Civil-Military Relations in Transitions: Behavior of Exiting Senior Officers
Charles D. Allen
United States Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Presented at 24th World Congress of
International Political Science Association
Poznan, Poland
July 26, 2016
DO NOT CITE OR DISSEMINATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR
Contact [email protected]
Allen, Charles D.
Civil-Military Relations in Transitions
Civil-Military Relations in Transitions: Behavior of Exiting Senior Officers
As President Obama’s administration transitions and ends in January 2017, it will
have installed new uniformed military leadership at the most senior levels across the
Department of Defense. This includes the replacement of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Vice Chairman (VCJCS) by the end of fiscal year 2015 and
each of the service chiefs by October 2016. Over the course of the last term of the
Obama administration, these senior officers have engaged with both the executive and
legislative branches of the U.S. government in the exercise of civil-military relations. At
times, it has been contentious with the President on the development of policies and
strategies for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has also been touchy with
Congress in the face of sequestration measures based on the Budget Control Act of
2011 (BCA 2011).1
Current civil-military relations challenges in the face of strategic uncertainty and
fiscal austerity exist not only with the national military strategy but also with the ability to
execute it through readiness, force structure, and modernization of the joint force and its
service components. Understandably, there is concern on how the incoming cohort of
senior officers will fare, not only in the area of global security area, but also amid the
realm of domestic politics.2 The focus of the paper is to examine the civil-military
relations (CMR) behavior of the most senior military officers as they transition out of
their senior leadership positions and assignments and the legacy left to their
successors. Key questions to address are: Has there been a change in CMR behavior
of these leaders? Are their once privileged and private conversations now public and
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more strident? What are factors that correspond to changes in CMR behavior of senior
uniformed members? Research source materials include congressional testimony,
press conferences and media engagements, as well as news reports and journalist
accounts of statements by senior military leaders.
From the inception of the nation, our U.S. military has struggled to find the proper
balance of civil-military relations, even before there was a body of literature for it.
General George Washington as commanding general of the fledging U.S. Army
addressed its officers in Newburgh, New York to quell the Newburgh Conspiracy.3
When Congress of the Confederation debated not keeping the commitment for back pay
and pensions, officers threatened to not disband the standing army. Some proposed to
march on the capital in munity to demand their due. Washington’s March 1783 speech
at the New Windsor Cantonment reminded the officers of their professional obligation to
the civilian leaders of the nation. In his final speech as the military commander in chief
seven months later, Washington reinforced the principle of duty and subordination to the
new government and its Congress. He modeled the expected behavior by resigning his
military commission in December 1783.4
At the onset of the American Civil War, President Lincoln wrestled with two
problems. The first was finding the strategy to defeat the southern secessionists (he
refused to refer to “The Confederacy”) in order to preserve the Union. The second
would prove more daunting – to find the general who would execute such strategy and
defeat the forces of the secessionist states. For a time, that officer was General
McClelland who had served as the General-in-chief for the Union Army and then
commanded the Army of the Potomac. While President Lincoln had selected a strategy,
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McClelland in practice did not agree with it and that showed in his failure to aggressively
bring the enemy to battle. Upon his relief from command, McClellan actively challenged
the President while in uniform and even became the Democratic political rival in the
election campaign of 1864 with his platform to end the war through negotiations with the
Confederate States of America.
Arguably, General George C. Marshall is the exemplar of civil-military relations
and behavior. As Chief of Staff of the Army at the start of the Second War World until its
conclusion, he established a relationship built on confidence and trust with two
presidents—Roosevelt and Truman—as well as with Congress. While candidly blunt in
his analysis and advice to civilian leaders,5 Marshall clearly understood their authority
as established in the U.S. Constitution.6 As historian Mark Stoler titled his book,
Marshall was the “Soldier-Statesman for the American Century,” having continued his
service to the nation as Secretary of State and then Secretary of Defense.
If Marshall is the exemplar, then General Douglas MacArthur also a former Army
Chief of Staff provides the counter-example of inappropriate civil-military behavior. As
the national hero and savior of the Pacific theater in the Second World War, MacArthur
was called upon to render a miracle to stop and reverse the 1950 North Korean invasion
of South Korea as the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command and Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. When felt constrained by President Truman on the
war strategy in the theater of operations, he was dismissive of “temporary occupants of
the White House”7 who got in the way of military experts. MacArthur violated direct
guidance from the President in speaking out to the press and threatening offensive
operations against Chinese forces. After his relief from command and forced retirement,
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MacArthur held court in Congress to deliver his farewell address detailing the risks of
political indecision and presidential restraints in the Korean campaign that precluded
decisive military operations.8 Like McClelland in the prior century, MacArthur was
insubordinate toward his commander in chief and once had presidential aspirations; he
did not intend to “just fade away.”9
For military officers, the detailed examination of military campaigns and the
generals and admirals that lead them is part of their professional studies. The cases of
the four generals—Washington, McClellan, Marshall, and MacArthur—are familiar to
Army officers. Perhaps more important for their education in the profession of arms is
the study of civil-military relations. From the Second World War and Korean War
emerged the prescriptive models and theories of civil-military relations by Samuel
Huntington10 and Morris Janowitz.11 While military leaders seem to embrace
Huntington’s “principle of objective civilian control,” it is rare practice for civilian leaders
to simply assign missions, provide resources to the military, and then defer planning
and execution to military professionals. Implicit in the principle is loyalty to the
Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary Defense, demonstrated by military leaders who
“stay on message.”
