Intra-Rebel Divergence, Third-Party Intervention and the Duration of
Intrastate conflicts: Crisis Management in Darfur
Ashraf Ali Hamed1 and Imad El-Anis2
Abstract
This paper examines the conflict in Darfur, Sudan by analysing the impact of divergence in the domestic
combatants’ views, attitudes, goals and interests, and how this negatively impacts upon conflict resolution.
It also investigates the effect of external intervention on the duration of intra-state armed conflict as a
form of crisis management. Although the influence of external intervention on the duration of internal
armed conflicts and crises has been addressed, more investigation is still needed. David E. Cunningham
(2010) argues that external state intervention in interstate armed conflict in the pursuit of a specific
agenda which is separate from the goals of the internal combatants, inhibits conflict resolution.
Furthermore, external states usually do not have the same incentives as the insurgents to negotiate. Their
anticipation of gaining from such negotiation tends to be less than that of domestic insurgents. In this
regard, a new theoretical model is developed. This model shows that when external states intervene with
a separate agenda in internal armed conflicts that involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are
multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, makes the likelihood of prolonging the
duration of the crisis higher.
Keywords
Crisis management, intrastate conflict, external intervention, civil war duration, Darfur.
Introduction
Studies conducted to investigate the duration of armed conflicts have been categorized into
mainly two categories. Firstly, studies concentrated on the key internal factors that lead to the
eruption of any civil war including the attributes of the societies where the armed conflict
occurs, and the economic, political, and geographic factors as well as the internal conflict parties
and their capabilities to wage war and achieve military victory or reaching to negotiated end.
Furthermore, investigating what happens to the duration of the armed conflict when such
circumstances are existing. Secondly, studies focus on the impact of external involvement in
internal wars. The type of the interventions (whether politically and diplomatically,
economically, militarily) and their effects on the duration length of the civil conflict have been
also addressed. However, existing literature into internal parties that affect the expected
duration of intrastate wars, as well as the broader topic of the duration of wars in general, is
remaining limited. Understanding the factors that drive the duration of civil conflicts is crucially
1
Author: Ashraf Ali Hamed is a PhD candidate in International Relations at The Nottingham Trent University,
UK. Email: [email protected] & [email protected]
2
Co-author: Imad El-Anis is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at The Nottingham Trent University,
UK. Email: [email protected]
1
vital to examine how the duration of those conflicts can be effected by the role of external thirdparty intervention.
Wagner (Wagner 2000, p. 449) and David E. Cunningham (2010, p. 116) similarly argue that
the duration of warfare is driven by factors that affect the ability of one side to achieve decisive
military victory or/and affect the willingness of each side to reach a negotiated settlement.
Those factors can be significantly affected by external actors within the existing approach of
external interventions in civil wars. In other research David E. Cunningham (2006, p. 876)
indicates that there are three approaches to understand factors can affect war termination.
Firstly, the economic dimension which focuses on the costs of warfare. Second, the military
dimension that examines how military position on battlefield can be the key element of
determining demands and form the final outcome of negotiations. Additionally, the diplomatic
approach that addresses incentives that motivates parties to involve in serious settlement
process.
Studies by Patrick M. Regan, Richard W. Frank and Aysegul Aydin (2009), Balch-Lindsay,
Enterline & Joyce (2008), Yang-Ming Chang, Joel Potter, Shane Sanders (2007), Dylan BalchLindsay, Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce (2008), Michael G. Findley, Tze Kwang (2006),
Tobias Böhmelt (2010), Yang‐Ming Changa & Shane Sanders (2009), and Patrick M. Regan
(1996) and have focused on the influence of third parties on the civil war process as main
approach. The basic expectations of outside interventions, whether diplomatic or military or
economic, are to shorten a conflict's expected period time, and the key motivation of these
interventions is to manage the civil armed conflicts effectively (2004). However, Some external
interveners might seek to end the Darfur crisis for humanitarian aims, other third parties have
their own incentives to prolong the duration of the war with view to plunder the natural
resources of the civil war state, or draining the resources of a rival intervener actor (BalchLindsay, Enterline & Joyce 2008).
On the other hand, while a few studies have directly shed light on the influence of the foreign
third-party on the duration of intrastate conflicts. Scholars like David E. Cunningham (2010),
David E. Cunningham (2006), Patrick M. Regan & Allan C. Stam (2000), Patrick M. Regan, (2002),
Håvard Hegre (2004), Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, Nicholas Sambanis (2000), Paul Collier, Anke
Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom (2004), Dylan Balch-Lindsay & Andrew J (2000), and Scott Gates &
Håvard Strand (2004) have examined how the duration of intrastate conflicts can be affected by
third-party intervention as well as inside factors associated with warning parties.
