically refers to university researchers and consultants.
Ideally, a study would refer to the same type of scientists
across measures, yet also compare different types of scientists. Second, this article does not measure scientific
positivism or degree type (Barke and Jenkins-Smith 1993).
It might be useful, for example, to distinguish ecologists
from engineers. Third, this article takes a subsystem
approach to examine the effects of collaborative policymaking. Other studies have focused on the role of scientists
at the level of the collaborative organization (Woolley and
others 2002). Because of this article’s subsystem view, it is
not known whether stakeholders are sincerely negotiating
in collaborative processes or whether scientists are interacting with stakeholders. Finally, this article uses data from
an imperfect research design. It is quite possible that
unspecified factors have influenced environmental policy
in the Lake Tahoe Basin from 1984 to 2001.
861
Application of these results to other policy subsystems
should be made cautiously. I expect that the findings from
this article are most relevant to other environmental policy
subsystems with relative homogeneity among scientists,
disagreement about the seriousness and causes of a salient
problem, no institutional mechanisms giving authority to
science, and value conflict among stakeholders. In contrast
to the findings in this article, I found that stakeholders most
frequently mentioned scientists as influential among organizational affiliations in a different policy subsystem where
scientists were given considerable authority over planning
decisions (Weible 2005). What is needed is a comparative
study across policy subsystems to examine the role of
scientists under different conditions.
The current analysis takes a step forward in understanding the role of scientists in environmental politics.
With the politicking and intermingling of science and
values in many contemporary debates – such as climate
change – there is probably no better time to investigate the
views of science and scientists in environmental policy.
There is also a great need to better understand, inform, and
improve how collaborative approaches incorporate science
and other forms of knowledge in environmental management. Research across different environmental issues and
over time is needed to build on these results.
Acknowledgments I’d like to thank Kent Bradford for asking
whether public skepticism of scientists and science had changed over
the past 20 years. The original draft of this article was written in
response to his question. Previous drafts of this article have benefited
from comments from John Hoornbeck and Paul Sabatier at the
Midwest Political Science Association’s 2006 annual meeting. I also
appreciate the feedback from Elise Logan, Derek Kauneckis, and the
anonymous reviewers. I’d like to express my gratitude to Paul
Sabatier and Mark Nechodom for inviting me to participate in their
research in the Tahoe Basin. The funding for collecting the data in
this analysis was provided by the National Science Foundation,
University of California at Davis, and the USDA Forest Service.
Appendix
Section 1. Affiliations
Respondents were placed into one of six affiliations.
‘‘Local Governments’’ include city and county government
employees (elected, appointed, and civil servants), as well
as employees of public utility districts and general
improvement districts. ‘‘Regional Governments’’ consists
of board members and key staff of the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, the Lahontan Regional Water Quality
Control Board, and the Tahoe Conservancy, as well as
some members of miscellaneous regional organizations,
such as the Forest Health Consensus Group. Elected,
appointed, and civil service employees of the federal
123
862
Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
government, the State of California, and the State of
Nevada are included in ‘‘State/Federal Governments.’’ The
‘‘Environmental Groups’’ category includes people in
leadership positions in the League to Save Lake Tahoe or
other environmental non-profits. ‘‘Business/Property
Rights Groups’’ includes leaders of various chambers of
commerce, homeowners associations, boards of realtors,
and the Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council. ‘‘Scientists’’
includes university researchers and employees of private
consulting firms.
Appendix Table 1. Number and Percent of Respondents by Stakeholder Affiliation by Year
Bus
Local Gov
Sci
Regional Gov
State & Federal Gov
Env Groups
Total
1984
49 / 27%
46 / 26%
7 / 4%
18 / 10%
28 / 16%
32 / 18%
180 / 100%
1990
56 / 21%
70 / 26%
11 / 4%
29 / 11%
67 / 25%
37 / 14%
270 / 100%
2001
77 / 22%
55 / 16%
38 / 11%
71 / 22%
84 / 24%
28 / 8%
353 / 100%
1990 Factor
Loading
2001 Factor
Loading
Section 2. Pro-Development Beliefs
The pro-development belief scale consists of three sevenpoint question (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
1984 Factor
Loading
Cronbach’s Alpha
.84
.86
.79
We cannot afford to let policies claiming to promote ‘‘environmental quality’’
prevent the continued economic development of the Basin.
0.89
0.88
0.87
Protection of water quality requires that regulations be rigorously enforced,
even when they create hardships for property owners. (reversed in scale)
0.84
0.86
0.81
There is too much concern for restricting growth in the Basin and not enough
concern for encouraging it.