The question posed by Huntington remains--“What is the proper course of
professional behavior when called before a congressional committee and invited to
criticize the President’s recommendations?”12 As challenging is Janowitz’s call for
military leaders to become political agents who exert their out-sized influence on the
national policy formulation and strategic decision making. His theory posited the
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necessity that military leaders “must make the management of an effective military force
compatible with participation in political and administrative schemes.”13
Contemporary political scientists challenge the precepts of the earlier
predominant theories. Eliot Cohen argues that, in practice for democracies, there is
subjective control of the military aligned with the principle of civilian control—what he
has coined as “an unequal dialogue” between the head of state and the most senior
uniformed military leader.14 Peter Feaver has reframed the civil-military relationship as a
principal-agent problem whereas the civilian principal leaders have limited knowledge
and expertise on the employment of military power and thus must engage and manage
their uniformed military agents.15 The management requires monitoring and taking
action to realign the behaviors of military leaders to “work” goals of civilian political
leaders rather than “shirk” for their service/military parochial interests. During the War
on Terror, the assessments of Cohen and Feaver seem more reflective of civil-military
behavior thus far in the 21st century. Accordingly, the actions of civilian leaders as
principals resulted in the forced retirements and firing of several senior military
officers.16
While Shields addresses civil-military relations theory from a public
administration perspective, her focus on three areas are informative for military
professionals, political scientists, and military sociologists. Specifically, Shields
examines, “(1) the relationship between civilian elites and military leaders; (2) military
leaders and their profession; [and] (3) military institution and society.”17 For this paper,
civilian elites are those executive branch leaders who are the civilian service chiefs and
the secretaries of defense to the President, who is the commander in chief of the U.S.
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military. Accordingly, the focal military leaders are the chiefs of the Armed Services,
including the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), the vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (VCJS), and the Chairman (CJCS), who is the principal military advisor to
the President and the Secretary of Defense. Another powerful group of civilian elites is
comprised of members of Congress, especially those from committees that provide
oversight – the Senate and House Armed Services Committees (SASC and HASC) –
and those members who are responsible for resourcing decisions through their
respective congressional Defense Appropriations Committees.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) members differ substantively from warfighting
commanders.18 Designated combatant commanders charged with developing and
executing military strategies to support national policy and security strategy in their
assigned regions and functions. Accordingly, they develop short-term perspectives on
defense issues and design theater campaign plans to support national security
interests; they have no direct roles in developing military budgets. In contrast,
JCS/Service Chiefs are responsible for the Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.)
functions for the Armed Forces. Among other responsibilities, they must man, train, and
equip forces provided to the combatant commanders. In effect, they are responsible for
the long-term health and well-being of their respective services. While the JCS
members support the short-term needs of combatant commander, they must remain
focused on mid- and long-term capabilities of U.S. military forces writ large. As the most
senior member of the JCS, the Chairman’s four roles specified in Title 10 are to assess,
advise, direct and execute, and parallel the roles of the service chiefs.
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Proper civil-military relations in DOD are enabled by dialogue, debate, and
eventual consensus in the form of best military advice that is presented by its senior
leaders—the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS—to the nation’s commander-in-chief
and chief executive, the President of the United States. The interactions between
executive branch leaders and uniformed senior officers are only two legs of the civilmilitary relations trinity. Embedded in our constitutional form of a democratic
government is the tension between the commander-in-chief’s charge to lead the armed
forces and the Congress’s responsibility to provide funds to resource our military.
Additionally, Congress has the constitutional responsibility to provide oversight of the
military through legislation.
The military leaders of the JCS have a depth and breadth of experience that is
formidable. Often with three decades of uniformed service, they have commanded
successfully at every level in either operational and/or institutional settings. Many have
served as commanders of either combatant or sub-unified commands during the War on
Terror, leaders of key organizations within their service, and in powerful staff positions
in the Pentagon. Their past performance stood scrutiny for presidential appointment
and the congressional confirmation to become members of the JCS. An explicit
consideration in their vetting is not only will they provide best military advice to the chief
executive but also convey their candid assessment to Congress, even when not in
consensus with the other joint chiefs and, importantly, when different than the president.