In agreement with much of civil war duration, works by Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, Nicholas
Sambanis (2000) and Chaim Kaufmann (1996) have indicated that ethnic wars tended to last
longer and are harder to resolve than other types of internal wars. Ibrahim A. Elbadawi,
Nicholas Sambanis (2000, p. 12) have found equally robust evidence suggesting that
intervention is less likely to occur in ethnic wars, though the degree of ethnic fractionalization is
not robustly associated with external intervention.
This view has been confirmed by Collir et al (2004, pp. 263-264) when their research revealed
some evidence that social diversity makes cooperation more difficult, leading to the prediction
that socially diverse rebellions tend to be lengthen. According to them war duration has a
positive and highly significant association with ethnic fractionalization. Meanwhile, Collir et al
(2004, p. 266) also found that unlike ethnic fractionalisation, religious diversity has no
2
significant effect on the civil war clock. They suggest that religion is less useful than ethnicity as
a force for the continuation of intrastate warfare. Their work also indicates that the long war
duration is significantly associated with polarized societies, as in such societies, the rebels have
the ability to easily mobilize and sustain support among their ethnic group, and provide the
necessary support.
This is because the ethnic diversity at the national level increases social cohesion on the rebel
side. The authors have transpired that during the course of the war, the government will exploit
such ethnic polarization in attempt to divide the rebel movement and win over some factions to
its side. According to them, such these governmental attempts are unlikely to be in the case of
homogenous societies, given the lack of strong socio-cultural or religious divide between the
government and rebel groups. In diverse societies, furthermore, maintaining the unity of the
rebellion movement composed of diverse groups is likely to become harder over time. This, in
turn, leads to the case of extreme polarisation in those societies, for which prolong the rebellion
duration for longer (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004, p. 263).
By contrast, Owen Frazer (2013) underscores that when religion shapes the identities and
value-systems of actors that are in conflict is necessary means that the degree of the complexity
of a conflict and make its resolution will be more challenging. Simultaneously, Owen Frazer does
not totally play down the significant of religious’ role in shorten the internal armed conflicts. He
suggested that should not fall into the of viewing religion always as negative and divisive
determinant lengthening the war’s duration. Religion could be a great opportunity, as with
every challenge comes an opportunity. Owen Frazer spell out this by contending that positive
religious discourse being delivered by religious leaders is significant, where can play a positive
role in accelerating the resolution of the conflict. He sees religiously-inspired concepts and
religious actors can often be important resources for peace by playing the role of connector,
bridging other divisions within society.
On the other hand, David E. Cunningham (2010, p. 117) argues that external state intervention
in interstate armed conflict in the pursuit of a specific agenda which is separate from the goals
of the internal combatants inhibits conflict resolution. External states usually do not have the
same incentives as the insurgents to negotiate. Their anticipation of gaining from such
negotiation tends to be less than that of domestic insurgents. Cunningham (2010) shows that
there will be an additional actors who has to be defeated militarily or consent to an agreement
to resolve the conflict. Furthermore, in many cases differences between external states and
internal combatants in the attractiveness of negotiation will actually induce external states to
not exit the conflict short of fully achieving their goals. Four dynamics that make negotiation in
multi-party warfare more challenging, for more details see, are identified. In other study David
E. Cunningham (2006) argues that intrastate wars are often difficult to be quickly ended when
there are a great numbers of foreign combatants involved in the civil war to pursue divers
preferences over the outcomes of the conflict with ability to undermine the opportunity of the
resolution.
This article is mainly founded to answer the question of; what happens to the length of the
duration of warfare that involves ethnic fractionation, religious diversity, and tribal societies,
when domestic combatants, whether the rebel movements or the government, have agendas
which are different from each other? The overall argument in this article is that when armed
conflict contains more than one armed group against the government will produce a case of a
3
multiplicity in agendas, leadership, insights and mechanisms for ending the civil war, among the
internal parties of the conflict particularly the rebel groups. Where such variables are very likely
to be affected by the top interests of their ethnicities or tribes, and occasionally by personal
goals or personalising the conflict. Additionally, this type of war often causes inter-insurgents
conflicts leading to an emergence of further armed groups internal veto players with new,
different goals, insights, and mechanisms to resolve. This in turn allows external actors to
intervene in the way of exploiting this privacy to achieve particular interests or ends which
substantially prolong a rebellion and leading to longer-lasting armed conflicts. To verify the
applicability of this theoretical model and to give it more explanatory power, it is implemented
on the internal combatants in Darfurian society. To achieve this task the key internal parties of
the Darfur crisis, their adopted strategic mechanisms, and the influence of divisions between
them on the duration of the crisis are investigated.