0.89
0.91
0.84
Section 3. Influence and Performance of Scientists at
Tahoe
In 2001, respondents were given a combined influence and
evaluation question:
‘‘Below is a list of seventeen organizations (or types of
organizations) that has been active in the Basin since 1990.
We are interested in, first, your perceptions of the influence
of each in determining what has happened in the Tahoe
Basin since 1990 and, second, your evaluation of the
overall performance of each organization with respect to
the kind of Basin you would like to see. The two criteria
may be largely independent of each other. It is entirely
123
possible, for example, that you may evaluate positively
what Organization X is trying to do, but view it as being
relatively ineffective (uninfluential) in determining what is
going on in the Basin. Likewise, you may view an organization as extremely influential, but dislike what it is
doing. Using any number from 0 to 100, please first record
the influence score of each organization where 100 indicates an extremely influential group, and a score of 0
indicates a group with no influence at all. Then please
provide an overall evaluation of each group in terms of
seeking to bring about the kind of Basin you would like to
se on a scale where 100 = extremely high rating to 0 =
extremely low rating.
Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
863
Influence
Evaluation
____ ____
1. Land developers and builders.
____ ____
2. Gaming industry.
____ ____
3. Local government officials.
____ ____
4. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
____ ____
5. Lahonton Regional Water Quality Control Board.
____ ____
6. U.S. Forest Service.
____ ____
7. Tahoe Conservancy
____ ____
8. Environmental interest groups, e.g. League to Save Lake Tahoe.
____ ____
9. Property rights groups, e.g. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council.
____ ____
10. Business associations, e.g. Chambers of Commerce, Visitor Center.
____ ____
11. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
____ ____
12. Nevada Department of Conservation.
____ ____
____ ____
13. Transportation agencies, e.g., TTD, CalTrans, NDOT
14. Transportation and Water Quality Coalition
____ ____
15. Native Americans (the Washoe tribe)
____ ____
16. Researchers in universities and consulting firms.
____ ____
17. Local newspapers and radio/TV stations.’’
Section 4. Science and Engineering Occupations
The exact question wording for the 1984, 1990, and 2001
mail-in questionnaires is: ‘‘What is your principal occupation (if retired, your last occupation)? 1. Realtor/
developer/contractor, 2. Tourist related businessperson
(casinos, motels, restaurants), 3. Other business person, 4.
Scientists/engineer, 5. Lawyer, 6. Journalist, 7 Planner, 8.
Other.’’ In 1984 the scientist and engineer question were
separate.
collaborative venues has decreased distrust of science in
the Basin. I kept with the scaled item because the standardized coefficient is small (std. coef. = 0.09), dwarfed by
pro-development beliefs (std. coef. = 0.56) and smaller
than education (std coef. = 0.12) and because results based
on single-item dependent variables are threatened by
measurement error, which factor analysis and scales help to
correct.
Section 7. Commercial and Private Property Ownership
Section 5. Education
Stakeholders were asked the following education question
on the 1984, 1990, and 2001 mail-in questionnaires:
‘‘Please indicate the highest level of education you have
attained: 1. not a high school graduate, 2. high school
graduate, 3. some college, 4. college graduate, and 5.
advanced degree.’’
Section 6. Secondary Analysis
When the analysis was conducted with the two distrust
science variables the results are the same as found in
Table 3 with the exception that year01 significantly
explains a portion of the variance for ‘‘Too many issues are
now decided by experts without sufficient consultation with
those affected.’’ This lends some support for the expectation that the accumulation of science and emergence of
Private Property
What type of residence (if any) do you have in the Tahoe
Basin?
Permanent residence (coded as yes =1)
Second or vacation home residence (coded as yes =1)
Lot with no dwelling (coded as yes =1)
Both a principal and a second home in the Basin (coded
as yes =1)
None (coded as no = 0)
Commercial Property
Do you own commercial or investment property in the
Lake Tahoe Basin? Yes = 1 No = 0
Section 8. Bivariate Analysis
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864
Environmental Management (2007) 40:853–865
Pro-Development
Beliefs
Distrust of Scientists
Commercial
Property
Private
Property
Science
Occupation
Education
1984
0.60**
0.30**
0.32**
–0.08
–0.36**
1990
0.67**
0.38**
0.33**
–0.21**
–0.34**
2001
0.60**
0.21**
0.17**
–0.22**
–0.31**
Relative Evaluation of University Researchers and Consultants
2001
–0.31**
–0.07
–0.10
0.26**
0.14*
Relative Influence of University Researchers and Consultants
2001
0.04
0.08
0.05
0.14*
0.06
**Pearson Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (1-tailed)
*Pearson Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
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