There have been several challenges to these two aspect of civil-military relations in the
21st century that have led historian Richard Kohn to propose six myths:19
1. “Everything is fine in the relationship”
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2. “Civil-military control is safe, sound, and inviolate—No coup, no problem”
3. “There exist a clear bright line between military and civilian responsibilities”
4. “The military in non-partisan and apolitical” and “The military is political and
politicized”
5. “There is a covenant between the military and the American people”
6. “Civilian control is understood by both sides in the relationship and the American
people”
There are a few examples that provide evidence of Kohn’s myths in the 21st
century and their associated challenges. In February 2003, Army Chief of Staff Eric
Shinseki, under direct questioning by the Senator Carl Levin of the SASC, responded
that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be needed to provide security for Iraq
following major combat operations.20 This statement was contrary to the strategy
endorsed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Though Shinseki completed his
full term as Army chief, he was effectively marginalized by Secretary Rumsfeld as
punishment for being off message. At the end of his tenure, Shinseki provided the
secretary a “Personal For” memorandum that explained the intent behind his answer
given to Senator Levin and the SASC.21 Noticeably absent from Shinseki’s retirement
ceremony, had Rumsfeld attended, he would have heard the farewell speech’s caution
to “beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division force Army,”22 challenging the
strategy-resource mismatch of the defense secretary.
Service chiefs are providers of manned, equipped, and trained forces to the
combatant commanders. Accordingly, Shinseki was a supporting service for multiple
theaters during his tenure, and importantly for that of General Tommy Franks. For the
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major combat operations of the new 21st century, General Franks headed the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) for the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003
invasion of Iraq. As a combatant commander leading the main warfighting
headquarters, Franks became frustrated with his Pentagon-based colleagues and
derided the service chiefs as “Title 10 Rear Echelon M**Fs [REMFs].”23 Regarded as a
hero following the speedy takedown of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes,
Franks retired in July 2003. During the 2004 presidential campaign, he actively
endorsed President George W. Bush at the Republican National Convention.24
While not a service chief, General David McKiernan was well respected as an
Army leader, having served as the land component commander for the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, then subsequently as the commanding general of the United States Army Europe
(USAREUR). From that position, he was charged to lead the U.S. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) effort as the Commander International Security Assistance
Forces (COMISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. As the U.S. war strategy in
Afghanistan changed under the new Obama administration, McKiernan disagreed on
how to implement it. When challenged and asked to retire quietly, McKiernan reportedly
replied, “You’re going to have to fire me.”25 He became the first U.S. general officer
fired from an active theater of war since MacArthur in Korea. In his retirement
ceremony, McKiernan’s message to military profession included, “What counts the most
are reputation and…decisions based on missions and taking care of troops and their
families.” His farewell speech acknowledged Huntington’s principle of civilian control
saying, “But, I’m a soldier and I live in a democracy and I work for political leaders. And
when my political leaders tell me, it’s time to go, I must go.”26
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JCS historian, Steven Rearden in Council of War offers that the most important
task of the CJCS is to manage civil-military relations through the transition of civilian
leadership.27 This applies to the appointment of new secretaries of defense, secretaries
of the armed services, and changes in leadership within the U.S. Congress, such as
following congressional elections when majority leadership for SASC and HASC shifts.
Notably, presidential appointees to senior defense positions and those elected to
Congress (currently less than one in five) have limited military experience and thereby
rely on the advice provided by their military experts. Arguably, trust and confidence are
extended initially to senior military leaders, and are continually tested throughout the
civil-military relationship.
As military leaders seek to provide the capability and capacity to perform
explicitly assigned missions, there continues to be a strategy-to-resource mismatch.
Accordingly, defense officials have sought to gain resources for the spectrum of
assigned missions, or relief from specific missions commensurate with the level of
resources provided by the nation in its defense budget. Accordingly, a persistent
concern of defense leaders is the requirements of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA)
that threatens cuts to defense spending by emplacing budget caps if national debt
reduction measures are not taken.28 Faced with the very real prospects of sequestration
in 2013, the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed and sent a memorandum to Congress imploring
it to pass a budget rather than emplace temporary spending measures through another
Continuing Resolution.29 While sequestration was enacted for a period in 2013,
Congress subsequently passed Bipartisan Budget Acts in 2013 and 2015 to delay
defense cuts by two-year increments. Part of the military leader engagements with
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Congress were calls to allow the military professionals to determine how defense cuts
would be applied, rather than by a non-discerning decree of legislation.
As JCS members transition out of their positions, civil-military relations can be
evaluated through a framework of not only what they do, but also how they do it.
Several forums provide an opportunity to observe civil-military relations. Pentagon press
briefings and issued statements are routine communications with recurring frequency
and set formats to share information with the American public. They are also the venues
to respond to existing crises or emerging concerns that have political or international
interest involving the U.S. military. Also common are engagements with think tanks on
policies and strategies still under development.30 These sessions are used to socialize
concepts and initiatives with civilian elites who are outside of government and active
contributors to the national security debate and policy development.