The two main anti-government groupings
Despite the multi opposition movements and the tangle of internal parties in the conflict in
Darfur, there are two key activist insurgencies in the territory. These are the Sudan Liberation
Movement, led by Abdel Wahid Nur, and the Sudan Liberation Army (the armed wing of the
Sudan Liberation Movement), led by Menni Arco Minnawi, from one side, and the Justice and
Equality Movement led by Jibril Ibrahim - who assumed the leadership of the movement after
the death of its leader and founder, his brother Khalil Ibrahim – from the other side (Minawi
2012).
The Sudan Liberation Movement / Army (SLM/A)
This movement emerged in July 2002 in the area of Golo in Jebel Marra, South Darfur after a
series of sporadic military operations carried out against the Sudanese army under the name of
"the Darfur Liberation Army". It officially declared itself in February 2003 under the name of
"the Sudan Liberation Movement” (Salih 2008, p. 7). Different sources suggest that the adoption
of the new name was on the recommendation of John Garang, leader of the Sudan People
Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the south, which suggests the shared relationship and
nationalist visions that combine the two movements (De Waal 2005c). The aim was to disavow
any intention to separate Darfur from Sudan and, secondly, an assurance that the embryonic
SLM would declare itself a political movement and not anti-Arab militia (Flint, De Waal 2008, p.
82). This movement is formed of individuals belonging to three major non-Arab tribes, the Fur,
Zaghawa, and Masalit, in addition to some groups that belong to other tribes.
The formation of the armed movement was a result of the policies of marginalization and racial
discrimination, exploitation and division, which has been practiced by the successive Sudanese
governments, both civil and military, toward the region. The SLM believes that governments
have strengthened tribal ethnic factors when recruited some Arab tribes to fight non-Arab
tribes, sometimes to the extent of ethnic cleansing, in some areas of Darfur, after what was a
safe region in which everyone had stability - according to the allegations of the leaders of the
movement, they emphasize that these policies culminated in the arrival of the Inqad
government to power in 1989 (Hussain Minawi 10/11/2012).
The main demands of the movement are the prevention of the moving nomadic militias from
carrying out armed attacks against settled tribes. The Sudanese government's refusal to
implement this requirement has led to the movement heading towards armed choice and
4
raising the ceiling on its demands (Willemse 2005). Further calls for the removal of
marginalization of the region and its development, equitable political representation in the
central government, abolition of the division of Darfur into three states in favour of one
province, have become the key demands of the movement. The Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM) is regarded as one of the most active movements in Darfur, especially at the military level
(Hussain Minawi 10/11/2012). Most of the military actions which have been committed against
the government army in Darfur are ascribed to SLM, given the power and effectiveness of its
military wing, led by Minni Minawi (Brooks 2008, p. 428). Disappointingly, this efficiency was
not offset by the same level of effectiveness on the political side which was the main factor that
led to the movement’s later secession into two factions (Hussain Minawi 10/11/2012).
Flint and De Waal (2008, p. 6) have demonstrated that significant disputes between Abdul
Wahid Nour and Minawi appeared. These differences have negatively affected trust and caused
deterioration in the relations between the two leaders and their tribes which lead to fierce
fighting between the former allies such that happened on the 15th January 2009. A general
congress of the movement, held in the period between 29-31 October 2005, resulted in the split
into two factions; the political led by Abdel Wahid Nur the military led by Minnawi (Brooks
2008, p. 421, Ahmed 2007, p. 18). On 5 May 2006 the faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army of
Mini Minawi signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese government in Abuja known as the
Darfur Peace Agreement "DPA". Whereby, Minawi became the senior aide to the Sudanese
president as well as president of the transitional authority for the Darfur region (Jooma 2011, p.
1), while Abdul Wahid Nour refused to sign (Flint 2006). This refusal was also a result of the
same differences in perspectives among the leaders during the negotiations (discussed in more
detail below).
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
The JEM is classified as an Islamist movement. The Islamic orientation of the movement has
strong local support among the Zaghawa tribe (De Waal 2005b, p. 128). It is reported that Khalil
Ibrahim, the founder, is a strong Islamist which indicates that religious diversity in Darfur is not
an issue. However, Khalil Ibrahim’s theological orientation has been regarded as one reason for
the defections within the JEM (Bechtold 2009, p. 151). The origins of the JEM are controversial.
The Sudanese government and others believe that the JEM has been a “stalking horse” for
Hassan Turabi, the godfather of the National Islamic Front (NIF), since the split in 1999
(Suleiman 2011, p. 34). Khalil Ibrahim, the chairman of the movement, emphasised that it is an
entirely independent movement that is deeply rooted in all regions (Flint, De Waal 2008, p. 88).
Many of the movements’ leaders still believe that Islamic values can be the model solution to
many of Sudan’s problems. Thus, the JEM has attracted members from across the political
spectrum (Flint, De Waal 2008, p. 89).
The JEM was established after the split occurred in the Islamist-reference ruling National
Congress Party (NCP) in 1999 (Hassan Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). It is believed that this armed
opposition group is comprised, largely, of non-Arab, black African members from Western
Sudan from mostly the ethnic Zaghawa tribe. In addition to some others from non-Arab tribes
like Mssalite who believe that the regime in Khartoum backs the Arab tribes in the province. The
JEM was established under the leadership of Khalil Ibrahim, the former regional Health Minister
in the Darfur province during the 1990s (Suleiman 2011, pp. 6-8).
5
Unlike the Sudan Liberation Movement, The JEM is characterized by a powerful political agenda.
It provides its own perceptions about the possibility of how the political regime should be. Its
vision is founded on a united Sudan within a federal formula. According to JEM leaders, Sudan
should be divided into seven federal states: Khartoum, Darfur, the South, East, the North,
Kordofan and Centre. The post of the president of the country should be rotated between the
seven states (Salih 2008, p. 8). The key objectives of the movement came in the founding
declaration centred on:
- Ending racial discrimination practiced by the regime in Khartoum.
- Achieving freedom, justice, and equality.
- Stopping all the wars and the extending security and ensure the unity of the country.
- Harnessing all the possibilities of the state and directing them to achieve balanced human and
economic development.
- Fighting against poverty.
- The establishment of a democratic federal system to govern the country.
On the other hand, Prof. Gérard Prunier (Prunier, Ababa 2008, p. 5) states that several splits
have emerged within the JEM, forming new movements: The Darfur Independence Front/Army
(DIF/A), The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), The National
Redemption Front (NRF), JEM-Wing for Peace (JEM-WFP), and JEM-Collective Leadership (JEMCL). These splits have been caused by varying political visions among the leaders of the rebel
movements in Darfur towards a comprehensive solution that should be adopted to end the
catastrophic situation in Darfur. This has importantly influenced the paths and courses of the
peace process. The impact of this phenomenon on the mechanisms adopted by domestic parties
to end the crisis, as well as on the duration of the crisis, will be discussed in more detail below.
The mechanisms of rebel movements
Through the key features of the mechanisms being used by rebel groups to deal with the
developments of the crisis and the techniques to address them, armed movements can be
classified as the party that handles the crisis by creating new crises, either intentionally or
unintentionally. Two key mechanisms of the armed movements in general can be identified as
following:
First, The keenness on the unity of the Sudanese territories. The two main armed factions, the
SLM and JEM, have adopted the unionist discourse as a key mechanism in their dealings with
the government and the rest of the other Sudanese forces. The SLM changed its name from the
Darfur Liberation Movement (DLM), which launched itself in the middle of February 2003, to its
current name SLM in reference to the movement's unitary approach and non-separatism. The
story is similar for the JEM. In an interview conducted with Gabriel Adam Bilal, the spokesman
for the GROUP assured us that the orientation of the JEM is the nationalist defence of the rights
of all Sudanese in all the territory of the State, not only confined merely to Darfur. According to
Bilal, the movement does not seek to attain power and wealth at the expense of other regions.
However, the movement seeks to dissemination of justice and equality in the political and
6
economic rights of all Sudanese wherever they are without discrimination, not to the hegemony
(Gabriel Bilal 22/10/2012).
Second, Coercive diplomacy and pushing towards the internationalization. Although the
frequent announcements of the rebel movements in Darfur to adopt the option of a peaceful
negotiation mechanism, a policy of boycotting settlement conferences and talks inside Sudan
were clearly adopted by rebel groups, particularly in the first phase of the crisis. For instance,
they have refused to attend the Chadian efforts in the Abeche talks in September 2003. They
also boycotted the combined conference of the people of Darfur in December 2005 called by
President al-Bashir, arguing that the Sudanese government is a key party in the crisis thus
cannot negotiate with it inside of Sudan. The Sirte summit, 2007, and the first round of
negotiations in Abuja in August 2004 are another good example (African Strategic Report 20042005, pp. 180-194).
The justification of the rebels is often that the mediators have failed to submit serious and
practical proposals which could be the basis of a draft for comprehensive and just peace in
Darfur instead those proposals were expressing the bias of mediators in favour to the Sudanese
government (Gabriel Bilal 22/10/2012). While the government has objected to the involvement
of international observers in the negotiations or within the control forces of ceasefire
agreements and peacekeepers in the region, in order to prevent the internationalization of the
crisis (Raslan 2004, p. 198). The opposition believes that the internationalization of the crisis
and the involvement of international actors such as the United States, Britain and others is vital
to urge the Sudanese government to enter into serious talks and to offers more concessions
(Gabriel Bilal 22/10/2012).