Other important forums are the service-related professional meetings and
symposiums used by senior officers to advocate on the behalf of the military. Service
Secretaries and Chiefs of Service provide keynote speeches at such gatherings to
connect with and garner support from myriad stakeholders who wield great influence
with U.S. government representatives on defense issues and the American people.31
Graduation speeches at service academies and senior level colleges (SLCs)32 also
provide a unique opportunity for senior military leaders to set expectations of newly
commissioned officers, affirm institutional values with members of the profession of
arms, and announce policy initiatives.
An additional outlet is through communications presented in official publications,
like Joint Force Quarterly (under the auspices of CJCS and the National Defense
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University), The Naval Proceedings (US Naval War College), and service-related
magazines like ARMY, which are the products of service associations. Other publication
venues are influential scholarly journals such as Orbis and Foreign Policy. Publishing in
national press, like Wall Street Journal or New York Times is likely to garner immediate
attention with the breadth of distribution.
The more formal and official civil-military venue is congressional testimony,
whether for the annual budget or oversight hearings. While routine, directed by law, and
consistent in timing, senior military leader testimonies generally reflect the military’s
corporate agreement aligned with presidential priorities as presented in the defense
portion of the federal budget request. In conjunction with the budget discussions are
readiness hearings from the Title 10 providers and updates from the combatant
commanders. Oversight hearings address functional concerns (i.e., acquisition
programs) or items of special interests to Congress, like the effectiveness of operational
strategies in a regional theater.
Of special interest and potential controversy are the farewell addresses of senior
military leaders as they transition out of their prominent positions and into retirement.
The purpose of such statements may be to reinforce current policies, strategies, and
priorities; to inform, extend awareness and compel action on an unresolved issue; to
provide a glide path to the successor; or to “clear the deck” of contentious issues for the
next service chief or chairman. The aforementioned cases of farewell addresses by
Generals George Washington, Eric Shinseki, and David McKiernan provide such
examples.
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This paper’s focus on the behavior of transitioning senior leaders starts with
materials available approximately one year prior to the leaders’ nominal release at the
end of the fiscal year in October. Thus said, there is a sequence of key events and
consistent battle-rhythm. In August, JCS members submit their service budget requests
for one year later. In October, service chiefs begin the new fiscal year with
engagements for their service associations’ annual meetings. For the following months,
services and the joint staff work the defense programming and budgeting processes
within the executive branch, which becomes part of the President’s Budget submission
to Congress in early February. March through June has the series of hearings for senior
defense officials and military officers with Congressional committees. Senior military
leader transitions are completed by change of responsibility and retirement ceremonies
in the summer months—they may be preceded by graduation speeches, final press and
media interviews, and publication of essays by the senior military leaders.
Contemporary Issues
Over the concluding term of the Obama administration, several defense issues
persist and rely on the advisement of the senior military leaders of JCS. Figure 1 lists
the last cohort, their positions, and key assignments, which serve as the foundation for
their expertise. Among the enduring defense requirements are developing an effective
National Defense Strategy supported by National Military Strategy to protect and
advance U.S. national security interests.33 Development of such strategic documents
has been of great importance with ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially
after the declared end of combat operations in those theaters. The resurgence of the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda as well as the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
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(ISIL)34 have complicated the U.S. desire to rebalance its military forces and effort to the
Pacific as outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.35 As problematic is the
messy aftermath of the promising Arab Spring and the resulting lack of effective
governance and security in the Middle East region. The complexity of the strategic
environment challenges the nation’s ability to clearly present threats and to develop
strategies with identified risks.
Officer Gen Martin Dempsey Position Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm James Winnefeld Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Raymond Odierno Chief of Staff, Army Gen Joseph Dunford Commandant, US Marine Corps Adm Jonathan Greenert Chief of Naval Operations Gen Mark Welsh Chief of Staff, Air Force Gen Frank Grass Chief of National Guard Bureau Key Assignments Army Chief of Staff Army Training and Doctrine Command US Northern Command Dir, Strategic Plans and Policy (Joint Staff) US Joint Forces Command US Forces‐Iraq Assistant to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Commandant, US Marine Corps US Marine Forces Command Vice Chief of Naval Operations US Fleet Forces Command US Pacific Command US Air Forces Europe Associate Director Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Commander, US Northern Command Deputy Director, National Guard Bureau Figure 1: Joint Chiefs of Staff positions and assignments The venue of choice for senior military leaders to go “on the record” appears to
be published articles and interviews. General Dempsey chose Joint Force Quarterly to
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convey his parting message.36 In a final interview, he sought to educate and inform
members of the profession of arms about the necessity of friction within civil-military
relations as part of national security decisionmaking for strategic-level issues.37
Dempsey embraced his role to provide the President with information and best advice
on issues that may extend beyond the military domain. As the senior military advisor, he
sought to make a compelling case for the assessment of threats, to work effectively with
other elements of the executive branch to employ the instruments of national power—
Diplomacy, Informational, Military, and Economic—to protect U.S. national security
interests. In doing so, he would suggest prioritization and recommend resourcing
requirements for defense capabilities.