To achieve this, the rebel movements in Darfur have used several tactics: escalating military
operations against government forces, exploitation of humanitarian aid for political purposes,
and Stimulating international concern by circulating the claim that genocide has taken place in
Darfur. Omar Saied (2008) has noted that the rebel movements were eager to undermine
almost all peaceful settlements taking place over the negotiation rounds in Sudan to resolve the
crisis; aiming to escalate the crisis for internationalization. Almost all interviewees who are
interviewed from the rebel side such as Gabriel Bilal (22/10/2012) and Hussain Minawi
(10/11/2012), and others confirm that they are convinced that the intervention of the
international community (particularly the United States and the EU) is the only way to force the
government to make important concessions, like what had happened with the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Sudan in the south. According to the opposition, the United
States A and Europe are able to provide large financial and logistical aid to push development in
the region (Raafat 2005, p. 96).
Splits in Rebel Movements and their Effects on the Duration of the Crisis
The most important challenge that has been faced and still faces completion of the peace
process in Darfur is the phenomena of splits within the rebel movements to numerous factions.
Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013) reveals that while opposition movements were initially
confined to the SLM and JEM, the number of factions has increased to more than 100. He adds
that divisions among the rebel groups have squandered international efforts to find a common
framework for both the government and the opposition to conduct serious negotiations until a
peaceful solution, that satisfies all parties of the conflict, is achieved. Instead, the efforts of the
7
United Nations and the African Union have been doubled to focus on reaching a unified
negotiating position and agenda which carries the demands of rebel factions in its
confrontation .
Defections and disputes inside insurgencies have weakened their negotiating position against
the government. This, in turn, has resulted in the absence of a real local partner to the
government who can ensure the application of what would be agreed upon (Osman Ibrahim
Musa 16/01/2013). Furthermore, this has frequently led to the postponement of the right
moment for settlement of the dispute, which was awaited by each party to achieve the greatest
possible gain (African Strategic Report 2004-2005, p. 183). Furthermore, it is believed that
successive splits within the ranks of opposition movements are attributed to the indulgence of
the key involved countries including the major states with those armed movements and factions
by providing financial, political, and military support. In contrast, that they - the major countries
- have exercised more pressure on the Sudanese government on the basis of responsibility for
the events in Darfur without putting similar pressure on those movements (Kamel 2009, p. 23).
While this argument is convincing, it can also be contended that this remains a supportive and
secondary factor. In our estimation, the absence of a united leadership, the tribal structure of
the armed movements in Darfur, and the different agendas which emanate from the objectives
and interests of the leaders of these movements and factions - which often are non-convergent
and sometimes rise to the level of narrow personal interests - could be the main reasons for the
proliferation of the Darfurian insurgencies. This was evident in the escalating conflict within the
SLM and the JEM whenever they are close to reaching a political settlement.
The absence of united leadership
Unlike the rebellion in southern Sudan, led mainly by one leader, John Garang, the leadership of
rebel groups in Darfur are distinct and not united. The absence of a united leadership is not only
between the two main armed movements in Darfur (the SLM and JEM) but also within each
single rebel group could clearly reflects the desires of these groups to individually achieve the
greatest possible gains (Berg 2008, p. 28). The most prominent of the leadership conflicts are
those which erupted between the Chairman of the SLM Abdel Wahed and its Secretary-General
Arko Minawi during the Tripoli Conference 2004 (Musa 2009, p. 102). Given the early military
successes achieved by the movement at the beginning of the crisis, especially after the
internationalization of the Darfur issue and description of the United States as genocide,
internal differences started to grow and come out among the political leadership in the LSM
(Raslan 2006, p. 209).
The Haskanita Conference embodied tensions of internal disputes regarding the leadership of
the SLM. This clearly emerged before the seventh round of negotiations in Abuja in August 2005,
which was under the auspices of the African Union and other regional and international
mediators. During this conference for the first time a proposal to isolate Abdul Wahid Nour,
head of the movement, was discussed (Musa 2009, p. 102). The commanders expressed their
dissatisfaction with the organizational work within the movement and its Chairman Abdul
Wahid. They showed clear concern over the absence of institutionalization and the emergence
of the tendency of the dictatorship to make unilateral, fateful decisions, which has much delayed
insurgency victory. Conferees decided to isolate Abdul Wahid from the presidency of the
movement due to his lack of commitment to institutionalism and his individuality of decisionmaking.