In August 2015 prior to his September retirement, Admiral Greenert granted an
interview with Defense News and focused on two main points. 38 First, that
congressional difficulty with passing budgets and the resulting use of Continuing
Resolutions have adverse impact on naval readiness. Accordingly, the uncertainty of
funding for training and maintenance as well as investments for modernization would
affect not only current capacities but also future capabilities. Second, while
acknowledging the security challenges of terrorism by ISIL and Al-Qaeda, Greenert
expressed concerned about the potential threats of Russia and China that would require
strong U.S. naval capabilities to counter.
Perhaps the most contentious civil-military relationship with the executive and
legislative branches has been with Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno. In
August 2015, his commentary, “This is no time to cut the U.S. Army” appeared in The
Wall Street Journal.39 Consistent with his previous statements, Odierno identified global
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missions that require Army capabilities and the resourcing challenges that “have
brought the nation to an important inflection point.”40 An adamant advocate for Army
force structure and force manning levels to accomplish missions of the national military
strategy, Odierno stressed “[d]ecisions made in Washington…must be based on the
world as it is, and not the world as we wish it to be.”41 Those Washington decisions on
policy and military strategies are within the executive branch, and decisions on
resourcing and oversight rules reside within the legislative branch, with which Odierno
had frequent interactions. After Odierno’s retirement, Army Secretary John McHugh was
more direct in criticizing Congress at the October convention of the Association of the
U.S. Army. He spoke of the Army’s need to get “beyond budget caps, continuing
resolutions, and the uncertainty they foster.”42
In his last month of his tenure as Air Force Chief of Staff, Defense News
interviewed General Mark Welsh.43 Like Admiral Greenert, he expressed concern about
the dim prospects of a timely defense budget and the ensuing impact of the Budget
Control Act on modernization programs that would provide future capabilities to the Air
Force. While pessimistic about the stability of the federal budget process, Welsh stated
that the majority of Air Force interactions with Congress were “very positive” and that
“we don’t have to agree.”44 Moreover, like General Dempsey, he conveyed that “Our job
is to provide the best military advice we can give…I have no issue with debate and
disagreement with Congress. That is part of the system.”45
The most nuanced in transition was Marine Corps Commandant General Joseph
Dunford, who had been nominated to succeed General Dempsey as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps the most striking test of civil-military relations occurs when
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civilian policy decisions appear to challenge the core identity and directly affect mission
readiness of a service. Such was the assessment of General Dunford in his report to
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus and the recommendation to exclude women from
some combat positions within the Marine Corps.46 Dunford’s best military advice was
presented in full knowledge that Mabus would not seek an exemption for the Marine
Corps and that Secretary of Defense Ash Carter had made public statement of his
support for full gender integration of the military. When Secretary Carter announced the
decision in December 2015, Dunford as the new CJCS stated, “As the senior military
advisor and the senior uniformed member, it’s my job now to assist the secretary with
full implementation to make sure that we do it in a way that maintains our combat
effectiveness, maintains the health and welfare of our troops and takes advantage of
the talent of all the men and women that we have in uniform. So we are getting after
that now.”47
In review of the engagements by the transitioning members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, four themes emerged: requirement for military preparedness, deliver capability for
contingency, maintain the covenant with the all-volunteer force, and provide for
stewardship of the military profession.
Military Preparedness
The US military is expected to provide options to the Commander in Chief in
support of the national security interests. This necessitates preparedness over the
spectrum of conflict from peacetime engagement to sustained combat operations in war
and across the range of military operation. The military has a “non-negotiable contract
to Fight and Win the Nation’s Wars.”
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Contingency
The study of U.S. history is replete with cases un-projected military operations
and campaigns, for which in-place plans were insufficient and underlying assumptions
were invalidated. Military leaders have learned to anticipate, “When, not if” as they
devise scenarios for the employment of military force. Thus said, their military goal is to
establish dominance through overmatch in capabilities such that there are “no fair
fights.” Additionally, given that projections for the duration of conflicts have been faulty,
(i.e., Operations in Afghanistan have been one-year wars for the past 15 years since
2001), it is important to have the capacity to sustain operations over time and multiple
deployments.
Covenant
Military leaders embrace the need for responsible command48 of the service
members entrusted to their care as part of the blood and treasure the nation expends to
protect its interests. The covenant must sustain the All-Volunteer Force and well as the
military’s connection to the American society that it serves. This includes the families of
serving members and, importantly, veterans who return to civilian life in the American
society.
Stewardship
A special obligation of senior military officers is to develop new members of the
profession of arms who will maintain the trust and confidence of the nation and of its
serving members across the cohorts of uniformed and civilian personnel.
Insights
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Understandably, points of friction are inherent in civil-military relations. Friction is
evident in formal statements and unofficial leaks across agencies of the executive
branch. Friction may arise from the assessments of threats and risks by senior military
leaders that are different from those by civilian leaders. It may be the case that the “best
military advice” is considered and decisions to the contrary are made by civilian
authorities. The purpose of apparently dissenting or non-congruent statements are fourfold. First, provide pushback on current policies and strategies. Second, influence and
potentially shape the discourse on emerging policies and strategies. Third, in the
absence of clear policy guidance, press for decision. Last, advocate for resources
commensurate with missions and established priorities.
Public and scholarly discourses commonly cite the tensions in civil-military
relations and can be represented by following: Authority, Autonomy, and Accountability.
Authority is established in legal documents such as the Constitution of the United
States, Title 10, United States Code, and policy directives within the Executive Branch.
Autonomy is sought by military officers as leaders in the profession of arms in
accordance with the Huntington’s constructs of expertise, responsibility, and
corporateness that gain the deference of American society to its military. However,
authority and autonomy must come with accountability to the American people and its
elected officials. Accordingly, trust and confidence are essential elements of developing
relationships that are necessary for appropriate civil-military relations behavior.
Implications
This paper has reviewed the evolution of civil-military relations through selected
cases in U.S. history that have served as the foundation of several theories and
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frameworks (e.g., Huntington, Janowitz, Cohen, and Feaver). Through the examination
of contemporary engagements of the latest cohort of senior military leaders in the final
term of the Obama administration, their behaviors demonstrated aspects of civil-military
relations and provided themes for consideration. It is clear that, given the tensions and
the consequences of inappropriate civil-military relations behavior, continued education
is needed on “proper” civil-military relations behavior.
The JCS members examined in this paper have progressed through careers
shaped greatly by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly referred to as the
“Goldwater-Nichols Act” (GNA). Accordingly, they have served in diverse joint
assignments; have time in the Pentagon watching the interaction between senior civilian
and uniformed defense leaders; and have participated in professional development
programs that include civil-military relations. Perhaps most important, they have
witnessed contentious and problematic civil-military relations behavior in the 21st
century as conveyed in the series of books by journalist Bob Woodward and by former
defense secretaries like Rumsfeld, Gates, and Panetta.49
One should note that this is the second complete cohort of JCS officers in the
eight years of the Obama administration. They have observed the successes and
challenges of civil-military relations over periods of stress and turmoil. Arguably, they
have taken those lessons to heart. An assessment of civil-military relations expectations
from the Reagan era still seems applicable, even thirty years since the passing of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. “In keeping with their military culture, the Joint Chiefs preferred
clearly defined organizational roles and lines of authority. What they often got … were
20 Working paper Allen, Charles D.
Civil-Military Relations in Transitions
vague directives, lax assignments of authority, and contradictory behavior from the
President and his subordinates.”50
Through it all, these officers have engendered the credibility and trust of the
President based on their past performance and established relationships with civilian
leaders. While anecdotal reports of strained relations between the White House and the
Pentagon surface, the behavior of this cohort of senior military officials seems
appropriate. Vigorous discussions and exchanges support offering best military advice
to civilian leaders as they determine policy objectives and approve plans as well as
evaluate specific courses of action for strategic issues. One must remember that
President Obama selected and nominated each of these JCS officers and they were
confirmed with consent of the Senate. As such, their prior performance and reputation
established a baseline of trust and confidence with the civilian masters in the executive
and legislative branches of our governments. An example of such presidential trust is
offered by General Dempsey who shared, “….as it came around to me, I would say, ‘I
am here as your military advisor, and that is not a military issue.’ And the President
would say, ‘Yes. But you are here and I want your view on the strategic issue that has
national security implications.”51
The greatest area of contention in civil-military relations may be the interaction
between Congress in its resourcing and oversight roles, and the Pentagon as it seeks
autonomy within the expertise and jurisdictions allotted to the military profession.52
While military leaders have protected communications with their commander-in-chief,
exchanges with Congress are generally public and “on the record”, inherently political,
21 Working paper Allen, Charles D.
Civil-Military Relations in Transitions
and potentially partisan. Thus, evidence of military dissent with presidential decisions
and policies is not readily available.
Congressional hearings may have evolved in some cases to challenge
presidential policies rather than the effectiveness of military operations. The
partisanship has also extended to delays in considering presidential appointees with the
impact felt more for civilian rather than military personnel. Such a delay resulted in
former Under Secretary of Army Brad Carson withdrawing from consideration as
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) after waiting a
year for Senate approval. Additionally, the approval of Secretary of the Army Eric
Fanning took six months based on Senate hold because of presidential remarks on an
unrelated subject.