8
Further, for his involvement in the operations of financial corruption and raised money for his
own benefit. Abdul Wahid is accused of stirring racism within his military leadership. Attendees
also agreed to appoint Arco Minawi as Chairman of the movement over Abdul Wahid, Mustafa
Teerab as secretary-general, and Juma Hakar the field commander as the Forces Commander of
the movement. On the following day of the conference, Abdul Wahid issued a statement
emphasising that the final statement of the Haskanita conference represents a utilitarian and
racial group which has its own agenda in seeking personal gain (Musa 2009, p. 385). Haskanita
has resulted in the separation of the military wing led by Mini Minawi, composing the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA), demonstrating the emergence of a third party in the negotiation process.
This conflict is also applicable on the two main rebel movements, the SLM and the JEM. This will
be more apparent in the later discussion of the ideological differences between these
movements.
The tribal conflict
The tribal factor, and its impact on the continuation of those movements to be united, is vital.
The effects of this tribal factor are indicated in the ways and the mechanisms adopted by rebel
groups to manage the crisis against the government in Khartoum. Alex de Waal (De Waal 2005a,
p. 131) stresses that "internal differences in each group perhaps most serious of all, the
mechanisms for debating political issues and establishing a consensus are very weak. This is
one reason for their reluctance to set up technical committees: every senior member needs to
be consulted on every issue". Escalating tribal tone was one of the main reasons behind the
escalation of the dispute between Abdel Wahid Nur. The intensity of the conflict between the
two men can be realized through the mechanism of tribal affiliation used to rally supporters. It
is argued that Minawi’s invitation to the general conference for the SLM was a reflection of the
differences in tribal ambitions in the Darfur region. The Nour's acceptance to participate in the
sixth round of negotiations in Abuja as the legitimate representative of the movement was a
result of his concerns regarding the Zaghawa tribe, led by Minawi, and its ambitions to control
the movement. In contrast, Minnawi has announced that the negotiating team in Abuja does not
represent the movement. He and his group would not abide by any agreements which will be
reached (Raslan 2006, pp. 209-210).
The Zaghawa tribe has unlimited ambitions and is characterized as a well-organized and
coherent tribe at the political, economic, and security levels. Zaghawa rebels led by Minawi have
seen themselves as the main cause behind the victories achieved by the government against the
movement. They feel that Minni Arko Minawi works much in the field among the soldiers unlike
the movement's leader Abdel Wahid Nur, who lives in Europe, and snatches the limelight,
ascribing it to himself. Minawi was able to make a wide success of attracting support for the
movement at the local and regional levels, especially in the Zaghawa tribe which has extensions
within the State of Chad (Abdul Sattar 2010, p. 46).
In contrast, Abdul Wahid Nour has failed in this task, which has caused retreat in his leadership
position as result of his removal from the battlefield and his stay abroad in addition to other
reasons related to his relationship with external parties such as Israel (Hussain Minawi
10/11/2012). Minawi has signed a peace agreement with the government on the 5th of May,
2006, which approved the basic formula to stop the fighting in the region while Abdul Wahid
Nour refused to do so. Several gains to the signatory movements have been achieved, which is
9
considered to be a major shift in the evolution of the crisis (Arabic Strategic Report 2005 - 2006,
p. 353).
The ideological conflict
Ideologically, there are obvious dogmatic and ideological disputes between the two key armed
movements of the SLA and JEM and their leaders. Disputes over the identity and religion of the
state are significant issues, and are the key axis that agendas for the rebel movements are based
on. The backgrounds of both leaderships are entirely different. Khalil Ibrahim, the founder of
the Justice and Equality Movement, is Islamists in his approach and vision for the state and
resolving the crisis. In contrast, Abdel Wahid Nur adopts liberal and secular ideas (Abdul Sattar
2010, p. 38). Ibrahim Khalil was a senior leader in the Islamist movement between 1989 and
1999. He was also a commander in the Popular Defence Forces set up by the Inkad Revolution
which are militias popularly used by the government to suppress the south rebellion. Ibrahim
Khalil was titled at that time "the Prince of Mujahedeen in the South" (Hassan Al-Turabi
14/01/2013). After the split that occurred in the Islamic movement at the end of 1999, between
Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, Khalil joined al-Turabi. Many observers believe that the
JEM is the only military wing of the Popular Congress Party headed by Hassan al-Turabi, while
this has always been denied by Hassan al-Turabi (Hassan Al-Turabi 14/01/2013).