Military leaders continue to call for congressional action to pass a timely federal
budget that precludes BCA 2011 sequestration cuts and temporary spending measures
of a Continuing Resolution. They also seek authorization and appropriations for defense
programs for weapon system acquisitions as well as Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) to deal with excess infrastructure and to use federal funding more effectively.
While some scholars express concern about apparent conflicts between the Congress
and Pentagon leaders, General Dempsey offers a valuable perspective. “Our entire
system is built on the premise that we require friction to move [forward]…I would advise
future leaders that friction and disagreement in decisionmaking is not a negative…in
general the person at the table with the most persuasive arguments tends to prevail in
those environments.”53
22 Working paper Allen, Charles D.
Civil-Military Relations in Transitions
The subject of civil-military relations is nominally included in the joint and service
professional military education programs. For the Army, civil-military relations are an
important part the curriculum at the U.S. Army War College. Under the direction of
General Dempsey and Odierno during their successive tenures as Army chiefs of staff,
civil-military relations sessions are held with scholars like Feaver, Cohen, and Kohn for
the Senior Leader Seminar I (for post-Military Education Level 1 colonels) and Senior
Leader Seminar II (for newly selected and promoted brigadier generals). It is equally
important for the topic to be presented and discussed with civilian officials. These
officials develop policies, laws, and ultimately make decisions involving the use of
military force. Accordingly, education on civil-military relations should be provided to
presidential appointees, the National Security Council Staff, and, as appropriate based
on committee assignments, to members of Congress. By its very nature, civil-military
relations are necessarily dynamic and messy and thus requires monitoring and
management.
The legacy of the last cohort of JCS members has provided a foundation for their
successors. The new cohort, in turn, will select their own paths that will shape the future
of civil-military relations. Those paths have key waypoints, such as embracing the
unequal dialogue with civilians who are unchallenged in their authority and control of
America’s military. Senior military leaders have demonstrated experience, expertise,
and judgment that must be provided with candor to inform the decisions of our national
policymakers. Thus, an exchange relationship is inherent in such discourse where
senior military officers are the agents who act on the behalf of civilian principals. The
relationship must be based on trust and confidence. Consequently, the exchange is
23 Working paper Allen, Charles D.
Civil-Military Relations in Transitions
among three elements: the Chief Executive, the members of Congress, and the military
that serves the nation. While there is tension, balance is possible and essential for
proper civil-military relations.
1
Budget Control Act of 2011 Public Law 112‐25 Cong. 2011. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The New Chiefs in Town,” War on the Rocks, June 30, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/06/the‐new‐chiefs‐in‐town/ 3
Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d’Etat." William and Mary Quarterly 27 (April 1970) 2:187‐220. 4
The officers of the Continental Army sent a letter to Congress March 20, 1783 detailing their concerns. Washington Farewell Address. “Washington’s Resignation Speech (Final Draft)” December 23, 1873. Maryland’s Old Senate Chamber, http://marylandstatehouse.blogspot.com/2012/07/george‐washington‐resigns‐speech‐
returns.html 5
Mark A. Stoler. George C. Marshall: Solider‐Statesman for the American Century, Twayne: Woodbridge, CT, 1989. 6
See The Constitution of the United States of America, Article I Section 8, “The Congress shall have Power…To declare War, To raise and support Armies, …To provide and maintain a Navy.” Article II, Section 1: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Section 2. “The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into actual service of the United States.” 7
This line was offered by the main character in the film “MacArthur,” Universal Pictures, 1977. 8
“General Douglas MacArthur Farewell Address to Congress delivered 19 April 1951” American Rhetoric Top 100 Speeches, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm 9
Ibid. 10
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil‐Military Relations, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1957. 11
Morris Janowitz. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, The Free Press: New York. 1960. 12
Huntington, 416. 13
Janowitz, 418 14
Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, The Free Press: New York. 2002. 15
Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil‐Military Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2003. 16
Donald Drechsler and Charles D. Allen, “Why Senior Military Leaders Fail: And What Can We Learn From Their Mistakes,” Armed Forces Journal, July 1, 2009 http://armedforcesjournal.com/why‐senior‐military‐leaders‐fail/ ; and Charles D. Allen, “Lessons not Learned: Civil‐Military Disconnect in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal, September 1, 2011. http://armedforcesjournal.com/lessons‐not‐learned/ 17
Patricia Shields, “Civilian‐Military Relations” in Encyclopedia for Public Administration, 2016. 18
This section is from Charles D. Allen, “The Pit and the Pendulum: Civil‐Military Relations in an Age of Uncertainty,” Armed Forces Journal, May 1, 2013. http://armedforcesjournal.com/the‐pit‐and‐the‐pendulum/ 19
See “Richard Kohn on Civil‐Military Relations, posted September 16, 2013,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l8MDZCOCatw 20
“Army Chief: Force to occupy Iraq massive,” USAToday, February 25, 2003, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003‐02‐25‐iraq‐us_x.htm 21
Eric Shinseki, “Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Subject: End of Tour Memorandum,” United States Army: The Pentagon, June 10, 2003. 22