In contrast, Abdel Wahid Nur, the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement is a secular and a
liberal. He does not believe in Islamising the state, he opposes the ideological orientation of the
Justice and Equality Movement. The thing that is taken on Abdul Wahid Nur which destabilizes
his position and image among the Sudanese, the Arab, and Islamic nation is his declared
openness to the West and Israel, as well as his preference to the residence between European
capitals (Paris in particular) away from the battlefield (AlAzreg 2012, p. 7). This argument is
supported by Ghazi (15/01/2013). He said that Abdel Wahid Nur excited for the relationship
with the West and Israel, without limitations, with evidence that he is the only politician since
the independence of Sudan not only opens an office in Israel, but he professes and is proud of it.
This ideological difference has clearly effected the management of the crisis and the
mechanisms used by the rebel movements. It has also had a considerable impact on external
actors to determine appropriate mechanisms for handling the Darfur conflict in ways which
serve their own interests and visions regarding the end of the crisis (Al Sadiq Al Mahdi
10/01/2013). The difference in the political culture and the ideological aims is one of the most
important factors that prolonged the duration of the civil war in West Sudan. Simply because
this ideological difference had necessarily led to an important difference in the agendas of, and
the solutions offered by, these movements to end the conflict. This would allow foreign powers
and actors to intervene in the crisis by way of employing this difference in line with to their own
interests which pushed them to intervene. External state intervention in such a fashion must
lead to the exacerbation of such differences between movements and even within the
movements themselves in adopted strategies that very likely result in more obstacles to a
solution.
Personal interests of leaders and their conflict over power (positions or financial gains)
Besides the power and wealth struggle between the centre and the Darfur region, it is clear that
there is a third type of conflict which is no less significant. This conflict is between the
Darfurians themselves over political positions and financial gains. (Azzain 2009, p. 156). The
10
conflict over the narrow political gains of the tribe represented by the armed movements and
their leaders is an essential factor in prolonging the conflict. This has significantly contributed
to the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the armed movements, and repulsion between the
leadership incumbents on behalf of the province, where these divisions have come to be formed
on ethnic and tribal fundamentals. Consequently, these rifts have intensified disputes between
various movements, as well as causing fragility within them. In this situation, the central
government is forced to negotiate with multiple parties; no one of them has the ability and
influence to be the legitimate representative of the people of Darfur (Abdullah 2009, pp. 9-11).
Hussein Minawi (10/11/2012) stated that the main point of contention which led to the signing
of the Abuja Agreement with the Minawi faction is related to power-sharing. While Abdul
Wahid Nour stuck in First Deputy President of the Republic, Minawi and his team accepted the
big Assistant to the President position which was approved by the government negotiator. They
were convinced that there was no difference between the titles as the references are almost
identical, the only difference is in the label.
Of the key reasons that undoubtedly have great impact on lasting the war in Darfur for more
than ten years now is the unclear goals of the rebels, who could not agree on a common line, and
growing personal feuds and rivalries (Berg 2008, p. 28). It seems that most rebel leaders are
keen on continuing the crisis and that it is not in their interest to stop the war. This is because
they are beneficiaries in terms of the gained spoils or funding. This argument is advocated by
many of scholars and different rebel leaders such as Sadiq al-Mahdi (10/01/2013), Osman
Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013), and Bushra Omar (sited in Musa 2009, pp. 385-389). They believe
that the reason behind the splits is a sense of individual opportunism of some rebel leaders,
driven by personal ambitions and requested positions. Abdel Wahed is accused of not being
serious and has become a businessman rather than the owner of a political project. According to
some rebel leaders, Abdul Wahid collects money from the international community, friendly
countries, various international organizations, and others on behalf of the revolution in Darfur.
However, Mohamed Amer (2012), one of the JEM elements stated that this money goes to his
investments. As a result the international community has become completely unconvinced by
him. A number of other rebel leaders who have also become businessmen, also see (Musa 2009,
p. 102).
Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013) reveals that when Minawi signed the Aboja peace
agreement he took millions of dollars on behalf of the Transitional Authority in Darfur to set up
development projects in the region. During the period of 4 to 5 years during of his survival in
power, Minawi did not build a single school or development project. Rather, it was found that
the money went to investments managed by his companies abroad. In this regard Ghazi
Salahuddin (15/01/2013), the Peace Adviser of president Bashir and Chairman of the
governmental Panel for the negotiations during the period between 2008 and 2010,
underscores that What unites the armed movements in the Darfur conflict is only self-interest.
The controlled Political, moral, and humanitarian discourse is perfectly used by the rebel.