Eric Shinseki, “Farewell Address,” June 11, 2003, Ft Myer, VA, 2
24 Working paper Allen, Charles D.
Civil-Military Relations in Transitions
23
See Andrew Bacevich, “A Modern Major General,” The New Left Review 29, September/October 2004, 123‐124 review of Tommy Franks, American Soldier, 2004. 24
“Remarks by Retired General Tommy Franks to the Republican National Convention” accessed April 7, 2016 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/articles/A57264‐2004Sep2.html 25
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Pentagon Worries Led to Command Change,” The Washington Post, August 17, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/08/16/AR2009081602304.html David 26 McKiernan, “Farewell Speech,” July 15, 2009, Ft Myer, VA. 27
Steve Rearden, Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942‐1991. Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2013. 28
The BCA called for programmed reduction in defense spending of $487 billion over ten years and an additional reduction of $495 billion as motivation to address the national debt. 29
Charles D. Allen, “The Pit and the Pendulum: Civil‐Military Relations in an Age of Uncertainty,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2013, 18. 30
For example, Washington, DC‐based think tanks are the Center for A New American Security (CNAS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Brookings Institution. 31
Each component has its annual meetings and convention hosted by Association of the United States Army (AUSA), The Navy League of the United States, The Marine Corps League, the Air Force Association and the National Guard Association of the United States, respectively. 32
SLCs are the Army War College, Naval War College, Air War College, Marine War College, National War College, and Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (the latter two are part of the National Defense University). 33
Most recent documents are the 2015 National Security Strategy of the Obama Administration, the 2015 National Defense Strategy signed by defense secretary Chuck Hagel, and the 2015 National Military Strategy signed my CJCS Gen Martin Dempsey. Charles T Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014). 34
Also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh. 35
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance 36
“From the Chairman: An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey,” Joint Force Quarterly, 78, 3rd Quarter, 2015, 2‐13. 37
Ibid., 5. 38
Vago Muradian, “Interview: US Navy’s Adm. Jon Greenert,” Defense News, August 31, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy‐budget/leaders/interviews/2015/08/31/interview‐adm‐jon‐
greenert‐cno‐usnavy/71453982/ 39
Raymond T. Odierno, “This is No Time to Cut The U.S. Army,” The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/this‐is‐no‐time‐to‐cut‐the‐u‐s‐army‐1439506616 40
Ibid. 41
Ibid. 42
Kevin Baron, “The US Army’s Biggest Concern Right Now is Congress,” Defense One, October 12, 2015. http://www.defenseone.com/business/2015/10/us‐armys‐biggest‐concern‐right‐now‐congress/122730/ 43
Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force Gen. Mark Welsh Pessimistic About Defense Budget Outlook,” Defense News, June 14, 2016. 44
See video interview with Defense News Associate Editor Aaron Mehta, “Defense News TV: Gen. Mark A, Welsh USA,” June 26, 2016. http://www.defensenews.com/videos/defense‐news/tv/2016/06/26/defense‐news‐tv‐gen‐
mark‐a‐welsh‐usaf‐hacking‐against‐india/86402068/ 45
Ibid. 46
Lolita C. Baldor, “Officials: Marine Commandant recommends women be banned from some combat jobs,” Marine Times, September 19, 2015. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/09/18/officials‐
marine‐commandant‐recommends‐women‐banned‐some‐combat‐job/72421888/ 47
Jim Garamone, “Dunford Says All in Military Will Work to Fully Integrate Women,” DoD News, December 5, 2015. http://www.defense.gov/News‐Article‐View/Article/632986/dunford‐says‐all‐in‐military‐will‐work‐to‐fully‐
integrate‐women 25 Working paper Allen, Charles D.
Civil-Military Relations in Transitions
48
Elihu Root, “The Army War College, Address at the Laying of the Cornerstone, Washington, D.C., February 21, 1903,” and “The Army War College, Address at the Dedication, November 9, 1908,” in The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root (1916), collected and ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916, 121‐29. 49
See Bob Woodward, Bush at War (2003) to Obama’s War (2011) New York, NY: Simon & Schuster; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir; Robert Gates. Duty: Memories of a Secretary at War, New York, NY: Penguin, 2011; and Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace, New York, NY: Penguin, 2014 50
Reardon, Council of War, 424. 51
“From the Chairman: An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey,” 9. 52
Colton C. Campbell and David R. Auerstadt, eds, Congress and Civil‐Military Relations, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015 53
“From the Chairman: An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey,” 5. 26 Working paper