Taking advantage of ethnic contradictions in Darfur, financial destitution, and the authoritarian
aspirations of members of the armed movements has necessarily resulted in the defection of
most of those movements. Many observers such as Salah Al- Duma (09/01/2013) have noted
that the reason for these defections is the temptation of money and positions and racial rising
amid those movements. Adam Abdullah (18/01/2013) decelerated that on several occasions
during the Abuja negotiations and beyond, the government resorted to the creation of fake
11
leaders inside these movements who have achieved nothing on the battlefield. Theses rebel
leaders aim to extort money from the government, riding luxury carts and residing in luxury
hotel accommodation at the expense of the state and the funds of the Sudanese people. With the
passage of time and the continuation of the crisis, clear major differences between the main
interests either of the armed movements in Darfur or the Sudanese state have raised up.
This is has been confirmed by analysis of the internal behaviour of the parties to the crisis,
particularly the armed movements. Conflict over privileges and searching on the political and
financial gains between the leaders of the rebellion have significantly contributed to the series
of divisions within the armed factions and the outbreak of some conflicts between those groups
themself. As a result, the legitimate claims and demands of those factions, that claim legitimate
representation of Darfur, are lost. Furthermore, features and limits of the Darfur issue that
wanted to be settled no longer exist, but are replaced by finding a way to unify the movements
and their visions in the face of the Sudanese government.
Conclusions
The paper has examined the influence of the divergence in domestic combatants’ views,
attitudes, goals and interests, on the Darfur crisis duration and resolution. Moreover, it
investigated how this divergence could affect the way of external intervention as a form of crisis
management. Moreover, it investigated how this divergence could affect external intervention
as a form of crisis management. The first outcome is that the Darfur crisis is a reflection of trust
crisis among the political class in Sudan. The visions of internal parties to resolve the crisis are
completely different. The evidence seems to indicate that while the Sudanese government seeks
to employ all efforts to resolve the crisis within a national framework, rebels believe that armed
action and internationalising the issue is the best ways to achieve their goals of rebellion. It also
found that political positions of the insurgents is non-uniform. The negotiating positions of the
two main factions suffer from a significant weakness due to the lack of uniformity in their
political visions and military agendas. The SLM aims to establish a confederation (autonomy),
whereas the JEM is designed to maintain a united Sudan and the establishment of a genuine
democratic system.
Besides, the unequal political and diplomatic experiences between local parties to the conflict
have contributed to the delay in achieving a peace agreement to resolve the Darfur crisis. The
NCP controls the governmental delegation negotiating on all occasions and negotiating with
clear strategy. However, the governmental negotiation team skilfully sought to take advantage
of divergence among the rebels and profit from their lack of experience in negotiations.
Increasing divisions and continual shifting alliances of rebel groups have not assisted in making
an important progress during the negotiation with the governmental professional delegation to
end the civil war in Darfur region. Ideologically, the investigation shows that the two key rebel
groups in Darfur are also non-uniform The SLM stems from a secular reference and is often
touted as a regional movement which seeks to achieve gains for the western Sudanese region.
On the contrary, the JEM the Islamic ideological announce itself as a nationalist movement
aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state in Sudan.
The ethnic and the tribal variety of Darfur society, the multiplicity of the armed groups, the
absence of a united leadership for the rebellion as well as the intellectual collision between the
armed groups themselves have led to an emergence various strategies and a differences in the
12
goals of the internal combatants in Darfur. This has also resulted in occurring further splits in
the rebel movements emerging more armed groups of varying credibility in Darfur and other
regions of Sudan. As consequence, the gap between insights of domestically conflicted parties
regarding the best settlement to end the catastrophic situation in the region, is deepened. On
the other hand, these factors increased the complexity of the crisis and backed the
internationalisation of the Darfur issue. Meanwhile they have significantly contributed at
distracting the international community's efforts to contain the crisis in a short time.
The attitudes of international actors have been hesitant because of the lack of sufficient
guarantees to enable them to rely on a certain movement or specific person to promote the
implementation of any agreement or settlement which can be accessed with the government in
Khartoum. The contradicting between the combatants’ agendas have led the International
efforts to be an vital factor contributed to the continuation of the Darfur crisis instead of solving
it. The inconsistency in each party's agenda would force the affective external actors to adopt
different strategies and mechanisms to each other. These differences have significantly led each
of the involved parties (internal and/or external) to adopt appropriate mechanisms in order to
manage the crisis in a way that can best achieve their strategic agendas behind the intervention.
Thereby, efforts that would bring all of the parties to sit around a serious negotiation table to
reach a swift a meaningful outcome and solution are undermined. Thus, it could be concluded
that these outcomes confirm the theoretical hypothesis that has been developed to serve this
work, which argues that when external states intervene with a separate agenda in internal
armed conflicts that involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition
armed groups with independent agendas, tend to increase the ease of mounting a rebellion and
extend expected duration of civil wars rather than shorten it.
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